Bone: I’m not so hung up on terms, as long as all parties understand them. When you initially said authoritarianism, I mistakenly thought about this guy FWIW.
How do you reply to John Stuart Mill’s point? Specifically, the government needs some sort of revenue to pay for its bombs and missiles. Why is it preferable to tax labor and savings as opposed to alcohol, tobacco, [del]firearms[/del], [del]sugar[/del], [del]Brussels sprouts[/del], and pr0n? Provided that the tax is set at the tax revenue maximizing point or below.
There’s a tax complexity argument against Mill’s point, but that seems easily alleviated in practice or at least addressed.
The Economist’s take is that illegal drugs should be decriminalized, taxed and discouraged. I’m mentioning this as they are somewhat supportive of abstract and esoteric appeals to liberty. (Informed skeptical take here).
Reference: JS Mill citation, public domain: [INDENT][INDENT][INDENT][INDENT][INDENT] A further question is, whether the State, while it permits, should nevertheless indirectly discourage conduct which it deems contrary to the best interests of the agent; whether, for example, it should take measures to render the means of drunkenness more costly, or add to the difficulty of procuring them by limiting the number of the places of sale. On this as on most other practical questions, many distinctions require to be made. To tax stimulants for the sole purpose of making them more difficult to be obtained, is a measure differing only in degree from their entire prohibition; and would be justifiable only if that were justifiable. Every increase of cost is a prohibition, to those whose means do not come up to the augmented price; and to those who do, it is a penalty laid on them for gratifying a particular taste. Their choice of pleasures, and their mode of expending their income, after satisfying their legal and moral obligations to the State and to individuals, are their own concern, and must rest with their own judgment.
These considerations may seem at first sight to condemn the selection of stimulants as special subjects of taxation for purposes of revenue. But it must be remembered that taxation for fiscal purposes is absolutely inevitable; that in most countries it is necessary that a considerable part of that taxation should be indirect; that the State, therefore, cannot help imposing penalties, which to some persons may be prohibitory, on the use of some articles of consumption. It is hence the duty of the State to consider, in the imposition of taxes, what commodities the consumers can best spare; and à fortiori, to select in preference those of which it deems the use, beyond a very moderate quantity, to be positively injurious. Taxation, therefore, of stimulants, up to the point which produces the largest amount of revenue (supposing that the State needs all the revenue which it yields) is not only admissible, but to be approved of. [/INDENT][/INDENT][/INDENT][/INDENT][/INDENT]
If you want a cite that’s the Tiebout model.
More generally, this is an application of the Coase theorem (which is more of a conjecture actually). If transactions costs are nil, it doesn’t matter if you give the individual a right to clean water or the industry the right to dump swill in the well. Either way, an agreement can be reached to obtain the optimal solution (X amount of sludge, but not more). That doesn’t imply that markets are perfect. Rather it implies (according to one view) that rules should set to minimize transactions costs: in this case regulating the pollution is superior to having the courts sort through pollution damages of each valley resident or worse deciding which resident pays how much to bribe the capitalist to install better equipment. In other contexts, one might assign property rights elsewhere. I’ve heard that in some jurisdictions you can legally to sell soda pop in buckets, regardless of the resulting health costs.