# Pearl Harbor: How much advance notice to get the battleships out to sea? **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [August 11, 2018, 5:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418 "2018-08-11T05:15:28Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 4
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2018, 3:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/61 "2018-08-13T15:19:35Z")
> [@AK84](#): > > Yeah, I guess he’ll have to ignore the fact that _\_Ostfriesland_ was statiinary and not shooting back. Yes. But the original statement was: \*\*AK84 \*\* _“Hitting ships at sea is not easy and on 7 Dec 1941 no capital ship had ever been destroyed from the air alone.”_ whereupon I countered with this list: Battleships: Ostfriesland , 1921 Alabama, 1921 Kilkis, 23 April 1941 Marat ,23 September 1941 Conte di Cavour, & Littorio 11 November 1940 ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2018, 3:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/62 "2018-08-13T15:20:38Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > T > > The US had AP (armor piercing) dive bombs and the Japanese did not. General ordnance bombs could other ships’ decks, including carriers, light cruisers, destroyers, etc., but couldn’t penetrate the armor on the BB. Didnt the IJN use a modified naval shell as a AP dive bomb? ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2018, 3:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/63 "2018-08-13T15:47:54Z")
> [@Corry\_El](#): > > In the initial attack on the US fields on Luzon many a/c were caught on the ground but more US fighters rose to engage the Japanese ones than at PH, mainly from fields not under attack. 4 P-40’s were downed with two pilots killed, 2 others were write offs from air combat damage, all 18 P-35’s engaged were hit though only one seems to have been an immediate write off and none were shot down outright. Three or 4 of the 7 Zeroes which failed to return were apparently victims of P-35/P-40’s, the others to AA while strafing, all 7 pilots killed. That wasn’t bad for by the standards of USAAF (or RAF or Dutch) fighters v IJN fighters in air combat early in the war, but the US fighters were fully occupied by the Zeroes and the Japanese bombers were untouched by them. It gives one idea of a possible alternative scenario at PH. As bad as the losses were at PH, the attack on the PI demonstrates exactly how unprepared the US military was for war. Despite knowing that the Japan would be attacking PI next, the US command simply did not know how to defend themselves, and consequently most of the planes were destroyed on the ground. The peacetime thinking was too strong. Fighter squadrons had come back then had sat down for lunch before the attack on Clark’s Field that wiped them out. Of course the US fighters couldn’t engage the Japanese land based bombers. In training exercises, these slow climbing aircraft weren’t able to engage US bombers flying at 20,000 ft, either. That would not have been the case at PH, where the Japanese level bombers where at 10,000 feet and the “low and slow” torpedo bombers where sitting ducks. As noted previously, the other material difference is that the Japanese did not have fighter escorts for their bombers at PH. Their radios were terrible so it would not have been likely to obtain help. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2018, 3:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/64 "2018-08-13T15:50:53Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > Didnt the IJN use a modified naval shell as a AP dive bomb? Those were the special AP bombs specifically for PH attack and dropped by the level bombers. I’m not certain that they never developed any during the war, but they didn’t have any at the beginning. ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2018, 4:07pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/65 "2018-08-13T16:07:16Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > As bad as the losses were at PH, the attack on the PI demonstrates exactly how unprepared the US military was for war. Despite knowing that the Japan would be attacking PI next, the US command simply did not know how to defend themselves, and consequently most of the planes were destroyed on the ground. The peacetime thinking was too strong. Fighter squadrons had come back then had sat down for lunch before the attack on Clark’s Field that wiped them out. > > . My Dad was in Dugout Dougs command HQ. His theory was that Doug had been ordered to let the Japanese take him by “surprise”, that the US knew of a impending IJN attack, but assumed it would be in PI, not HI. The idea being that the US voter might not support a war vs Japan over PI, unless by “sneak attack”. His other theory was that Dougout Doug was just a idiot, made into a cardboard hero at a time when the uS needed one. ---
**Author:** ![bump](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/7c8e57/32.png) [@bump](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/bump)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2018, 4:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/66 "2018-08-13T16:18:26Z")
> [@Little\_Nemo](#): > > Among the other surprises it inflicted that day, Japan used specially designed torpedoes that worked in shallow water. Or, if “Tora, Tora, Tora!” is to be believed, they had wooden fin contraptions that kept the torpedoes from diving too deep before leveling out. ---
**Author:** ![bump](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/7c8e57/32.png) [@bump](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/bump)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2018, 4:25pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/67 "2018-08-13T16:25:15Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > It has been said the the Japanese actually did the US a favor by sinking and knocking out these WWI relics. Also, the peacetime navy was understaffed, with the intention of filling the ranks in the event of a war. Sinking the ships released these experienced sailors for duty on other ships. > > The loss of so many of these giants forced the USN to quickly rethink strategies and doctrine to a greater degree than may have happened without the lopsided defeat. Ironically the IJN didn’t, despite or perhaps because of the win. Yup… after Pearl Harbor, the USN’s main combat strength in the Pacific was in the carrier groups, and the admirals had to rethink how to fight a war using that, as even the next four battleships under construction were due to be commissioned between March and September of 1942, which was a long way out. That had multifaceted advantages; they could produce carriers faster than battleships, and they had the ability to strike at much longer ranges- effectively rendering battleships obsolete except for being big targets. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2018, 4:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/68 "2018-08-13T16:31:07Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > My Dad was in Dugout Dougs command HQ. His theory was that Doug had been ordered to let the Japanese take him by “surprise”, that the US knew of a impending IJN attack, but assumed it would be in PI, not HI. The idea being that the US voter might not support a war vs Japan over PI, unless by “sneak attack”. His other theory was that Dougout Doug was just a idiot, made into a cardboard hero at a time when the uS needed one. I remember you mentioning your father being on MacArthur’s staff before. When was that? Interesting for a staff officer to suggest that he was just an idiot, and he wasn’t the first to make that comment. More than one historian have suggested that MacArthur become overwhelmed that morning, with many suggesting that he had a (minor?) nervous breakdown for the critical several hours when no one could get permission to launch an attack on Formosa. While he did have orders to not provoke the Japanese into attacking, he also had explicit orders to launch a counter attack if the Japanese attacked first. Which they did at PH and Wake Island. There should have been no question concerning that. With his close personal a professional ties to the Philippine president Manuel Quezon, certainly his conflict on interest cannot be ignored. As much as I dislike the general, the failure was not entirely his. Everyone was bad, with no one in the command structure prepared for an attack. Again, it was a peacetime organization which was suddenly thrust into war. ---
**Author:** ![Gorsnak](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/gorsnak/32/7587_2.png) [@Gorsnak](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gorsnak)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2018, 4:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/69 "2018-08-13T16:42:00Z")
> [@DesertDog](#): > > Here is [Wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Missouri_(BB-63)) on _Missouri_. Top speed, 32.7 kt Even [_Maine_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Maine_(ACR-1)), laid down in 1888 and the one that sank in Havana harbor, could manage 16.4 kt. I forgot all about the Maine. 😃 ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2018, 4:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/70 "2018-08-13T16:56:22Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > I remember you mentioning your father being on MacArthur’s staff before. When was that? Interesting for a staff officer to suggest that he was just an idiot, and he wasn’t the first to make that comment. > While he did have orders to not provoke the Japanese into attacking, he also had explicit orders to launch a counter attack if the Japanese attacked first. Which they did at PH and Wake Island. There should have been no question concerning that. > > With his close personal a professional ties to the Philippine president Manuel Quezon, certainly his conflict on interest cannot be ignored. > . My Dad was a Senior NCO. He arrived in PI in Dec 1941, just in time to get Malaria and get invalided home before the Japanese invasion was in full force. My Dad had the PI Defense, Liberation and Independence medals. After he was sent back to the States he was assigned “Repl-Depl” to the 10th Mtn, but then was sent back to Australia then New Guinea “by personal request” of some high ranking staffer of the “Bataan gang”. Dad never quite figured out why. Yes, he could type, drive and knew a little Japanese and Tagalog, but nothing unique. Dad did say he “knew the secret of Dugout Dougs escape”, he apparently knew the B17 crews that flew MacArthur out in the second leg. He was cicialian aircrew for Boeing before the war. I think he arrived as a civilian in a B17, volunteered on Dec 8th, then got sick. His records show he started as a Corporal? ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2018, 4:59pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/71 "2018-08-13T16:59:14Z")
> [@bump](#): > > Or, if “Tora, Tora, Tora!” is to be believed, they had wooden fin contraptions that kept the torpedoes from diving too deep before leveling out. Yes, the Japanese developed a wooden frame that attached to the torpedoes. The British had a wire that attached the torpedo to the plane for the first part of its drop and made it land on the water flat rather than headfirst. ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2018, 5:08pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/72 "2018-08-13T17:08:33Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > As much as I dislike the general, the failure was not entirely his. Everyone was bad, with no one in the command structure prepared for an attack. Again, it was a peacetime organization which was suddenly thrust into war. I disagree on that point. I think the fault was almost entirely MacArthur’s. He had been in command in the Philippines since 1937 and had made the command structure into what he wanted. And what he wanted were officers who were subservient to him. Anyone who showed initiative or independence was weeded out. So on December 8, you had an entire command structure which wouldn’t do anything until Douglas MacArthur told them to. And MacArthur himself had collapsed and wasn’t giving any orders. The entire military was paralyzed. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2018, 5:10pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/73 "2018-08-13T17:10:22Z")
> [@bump](#): > > Or, if “Tora, Tora, Tora!” is to be believed, they had wooden fin contraptions that kept the torpedoes from diving too deep before leveling out. No one needs to go to a movie for that information. It’s well documented. Many people believe that the Japanese got their idea for this modification from the British attack on Taranto. Here is a [typical quote](https://www.thoughtco.com/battle-of-taranto-2361438). > [@](#): > > To compensate for the shallow water of Taranto harbor (40 ft.), the British specially modified their torpedoes and dropped them from very low altitude. This solution, as well as other aspects of the raid, was heavily studied by the Japanese as they planned their attack on Pearl Harbor the following year. Yamamoto had already been thinking of attacking PH, and modifying torpedoes was something they had already considered. The Japanese had already added wooden breakaway fins to their torpedoes in 1936. _Tora, Tora, Tora_ has added to popular misconceptions concerning the attack. The first is the manufactured quote attributed to Yamamoto concerning his fear that all they did was awaken a sleeping giant. Although initially opposed to the war, he personally forced the IJN into carrying out the attack. Another was Air Commander Fuchida’s spurious claim that he argued for a third strike again the oil tanks. He was a technical adviser for the film and an accomplished liar by this point in his career. He mislead historians for decades concerning the state of the Japanese carriers at Midway and found other ways to lie as well. ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [August 13, 2018, 5:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/74 "2018-08-13T17:20:11Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > _Tora, Tora, Tora_ has added to popular misconceptions concerning the attack. The first is the manufactured quote attributed to Yamamoto concerning his fear that all they did was awaken a sleeping giant. Although initially opposed to the war, he personally forced the IJN into carrying out the attack. > > Another was Air Commander Fuchida’s spurious claim that he argued for a third strike again the oil tanks. He was a technical adviser for the film and an accomplished liar by this point in his career. He mislead historians for decades concerning the state of the Japanese carriers at Midway and found other ways to lie as well. Yes, that quote is very nice but doubtful. Hower, he was quoted: \*"If we are ordered to do it,” Yamamoto had answered, “then I can guarantee to put up a tough fight for the first six months, but I have absolutely no confidence as to what would happen if it went on for two or three years.” Yamomoto states this in 1940 to the then prime minister, Fumimaro Konoye. This was long before the Pearl Harbor attack . Again in September 1941 he made a similar prediction: “For a while we’ll have everything our own way, stretching out in every direction like an octopus spreading its tentacles. But it’ll last for a year and a half at the most.” SEPTEMBER 1941"\* > **[Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto Quotes | PearlHarbor.org](https://pearlharbor.org/blog/yamamoto-quote/)** > > Who said the quote about the sleeping giant? Maybe it is one of many Admiral Yamamoto Quotes. Read some of his other fascinating quotes here.|Who said the quote about the sleeping giant? Maybe it is one of many Admiral Yamamoto Quotes. Read some of... I’d be interested to hear more about that Fuchida info. ---
**Author:** ![Corry\_El](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/ecae2f/32.png) [@Corry\_El](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Corry_El)\ **Post date:** [August 14, 2018, 2:40am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/75 "2018-08-14T02:40:51Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > 1. As bad as the losses were at PH, the attack on the PI demonstrates exactly how unprepared the US military was for war. Despite knowing that the Japan would be attacking PI next, the US command simply did not know how to defend themselves, and consequently most of the planes were destroyed on the ground. The peacetime thinking was too strong. Fighter squadrons had come back then had sat down for lunch before the attack on Clark’s Field that wiped them out. > > 2. Of course the US fighters couldn’t engage the Japanese land based bombers. In training exercises, these slow climbing aircraft weren’t able to engage US bombers flying at 20,000 ft, either. That would not have been the case at PH, where the Japanese level bombers where at 10,000 feet and the “low and slow” torpedo bombers where sitting ducks. > > 3. As noted previously, the other material difference is that the Japanese did not have fighter escorts for their bombers at PH. Their radios were terrible so it would not have been likely to obtain help. 1. Overall I agree, there’s no reason to think the Hawaiian Air Force (as the US Army air contingent there was still called) was immune to readiness deficiencies. Although, some material ones were probably more acute in the Philippines\*, and some might have had to do with specific personal leadership issues. But in general the Hawaiian AF’s problems were probably obscured by being taken totally by surprise. Although the FEAF disaster on Dec 8, losing half the B-17’s on the ground and a lesser but significant % of the fighters on the ground, was also partly bad luck: fog at the Japanese fields on Formosa delayed their attack till US planes had to land after being launched to avoid being caught on the ground at dawn. 1. I was focusing on the aspect of the FEAF fighters being occupied in combat by the Zero escort on Dec 8, which they were. It’s true P-40’s also had lackluster altitude performance but an overstatement to say they couldn’t intercept IJN twins at ~18-20k ft (bombers over Clark at 5.5-6km). They did in later operations, as for example 49th FG defending Darwin Australia in 1942. But it required a coordinated air warning/direction system for one thing. The FEAF fighters had only practiced this a few times and found in this case US (ground) radio’s being used didn’t really work. Again, general unreadiness. 2. But if Hawaiian AF fighters had risen to meet the meet the incoming PH raid in numbers they too would probably have been heavily engaged by the Zero escort, which certainly did exist, 45 in the first wave 36 in the second (albeit not as big as the 87 Tainan/3rd AG Zeroes accompanying the missions over Luzon Dec 8). The PH Zeroes met no opposition at first, so went immediately to strafing. That allowed P-40’s taking off later to pick off a few attack planes without interference. \*the FEAF’s fighter contingent included many brand new P-40E’s. The pilots had a reasonable degree of flying experience in general but very little in those new a/c, which also had some teething problems. The HAF’s P-40B/C’s had been flown for awhile like the FEAF’s P-40B’s. The HAF’s P-36’s were also closer to being competitive with Zeroes than the FEAF’s P-35’s. There were a small number of completely obsolete P-26’s in both cases. ---
**Author:** ![Corry\_El](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/ecae2f/32.png) [@Corry\_El](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Corry_El)\ **Post date:** [August 14, 2018, 4:00am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/76 "2018-08-14T04:00:33Z")
> [@Chronos](#): > > Not just that: A plane can dive faster than a bomb can free-fall, so when a dive bomber released its bombs, they’d be going faster than a level-dropped bomb would be at the same altitude. A faster bomb means less time before it hits, which means less distance for the target to move. For WWII dive bombers it was the other way around, the plane had way more sectional area for its weight especially with dive brakes to slow it down. A bomb could be going supersonic speed if dropped from high enough, as would be an AP shell. As was mentioned, modified battleship caliber AP shells were used as AP bombs. This was the dilemma trying to kill battleships with bombs. A dive bomber had a good chance of a hit but from too low to give any chance of penetrating a then-modern battleship’s main armor deck. A level bomber at 10 or 20k ft could get the penetration, but was very unlikely to get a hit on a moving ship with an unguided bomb. The most elegant solution was a guided AP bomb dropped from high altitude, the German Fritz X which sank the Italian battleship Roma, besides of course torpedoes\*. AP bombs of the type dropped by US dive bombers on Yamato would only work fully work against lighter armored ships like cruisers. None of the bombs dropped on Yamato penetrated the armor deck (some were general purpose bombs anyway), though they caused serious fires above it. \*two other approaches: the US Army trials in the early 20’s (against moored obsolete US and more modern German battleships) tried another method which was 2000# non-AP bombs to inflict underwater damage by shock from near misses, but battleship underwater protection was very strong by WWII And the Germans had rocket assisted unguided AP bombs to boost the speed when dropped by a dive bomber at low altitude. ---
**Author:** ![Sloe\_Moe](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/8797f3/32.png) [@Sloe\_Moe](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sloe_Moe)\ **Post date:** [August 14, 2018, 4:13am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/77 "2018-08-14T04:13:58Z")
I think it was explained that firing up boilers would take too much time. And towing them initially out when they are are anchored side-by-side was hard. So the logical hindsight solution was to install anti-torpedo nets. So they could have been kept from getting torpedoed but as to how it could defend against dive and level bombers, it couldn’t, as long as they were in the harbor. ---
**Author:** ![Leo\_Bloom](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/leo_bloom/32/10377_2.png) [@Leo\_Bloom](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Leo_Bloom)\ **Post date:** [August 14, 2018, 3:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/78 "2018-08-14T15:32:07Z")
> [@Chronos](#): > > …Google helpfully bolded the wrong part for me. It does in fact say 35 knots top speed… Interesting in a possible sad way, given that the entire world, including even you here! (before doing the sensible thing)–becomes accustomed/reduced to Google-borrowing the class notes of someone who doesn’t get it. ---
**Author:** ![Capn\_Carl](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/838e76/32.png) [@Capn\_Carl](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Capn_Carl)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2018, 3:19am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/79 "2018-08-15T03:19:13Z")
> [@ExTank](#): > > Uhm…no; the Battleship had not yet quite been relegated to the scrapheap of history/limited use effectiveness just yet (as of Pearl). Admiral Jesse Olendorf, in command of Task Force 77.2, fought the last major ship-to-ship gun battlel in the Battle of Surigao Strait/Battle of Leyte Gulf, in late October, 1944. > > I would argue (debate) that the big-gun ships weren’t truly obsolete until the advent of reliably accurate anti-ship missiles. > > Actually, since I apparently missed my true calling (Submariner; how I dearly love to torpedo surface ships!), I would argue that surface warships in general became obsolete with the advent of the nuclear submarine and accurate sound/wake homing torpedoes! > > **ETA:** I do agree with your point, that had the BBs not been ravaged at Pearl, then the Pacific Theater’s tactics/strategy would have been considerably different. Oldendorf’s BBs are often given credit for winning at Surigao, but the Japanese ships were sunk by destroyer torpedoes, not gunfire. ---
**Author:** ![Rocky\_from\_Plano](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Rocky\_from\_Plano](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Rocky_from_Plano)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2018, 12:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418/80 "2018-08-15T12:36:11Z")
Love this thread!!! Many interesting points have been made. To repeat what many of said, if the battleships had made it to sea before the attack, it is most likely less of them would have been badly damaged, but if any had been sunk, there would have been no way to salvage them. The repaired ships played important roles later in the war, against shore and sea targets. (Your BB does not have to sink the other ship to be effective.) Distracting the other side from attacking your smaller ships (not to mention damage you cause when your big shells do hit), makes it easier for the little guys to press home their attack. If you look at the damage the Taffy 3 DDs and DAs caused without big ship support, imagine what they might have done if they had a couple BBs (or even heavy cruisers) on their side. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418.md?page=3) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/pearl-harbor-how-much-advance-notice-to-get-the-battleships-out-to-sea/819418.md?page=5)