I’d like to take a crack at this, if no-one objects.
2014, in a thread about Felon Disenfranchisement. Among other arguments against it (and very few I could see in favour) was the practice of striking felons off the voter rolls tended to catch perfectly innocent citizens with similar names. Bricker’s response to this generally was what-about-isms, i.e. what about innocent people who get convicted of crimes - does objecting to felon disenfranchisement on this basis mean one wants to do away with the criminal justice system altogether?
I’m sure Bricker can present any number of precise reasons why the situations are different, but I feel confident in interpreting his opinion as (in the case of the franchise, at least), there is no practical difference between a presumption of guilt and a presumption of innocence - if a citizen is struck from the voter rolls because the government presumes guilt (and based on nothing more than the citizen’s name being similar to a known felon’s name), the onus is on the individual to demonstrate innocence (and to the satisfaction of an election official, I presume, not even a judge or jury), if he want to exercise his right to vote.
It’s of no specific relevance to the Pell case, just an observation that Bricker’s views and definitions of “the presumption of innocence” may be flexible at times. By the standards Bricker offered in that thread, Pell should be be forced to demonstrate that he is innocent. If he cannot or will not, feel free to strip away his rights.