# Patton vs Rommel **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [October 13, 2008, 4:09am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674 "2008-10-13T04:09:55Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 16\ **Page:** 2
**Author:** ![Quercus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/q/7ab992/32.png) [@Quercus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Quercus)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2008, 2:00pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674/21 "2008-10-14T14:00:23Z")
> [@Aquila\_Be](#): > > Bletchley Park had nothing to do with revealing any ‘plan’ simply because no German General ever transmitted details of field operations to Berlin. I’m not an expert, but I was under the impression that the Allies were intercepting and deciphering operational-level radio traffic, not just strategic communications between Berlin and Theater HQs. And given the lack of land lines in Africa, there would have been a lot of radio traffic to intercept. So while I don’t know, it seems plausible that signals intelligence could have been important operationally and even tactically in North Africa. ---
**Author:** ![Hypno-Toad](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/b2d939/32.png) [@Hypno-Toad](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hypno-Toad)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2008, 4:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674/22 "2008-10-14T16:51:04Z")
> [@Quercus](#): > > I’m not an expert, but I was under the impression that the Allies were intercepting and deciphering operational-level radio traffic, not just strategic communications between Berlin and Theater HQs. And given the lack of land lines in Africa, there would have been a lot of radio traffic to intercept. > So while I don’t know, it seems plausible that signals intelligence could have been important operationally and even tactically in North Africa. Land lines were laid to almost everywhere they could reach specifically to reduce vulnerable radio traffic. Likewise, runners and couriers were still available as a last ditch measure. Not so good if you had to send a message 40+ miles, but still useful at the front lines to convey small unit orders. ---
**Author:** ![smiling\_bandit](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e9a140/32.png) [@smiling\_bandit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/smiling_bandit)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2008, 5:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674/23 "2008-10-14T17:40:58Z")
Regardless, Rommel was very, very good, but in Egypt he had reached the limit of endurance. Mongomery may have had a longer supply line, but his troops were actually better supplied due to superior Allied Logistics, plus Hitler refused to either withdraw or substantially reinforce that army (this, in Italy and Russia and France, was arguably the reason Germany lost the war). IIRC, by this time the British were dominating the Med, and the Germans knew they couldn’t leave their rear unguarded since America was coming. Rommel may have lost, but he was in a horrifically bad position which was only made marginally tenable by his earlier victories. He was going to have to fight an enemy who knew when, where, and how he would come, with superior material and scouting. ---
**Author:** ![slaphead](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e9bcb4/32.png) [@slaphead](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/slaphead)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2008, 6:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674/24 "2008-10-14T18:52:04Z")
> [@Aquila\_Be](#): > > You forget that the Eighth Army, dangling on the end of a 1570 mile (that’s about 2500 km) supply line leading back to Alexandria, also won a defensive victory at Medenine on 6 March 1943. . You’re kidding, right? I’ve yet to see any description of Medenine that fails to mention the great superiority of force possessed by the Allies, especially in artillery. > [@](#): > > Montgomery himself, in spite of anxiety for a few days, looked on the Battle of Medenine as an incident occurring during his preparations for the much greater battle for the Mareth Line. From the very same NZ History you quoted. At that stage in the game Rommel had no choices left but to surrender or watch his forces be pulverised. A few pages further on we get > [@](#): > > The German attack at Medenine was virtually a straightforward charge against our line, with little subtlety, with only a weak flank attack, and with practically no reconnaissance beforehand. The war diaries of all three panzer divisions show that there was little if any co-ordination by Rommel, and in fact the renewal of the attack on a general scale in the afternoon was arranged by the three divisional commanders themselves through personal and radio discussion. Having launched the attack, Rommel seems merely to have looked on and almost to have expected the worst from the outset. > [@Aquila\_Be](#): > > The intelligence provided by Bletchley Park was useful to the extent that it provided the Eighth Army with valuable information of Rommel’s supply problems and reinforcements, but any notion that such information had any bearing on the outcome of Alam Halfa is absurd. A couple of minutes searching turns up the following quote from “Intelligence Power In Peace and War” > [@](#): > > Alam Halfa in 1942 saw 'operations welcome intelligence into full partnership for the first time… or perhaps you might prefer this from “The Contribution of Intelligence to the Battles of Alam Halfa and El Alamein” > [@](#): > > The transformation of intelligence during the Second World War and Montgomery’s use of it at the operational level was fundamental to surprising and deceiving Rommel in the Western Desert, and, in turn, avoiding surprise and deception of the Eighth Army. The British victories in the defensive battle of Alam Halfa and the offensive assault at El Alamein were in a large part due to the effective use of intelligence at the strategic and operational levels of war. Given that people publishing on the subject of military intelligence regard Alam Halfa as one of best demonstrations of its effectiveness, I’m inclined to take their interpretation over yours. ---
**Author:** ![paperbackwriter](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/53a042/32.png) [@paperbackwriter](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/paperbackwriter)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2008, 9:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674/25 "2008-10-14T21:26:18Z")
> [@Quercus](#): > > I’m not an expert, but I was under the impression that the Allies were intercepting and deciphering operational-level radio traffic, not just strategic communications between Berlin and Theater HQs. And given the lack of land lines in Africa, there would have been a lot of radio traffic to intercept. > So while I don’t know, it seems plausible that signals intelligence could have been important operationally and even tactically in North Africa. This impression is probably more informed by cryptanalysis’s impact on the Battle of the Atlantic than any land campaign. Histories of Bletchley Park sometimes make it sound like the Allies were reading every transmission from every German outpost, but tactical-level intelligence was rare for land campaigns. The greatest volume by far of tactical intelligence provided by codebreakers was of U-boat movements. Every U-Boat was directed by Dönitz. Orders went out to the U-boats telling them where to go, when to form wolfpacks, where to patrol, when to take up position on a particular line that convoys were expected to cross, and more. U-boats sent back daily reports and when a U-boat did sight a convoy, it shadowed the Allied ships and sent out frequent position reports to call in more hunters. This was a huge amount of very detailed communication, and did indeed directly impact the tactical situation. By contrast, if Rommel had felt it necessary to brief OKW on one of his battle plans, he would fly there himself. ---
**Author:** ![slaphead](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e9bcb4/32.png) [@slaphead](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/slaphead)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2008, 9:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674/26 "2008-10-14T21:40:56Z")
> [@paperbackwriter](#): > > This was a huge amount of very detailed communication, and did indeed directly impact the tactical situation. > > By contrast, if Rommel had felt it necessary to brief OKW on one of his battle plans, he would fly there himself. However, it’s worth bearing in mind that large-scale operations on land are a different kettle of fish from trying to find a wolfpack in the open ocean. If you give a competent set of staff officers some basic information such as the location, date and force composition of a corps-level attack, they can make a pretty good job of second-guessing what is likely to come at them. There are only so many ways you can shovel tens of thousands of men and all the associated logistics through a given set of terrain. If you look at Case Yellow, for example, a credible tip along the lines of “Holland a diversion, main thrust Ardennes/Meuse” a week or so in advance would have been enough to turn the Blitzkrieg into a complete and utter disaster for the Germans. ---
**Author:** ![phouka](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/c5a1d2/32.png) [@phouka](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/phouka)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2008, 10:25pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674/27 "2008-10-14T22:25:49Z")
> [@Little\_Nemo](#): > > The classical meaning of Nemesis that originated in ancient Rome is a little dated. A nemesis, like a fate or a fury, is now seen as something other than a divine entity. > > That said, I think crediting Joss Whedon for making this change is a little short-sighted. The meaning of the word had changed decades before Whedon came along. > > A nemesis, according to Merriam-Webster, is “a formidable and usually victorious rival or opponent”. I know. I’m usually very much a descriptivist as opposed to a prescriptionist when it comes to language, but giving up the older, and to my mind, more elegant definition of Nemesis just chafes my butt. And I blame Joss because he wrote in the little discussion among the minor villains of Season 6 as to whether they were Buffy’s nemesis, arch-nemesis, or arch-nemeses (plural). Grrrrrr! Argh! I’ll be quiet now. ---
**Author:** ![The\_Second\_Stone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/bbe5ce/32.png) [@The\_Second\_Stone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/The_Second_Stone)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2008, 10:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674/28 "2008-10-14T22:52:59Z")
Monty gets no great general points from me for his handling of North Africa. Rommel’s supplies were being interfered with to the point of not being resupplied at all, thanks to Enigma. Without fuel and more tanks, Rommel was a sitting duck. The fact that he managed to save 30 or so of his tanks and his own skin was brilliant generalship. With more than a 20 to 1 tank advantage by the end, and having Enigma intelligence, which generally constituted the whole order of battle, Monty should have done better. But he didn’t. That being said, Monty didn’t screw things up like his predecessors had. But his offensive was pathetic considering what his advantage was and he knew how big an advantage it was. Rommel should not have been allowed to retreat at all. Patton and Rommel never met in battle. Only in propaganda did it matter. And Patton’s mind. ---
**Author:** ![Aquila\_Be](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/a698b9/32.png) [@Aquila\_Be](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Aquila_Be)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2008, 1:25am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674/29 "2008-10-15T01:25:30Z")
> [@slaphead](#): > > You’re kidding, right? I’ve yet to see any description of Medenine that fails to mention the great superiority of force possessed by the Allies, especially in artillery. So, now supply distances don’t matter for the purpose of your arguments unless their to Rommel’s disadvantage? However, I did refer to Rommel’s decision to attack as idiotic. The Medenine position took nearly a week to set up and reinforce, particularly wit AT artillery, and the advance to Medenine itself was undertaken at General Alexander’s urgent request to Montgomery because of trouble further north. By the time the “Desert Fox” prepared to attack he found he had let things drag on a bit too long. In his own words, from The New Zealand Army documents: [NZETC - Rommel’s comments](http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Bard-c7-17.html) > [@](#): > > Rommel has little to say about the Battle of Medenine, but his remarks are of some weight: ‘The attack began extraordinarily well, but soon came up against strong British positions in hilly country, protected by mines and anti-tank guns…. Attack after attack was launched, but achieved no success…. it soon became clear that the attack had failed and there was nothing more to be done about it…. The attack had bogged down in the break-in stage and the action never had a chance of becoming fluid. The British commander had grouped his forces extremely well and had completed his preparations with remarkable speed. In fact the attack had been launched about a week too late…. We had suffered tremendous losses, including forty tanks totally destroyed. But the cruellest blow was the knowledge that we had been unable to interfere with Montgomery’s preparations. A great gloom settled over us all. The Eighth Army’s attack was now imminent and we had to face it. For the Army Group to remain in Africa was now plain suicide.’ Now to deal with this ‘Ultra’ thing which you appear to believe caused victories as per your quote: > [@](#): > > A couple of minutes searching turns up the following quote from “Intelligence Power In Peace and War” > or perhaps you might prefer this from “The Contribution of Intelligence to the Battles of Alam Halfa and El Alamein” > > Given that people publishing on the subject of military intelligence regard Alam Halfa as one of best demonstrations of its effectiveness, I’m inclined to take their interpretation over yours. Here’s a different perspective on Ultra, its limitations and benefits. Basically it concludes that on a short term, day to day tactical level it had limited benefit, particularly where land engagements were concerned, but it did provide a great advantage in planning things on a long term basis. [topedge](http://www.topedge.com/panels/ww2/na/intelligence.html) > [@](#): > > The Allied knowledge gleaned from Ultra that the Germans were about to attack Greece did allow the them to send forces, but the Allied capability was such that it was not possible to have a realistic chance of winning the conflict there. Again in May 1942 although the Eighth Army had �good general warning of the imminence of Rommels attack, the British lost the battle of Gazala.7. Ultra was an extra weapon in the Allied armoury, not their primary source of wisdom. It was consulted by commanders in planning stages or when an important decision was to be made, but was not the basis of their decision. > > * * * > > It is worth mentioning that Ultra achieved long term successes in North Africa, in as much as the consequences of its input were more long term than immediate. For instance it is true to say that although detailed Ultra decrypts failed to stop the successful invasion of Crete, the resistance the Allied forces were able to give (as the precise plans of the invasion were known) helped to persuade the Axis powers to firstly postpone and then to cancel a similar invasion of Malta. Ultra also had a negative role in the North Africa, by which the Allies could gauge if their deception techniques were being successful and whether the Axis forces had knowledge of Allied operations or not. This ‘no news is good news’ role which Ultra performed especially well preceding the Allied Torch landings in November 1942 was extremely useful to the Allies in the planning of future operations too. The effectiveness with which intelligence was processed was significantly improved towards the end of the war which led to its role being enhanced to some extent. > > * * * > > Since the release of many documents Ultra`s role in the Second world War has been greatly exaggerated, being elevated to the rank of a decisive factor. Such an assertion involves the overlooking of the numerous and crippling limitations of this form of intelligence, technically and operationally. Through analysis of such limitations, in relation to its isolated successes, it can be seen that Ultra was no more than a supplementary factor in the Allies favour, complimenting their knowledge of the Axis powers and their forces in North Africa. Intelligence occasionally enabled the Allies to know vital information about the Afrika Korps and, although rarely in the short term, due to the slow speed of its distribution , Ultra did achieve decisive victories for the Allies in the long-term over its Axis counter-parts, but for the most part intelligence provided very minute parts of an ever-changing jigsaw which although significant, was not decisive in itself. As for Alam Halfa, the main reason for the victory was Montgomery ditching that ridiculous and over complicated Auchinleck/Dorman-Smith defensive plan and substituting his own. _(Oh please, please Lord, let no one mention that idiot Corelli Barnett)_. Now, back to the battles between Patton and Rommel. ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2008, 2:28am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674/30 "2008-10-15T02:28:45Z")
> [@](#): > > However, it’s worth bearing in mind that large-scale operations on land are a different kettle of fish from trying to find a wolfpack in the open ocean. If you give a competent set of staff officers some basic information such as the location, date and force composition of a corps-level attack, they can make a pretty good job of second-guessing what is likely to come at them. There are only so many ways you can shovel tens of thousands of men and all the associated logistics through a given set of terrain. > If you look at Case Yellow, for example, a credible tip along the lines of “Holland a diversion, main thrust Ardennes/Meuse” a week or so in advance would have been enough to turn the Blitzkrieg into a complete and utter disaster for the Germans. Sometimes even great intelligence isn’t enough. Allied code-breaking had pretty much handed them the entire plan for the invasion of Crete. But even knowing what German troops were going to be used and when and where they were going to attack wasn’t enough of an advantage for the Allies to win the battle. ---
**Author:** ![slaphead](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e9bcb4/32.png) [@slaphead](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/slaphead)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2008, 8:24am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674/31 "2008-10-15T08:24:36Z")
> [@Aquila\_Be](#): > > So, now supply distances don’t matter for the purpose of your arguments unless their to Rommel’s disadvantage? Was Rommel in Egypt as well-supplied as Monty in Tunisia? I think not. Most likely Rommel in Tunisia wasn’t as well-supplied as Monty in Tunisia. Length of supply line can be overcome by having enough materiel and transport, and that made Tunisia-Alexandria a better bet for Monty than Tunisia-Italy was for Rommel. > [@Aquila\_Be](#): > > Now to deal with this ‘Ultra’ thing which you appear to believe caused victories as per your quote: Caused victories? Caused victories? You are indeed having a laugh. I said decrypts were one of the factors that gave Monty his victories, along with superior quantities of materiel and shorter supply lines. Since you appear to believe that intelligence was irrelevant, force superiority was irrelevant, and supply was irrelevant, I presume you ascribe victory purely to Monty’s god-like genius? > [@Aquila\_Be](#): > > Now, back to the battles between Patton and Rommel. The reputation these two have, and their purported rivalry, is just more of the same stuff that we’ve been going over with Monty. Both of them did well because they were skilled commanders who were given solid military machines and understood how to lead them and how to use them - just like Monty. But it doesn’t mean they were all avatars of Mars in human form. Wars are generally won by solid, competent commanders who don’t fuck up, who are on the side with the big batallions, and who can leaven sensible risk aversion with a little audacity when it’s absolutely required. But the tag of ‘solid professional who never fucks things up and gets the job done’ doesn’t massage the ego very much, and it doesn’t make for good press. That, along with the drama of long arrows sweeping back and forth over a map of Africa leads to Rommel, Patton and Monty having an over-inflated reputation, IMO. ---
**Author:** ![Aquila\_Be](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/a698b9/32.png) [@Aquila\_Be](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Aquila_Be)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2008, 10:34am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674/32 "2008-10-15T10:34:35Z")
(Re the Green Hornet and the Desert Fox). > [@slaphead](#): > > The reputation these two have, and their purported rivalry, is just more of the same stuff that we’ve been going over with Monty. Both of them did well because they were skilled commanders who were given solid military machines and understood how to lead them and how to use them - just like Monty. But it doesn’t mean they were all avatars of Mars in human form. > > Wars are generally won by solid, competent commanders who don’t fuck up, who are on the side with the big batallions, and who can leaven sensible risk aversion with a little audacity when it’s absolutely required. I agree with you 100%.🙂 ---
**Author:** ![Aquila\_Be](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/a698b9/32.png) [@Aquila\_Be](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Aquila_Be)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2008, 11:05am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674/33 "2008-10-15T11:05:16Z")
> [@The\_Second\_Stone](#): > > Monty gets no great general points from me for his handling of North Africa. Rommel’s supplies were being interfered with to the point of not being resupplied at all, thanks to Enigma. Without fuel and more tanks, Rommel was a sitting duck. The fact that he managed to save 30 or so of his tanks and his own skin was brilliant generalship. With more than a 20 to 1 tank advantage by the end, and having Enigma intelligence, which generally constituted the whole order of battle, Monty should have done better. > > But he didn’t. That being said, Monty didn’t screw things up like his predecessors had. But his offensive was pathetic considering what his advantage was and he knew how big an advantage it was. Rommel should not have been allowed to retreat at all. I suppose that’s not quite as bad as claims made by some Americans to the effect that: 1- Rommel was allowed to escape with his army intact. 2- Montgomery and the Eighth Army failed to pursue Rommel. but it’s getting there. One thing you neglected to mention was how incredibly brilliant the ‘Desert Fox’ was in mobile warfare. He certainly proved it post Alamein. The battle of Alamein, 23 October to 3 November 1942 lasted twelve days. Montgomery pre stocked the Alamein line with eleven days of all essential supplies so that road transport could devote itself exclusively to casualties (and POWs). He was out by one day. The outcome resulted in over 30,000 prisoners and 20,000 dead or wounded for Rommel’s forces and the elimination of nearly all his tank and artillery forces. The Eighth Army now moved into the next stage: **Pursuit Phase** _Alamein to Tobruk: 4-13 November 1942_. Eighth Army under General Montgomery advanced 365 miles to Tobruk in 10 days meeting with little resistance from the shattered remnant of the Afrika Korps under Field Marshall Erwin Rommel (The Desert Fox) and continued to collect prisoners. That’s over **36 miles** per day. _Tobruk to Benghazi: 14-20 November 1942_. Eighth Army continues to pursue of the remnants of the Afrika Korps led by the Desert Fox and advances a further 305 miles from Tobruk to Benghazi in the next seven days. That’s over **43 miles** per day for another seven days or over **39 miles** per day for 17 days and a total of 670 miles. Due to supply problems that was the end of the pursuit phase. There was pause of a few weeks while the demolished port of Benghazi was made usable again and supplies had to be built up to enable the advance to continue. If you know of any advance in military history that went so far and so fast I’d be pleased to hear about it. ---
**Author:** ![slaphead](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e9bcb4/32.png) [@slaphead](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/slaphead)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2008, 12:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674/34 "2008-10-15T12:15:05Z")
> [@Aquila\_Be](#): > > 1- Rommel was allowed to escape with his army intact. Heh. That cracks me up. It’s pretty much a truism that running away like the devil is on your tail, into the safety of your own territory, back towards your own base (so you encounter your supply train as you go) and ditching anything non-essential that might be slowing you down is nearly always faster than following the enemy into their own territory while carting all your own supplies, keeping an eye open for attacks and maintaining your forces in good order. Without a second force present to play hammer+anvil, or some terrain to pin the enemy against, it would be bloody hard to stop Rommel escaping without taking the risk of charging forward at a silly speed. Besides, why would Monty bother trying some super-cunning manouvre that might go wrong? All he had to do was follow the trail of fear-induced diaorrhea over the horizon at a good enough speed to stop Rommel setting up good defensive position until he was back in Tunisia. Once there, the Axis weren’t going anywhere and the two allied armies could coordinate to crush the Afrika Korps like a bug at a time of their own choosing. Why fight in a hurry using one army when you can do it at your leisure with two? Monty had all the cards and he played them well. [\*] Come to think of it, Torch put the anvil in place and Monty was swinging the hammer. It cracked Rommel’s nuts pretty thoroughly. ---
**Author:** ![Earl\_Snake-Hips\_Tucker](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/earl_snake-hips_tucker/32/3269_2.png) [@Earl\_Snake-Hips\_Tucker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Earl_Snake-Hips_Tucker)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2008, 4:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674/35 "2008-10-15T16:49:28Z")
> [@Crusoe](#): > > Just throw Mark Clark in there as well… Eh, at the risk of hijacking, I’ll just toss in [a thread from a while back.](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=167503) ---
**Author:** ![Crusoe](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/49beb7/32.png) [@Crusoe](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Crusoe)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2008, 5:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674/36 "2008-10-15T17:34:15Z")
> [@Earl\_Snake-Hips\_Tucker](#): > > Eh, at the risk of hijacking, I’ll just toss in [a thread from a while back.](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=167503) Thanks, **Earl** , that’s interesting stuff. My aside was based on some fairly critical writing by Carlo d’Este and (more recently, and less damningly) Rick Atkinson. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/patton-vs-rommel/467674.md?page=1)