Parliamentary yelling

[Huerta88]

@AK84

In the UK there is absolutly no requirement for the Government to resign if it loses any vote. There is a convention which says that a government must have the confidence of the lower house (arising from Sir Robert Peels’ failure to govern without the confidence of the House in the 1830’s). That is why it is a convention that the government must resign if it loses a vote on something that is part of their main agenda; if they lose clearly they no longer have the confidence of the house.

It is much more complicated than that of course, there may be a vote on a particular clause for instance, losing that vote may not be fatal, losing the vote on the basic structure of the bill will be.

Right, I knew it had never been formal, but losing a big vote was as a practical matter a guarantee you’d have to resign. I <thought> that they had in recent decades arrived at a reformulation of that tradition whereby the Gov’t would on rare occasions formally say “this is a matter of confidence,” thereby affirmatively signalling that they’d be stepping down for sure if they lost. Of course, as Brown is now potentially finding out, you don’t have to lose a vote in the House to lose de facto, and perhaps any, support from your constituency in a way that could make you abdicate.

[Really_Not_All_That_Bright]

@Huerta88

Of course, as Brown is now potentially finding out, you don’t have to lose a vote in the House to lose de facto, and perhaps any, support from your constituency in a way that could make you abdicate.

Nitpick: abdication is what monarchs do. Governments dissolve.

[Mk_VII]

@Huerta88

you don’t have to lose a vote in the House to lose de facto, and perhaps any, support from your constituency in a way that could make you abdicate.

Chamberlain won the Norway debate in May 1940 - but the numbers of his own coalition (Tory and National Liberal) who voted against, or abstained, meant that he felt unable to carry on.
William Pitt the Younger lost votes in the House repeatedly, but still carried on.

[Elendil_s_Heir]

@Koxinga

I suspect the right hon. Gentleman Mr. Bright was “tired” when he wrote that.

Hmmm. Perhaps he was even “tired and emotional”: Tired and emotional - Wikipedia

May I recommend Jeffrey Archer’s political novel First Among Equals for a fascinating look at the House of Commons from the 1960s through the early 1990s. It follows three (four, in the British edition) rivals as they rise through politics to eventually vie to become Prime Minister. They’re fictional, but real politicos like Wilson, Heath, Callaghan, Thatcher etc. appear throughout, as do the Queen and Prince Charles. Lots of nifty behind-the-scenes details. A great story, and very well-told.

[Northern_Piper]

@Really_Not_All_That_Bright

Nitpick: abdication is what monarchs do. Governments dissolve.

Governments fall or are defeated. Parliament is dissolved.

[SciFiSam]

@APB

I’m pretty certain that this is a myth. Or perhaps more accurately, a myth that may have become true. The size and configuration of the pre-1834 Commons Chamber was very obviously determined by its origins as St. Stephen’s Chapel. So, although over time the original seats were replaced, the space between the frontbenches probably remained much the same and so had nothing to do with the length of swords. However, it is I suppose possible that the spacing in the current Chamber (both pre- and post-Blitz) was determined by two-swords lengths on the basis that there was now this myth claiming that they ought to be. It sounds just like the sort of ‘tradition’ the Victorians would have loved.

And I rather think that this does connect to the issue of parliamentary yelling. It’s often said that it is the fact that the Commons has parallel benches along either side that determines the character of Westminster politics. Perhaps. But I suspect it has more to do with the size of the Chamber. Rumbustiousness surely comes more easily in a small, crowded Chamber with everyone crammed together on benches.

One effect of this is that MPs need to be particularly skilled at reading the mood of the House. Unless that is, as is usually the case, the House is almost empty.

No, the concept of ‘unparliamentary language’, including accusations of drunkenness, is alive and well.

http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/debate.cfm

I did look online to see if there was anything saying that the ‘two swords’ thing was an urban legend, and couldn’t find anything. Like I said, even if it is a myth, it still does make sense both metaphorically and practically - otherwise the opposition would have been covered in spit any time Roy Hattersley spoke from the front bench.

[Imasquare]

@cjepson

Here in the US, it seems that every time I hear a clip of someone speaking in the British Parliament, all the other MPs are yelling like schoolboys.

Australian parliament is just as bad. They behave like loud mouthed idiot school children. It is very depressing to think that people such as this lead the country.

I’ve always been impressed at the difference in US political debate. From what I have seen they argue their points in a much more civilized respectful manner, rarely resorting to shouting or ridiculing each other in public.

Its also impressive that US presidents can and do appoint people who are their political opponents to roles in their government. In Australia that would never happen. There is no bipartisan cooperation at all - each side is completely and utterly opposed to the other. If the government expresses an opinion the opposition party will vehemently oppose it regardless of whether or not they supported such a position last time they themselves were in government. They are really just like silly schoolboys who support different football teams.

[Quartz]

@Rysto

Formal coalitions in the Westminster system are extremely rare, and tend to be quite unstable.

The last major one in the U.K., the Lib-Lab pact in the late 70s, was stable.

[The_Stafford_Cripps]

I don’t think the Lib-Lab pact counts as a formal coalition, for example I don’t believe there were any Liberal ministers. It only lasted from March 1977 until July 1978, in a Parliament that lasted from October 1974 until April 1979. Labour remained in power the whole time; they also used support from Ulster Unionists or Scottish and Welsh nationalists to get majorities when they needed to. In the end the government fell when the SNP decided to vote against them.

[Ximenean]

[edit] Deleted. Just restated what G. Odoreida said.

[Polycarp]

@Northern_Piper

It depends on two factors, which can vary tremendously within the governments based on the Westminster system: the strength of party discipline, and the conception of a confidence vote within that particular Parliament.

For party discipline, the question in any system is how much authority the party has over individual members. By and large, party discipline tends to be stronger in parliamentary systems than in congressional systems, because party discipline is essential to obtaining power. An MP who does not consistently vote with the party not only weakens his/her own chances of gaining office, but also weakens the party’s chances as a whole. So an MP who does not support the party might find him/herself no longer in the party, or not favoured with party funding during an election, and so on. Other factors, such as the way MPs are elected, also may contribute to party discipline. For example, a proportional representation system based on a list of candidates determined by each party immeasurably strengthens party discipline.

The other factor is the concept of confidence. In Westminster systems, the budget, the Debate on the Speech from the Throne, and confidence motions are invariably confidence matters - if the government doesn’t carry those matters, it falls. But how broadly do you cast the definition of “confidence matters” outside those issues? In Canada, in the past century there has been a very wide definition - almost everything has been considered a confidence matter, so the government imposes the whip on all votes. That’s not always been the case - in the early years of Confederation, there was a much looser definition of confidence matters, which in my opinion led to a more effective public debate in the House - the fact that the government might be defeated on a bill did not automatically lead to an election, unless it was a bill on a subject that was so important to the government that they decided the defeat was a confidence matter.

In the case of minority governments, it’s very fluid and can vary tremendously, based on the political situation. Some minority governments try to “govern like they have a majority” - that is, just press ahead with their platform and essentially dare the Opposition to vote them down, triggering an election. There’s no formal agreement between the parties. That sort of situation is most likely when the government party is already close to having a majority of the seats in the Commons.

But in other cases, where there are three or more parties in the House, there may be a formal agreement between two of the parties - one will form the government, and the other will agree to support the government’s budget and Speech from the Throne (i.e. - the outline of the government’s policy), provided the budget and Speech contain certain policies and spending programmes that the second party wants to see implemented.

A good example of that occurred in Ontario in 1985. The Progressive Conservative government called an election. The results of the election were: PC, 52; Liberals, 48; NDP, 25. Although the Liberals had the second largest number of seats, they were able to reach an agreement with the NDP. The Conservative government met the House after the election, and the Liberals and the NDP together voted non-confidence. The Lieutenant Governor then called on the Liberals to form the government, and the NDP supported the Liberals in office for the term of their agreement (two years), in exchange for certain policies that the NDP had campaigned for. But on other matters, the NDP felt free to vote against the government, and the NDP and the Liberals agreed that those matters, not covered by their agreement, didn’t count as confidence matters, so a defeat on one of those votes in the House did not trigger an election.

Even more formal is the coalition government, where two or more parties agree to form a joint government. When the two parties form a joint government, then all the members of the parties are normally committed to supporting the coalition on all major issues, but again, there may be political agreements between the coalition partners as to what matters will be brought forward, and whether they will be considered confidence matters. (The 1985 situation in Ontario was not a coalition agreement, since the NDP sat on the Opposition side and did not have any representation in the Cabinet, which was purely Liberal.)

The government proposed to replace the Conservatives prior to last winter’s prorogation would have been an interesting case – the Liberals and NDP would have been in coalition, with a stated number (4 IIRC) of NDP Ministers in the Cabinet. But they would have been sustained in office by the Bloc (Parti?) Quebecois, who were not to be part of the coalition, would support it on confidence matters for eighteen months, but feel free to vote against the government on other matters, and would presumably sit in Opposition.

Is there a term for this (besides “strange” ;))?

[Hypnagogic_Jerk]

@Polycarp

Is there a term for this (besides “strange” ;))?

It would have been a minority coalition government (as in, a minority government and a coalition government simultaneously); I don’t think there’s any more specific term. Yes, it is a bit strange, in the sense that you usually try to get a true majority when building a coalition government, and would certainly have been unprecedented in Canada, but I’m quite certain similar things have happened in countries with a more fragmented legislature.

[Northern_Piper]

I would think that if dug through the histories of the Italian governments (post WWII) and the Israeli governments, you would find similar oddities.