Let me correct that to Garcia ignores relevant portions of Katz. There is no discussion of the idea that some actions in public show there is an expectation of privacy.
I think it would be illegal gambling to take you up on your offer. If we hadn’t waived the fourth amendment by talking about it in public, perhaps I’d have taken you up on it.
So far as I know, predicting the future is not a part of valid legal analysis.
In my opinion, since the supreme court has specifically left open the question for this type of activity, there is a presumption that they do not like it. When it was raised before, they could have said it has no merit instead, closing the door instead of the invitation.
They took it because there’s a circuit split between DC and every other federal circuit. If they did not take it, the law in DC would be that there is a mosaic right of privacy, and the law in the rest of the country would be that there isn’t.
I’ll bookmark the thread, post here when they overturn Jones, and see what you have to say then.
I’m not talking about granting certiorari for Jones. I’m talking about…Knotts I think it was where they invited the question.
You haven’t explained why my reasoning that Garcia is wrong, just a blanket statement of faith that it is correct. In a nutshell, Katz claims that seeking to conceal your activities in public can show a reasonable expectation of privacy. Garcia has no mention of that principle, despite facts being present that demand, if not the opposite decision, at least discussion. Instead the Garcia court-cherry picked Katz for favorable law to the outcome and ignored Katz for any unfavorable law, which does exist. Garcia also reserved the question, implying the decision might be different, of extended/mass surveillance which Garcia is not about. This you also ignore.
You haven’t addressed my argument that Oliver and Dunn show that Pinedo-Moreno is in error. These cases stand for the principle that the curtilage of a home is covered by the fourth amendment. The Pinedo-Moreno court ignores that in favor of confusion over plain view. It is certainly true that what a man purposely or knowingly exposes to the VIEW of the public while in his home is not protected by the fourth amendment. But being able to see from the street evidence of crime is not the same thing as permission to fiddle around with the curtilage of the home. Again your only argument is sweeping confidence in the decision of Pinedo-Morales. And again, Pinedo Morales does not reach to any question beyond a one-time following, and both it and Garcia are distinguished thereby.
You are exhibiting a very poor application of stare decisis.
And now you are reduced to betting and speculating that the change of the political makeup (well, that’s what I am figuring is the only real thing you could be hoping on, since you’re not applying stare decisis very well).
I wouldn’t take the chance of embarrassing myself without showing better reasoning. Bluster is about all you’ve got here, not thoughtful reasoning of each issue.
Some have expressed a lack of understanding of how the fourth amendment guarantees a right to privacy. I do not nor have ever had such a difficulty. It seems obvious to me that privacy is behind a need to guarantee that a person shall be secure in their homes, papers and effects and property.
At any rate, the following illustrates that it is part of the common law that we adopted from England. Since the fourth amendment is written in the language of the common law (as is the entire constitution) we look to the common law to understand any of the constitution’s language. The idea that the supreme court “carved out” some privacy interest that wasn’t there, or was judicially active, or made up some new point of law is ridiculous. It is apparent from Blackstone that it has been our law for some centuries. If anything the question should be, what took them so long to uphold it? Today our lawyers and jurists are so far removed from the common law, they forget it and seem surprised to hear of its principles. Parts of Blackstone’s commentaries were required reading by more than one of my professors.
“One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others, see W. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 2, ch. 1, and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.” RAKAS et al.v. ILLINOIS. 439 U.S. 128 99 S.Ct. 421 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1979).
This also explains why using GPS without probable cause or a warrant is no good. (and probable cause only cuts it if exigencies prevent the obtaining of a warrant) The owner of a car has the right to exclude all others from messing with the car. It does not matter how little they do. It does not matter if the car is in public. We all would get upset if we walk out in the morning to get in our car and found someone laying underneath tinkering away. Why? You have the right to exclude others, meaning all others, from fiddling with your property.
No. In New York v Class, an officer reached into a car to move papers that obscured the VIN number.
The dispositive question, despite your attempts to make it otherwise, starts and ends with Katz: is there a cognizeable, reasonable expectation of privacy in the undercarriage of the car?
No.
That’s it. Thanks for playing. What do we have for the runner-up, Johnny?
And what pisses me off the most about this is that after the Supreme Court rules, you’ll just shrug and blandly explain that they got it wrong. Nothing will move you from your invincible position.
You see, Bricker, there are these things called exceptions. I have no argument here with the government seeking to identify the car, it is well settled. But you can’t seem to understand differences between things like identifying the vehicle vs. attaching something to it. You can’t seem to understand the difference between looking at something and attaching something to it. And the government’s interest in identifying the car is now permission to attach things to it? How is it you cannot understand the difference? Do you really think the Supreme Court is going to be quoting Class?
Your opinion of the matter you mean. Or did I miss your appointment to the Supreme Court? For what you can see of it, No. For what you can just start fiddling with, Yes.
Let’s see…arrogance as a debate technique…hmmm…Nope, not impressive. Save it for the ruling Bricker. In the meantime explaining how an exception in the interest of identifying a car relates to attaching things to it would make more sense. But you’re the one who wants to set himself up for embarrasment by insisting the Supreme Court has to rule as you think. I’m not gonna make a claim as to what they will do.
You’ll note, if you’ll ever start thinking about it, that the Supreme Court hasn’t yet had a case where something got attached to the car. They allowed a beeper case to stand but they specifically talked about how the beeper was added before it was bought by the defendant, therefore, the government did not change anything? Remember that, Bricker?
You’ll do better if you start THINKING instead of getting pissed off that someone is here strongly challenging your crazy ideas that this is all fine and good.
Nor you yours. If I find something that is contradictory to their past precedent, and instead of overruling the just ignore it, I will be sure to point it out.
The difference between us is that I don’t think circuit court opinions are superior to the Supreme Court’s. You on the other hand think a concurrence of one judge in a circuit court case is the binding law.
But that’s the point. He has no reason not to do that, because he hasn’t argued based on what the Supreme Court thinks. It’s not his fault that you made the mistake of putting yourself where you can actually lose the argument, while he did not. He has no obligation to take a side that will mean he’ll lose if you wind up being correct.
He has the right to be a textualist or an originalist, and ignore any dicta that disagree with that. You’ve done it yourself, too, when saying you believe a decision was wrong. You have no problem saying the court made what you believed to be the wrong decision.
So his argument right now is pretty simple. You are no longer offering arguments for why your position was accurate, but throwing out ad hominems as if they mean anything. So what if he’s a slimeball for doing the above. How does that relate to whether or not you are correct?
Yes. But I have never disputed that the result is the controlling law. I can certainly say, “I would have decided this differently.” I don’t say, “The Supreme Court’s decision is unconstitutional.”
In my view, his responses when I was producing actual argument were non-responsive.