Lots of people remember Pearl Harbor. Substantially fewer recall Japan taking Nanking in 1937, also a soldier striking American consul John Moore Allison in the face and the sinking of a US gunship at that time. In 1940 Stimson initiated sanctions in the Export Control Act and moved the Pacific Fleet to Hawaii. It passed the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941.
And yet they had fighter aircraft on the island, almost as if they contemplated the possibility of engaging in some form of aerial combat. And obviously the only way that the Japanese were going to get onto any part of Hawaii was from the sea, via amphibious landing. So I’m not really sure what you’re getting at.
Anyway, it’s kind of moot as far as I am concerned. The main thrust of what I am getting at is that even if Ward’s report of engaging a submarine had been 100% believed and attributed to the Japanese—even to the Japanese initiating hostilities—it’s still a few steps removed from that to anticipating a carrier-based air raid or even, if you prefer (if you think the Army simply could not have countenanced the idea of an air raid), an amphibious invasion. It’s a submarine. Maybe it’s operating in concert with a larger fleet, maybe it’s not. Nothing about it necessarily cues thoughts of an impending major action. Certainly not enough to scramble every fighter (scramble to where and for how long?), perhaps not even any fighters at all.
In hindsight we are able to draw the connection between Ward engaging a midget submarine and the imminent attack on Pearl Harbor. But at the time, would it have been reasonable to conclude that a single engagement with a Japanese submarine (assuming they had credited Ward’s report and drawn the inference it likely belonged to the IJN) should trigger anything more than increased patrols, perhaps a cancelling of leave and a heightened state of readiness short of taking to the air or sortieing the fleet?
Honestly, if the reported threat is a submarine being sighted just outside Pearl Harbor, I think the last thing I’d want to do is sortie the capital ships. What if there are more submarines there, just lying in wait? Best to get some scout planes in the air, and maybe send out some destroyers to conduct a search of the approaches to the inner harbor before sending anything too valuable out and risk having it eat a torpedo…
Pearl Harbor gave MacArthur ample warning of an attack on the Philippines, but he would not take pre-emptive action against the Japanese. The Navy had a different attitude. My father told me in 1940 that the Navy considered the US to be at war with Japan. He was flying patrols from Seattle to Alaska.
The interesting thing is that the Ward fired on the submarine. We were not at war with Japan and midget subs were not commonly recognized as a threat. The Navy obviously was on different footing than the Army.
The Army airplanes were part of the Signal Corps. They were concentrated in an area where they could be protected from saboteurs. There was no operational plan for air defense. At most, Stark would have put soldiers on the alert in coastal trenches. The Army had responsibility for defending Pearl but the Army was still fighting WW1.
I’m curious as to what these assumptions are made on, because they don’t match historical reality. There was plenty of mistakes made by everyone, and America was completely unprepared, but I don’t see the justification for the hate of the US Army in this case.
From a really good book, Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions by Alan Zimm:
So, in your opinion, were they more stupid for having AA capacity when the “probably would have assumed they were repelling a land invasion, not an attack by air”?
Of course, they didn’t do particularly well that morning because they hadn’t been at full alert that morning.
A little known fact was the military had been at higher levels of alert in November and then relaxed the alert for reasons which must have seemed good at the time. Had they maintained the high level for alert, they would been able to shoot down more planes.
I understand your second point better than the first, but note that Prince of Wales’ speed had ready been reduced after the first hit to a speed less than the old battleships. Different sources give a range between 11 and 15 knots, and with the electric steering out, the ship was difficult to maneuver. Despite that, and the problems with the AA, and the Japanese still only hit three out of 26 on the second attack, about 11%.
For the first point, I’m not sure the value of comparing the theoretical power as opposed to the actual power.
I thought about the attack all day, and I just can’t get it to add up to three. Even two seems difficult, while four is out of reach and five is right out.
The attackers were arranged in shotai (small groups) of four, with 16 Kates from Soryu and Hiryu assigned the carriers and 24 torpedo bombers from Akagi and Kaga assigned the battleships. Six of the eight from Soryu attacked Utah.
The best way to attempt to sink three ships would be for the 16 from Soryu and Hiryu to concentrate on one and the 24 from Akagi and Kaga to split up into two groups of 12. However, the numbers just aren’t there.
For the attacks with only 12, getting really lucky and sinking with only four torpedoes would still require 33% hits, an impossible number. The group with 16 would “only” be 25%, which is still better by more than twice over the second attack on the crippled Prince of Wales.
It gets worse assuming a more realistic five or six hits, with up to 50% hit ratio.
One serious problem about this was the attack on Pearl Harbor was set for the planes to attack one at a time rather than in parallel as is normally the case. While many (and presumably most) of the pilots had trained on the normal attack method, Japanese were not really good at changing orders on the fly. They were not using radios during the attacks and attempting to set up coordinated attack by hand signals would be more difficult.
As hinted about above, there wasn’t good target discipline in the historical attack.
If any of the planes when charging off by themselves or in small groups to attack other battleships, then that would lower the odds.
Even sinking two wouldn’t be easy. Presumably, the groups would be 16 planes (with the math done above) and 24. Even getting four hits from 24 would be more difficult than the attack on the crippled Prince of Wales. Achieving five hits would be their success rate would be 20%, which doesn’t seem likely and six would again be unrealistic.
All that calculations aside, I agree with @ASL_v2.0 that charging out of the harbor would be unlikely, simply based on sinking a sub.
Yeah, I don’t know. A nation does not have to be at war to defend its territorial waters and a sub appearing unannounced, traveling submerged, in the process of submerging, or otherwise in the process of seeking to evade detection in territorial waters can be fired upon, whether or not nations consider themselves at war, whether or not our modern sensibilities (not anticipating being drawn into an ongoing global conflict) might prefer to take a wait and see approach. Consider it the equivalent of a flight of US army aircraft coming back, fully armed, from a training mission (double plus unlikely, but just follow with me) and happening upon a flight of Japanese aircraft laden with bombs approaching Hawaii, entering into US air space. That’s not the sort of thing where you have to just follow the aircraft in and wait for them to start unloading ordinance. You can deduce from the circumstances that some serious violation of sovereign territory is in progress and use whatever force is necessary to end the incursion.
You keep saying that as if it supports your position. Even if I were to grant that the Army had not learned the lessons of the preceding decades (certainly there is evidence that they hadn’t learned all lessons in full, based on how it actually performed in combat during some early engagements), even a WWI Army would have been capable of understanding the threat posed by aircraft, especially to installations on land, or even just for their utility in conducting reconnaissance and overflight of defenses in advance of a ground assault. They didn’t have to read the most up to date reports coming out of Europe for that: those were lessons straight out of WWI.
Agreed - battleships do not charge well from a cold start.
My attitude toward the Army is not one of hatred. It is just a comment on the state of the US military in 1941. The Army and Navy were in contention over the mission of coastal defense.
I think you’re thinking of the early radar set they had at Pearl Harbor. That was part of the Signal Corps.
The radar set operated for a few hours every day, and it picked up a large mass or planes heading for Pearl Harbor early on December 7th. When they called it in, the AAF duty officer assumed it was the B-17s coming in from California and told them not to worry about it.
The Nevada had her boilers up and was attempting to leave the harbor in under an hour.
I think I’m either not expressing myself well or you’re misreading me or some combination of the two. I’m not arguing for any particular damage/sinking distribution or that the fleet sortieing would be the only or likely outcome of the hypothetical presented by Asuka, I’m noting that
Simply wasn’t going to happen. There was no chance of the attack doing minimal damage or of almost all the battleships escaping unharmed even if the fleet was at full alert and fighters were in the air, regardless of how likely or unlikely a reaction this would have been to the Ward’s attack being taken more seriously. Even taking the hypothetical of everyone going on full alert for an incoming air strike at face value wouldn’t result in the US fleet emerging unscathed or with minimal damage. The strike was too large, the Japanese too skilled, and the anti-aircraft abilities of the US fleet too weak for that to be a plausible outcome; battleships were going to be hit, damage on some of them was going to be enough to put them out of action, and at least something sinking was very likely.
Channeling Monty Python?
OK, I think I understand better what you are saying, and agree that the post you were replying to was unrealistic.
I wasn’t really arguing with you so much as riffing of the question if more ships could be sunk. Obviously, in the deep water, nothing was going to get refloated where two BB were in the historical attack. However, the question of how bad could it have been is an interesting question.
You know the following, but it may be interesting for others.
I agree, the Japanese were very good, including probably having squadrons of torpedo bombers which were the best, or among the best, in the world. They developed the anvil attack, for example which the US Navy took much longer to master and actually accomplish in the war. The US had faulty, inferior torpedoes and an obsolete bomber at the start of the war at well, which made sinking ships much more difficult.
The original AA capacity of USN warships was designed to handle biplanes and it wasn’t upgraded to keep up with the increased lethality of the attackers. It wasn’t until 1940 with the breakout of war in Europe that the USN really started to look into the matter. Rear Adm Ernest King, later COMINCH and CNO, was tasked in August, 1940 with chairing the newly formed Navy Department Antiaircraft Defense Board to further study the matter. In December, 1940, the Antiaircraft Defense Board declared that “. . . . the lack of adequate close range antiaircraft fun defense of existing ships of the Fleet constitutes the most serious weakness in the readiness of the Navy for war.”
The committee recommendations were included the 40 mm Bofors and 20 mm Oerlikons with upgrades starting in 42. Obviously, PH added urgency to the situation. The story of the Bofors is interesting, and although the US Army had been aware of the gun as early as 1937, the final deal allowing the US manufacturing rights wasn’t finalized until June, 1941.
One interesting fact about the 20 mm Oerlikons is that in 1935, the Bureau of Ordnance rejected the earlier 1934 model because it had been a low velocity weapon with a rate of fire of only 265 rounds a minute. However, the Japanese adapted this model and at the time of Pearl Harbor, it was their standard aircraft and antiaircraft gun. The investment from the Japanese allowed the company to perfect the 20-mm gun which the US found so effective against the Japanese. Also, in order to allow the mass production of the gun, manufacturing techniques and gun refinements reduced the number of hours required for manufacture from over 428 to less than 77.
However, while the USN warship AA capacity was completely inadequate, there were other reasons why an attack with several hours notice would have led to very different reasons, in or out of the harbor.
The ships weren’t in Material Condition Zed, concerning the status of waterproof doors and covers. Had they been secured, at least California may not have been sunk.
Arizona and Oklahoma, both sunk, were completely lost, of course. West Virginia (sunk) and California (sunk) returned to service in '44 while Nevada (beached), Tennessee and Maryland returned in '42.
There were fundamental flaws in the IJN planning for the raid, which is the reason I wonder just how bad would the outcome would have been for the US, have been had the fleet headed to sea, however unlikely that action would have been.
If the battleships had put to sea, they wouldn’t have been densely arranged , certainly not in straight lines, probably not stationary and the battleships may well have had better warning.
It seems to me that the japanese were extremely well prepared for attacking the battleships in Pearl Harbour and that gave them a better chance to get it right. For example they sent 49 Kates with bombs , to do high level bombing on the shore side battleships… that shows how prepared they were for the situation being that the attack was a surprise attack… … throw some more randomness in , and its a completely different situation ?
If they only attacked Pearl Harbour, the japanese planes would have had to bomb something and that might have been office and accomodation buildings rather than just large infrastructure (like fuel tanks, hangars … ) …
If they had somehow launched an attack on the battleships at sea … there are too many unknowns.
better warning ? In harbour, battleships had lesser crew, and they had only two minutes warning (the japapense plan was to not let them have ANY warning. ) at sea, they would have full crew, and have been operating their own radar and be very much more worried about incoming detection. five of 12 torpedo bombers who attacked the battleships were shot down, because 2 minutes warning let them get a bit of AA off.
But the torpedo bombers might have been able to attack the battleships more effectively.
They wouldn’t have wasted torpedoes on lesser targets, 11 torpedoes (and hence 11 of the torpedo kates in the first wave , almost half) were wasted on Utah (a museum ship !) , Raleigh and Helena.
The Japanese torpedo bombers did also waste torpedoes by ensuring West Virginia was firmly on resting its keel on floor of the shallow mooring site with SEVEN torpedoes. Oklahoma four. California got the right number, two.
So it can go either way. The battleships can leave the day before, and the Japanese can’t find them, or they rendezvous with air craft carriers and things get serious.
Or suppose the battleships are almost left in port, but someone wakes up to the clues, and gets the battleships to rush out of port that morning but its too late, and its the worst possible timing, and they caught as a pack just out of port . While the USA get warning, the first waves 50 divebombers also attack battleships, and there’s no reason that the second wave wouldn’t just repeat the first wave,
and have 24 torpedo bombers and at least 50 dive bombers… and they could get a third wave in ? It seems that in some situations, the battleships can be wiped out. Its a thought like that , that might have entered the mind of the person who felt they could not issue an alert due to the detection of the submarines and increased traffic… what if the ships leave at the wrong time ? when is the right time ?
are they safer in port ? better to err on the side of status quo ?
On the issue of Japan declaring war after it had begun hostilities, this was its pattern of some years. Indeed, in the 1920s, Britain and Japan had a mutual defence treaty, Canada’s Defence Plan Number 1, or “what to do if the Yanks attack,” and counted on that. The plan noted that in the event of war with the US, (usually cast as part of a US/Britain war), Canada could depend on the British fleet showing up on the US east coast and the Japanese fleet on the west coast, with the advantage that Japan would have an element of surprise as it would start shooting before it declared war. The “day of infamy” was therefore part of Canada’s strategic reckoning, and Japan’s war policy well-known. Of course, the tricky part of any prediction is timing.
Jewish American Princesses?
(‘Japs’ can be wrong in more than one way!)
I do wonder, too, how likely the Americans - or at least those with the “battleship as God” mentality - even though about a sneak attack on the fleet that did not include an invasion. Maybe the Philippines was close to front lines and liable to attack (after which an invasion did follow) but perhaps the idea that a strategic attack would involve an air raid and then… nothing further was farfetched, probably not the sort of action that the top brass thought of as most likely - simply because it would have the effect it did, which would mean dragging the vast resources of the USA into a war that - so far - was not happening.
Would an invasion of Hawaii in 1941 have been feasible? Probably both sides recognized the unlikely possibility of success so dismissed that possibility and so the risk of an air attack from far away.
Even if everything had succeeded beyond their wildest dreams, and the entire Hawaii-harboured fleet was destroyed - what would have been the long term result? The Japanese assumed a long term hiatus and possible demoralized USA, but the US brass probably assumed the Japanese thought the same as they did and would know the response would be fierce. Different mindsets, perceptions.
It was not quite a Declaration of war, it was a final ultimatum that diplomatic measures had failed.
According to some sources, one of which was the John Ford Propaganda Film December 7 December 7th (film) - Wikipedia the carriers not being there had been reported to the Consulate. (oh, and that film is interesting)
The Japanese consulate had an extensive espionage staff and also recruited locals. They took clear pictures of Pearl Harbor.
However, the task force was under radio silence, and like engineer_comp_geek said the battleships were the primary target anyway.
Neither the USA nor Imperial Japan understood the other. Nothing could anger the USA more than an attack like Pearl Harbor. And the USA diplomatic attempts with Japan did not seem to be undergone with a understanding of that people and their leadership either.
Just the opposite. The USN doctrine prewar was to have carrier screen and scout for the battleships.
The IJN didn’t think about BB escorting CVs until well after Midway, either. To be fair, the IJN battleships didn’t have the kind of AA armament our BBs did. although later that was improved.
The US knew something was up, and soon, but not where or exactly when. Most thought the Philippines. Intelligence did not make things clear to Kimmel or Short, mind you, their communications were not precise.
The AA fire would not have been that intense. The BBs would have been damaged, and likely the Arizona still sunk or very badly damaged assuming the same “lucky” bomb hit. But having Battle stations up, watertight doors sealed, damage control at the ready- all that would have minimized the damage done. My total WAG would be one BB sunk (the Arizona or the OK) and several badly damaged.
The Arizona was sunk by bombs, not torps, note.
Note that the surprise at Pearl can be laid at anglophile FDR in a indirect way- the Atlantic was getting all the good stuff. Kimmel had begged for enough PBY Catalina to do a full around the clock air recon, but they were sent to fight Uboats instead.