There’s that simulation-thingy again, and so I’ll have to ask again whether that’s actually a good model for ‘existence outside of space and time’. As I argued before, the simulated universe plays the role of an embedded space, like the spherical surface I used in my previous post, or like Lineland, which Frylock brought up. An existence within the larger space then is not anything more surprising than an existence not limited to the sphere, and for all problems supernatural concepts have in our space, they have them in the larger space, as well; we can easily expand our notion of universe to encompass the whole of that larger space, and then ask the same question again: Is existence outside of this space possible?
If, now, this space turns out to be itself just embedded within some other space, then we can do the same dance again, and again end up back at square one; things only become interesting (and the question, in turn, only worth asking) when we are presented with a space that’s not embedded within another. Is some form of outside (or transcendent) existence possible then? Thus, in using the simulation argument, one essentially presumes an ‘embedded space’ kind of scenario for our universe; outside existence is then trivially possible, and the question ceases to be of any real interest.
Or, in other words, the creator in his mom’s basement would not be god, though he may well have godlike abilities relative to us; god, in any meaningful way, might be his creator, instead. Similarly, you would not call an alien with extremely advanced technological means, who is seemingly capable of performing magical feats, a true magician, I presume. Both the ideas of godliness and magic need an essentially supernatural element, it seems to me, which beings from some space that simply encompasses ours – there being perfectly natural existences, and their seemingly godlike powers just being a consequence of their nature – lack; their godliness thus would simply be a consequence of our ignorance of the embedded nature of the space we inhabit. No, I think the question of outside existence only becomes meaningful once you assume that there exists some space that is not itself embedded within another space (not necessarily ours, though).
That even reasoning about the relevant concepts without assuming some form of embeddedness becomes difficult to impossible only speaks to the inconsistency of the notion, I think.
That’s how it seems to me, as well. Consider a universe made up of a few balls on green felt; this universe certainly has an outside, and that outside has influences on the balls – it sets them in motion, causes them to collide, which sends some of them into deep, black holes, etc. But the outside beings have to use a special means – a long, wooden stick --, which has to at least in part enter the universe, to exert any influence on the balls, and they can’t make them move without it.
It works similarly in our universe; if god doesn’t at least partially exist within it, there’s nothing here to make the balls move. The problem is, that if something partially exists within the universe, it must exist totally within the universe; that’s why we don’t generally limit our universe to billiard tables, but describe everything external to them as part of it, as well.
The reason for that is something like: if something only consists of one part, and exerts influence on something within this universe, then, since a part must exist within the universe, the one part that wholly makes up that thing must exist within the universe; if something consists of multiple parts and exerts influence upon something within the universe, then at least the part that exerts influence must exist within the universe; but then, every part of the whole something that exerts any influence on the part that exerts influence on something within the universe exerts itself influence on something within the universe, and thus must exist within the universe; and so on, until every part of this something is shown to exist within the universe (for if there is a part that does not exert any influence on some part connected to the universe by a chain of influences, it cannot be thought of as being part of a connected whole, and thus, is not actually part of the thing in the first place).