On Atheism and Agnosticism

[erislover]

Who is rejecting faith? “Do you believe in god?” “Yes, I think God exists.” This is how people answer that question. Who is rejecting what here?

Then you are simply summarily writing out of the picture countless theists that DO make this distinction.

Well, I think you write out the other side with your bifurcation so

You can’t tell if something exists simply from what a person believes.

Well, duh. You can’t tell it from what a person knows, either. Just because I say “I know P”, P does not follow. I agree with what you say in one sense: knowledge is based on some criteria. Belief is often not (though there are uses of the word which still lend themselves to judgment by criteria). But in both cases, they assert that P is the case. In one we can give factual grounds, in another we cannot.

I believe in god, I know God… in either case, to this person, god is the case. It is just a matter of what you can expect them to say about god: heavy on the faith, or heavy on the “shaking random parts doesn’t make a clock” reasoning.

I know things that are true. I thought I knew things that were true but they turned out to be false. He knows things that are true. He believes that’s true, but it is not (note: we do not find ourselves saying “He knows its true, but its not.” This is not menat to be peculiar.) I believe that the world outside the scope of my knowledge is like this… and here like this… etc. That is, this is the world as I see, though in these instances I allow for a difference of opinion. It does not say that I somehow don’t actually think these things are the case, merely that I am willing to tolerate latitude.

[erislover]

…tolerate latitidue in others.

[Apos]

—Well, I think you write out the other side with your bifurcation so—

Other side of WHAT? What view is being ruled out?

At least flowbark felt the need to make substantive points based on semantic measures.
I can’t even tell what your problem is. You don’t seem to disagree with the character of the distinction: you speak as if you did… but then present no actual articles of disagreement.

Yes, both knowledge and lack of knowledge can lead one to affirmation of a belief. So? These are up to the person to elaborate on: they still don’t change the basic issue: whether or not they will affirm the claim (and you still don’t seem ready to acknowledge the central importance of the claim to all these definitions)

[Measure_for_Measure]

Believe me Apos, I’m fairly sure that Eris has put forward some of my difficulties with your argument. It’s just that I haven’t even been able to establish certain preliminaries with you. Or so it seems - I’m still not sure.

Furthermore, engaging in an argument about definitions usually precludes substantive debate. Personally, I usually prefer to accept the opposing side’s definitions provisionally, just so I can get on with addressing the underlying issues. Here, I haven’t been able to.

Preliminaries
Just as I can’t define atheism merely by looking it up in the dictionary (which will typically give a definition of strong atheism), so (I contend) it is invalid for Apos to mandate that “Agnosticism/gnosticism deals with whether or not the person can claim KNOWLEDGE about the validity of the god claim.” As far as I can tell, that is not the way empirical agnostics typically define themselves.

Of course there is the substantive issue about whether “Withholding judgement regarding the existence of God”, is a simple dodge. But I think I’ve defined this position reasonably, to wit: ~Believe(X) and ~(Believe(~X). At any rate, it is not answered by definitional discussions.

I see nothing wrong with Apos proposing a definitional structure and proceeding to a substantive argument. What I have a problem with is when he insists that agnosticism is thus and so, especially when this definition flies in the face of common usage. (Sort of. There is certainly some foundation for Apos’ framework.)

The Point: Definitions are tools; it’s better to address the underlying contentions than to argue about the “true” definitions or to redefine words so that the meaning of the opposition’s points are lost.

Nonpreliminaries, which I haven’t gotten to yet
There is the issue of whether Apos’ framework is reasonable. I have a few difficulties:
a) Counter-framework: Belief could be construed to be a stance towards an alleged fact: this stance is not necessarily binary.

b) Continuity difficulty: Although you can always restate a belief within a binary framework, this tends to over-simplify beliefs that are continuous. (So when belief varies by intensity, as in gambling or probabilistic contexts, you throw a great deal out at best and generate absurdities at worst.)

c) Qualitative difficulty: Although Professor Hosper takes the dictionary’s route and equates atheism with strong atheism, at least he acknowledges a variety of stances that can be held theologically. Now Apos’s 4 box grid does allow a certain variance. It would be better though, if (IMHO) the stated beliefs of the various parties formed the starting point of the analysis.

d) If you are a cognitivist or a Decision-theoretic cognitivist, belief does not arise independently of perceived knowledge. So the Apos’ key distinction between belief and knowledge is not unambiguously sharp.

A Confession
I believe I was wrong when I stated that the Infidel link proposed a different definition of atheism than the about.com link. To review, ““Weak atheism” is simple skepticism; disbelief in the existence of God.” The author then goes on to say that, "Disbelief in a proposition means that one does not believe it to be true. Not believing that something is true is not equivalent to believing that it is false; " Oops. That’s the position of Apos and About.com. So my proposed definition of soft atheism as one based on probabilities lacks foundation. I retract it, pending evidence of its use.

[Measure_for_Measure]

Some Notes

1. Some appear to claim that ~(Believe(X)) —> Believe(~X), i.e. weak atheists are actually strong atheists. I disagree.

2. There is a substantive atheist/agnostic controversy as summarized here:

*From Bill Schultz’s entry here:*C:\My Download Files\A Formal Justification of Agnosticism.htm
There has long been a trend among some strong atheists to savagely attack any who declare themselves to be agnostics. The usual mode of attack is to bifurcate the decision, claiming that if you fail to assert that God exists (and to thereby become a theist), the only other option available is to declare that you lack a belief in any God or gods, and that this is one of the accepted definitions for atheism. I have long opposed such people by asserting this argument to be a fallacious form of bifurcation. [1] Now, another carefully reasoned argument for the fallaciousness of this same argument has surfaced. This new argument is the subject of this brief essay. It argues that the rules of inference from Classical logic (meaning the logic as defined by Principia Mathematica by Whitehead and Russell) cannot be used in discourse about unexperienced truth values. As a direct consequence, the attempt at bifurcation is formally invalid.

Of course, I didn’t follow any of that. Anyway, a response to that argument is here: http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/martinag.html

3. It may make sense to separate the epistemological issues (why I believe what I do) from the theological ones (what do I believe?). At the same time, I see no need for making the latter a binary problem: just as one can say that the probability of showing a “6” on a 6-sided die (sitting under a cup on my desk) is 1/6, I could also situate myself as “doubtful, but not ruling out” or simply “not ruling out” regarding the existence of X.

Tieing the words “atheism” and “theism” to theology while associating agnosticism exclusively with epistemology may be somewhat misleading. (Though perhaps useful if the appropriate disclaimers are provided).

[Measure_for_Measure]

Great. Bill Schultz link: http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/bill_schultz/justified.html

[Measure_for_Measure]

b]Apos**: ------Either you are willing to affirm the truth of god’s existence, or you are not. Why you do, and what your threshold is for whatever epistemology might underlie your thinking (and there might NOT be one!!!) is your own business, and doesn’t enter into atheism anymore than it enters into theism.

Ok.

1. Affirm truth-value of (X exists) - Theist.
2. Not affirm truth-value of (X exists) - Weak Atheist & Strong Atheist & Agnostic
3. Affirm truth-value of (X does not exist) - Strong Atheist, but not Weak Atheist and not Agnostic

Agnostic:
Not affirm truth-value of (X exists)
and
Not affirm truth-value of (X does not exist)

Within this framework, I would list agnosticism between 1 and 2.

In practice, I suspect that many may switch among some of these categories, depending upon their mood.

[Measure_for_Measure]

:smack: I just proved Apos’s point. Since we can’t have that, let me try again.

One Look:

If, according to Apos, Weak atheists will

1. ~(Affirm truth-value that X exists) (Not theists)
   AND
2. ~(Affirm truth-value that X does not exist) (Not strong atheists)

THEN, according to this definitional system there is nothing that distinguishes Weak Atheists from agnostics. I’m not sure if Apos will accept #2 as part of the definition of Weak Atheism though. If not, then 1&2 together could define agnosticm.

---

Look #2:

Alternatively, we could say:

1. Theist: Affirms truth-value of X-exists

Agnostic
2a Not affirm truth-value of X exists
2b Not affirm truth-value of X not exist
2c Rejects truth-value that X exists
2d Rejects truth-value that X not exist

Weak Atheist
3a Not affirm truth-value of X exists
3b Not affirm truth-value of X not exist [Is this the case?]

Strong Atheist
4 Affirms truth-value of X not exist

I speculate that Apos might consider 2c and 2d to be epistemologic statements. Indeed, he appears to retain them and eliminate 2a and 2b altogether. I’m not clear on why rejecting something is a matter of epistemology while accepting it is a matter of belief.

[Nightime]

You say that the point of distinguishing one group from another is to “note what each will concede in a discussion.” “Do you take A to be true? Or does it need to be proven to you?” This is simply incorrect. Just because someone currently accepts A to be true does not mean that they will be willing to accept it as a premise in a given discussion. It is equivalent to the scientific method. Beliefs can be constantly tested and strengthened by not allowing them to be used as a premise. What of people who believe in god provisionally, pending the arguments in their next discussion? Also, what if someone forgets why they believe in god? They may not be willing to use god’s existence as a premise, but they still believe. Your definitions, and the justification behind them, misrepresent the nature of belief, and deny the most common types of belief.

are they willing to grant the existence of god a true? Are they willing to take the AFFIRMATIVE step?

As I have just shown, this is a bad definition for theism. As such, any definition of atheism based on this definition is also bad.

[Apos]

Flow, (X exists) is not the same claim as (X does not exist). That’s why, on the first order of definition, I don’t use (X does not exist) as a distinguishing feature. Why? Because it is the positive claim that’s important here: the definition of theist came before the definition of atheist (since “atheist” is simply the outgroup created by theists). That someone believes that there are no gods is not directly relevant to the question of whether they believe IN god or not: it is, rather, one possible detail of the “no” answer.

Again: agnostics are not “between” anything: they can be characterizations of either theists, “weak” atheists, or even strong atheists (I don’t know whether god exists or not, but I refuse to believe it!). This is, of course, assuming that you are still using “agnostic” in the sense of knowledge, theism in the sense of belief. If you reject that division, fine, but you are most certainly violating the philosophical meaning of those words. Regardless, you still end up with agnostics being just another word for weak atheists: so what? We can’t have two words describing th same thing?

—I speculate that Apos might consider 2c and 2d to be epistemologic statements. Indeed, he appears to retain them and eliminate 2a and 2b altogether.—

Nonsense: 2c and 2d aren’t characteristics of any agnostics I’ve ever met. Indeed, they seem to violate your own previous position! What’s going on here?

—Indeed, he appears to retain them and eliminate 2a and 2b altogether. I’m not clear on why rejecting something is a matter of epistemology while accepting it is a matter of belief.—

We aren’t ever talking directly about epistemology here: we are talking purely about the people involved.

I think your problem remains that you wish to find some sort fo mangled structure in which agnosticism and atheism/theism are exclusive. I think this effort is doomed to fail, even if only on the matter of common usage. There are tons and tons of atheists who also claim to be agnostics, and tons of theists who claim to be agnostic as to god’s existence.

I still also point out that your structure treats all these mangled definitions as if they were one the same scale of distinction, despite the fact that they deal with at least two different claims!

[erislover]

Yes, both knowledge and lack of knowledge can lead one to affirmation of a belief.

Uh, no. the distinction between belief and knowledge is an epistemological one. That’s kind of the point that separates them. I am not clear how else to use the word “belief” that doesn’t make epistemological and ontological assertions.

“I believe X” states X exists [this person would say X exists if asked] and though they can offer [perhaps] some guides as to why they think that, the matter is open for flexibility even if not discussion [they can tolerate that you might not believe that].

“I believe ~X” states ~X exists (X is not the case, more appropriately, or that X doesn’t exist) and though they can offer [perhaps] some guides as to why they think that, the matter is open for flexibility even if not discussion [they can tolerate that you might not believe that].

“I know X” states X exists and you are free to question the extent to which they can prove this.

“I know ~X” states X does not exist and you are free to question the extent to which they can prove this.

“I don’t believe X” states, to me, a form of disbelief: a belief (or possibly knowledge) of the opposite, ie- “I believe ~X”. Consider cases where this is used to show incredulity: this is not, I think, accidental. But it also states, to me, a form of un-belief. “I don’t believe in God” can be an affirmation of (~belief), or it can be a rejection of being forced to have beliefs about (X). The case for this is ambiguous except in the context of a conversation.

“I don’t know X” is, in almost all I cases I can imagine, a statement where nothing can be said about X, unless it is then followed by statements about belief (“I don’t know god exists, but I believe that etc…”).

Atheism is not a distinction based on belief. Since this is the case, you cannot come to atheism by making distinctions about belief. You recognize this yourself by stating that [paraphrase] “we usually don’t define things like this.” Of course.

“Do you have a belief in a god or gods?” If they answer yes, I agree, they are a theist. If they answer no, we don’t know anything yet.

[Apos]

—You say that the point of distinguishing one group from another is to “note what each will concede in a discussion.” “Do you take A to be true? Or does it need to be proven to you?” This is simply incorrect. Just because someone currently accepts A to be true does not mean that they will be willing to accept it as a premise in a given discussion.—

We aren’t just talking about any sort of discussion, but rather one based on what a person actually believes is true. I mean, if these terms are not going to be, at some point, based on people’s actual beliefs, then I throw up my hands: you’ve flabbergasted me. I don’t know what to say.

I mean, seriously, if we take you at your word here, then we might as well not define anyone in the first place. Anyone can argue anything at any time for the sake of arguement. I guess Paul Tillich was right: atheists are the only true theists, black is white, and god disappears in a puff of logic which only confirms his omnipresent reality.

—What of people who believe in god provisionally, pending the arguments in their next discussion?----

What about them? I do this all the time when I consider the framework of other people’s claims about god. This doesn’t change the fact that I am an atheist, and that I don’t believe in any gods.

—Also, what if someone forgets why they believe in god? They may not be willing to use god’s existence as a premise, but they still believe.—

Also, what if anyone does anything?
But wait a minute: how can someone both believe something is true, and not believe that it is true? We’re not talking about just any old premise in any old arguement: but rather what people actually think is true.

—Your definitions, and the justification behind them, misrepresent the nature of belief, and deny the most common types of belief.—

Perhaps you’d like to make a ghost of a case as to how, instead of just saying it? What is a belief in god other than someone who affirms that god exists?

—As I have just shown, this is a bad definition for theism. As such, any definition of atheism based on this definition is also bad.—

Please, tell me more of this glorious world in which theists don’t believe in god. Good grief!

[Apos]

—Atheism is not a distinction based on belief. Since this is the case, you cannot come to atheism by making distinctions about belief.—

How could a word that means “without god belief/s” NOT be a distinction based on belief?

You do not “come” to atheism at all. It isn’t a positive position. It’s a default position. Babies are atheists, under my definition, for the very reason that they don’t have any beliefs at all (including god beliefs). If you recoil at that application of the definition, then I would suggest you examine your thinking: because you’re probably recoiling because of your previous connotations of the definition, not because of my usage.

—You recognize this yourself by stating that [paraphrase] “we usually don’t define things like this.” Of course.—

But we do sometimes. Amoral. Asymetrical. Civilian. Sometimes, what’s important is not what a person is, but what they aren’t. This is just such a case. The vast majority of people on this earth are theists. Some of us are not: but that doesn’t mean that all of us non-theists have anything in common either.

—“Do you have a belief in a god or gods?” If they answer yes, I agree, they are a theist. If they answer no, we don’t know anything yet.—

At least you’re one up on Nightime: you agree that theists believe in god!

But the second half of your claim is sort of odd for this discussion. This is an arguement about the most useful sorts of definition. If you simply want to presume that your definition is correct, who cares? I define “atheist” as “not being a theist.” You, obviously, object to this sort of definition. That’s fine: but it’s just sort of goofy to argue that lacking belief “we don’t know anything yet” when that’s EXACTLY WHAT DISTINCTION I USE TO DEFINE ATHEISM. Again, perhaps you don’t think this is how “atheism” should be defined, but at least acknowledge that this IS the definition I’m arguing for! I’ve said over and over that knowing that someone is an “atheist” tells you precisely nothing about what they are: it simply tells you one thing they are not (a theist).

[erislover]

A distinction based on beliefs is a positive distinction, Apos. That’s the problem I’m having with your bifurcation.

[Apos]

—A distinction based on beliefs is a positive distinction, Apos. That’s the problem I’m having with your bifurcation.—

The prescence or abscence of a particular belief. To note that something lacks a characteristic (like god belief) is a negative definition, if anything is.

[erislover]

Well, I think we’re back a page now arguing whether “don’t believe” means [etc]… If a debate reaches an oscillation point, I am wary of adding anything more. But.

“Do you have a belief in god?” This sounds correct. Answer yes: “Sure, I believe in God.” Comment: people do not usually consider that they “have” beliefs, they simply believe.

Answer no: “No, I don’t have a belief in God.”
Answer no: “No, I have no belief in God.”

Which one was phrased correctly for you?

Anyway, I think we fundamentally view of belief, and use the word “belief”, altogether differently. As I’ve ever used it, the opposite of a belief is the belief of the opposite, not a “lack of” belief.

To note that something lacks a characteristic (like god belief) is a negative definition, if anything is.

Atheism and theism are not on logical sides here. There is no question you can ask to seperate the two logically. If there were they would be opposites, and you could get a definition [positive] of atheism from negating theism [positive], and you can get a definition [positive] of theism from negating atheism. As this is not the case, you are incorrect to attempt to divide the two based on a single exclusive-or distinction.

[Apos]

—Answer no: “No, I don’t have a belief in God.”
Answer no: “No, I have no belief in God.”
Which one was phrased correctly for you?—

You’re missing the point. Both are phrased “correctly.” Lots of other things are possible. Neither theism nor atheism delimit a single set of proper possible details: the scope of the original definitions is very small: the details can come later.

—As I’ve ever used it, the opposite of a belief is the belief of the opposite, not a “lack of” belief.—

Uh, so what? What does that has to do with defining theism and atheism?

—Atheism and theism are not on logical sides here. There is no question you can ask to seperate the two logically. If there were they would be opposites, and you could get a definition [positive] of atheism from negating theism [positive], and you can get a definition [positive] of theism from negating atheism. As this is not the case, you are incorrect to attempt to divide the two based on a single exclusive-or distinction.—

I’m having a hard time sorting through the jumble of non-sequitur here. Back up: do you agree with my account of what a negative definition is, and that MY take on atheism is a negative definition?

As to your new claim: so what if you think atheism should be whatever you think an “opposite” of theism is? That’s not the point. This discussion is about definitions, which are not, at base, necessarily anything other than what people say they are.

But that’s granting too much to begin with. I don’t really even understand what your arguement is here. Are you agreeing with me or disagreeing? Based on what? Your own assumption about what the words should mean?

[erislover]

[list=1][li]Atheism requires a negative definition[/li][li]Theism requires a positive definition[/li][li]The opposite of a positive definition is a positive definition[/li][li]An either-or distinction seperates opposites[/li][li]Thus a single either-or distinction will not properly indicate whether a person is an atheist or a theist[/list=1][/li]I find your definition of an atheist as someone who lacks belief in gods to be standard. I find, as ever, a problem with the method you are attempting to use to present this distinction.

[Nightime]

We aren’t just talking about any sort of discussion, but rather one based on what a person actually believes is true. I mean, if these terms are not going to be, at some point, based on people’s actual beliefs, then I throw up my hands: you’ve flabbergasted me. I don’t know what to say.

Of course the terms are based on beliefs. The problem is, belief is not the black or white issue you present it as. I find the idea that the theist/atheist distinction is based on one’s position in a discussion to be wrong.

Consider a person who, for the purposes of their actions, accepts that god exists. When making a personal decision, they are influenced by this belief.

Now that same person, in a discussion, may not accept as a given that god exists. In fact, for the purpose of describing reality, they may not accept that god exists.

Granted, you may be unaware that there are people who make such distinctions between their beliefs, and you may not make such distinctions yourself, but that does mean that such distinctions are universally unimportant. I think if someone accepts that god exists for the purpose of making moral choices, but does not accept that god exists for the purpose of describing reality, they are still a theist, but your definitions preclude this possibility. In essence, this person both believes in god and does not believe in god, and does not fit in your narrow categories, but only because there are different types of belief!

I guess Paul Tillich was right: atheists are the only true theists, black is white, and god disappears in a puff of logic which only confirms his omnipresent reality.

Perhaps we could avoid the conclusion that black is white if we did not deny the existence of grey.

What about them? I do this all the time when I consider the framework of other people’s claims about god. This doesn’t change the fact that I am an atheist, and that I don’t believe in any gods.

So provisional belief doesn’t count as belief? Why do you get to decide what kind of beliefs are important? For someone who believes it is possible that the universe itself doesn’t exist, almost all beliefs would be provisional. So, they have no meaningful beliefs because you say so? I think if someone believes in god provisionally, waiting to see if the universe itself even exists, they are a theist. Again, this just shows that belief is not a black or white issue.

But wait a minute: how can someone both believe something is true, and not believe that it is true? We’re not talking about just any old premise in any old arguement: but rather what people actually think is true.

Why are we talking about what people think is true, rather than what they accept as true for the purpose of making decisions? If someone believes god is merely reasonably likely, and yet accepts his existence for the purpose of making all their decisions, I would call them a theist. And, more importantly, they would call themselves a theist.

Perhaps you’d like to make a ghost of a case as to how, instead of just saying it? What is a belief in god other than someone who affirms that god exists?

I don’t think we should be talking about “a belief” at all. We should be talking about “belief.” I don’t know any theist who would describe themselves as having a belief in god, rather than as believing in god. They might accept the existence of god for some purposes but not others. Affirming that god exists in a discussion might not be one of the purposes for which they accept god’s existence.

Please, tell me more of this glorious world in which theists don’t believe in god. Good grief!

I could go on about different types of belief, extent of belief, etc., but clearly you are determined to make belief a black or white issue.

[Apos]

—Atheism requires a negative definition—

No. I define atheism by using a negative definition. Some people (like flowbark) don’t. They aren’t “wrong” for not doing so. There is no “requirement” for what “atheism” should be defined as: we are discussing what we think is the best definition (using a pretty loose set of subjective estimations as to what makes a good definition).

—Theism requires a positive definition—

No. It’s just that most everyone DOES define theism by using a positive distinction.

—The opposite of a positive definition is a positive definition—

In some people’s estimation. It’s not clear what this really means: what’s the opposite of the distinction “car”? An “anti-matter car”?

—An either-or distinction seperates opposites—

So what? Why is it necessary that we be defining opposites?

My definitional scheme isn’t about opposites, it’s about being exhaustive in regards to the truth of the god claim.

—Thus a single either-or distinction will not properly indicate whether a person is an atheist or a theist—

Uh, why not? Your arguement isn’t making much sense. A single distinction DOES properly indicate atheist vs. theist, as I have defined it! You might argue, with flowbark, that atheist should mean something else than I say it should, but that’s a different arguement.