Now serving #3... Samuel Alito

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 US 111 (1942)

Well of course. One never knows if you’ll live as long as the Gipper or as short as Tippecanoe. But I’d say the odds of Scalia serving past a theoretical second Edwards term are less than 50%.

OK.

Can you be more specific? Which laws were common in “the South” and have now been rendered null because the SCOTUS mandated the 1st amendment on the states?

I don’t recognize that song. Can you hum a few bars?

As for granola-- it’s a favorite. I’m a child of the 60s in case you didn’t know. Peace, Love, and Rock 'n Roll, baby!

A child of the 60’s? Oh, dear. Your mom…did she ever call herself “Starchild”?

I’m on your side of this discussion. I think it’s very likely Scalia, a healthy man, would serve up to and past age 80.

Is he not qualified in your eyes? Or do you object to his liberal stance on the issues?

I don’t mind his personal liberal views, and he’s certainly objectively qualified.

However, his opinions are often unwise, in that they reflect a judicial philosophy that I’d like to see marginalized or even eliminated on the Court.

For example, he was the author of Kelo v. City of New London, ruling that eminent domain could be used to forcibly take private property from people and turn it over to developers. I find that dangerous - a willingness to ignore the reasonable meaning of “public use” in favor of a more expansive view that defines public use as any purpose that the government wants. This is what comes from permitting judges to ignore the text in favor of imposing their own view of “justice”.

So in considering Alito for confirmation, objective qualifications are not enough?

No, no, no. I grew up in the 60s. My (late) parents grew up during the Depression. I’m an old fart-- not as old as you, but close. :slight_smile:

John Mace:

We’ve had this discussion before, but to the extent that originalism and textualism are different things, Scalia is more the latter than the former. His long-running dispute with Justice Breyer over the value of legislative history makes this clear. Scalia is much less concerned with what the legislators (or the Framers) intended when crafting the law than he is with what the text of the statute (or the Constitution) can plainly and reasonably be interpreted to mean.

If someone asks me if I’m a mammal or a primate, I’d say both. To the extent that those are different things, I’m more the latter than the former. But they’re not different things. I said in an earlier thread tht Scalia could be described, in the Genus species mode, as an Originalus textualensis. His goal is Originalism. His method to achieve that goal is textualism.

50 posts later. Nobody has any comments on his Doe vs. Groody opinion?

There are non-originalist textualists. There are non-textualist originalists. There are originalist textualists whose interpretation and application of originalism and textualism lead them to different conclusions, case by case, than Scalia. Just so that’s clear.

Textualism is not wholly contained within originalism, nor is it necessarily predictable and determinate.

Haven’t you read that Farber book yet? :slight_smile:

Actually there’s a new response that clarifies things. Never mind.

Are there? Can you give an example?

Agreed. There are non-primate mammals.

Certainly. It’s not a mathematical formula with only one answer.

I haven’t been able to find it. I actually tried to buy it a Borders a few months ago, but they didn’t carry it. I’ll check Amazon.

I’ll admit that I’m using Scalia’s definitions, but if there are other commonly held definitions (by legal scholars), I’d be interested in seeing them.

At any rate, this does end up being a bit of a semantic debate. Certainly no on has a copywrite on those terms. :slight_smile: It would be interesting to see someone who calls himself a textualist, but eschews originalism. Why would he adhere to the text if not to adhere to the original intent?

In another thread I pointed out that Alito’s position here puts him way out of the mainstream. Most Americans are going to find this highly objectionable. As they should.

That’s an easy one. By assigning to words their most reasonable contemporary meanings, you’re 1) providing a built-in mechanism for the evolution of circumstances past the ken of the Framers, and 2) allowing the Constitution to remain comprehensible and accessible to the greatest number of people, both meaning that large scale Article V amendment is less often necessary.

Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Amar are both non-originalist textualists, in very different ways.

You’re mixing apples and '57 Chevy Bel Airs here.

I’m saying I’d like to see John Paul Stevens retire. I’m not saying he’s unqualified. If I were a Senator and Stevens were proposed for the Court, I’d vote for him.

But if I were President, I’d never nominate him.

Why? I’m just trying to get an idea of what you base your preferences for supreme court justices on. I don’t see a great difference between criteria used for confirmation and criteria that leads you to want a justice to retire.

Based on your previous view of Steven’s wisdom and judicial philosophy, I find this surprising. Why would you vote for a nominee that does not meet your criteria for a supreme court justice?