The SOFA (Status Of Forces Agreement) with Japan stipulates that the US has primary jurisdiction if the suspect was acting in official duty so it’s not likely that the navy officer will actually be charged.
In general, Japan is much more strict about charging people with negligent homicide when there is an accident in which someone dies, with a belief that offenders need to face punishment.
Two articles that shed light on what was happening (and not happening that was supposed to be happening) at the time.
Fitzgerald officer of the deck pleads guilty at court-martial
Former USS Fitzgerald Officer Pleads Guilty to Negligence Charge for Role in Collision
Between these collisions and the never ending Fat Leonard scandal, it’s a wonder the Navy is still afloat.
A Lt j.g. is one step above Ensign, right? So what was she doing being Officer of the Deck in such a complex environment in the first place?
It could be that they will ask the captain that when he gets his days in court.
On a destroyer a Ltjg who is not a qualified OOD on their ship will not make it past LT. On reserve duty as a Ensign I stood JOOD watch with the Senior Ensign as the OOD.
Was this an exaggeration? (But one also hears about overworked medical interns, etc.)
I don’t know how it’s possible to successfully work people that hard. I’ve tried to operate sleep-deprived on a few occasions: I become extremely stupid.
So it’s a basic competence, then?
Quite some time ago I was an OOD on a US Navy destroyer. It’s completely normal - indeed expected - that a LTJG will qualify as OOD underway. Not every one does, but failure to do so would indeed be seen as a meaningful shortcoming.
The articles linked by dba Fred are eye-opening: The ship was doing 20+ knots in a crowded shipping lane, and the CO was not on the bridge. Both of these are astounding, most especially the latter.
At her court martial, the OOD admitted to not calling the CO to the bridge, in violation of his standing orders. She apparently implied that this was common. But the CO must have known that the ship would be in crowded waters, and should have been on the bridge without having to be called. To be asleep in his cabin is beyond inexcusable - I’d call it impossible if it hadn’t happened.
Some further thoughts:
For the OOD to fail to call the CO to the bridge in violation of his standing orders is not different in principle from any failure to follow orders. I’d expect even a single benign case to have an extremely bad effect on that OOD’s career. I’m pretty sure if I’d done that I’d have never again been allowed on the bridge, and my next fitness report would have been beyond harsh.
For the CO to be asleep while the ship is in a busy shipping lane is a dereliction of duty roughly comparable to an airline pilot being in the passenger cabin chatting with a flight attendant while the autopilot flies the approach and landing. And the failure of the OOD to call him is no sort of defense - the response to this would be along the lines of “You should take that up with whatever officer was ultimately responsible for the OOD’s training” (which is of course the CO).
Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown… or the captain’s cap.
The OOD could easily be a LT(jg) nothing wrong with that. But I (we??) have no idea of how she was on the bridge. Had she been a commissioned Officer for 2 years, 3 years, 3 years and 11 months? Was she experienced? Not? Was she any good?
Going though those shipping lanes is hard - very, very hard going 20 knots. And I’ll concur with one thing, the CO should have been on the bridge, and if not him than the XO.
Night orders are tricky. On most ships I was on, the ship’s culture trumped the night orders. So for some OODs, the 10,000 yard notification was set in stone. For others that the CO had faith in, the CO was never called nor expected to be called. And in the shipping lanes as described, they’d be a contact under 10,000 yards all the time.
It’s always possible that a relatively junior officer fails to call the ‘boss’ because they are scared of seeming incompetent. A captain has to tread that fine line between having and showing confidence in their juniors and looking over their shoulders all the time.
If a JO is in over their head and does not call the CO that indicates that they are not going to make a good officer.
A little different because it was a merchant ship. I was a 3rd Assistant Engineer on the 12-4 watch. Having problem with the evap. It kept flashing over and contaminating the water I was making. After enough time I had to call the 1st down to show me what I was doing wrong. And it was simple. But I was not afraid to call him.
And serving reserve duty as the JOOD on a destroyer. We had a ship on the radar scope. The OOD was not plotting but depending on CIC to do the plotting. Standing orders we both were to plot any ship on radar. The CO got wind of the fact. And came to the bridge and had the OOD call his relief. And that was one ship in the area.
This. Some commands can develop poorly and people are afraid to ask questions. No one should be afraid to ask questions.
This fear can develop as people who are senior don’t want to be bothered and/or are offended if someone asks them a question. And, no one wants to offend a senior.
But, I bet the culprit here was the operational tempo and training.
At one point in my brief Navy career all my training was classroom based with labs (practicals). This then changed to using a Learning Managment System (LMS) and labs, and then just LMS, with the practical part being taken care of when one got to the ship. This resulted in a bunch of new people that no one had time to teach the basics because we were busy, and were subsequently avoided like the plague. When the experienced people left there was then a knowledge/demonstrated experience vacuum which as one can imagine caused issues.
Also, going in and out is very taxing for both self and family. Adds to stress levels and just wears you down.
Irrespective of whatever policies were in place, this sounds like bad maritime resource management by both junior and senior.
A little further digging and I found better information, the Navy report on the Fitzgerald collision (with the added bonus of the McCain collision) (Warning PDF attachment) http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=103130
The Timeline of Events fills in background I was wondering about: the Sea & Anchor Detail, CIC, why the Fitzgerald was in the Vessel Traffic Separation Scheme after midnight.
More information about the incident from below decks: https://news.usni.org/2018/05/10/uss-fitzgerald-combat-team-unaware-approaching-merchant-ship-seconds-fatal-collision
So much to digest, so many events that should have raised red flags and brought things to a screaming halt.
My conclusion: the Fitzgerald was half-deaf and half-dumb (lack of comms between the Bridge, the Combat Information Center and the Captain, lack of bridge-to-bridge comms with the Crystal) and half-blind (the CIC radar was incorrectly set to long range, 3 lookouts on the port side and none on the starboard).
Followups:
Troubling US Navy review finds widespread shortfalls in basic seamanship
A three-month internal review conducted by senior U.S. surface fleet leaders found some or significant concerns with the ship handling skills of nearly 85 percent of its junior officers, and that many struggled to react decisively to extricate their ship from danger when there was an immediate risk of collision, according to an internal message obtained by Defense News.
Yikes. That’s not good.
The misogynistic, homophobic and racist comments on the article aren’t good either. Apparently the problems in the navy would be solved at a stroke if they didn’t allow women, gays or black people on the ships.