# Patton's 1937 itemized intelligence memo on Japanese attack plans: impact? who read it? **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [December 7, 2016, 10:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147 "2016-12-07T22:51:41Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 2
**Author:** ![Exapno\_Mapcase](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/exapno_mapcase/32/1051_2.png) [@Exapno\_Mapcase](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Exapno_Mapcase)\ **Post date:** [December 8, 2016, 9:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/21 "2016-12-08T21:58:17Z")
> [@Corry\_El](#): > > I was mainly just amused by the anachronism of ‘hawks and chauvinists’, and now by ‘conservatives’. Isolationism was the general feeling of the public and therefore politicians. It was not a left-right divide nor were their ‘hawks/doves’ per se like in the post Vietnam Cold War. It was not today’s left/right divide, no. However, a divide between the conservatives of the day and the progressives of the day certainly existed throughout the Roosevelt administration, with the conservatives far more likely to be isolationists. This is crucial for all understanding of the run-up to WWII and I don’t understand why you would minimize it. > [@](#): > > But as you go on from general isolationism to claiming the US military didn’t pay attention to Japan, you’re clearly mistaken. The War Department governed the Army. The Navy Department was always a lot more focused on Japan, because it was by far the most plausible enemy, certainly by 1937. This was somewhat reflected on the other side. The Imperial Army wasn’t particularly focused on the US Army, but the IJN was pretty much obsessed with the USN. USN planning, exercises and deployments over the 30’s were more and more focused on Japan as the plausible enemy, though not the same virtually singular focus of the IJN on the USN. I agree, although our emphases are entirely different. The entire Army was a pitiful nothingness in the overall scheme of national concerns. The Navy paid somewhat more attention to Japan but we know now that it was insufficient internally and meaningless externally. It didn’t matter what they focused on because no one was paying them serious attention. > [@](#): > > And when it came to Army commands in the Pacific, in Hawaii and the Philippines, what’s being quoted here is Patton’s view as G-2 of the Hawaii Department\*, were also naturally focused on Japan. Who else was going to attack either place? (threats from other powers were plausible in the early days of US control of HI and PI in the 1890’s but not by the 1930’s). The buildup of a large Philippine Army from 1937 (though still unready as of 1941) to augment the small US Army infantry force there was expressly to meet the Japanese threat. Likewise the hurried reinforcement of US Army air units there especially in 1941. Since I said specifically that Japan was far more of a concern in California and the West Coast, how does this refute me? California was both paranoid and increasingly bigoted against Japanese. Of course they looked to every move their enemy took militarily. What I want is evidence that this attitude was reflected in national circles. > [@](#): > > And without clarifying by date, you risk being absurdly wrong on the statement ‘[US military didn’t take] an attack by Japan of any kind seriously.’ In 1937 the Japanese threat was only the subject of general planning, but by the fall of 1941 an attack by Japan within months was viewed as highly likely. By early December it was viewed as a virtual certainty. Let’s specify that the time period I am writing about was the time period the OP was about, c1937. The breakout of the war in Europe in 1939 made a difference, although it hardened rather than softened isolationist attitudes, so the government sought every avenue to prepare for a possible war. But Roosevelt spent 99% of his time looking toward Europe and Hitler and so did his top generals. Japan was, as I said, a footnote. You can’t do history by hindsight. ---
**Author:** ![Kent\_Clark](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/kent_clark/32/105_2.png) [@Kent\_Clark](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Kent_Clark)\ **Post date:** [December 8, 2016, 11:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/22 "2016-12-08T23:28:53Z")
[Billy Mitchell predicted a Japanese air attack](http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/MuseumExhibits/FactSheets/Display/tabid/509/Article/196418/brig-gen-william-billy-mitchell.aspx) against Pearl Harbor and the Phillipines way back in 1925. It wasn’t like the idea hadn’t been studied to death in war colleges. ---
**Author:** ![Melbourne](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/b5e925/32.png) [@Melbourne](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Melbourne)\ **Post date:** [December 9, 2016, 12:30am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/23 "2016-12-09T00:30:45Z")
> [@Leo\_Bloom](#): > > By way of analogy, Winston Churchill’s tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty–and the fuck-up laid at his feet. Of course, Gallipoli was of huge importance, but not ranking with Pearl Harbor (as if anything could, besides 9/11)–except for the Turks. And to the Australians. And possibly to the New Zealanders? (I haven’t asked). We know how important Pearl Harbor and 9/11 were in the global scheme of things. But actual, here and now, on the ground importance? Gallipoli. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [December 9, 2016, 2:23am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/24 "2016-12-09T02:23:09Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > There were **85,000** troops stationed at Singapore, as well as a really good number of coastal batteries. It fell in a week. You mean after [landing over 200 miles north of Singapore and spending two months advancing down the Malay peninsula](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malayan_Campaign) Singapore fell after[a week of fighting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Singapore) in which the coastal batteries were entirely moot? Entirely the same situation, excepting the part where Oahu isn’t attached to a 200+ mile long peninsula but is in fact a rather small island where any attempted landing would be murdered by the coastal artillery. Hell, the 155mm divisional guns of the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions could hit any part of the island from Schofield Barracks. ---
**Author:** ![Corry\_El](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/ecae2f/32.png) [@Corry\_El](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Corry_El)\ **Post date:** [December 9, 2016, 3:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/25 "2016-12-09T15:39:17Z")
> [@Exapno\_Mapcase](#): > > 1. The Navy paid somewhat more attention to Japan but we know now that it was insufficient internally and meaningless externally. It didn’t matter what they focused on because no one was paying them serious attention. > > 2. Since I said specifically that Japan was far more of a concern in California and the West Coast, how does this refute me? California was both paranoid and increasingly bigoted against Japanese. Of course they looked to every move their enemy took militarily. What I want is evidence that this attitude was reflected in national circles. > > 3. Let’s specify that the time period I am writing about was the time period the OP was about, c1937. The breakout of the war in Europe in 1939 made a difference, although it hardened rather than softened isolationist attitudes, so the government sought every avenue to prepare for a possible war. 1. So I guess by this reasoning the IJN’s planning focus on the USN was meaningless because we now know it was ultimately completely defeated? Really doesn’t make much sense either way. You can easily read about USN interwar planning and exercises and this easily answers the actual question: the USN was _mainly_ focused on Japan as adversary, so if it didn’t take Japan ‘seriously’ it must have not taken anything ‘seriously’. The USN had flaws in its material and training readiness ca. late 1941, and was specifically not expecting a carrier raid directly from Japan against Oahu in early December. That’s not the same as ‘no evidence the War [and Navy] Departments never took an attack by Japan of any kind seriously’. 2. This whole line of argument is just changing the subject. People on the West Coast California were more conscious of Japanese and often to hostile to them because there were fairly numerous Japanese immigrants there but hardly anywhere else in the US (except also HI). Not really relevant to my comment pointing out the error of ‘War Department never’, nor did anti-Japanese feeling on the West Coast particularly focus on a military threat from Japan until the war actually came. Just a different topic, pretty basically. 3. Again it’s shifting focus to the general public’s attitude which isn’t what the original comment was about. In terms of the relevant discussion, military planning and attitudes, it’s if anything the wrong way around. Ca. 1937 the USN’s pretty much sole focus was a possible war with Japan. The fleet was almost all in the Pacific, where the only plausible adversary was Japan. After the outbreak of the European war the USN had to shift focus, and eventually deployments, more toward the threat from Germany. By the time of PH some battleships, carriers and cruisers, even besides destroyers escorting British convoys, were in the Atlantic, vs basically none except ships completing trials etc., in 1937. Likewise from 1940 the Army focused back on repeating the mobilization of a large force to send to Europe, so again if anything less on Japan than ca. 1937 where the US Army contingents in HI and PI, whose only plausible opponent was Japan, were a bigger relative portion of the small US Army. I think your reasoning and argument here is hampered by a basic lack of reading on the actual topic you first commented on, and maybe just a general tendency to shift everything to bigots, conservatives, etc. Believe it or not on some specific topics that’s actually not relevant. 🙂 ---
**Author:** ![Exapno\_Mapcase](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/exapno_mapcase/32/1051_2.png) [@Exapno\_Mapcase](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Exapno_Mapcase)\ **Post date:** [December 9, 2016, 4:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/26 "2016-12-09T16:05:03Z")
> [@Corry\_El](#): > > I think your reasoning and argument here is hampered by a basic lack of reading on the actual topic you first commented on, and maybe just a general tendency to shift everything to bigots, conservatives, etc. Believe it or not on some specific topics that’s actually not relevant. 🙂 Believe it? Not. Seriously not. There is no universe in which isolationism is not relevant to WWII. You don’t suppose it’s you that has the tendency to ignore real-world political and social reality in favor of meaningless behind-the-scenes minutiae, do you? I see a tremendous difference in our areas of interest and expertise, since I’m an actual working historian and social scientist and you seem to have no awareness of any structure outside of a narrow focus on the military. The military in the 1930s, of all times. Need I point out what a bastion of bigotry, exclusion, and general hatred the military of the 1930s was? I probably do need to. You certainly haven’t done that reading. It doesn’t involve pretending to blow things up. ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [December 9, 2016, 5:02pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/27 "2016-12-09T17:02:42Z")
One important thing to keep in mind is that isolationists weren’t necessarily part of a peace movement. Some of them didn’t object to a military build-up; they objecting to American-made military equipment being sent to Britain and the Soviet Union. They felt we shouldn’t be sending military equipment to other countries when our own armed forces were short-handed on that same equipment. ---
**Author:** ![Exapno\_Mapcase](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/exapno_mapcase/32/1051_2.png) [@Exapno\_Mapcase](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Exapno_Mapcase)\ **Post date:** [December 9, 2016, 5:30pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/28 "2016-12-09T17:30:11Z")
> [@Little\_Nemo](#): > > One important thing to keep in mind is that isolationists weren’t necessarily part of a peace movement. Some of them didn’t object to a military build-up; they objecting to American-made military equipment being sent to Britain and the Soviet Union. They felt we shouldn’t be sending military equipment to other countries when our own armed forces were short-handed on that same equipment. It’s true that whatever money the military could scrape up was used mostly with the intention of defense of the coasts and secondarily protection of the rest of the Americas. It’s not the case that were preparing for an active war with Japan during the 1930s. Most of the buildup did not start until after the War began in Europe. It’s interesting - and I think instructive - the look at what the military itself says about this period. You can find a look at the interwar years [here](http://www.history.army.mil/books/AMH-V2/AMH%20V2/chapter2.htm), a chapter from a military history textbook. It’s as positive a history as possible, but others can read between the lines. ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [December 9, 2016, 5:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/29 "2016-12-09T17:34:08Z")
> [@Corry\_El](#): > > As I said not impossible to do either thing, but the Japanese probably could not have done all three, as in invade Malaya and the Hawaiian Islands immediately and the Philippines within days after (different forces and shipping mainly than used in Malaya) > > That’s pretty different than launching and sustaining a campaign against islands from 2,500+ miles away (the Marshalls), or even the distance from other Hawaiian islands to Oahu if the Japanese took one first as a staging point. Oahu was not impregnable though, I agree. Right. They _could_ have taken Hawaii, but it would have been foolish, useless and hard to defend. ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [December 9, 2016, 5:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/30 "2016-12-09T17:57:55Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > You mean after [landing over 200 miles north of Singapore and spending two months advancing down the Malay peninsula](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malayan_Campaign) Singapore fell after[a week of fighting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Singapore) in which the coastal batteries were entirely moot? Entirely the same situation, excepting the part where Oahu isn’t attached to a 200+ mile long peninsula but is in fact a rather small island where any attempted landing would be murdered by the coastal artillery. Hell, the 155mm divisional guns of the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions could hit any part of the island from Schofield Barracks. Its over 20 miles from Schofield to Waikiki. Even the long Tom has a rang of only 14 miles. Defending Waikiki was Battery Randolph which had two WWI period 14 in rifles mounted on disappearing carriage. Battery Dudley had two WWI period 6 in rifles mounted on disappearing carriage. All gone within seconds due to a sustained fire from **eight** IJN battleships. [http://www.northamericanforts.com/West/hi-north.html](http://www.northamericanforts.com/West/hi-north.html) [http://www.fortwiki.com/Category:Harbor\_Defense\_of\_Honolulu](http://www.fortwiki.com/Category:Harbor_Defense_of_Honolulu) Most of the coast defenses of Hawaii were built in 194 **2**. ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [December 9, 2016, 7:02pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/31 "2016-12-09T19:02:32Z")
I think the best defense Oahu had is that over 6000 kilometers of ocean separate it from Japan. The Japanese could have landed an invasion force in Oahu in 1941. But they couldn’t have kept it supplied. ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [December 9, 2016, 7:25pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/32 "2016-12-09T19:25:11Z")
> [@Little\_Nemo](#): > > I think the best defense Oahu had is that over 6000 kilometers of ocean separate it from Japan. > > The Japanese could have landed an invasion force in Oahu in 1941. But they couldn’t have kept it supplied. Right, logistics would have been a nitemare. Really bad idea. But the coastal defenses and the garrison of green poorly equipped troops would not have been a big challenge. ---
**Author:** ![griffin1977](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/977dab/32.png) [@griffin1977](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/griffin1977)\ **Post date:** [December 9, 2016, 10:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/33 "2016-12-09T22:42:43Z")
Probably filed in the 13,043th draw (section b(xxiv)) of the filing cabinet entitled: “Examples of Military Authorities Ignoring Intelligence Advice They Didn’t Like” ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [December 10, 2016, 12:53am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/34 "2016-12-10T00:53:29Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > Most of the coast defenses of Hawaii were built in 194 **2**. Horseshit. Before the attack at Pearl Harbor the 15th and 16th Coastal Artillery Regiments had [between them](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=17143530&postcount=36): 4 16" naval rifles 2 14" naval rifles 4 12" naval rifles 20 12" mortars 12 240mm guns 4 8" railway guns 2 8" guns 18 155mm guns GPF 8 6" guns 10 3" guns 20 3" AA guns 12 2.4" guns See further posts in that thread for an explanation of why land based artillery has a huge advantage over ship based artillery, among other things you can’t sink coastal artillery. See for example["Big Willie",](https://books.google.com/books?id=mhJE9XFacGwC&pg=PA288&lpg=PA288&dq=Toulon+big+willie&source=bl&ots=2iXwNZKxPc&sig=wykGcSHjX2yY_U36AtWhfoB6KXc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjhw_mZrejQAhVG2mMKHcLGC1sQ6AEILDAC#v=onepage&q=Toulon%20big%20willie&f=false)a 340mm (13.4 inch) battery controlling Toulon which the Allies spent 9 days trying to destroy with three battleships, several cruisers and aerial bombing. There’s a picture of the moonscape surrounding it [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:WWII,_Europe,_Near_Toulon,_France,_%22Weapons_%26_Fortificcations_-_Long_Range_Naval_Gun%22_-_NARA_-_195329.tif). > [@Little\_Nemo](#): > > I think the best defense Oahu had is that over 6000 kilometers of ocean separate it from Japan. > > The Japanese could have landed an invasion force in Oahu in 1941. But they couldn’t have kept it supplied. Landing would have been extremely problematic, but the distance and logistics couldn’t be gotten around. It took most of the Japanese tanker force to support the carrier striking force that historically attacked on Dec 7th. Coming up with enough tankers to get a multi-divisional landing force and 8 battleships there to be able to perform the fantastic feat of destroying the coastal artillery “in seconds” simply wasn’t going to happen. ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [December 10, 2016, 1:53am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/35 "2016-12-10T01:53:25Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > Horseshit. Before the attack at Pearl Harbor the 15th and 16th Coastal Artillery Regiments had [between them](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=17143530&postcount=36): > > 4 16" naval rifles > 2 14" naval rifles > 4 12" naval rifles > 20 12" mortars > 12 240mm guns > 4 8" railway guns > 2 8" guns > 18 155mm guns GPF > 8 6" guns > 10 3" guns > 20 3" AA guns > 12 2.4" guns > > . You’re citing yourself? :dubious: My cites say different. Not quite the firepower of _one_ of the 8 battleships there with the Pearl harbor attack force. ---
**Author:** ![Beware\_of\_Doug](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/278dde/32.png) [@Beware\_of\_Doug](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Beware_of_Doug)\ **Post date:** [December 10, 2016, 5:45am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/36 "2016-12-10T05:45:58Z")
> [@kunilou](#): > > [Billy Mitchell predicted a Japanese air attack](http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/MuseumExhibits/FactSheets/Display/tabid/509/Article/196418/brig-gen-william-billy-mitchell.aspx) against Pearl Harbor and the Phillipines way back in 1925. It wasn’t like the idea hadn’t been studied to death in war colleges. And Mitchell ended up court-martialed for his outspoken advocacy of air power. The role of the air services was strictly limited between the wars because it threatened every conventional military doctrine - _and_ the reputations of countless senior officers. ---
**Author:** ![Northern\_Piper](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/northern_piper/32/5304_2.png) [@Northern\_Piper](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Northern_Piper)\ **Post date:** [December 10, 2016, 6:39am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/37 "2016-12-10T06:39:51Z")
He was court-martiales for insubordination. Accusing senior officers of “almost treasonable administration of national defence” is not about air power per se. It is an officer accusing other officers of treasonable conduct. The court martial found that the truth or falsity of Mitchell’s position on air warfare was irrelevant to the charges of insubordination. ---
**Author:** ![Isilder](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/cc9497/32.png) [@Isilder](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Isilder)\ **Post date:** [December 10, 2016, 11:50am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/38 "2016-12-10T11:50:40Z")
> [@Leo\_Bloom](#): > > This article, **[Patton warned of Pearl Harbor attack](https://www.army.mil/article/49030/patton-warns-of-pearl-harbor-attack/)** was published in an Army website December 7, 2012. > > As we all aware today is the 75th anniversary of the attack. > > Where did this memo of Patton go/get filed away by? Everyone knew it. It was filed away as “bleedingly obvious, and we’d better ensure grabbing the central Pacific area is a bad path for the Japs to take”. So what is this to do with the tragedy of Pearl Harbour ? 1. They didn’t have the fleet of air craft carriers at pearl harbour as sitting ducks. They wouldn’t trap the air craft carriers in where they had less manoeuvrability, various take off /landing headings were blocked by land … and certainly didn’t amass them all in one place. 2. They did have disposable resources sitting at pearl harbour but at the time they were quite busy for the purpose of readying the fleet of air craft carriers, and the defense force was there to defend Hawaii. Neither function could be interrupted . You do realise that there was a second possible attack ? Cruisers, Destroyers, pocket battleships and other fast boats make a landing, while the air craft defend them ? The regular navy was in pearl harbour to prevent pearl harbour being taken by a land force. The aerial attack on Pearl Harbour may have been predicted, but serves as no evidence that the USA military didn’t think about the japanese attacking the USA directly… Pearl harbour’s tragedy occurred here "The first wave was detected by U.S. Army radar at 136 nautical miles , but was misidentified as USAAF bombers … ". There’s the tragedy there. They trusted the radar and with little experience with radar, that was a mistake. They could have carefully analysed flight plans and worked out no flights were expected… but didn’t. it was a busy place and multiple sections of the military working there… no coordination to that level… ---
**Author:** ![md2000](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/73ab20/32.png) [@md2000](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/md2000)\ **Post date:** [December 10, 2016, 1:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/39 "2016-12-10T13:14:20Z")
I suspect the general thought was that Hawaii was too far for a successful invasion, and that any full-on invasion force would be so big that it would be noticed well before it arrived. Maybe the younger, more savvy and flexible-minded officers could see other alternatives; but don’t forget that the savage and innovative warfare of WWI was only two decades before, and that seemed to rely on fairly hefty, more immobile weapons; not a lot of naval work outside of submarine warfare. The true potential of bigger and more capable aircraft was not yet demonstrated to the west before WWII started. I assume in the minds of the more elderly admirals, and less savvy civilian government types, an attempt to take out the fleet at Pearl Harbor would start with the IJN sailing up within bombardment range. Aircraft might do some damage, but… for real effect, you need those massive guns. Why would they do that when we have these massive shore batteries? As for submarines - we’re sheltered inside the harbor. Plus, they were probably instead thinking, like Patton, in terms of full invasion and assessed that as too much of an overreach for the Japanese to attempt. ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [December 10, 2016, 3:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147/40 "2016-12-10T15:29:33Z")
> [@Northern\_Piper](#): > > He was court-martiales for insubordination. Accusing senior officers of “almost treasonable administration of national defence” is not about air power per se. It is an officer accusing other officers of treasonable conduct. > > The court martial found that the truth or falsity of Mitchell’s position on air warfare was irrelevant to the charges of insubordination. Mitchell was also pretty much wrong in his claims as well. He was arguing that bombers could sink ships by dropping bombs on them. His opponents argued this was almost impossible; bombers were less accurate than Mitchell claimed and ships could move around and shoot at the bombers. Mitchell was able to demonstrate that a bomb could sink a battleship. But the demonstration didn’t prove his larger point. The ships in the demonstration were unmanned and were anchored in place. When WWII started and people began dropping bombs in actual battle conditions, it was found that Mitchell had been wrong. Bombers routinely missed their targets by miles. Ships were sunk by planes, but it was torpedo bombers and dive bombers that were sinking them not the conventional bombers Mitchell had argued for. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147.md?page=1) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pattons-1937-itemized-intelligence-memo-on-japanese-attack-plans-impact-who-read-it/774147.md?page=3)