Where do you get your paint and brushes and overalls?
More seriously, I still haven’t heard the one thing that is really needed in this sphere: a test for meaningfully distinguishing between interstate and intrastate commerce. Individual fact patters are nifty and all, but what’s the test?
So – and this is a sincere question – how does a textualist/originalist go about determining what “interstate commerce” means in the context of contemporary circumstances and contemporary legislation?
How about this (and, again, this is in response to Gaderene): That the actual product in question, the good or service being provided by the company, does not cross state lines.
Too simple?
Alternatively, were there federal laws struck down in the early days of the Republic because they were overly broad wrt to the commerce clause? Do those SCOTUS rulings shed some light on a way of thinking about limits on federal powers?
That wasn’t actually a response to my question. 
What’s inherently textualist or originalist about your test?
Why not? Interstate means going across state lines, does it not?
Yes. Whence do you infer the “actual product in question” portion of your test from text and original intent?
Because if you don’t limit it to the “actual product in question”, you get to the point where we are today-- where the word “interstate” might as well not even be there. I start with the assumption that the word is there for a purpose. If you’re defenition of that word renders the word meaningless, then your definition is no good.
It’s only when you start asking the painter if he bought his paint brushes in another state that you get to where everything can be regulated. Because then you ask him, well if you didn’t buy them in another state, maybe the bristles came from another state. Or, you say that the market for paintbrushes makes brushes made in his home state indistinguishable from out of state bushes.
But I’m open to other definitions, as long those definitions don’t logically make the word have no restraint on federal authority.
Just as long as you recognize that you’re no longer arguing from text or from intent, but from logic. And that logic, even more so than text or intent, is subject to multiple and competing reasonable interpretations.