There are many reasons why a public trial of these terrorists is objectionable.
As I’m sure you’re all aware, gathering intelligence is a secretive business. If we have public trials in which we present the evidence against these terrorists, the presentation of evidence may necessarily give away the source of that information. For example, if our information comes from an operative or informant placed within the terrorist cell, we can’t really expect to be able to use him after he has appeared and presented evidence at trial; his cover will certainly be blown. The same goes for tapped phone lines, intercepted emails, bugged conversations, etc. Any time we publicize the fact that we have knowledge of certain information, the terrorists will no longer use those phone lines or emails, or they’ll change the manner in which they’re communicating sensitive information. That means we won’t be able to tap into those information sources any more.
Thus, by using the intelligence we’ve gathered as evidence in a public trial, we’re drying up the sources of information. Every time we publicize the information gathered, it becomes more difficult to predict terrorist strikes and thereby prevent their occurence. The choice becomes:
- try the individual and give up our sources of intelligence, thereby decreasing the likelihood that we’ll be able to prevent future terrorist acts;
- let the individual go, thereby increasing his ability to continue the goals of the terrorist network and increasing the likelihood of future attacks; or
- hold him indefinitely until our intelligence is compromised through other means or becomes outdated, and try or release him at that point.
In this way, trying the suspect and protecting the American people are mutually exclusive. Option 3 is not without its costs. But as I’ve stated over and over, I think that if option 3 is used only sparingly, then the costs of not trying the potential terrorist are vastly outweighed by the benefits.
Another reason is that enemy combatants might not be strictly violating domestic laws. For example, even if the FBI hears Joe McTerrrorist talking with Osama bin Laden about planting a bomb in the Mall of America, he hasn’t committed a crime until he actually takes a step toward enacting his scheme (i.e., acquiring bomb-making materials, etc.). Thus, despite knowing that he’s planning to kill civilians and has the money and ability to make and plant a bomb, the FBI would not be able to arrest him and charge him with a violation of American law.
But should the government be forced to wait until he’s actually bought explosive materials and started constructing the bomb before they arrest and detain him? Under international law (specifically, the EC/UC doctrine), the government doesn’t have to wait. He’s just shown himself to be engaged in acts of sabatoge on behalf of an enemy agent that removes him from the protections of the Geneva Convention, and makes him subject to detention as an EC/UC. I think that’s a good thing, and I find the alternative – that people that consider themselves at war with the US can’t be detained under the rules of war – very scary.
These type of detentions are not ony important for keeping terrorists from bringing their plans to fruition and keeping our intelligence sources secret, but for gathering intelligence. It’s much easier to get information from Joe McTerrorist if we can keep him in custody, and if he believes that we can keep him in a military brig for as long as we want until he talks.
Perhaps most importantly, we should be allowed to detain terrorists for indefinite periods because we want to win, and because the law says we can do it. Why should we make preventing terrorist attacks more difficult than it already is? If the law is on our side, we should use it.
There are others, but these are just a few off the top of my head.