Let me add a little more rigor to my thesis (and bump this thread while we’re at it).
We are considering the metaphysics of debate on social value.
Such debate falls within the realm of logic. To do so, constructions must follow the rules of propositional calculus. Additional, the set of axioms (whether individual or by schema) we use to generate constructions must not lead to internal contradiction. If we find we can construct a contradiction, we must add, remove or change an axiom to prevent that construction.
Additionally, the aethethic guidelines of simplicity and clarity apply. If two axiom sets provide different conclusions to the same proposition, we should give more weight to the simpler set and the set with fewer ad hoc axioms.
Debate on social value also must accept the restrictions of empricial science. Any theory of value which contradicts ordinary objective experience, either in its assumptions or its predictions, must be held as false. Note that such contradiction does not necessarily invalidate each part of the theory; the theory may be amended to remove the contradiction.
The above restrictions are necessary, but are not sufficient. It is still possible to formulate two theories of value that each fulfill the above conditions but seem to contradict one another. We cannot tolerate such a contradiction, especially in the matter of law; as a single society, we have one law based on one set of values.
To determine whether a particular value should fall in the realm of law, and what that law should specify, we need to add a primary factual basis: a set of facts that has immediate relevance to theories in this domain.
We could accept as primary fact the meaning of the text of a specific body of religion or philosophy. However, in almost all industrialized Western countries, we have specifically excluded considering the meaning of a particular religious or secular text factually relevant to debate on social value. In other words, a contradiction between the meaning of the text of the Christian Bible (for instance) and a particular value is specifically held irrelevant to the domain of secular social value.
Such a claim of irrelevancy does not itself contradict the strictures of emprical science. An empirical claim that the physical text does not exist would be in obvious error; the meaning of the text, however, itself interpretive and (in a secular sense) conditional, need not be considered a primary fact of observation.
(1) I submit that the existence of individual preference and the commonality of such preferences form a body of objectively determinable fact using which we can test theories of value in an empirical manner.
(2) I also submit that the historical or scientifically predictable consequences of the implementation of a policy based on social value also form a body of objectively determinable fact.
(3) While by definition a logical and rational individual cannot hold mutually contradictory preferences, it is certainly possible for an individual or group to hold a preference in contradiction to anothers’. I submit that we can formulate a decision procedure to use all the individuals’ relative weights to consistently either determine the dominant preference or exclude both preferences from the realm of objectively determinable value.
(4) I submit that all useful debate about social value in a secular society falls withing one of the three previous stipulations: establishing relative preference, making scientific preditions about the consequences of a policy based on those preferences, and formulating a decision procedure to weigh values in conflict.
The third stipulation is obviously speculative and most open to challenge. One, two and fource, because of their precise formulation, will fall to a single counterexample.
I am disappointed that Jodi and UncleBeer, having heavily criticized my thesis in other threads, have so far chosen not to comment when I have exposed my propositions to direct debate without the necessity of hijacking a topical thread.