# people who believe in ghosts

**URL:** <https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885>\
**Category:** The BBQ Pit\
**Created:** [March 1, 2004, 9:24am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885 "2004-03-01T09:24:00Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 5

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**Author:** ![Nametag](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/nametag/32/406_2.png) [@Nametag](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Nametag)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 3:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/81 "2004-03-01T15:38:38Z")

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Why the proof? It’s a trivial result of your (thoroughly invalid, IMHO) definition of “god.” If you define god as “necessarily existing,” you’ve already eliminated the possibility of god not existing – the proof is mere window dressing for dogma. Merely stating that “x is true” doesn’t make it true; definitions (or postulates) have to be agreed upon.

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**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 3:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/82 "2004-03-01T15:40:07Z")

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> [@Cheesesteak](#):
>
> When you put forth a premise that something is “possible” you immediately suggest that there is an alternate possibility. If you want to be intellectually honest, you have to examine those alternates, and treat them with the same validity as your initial premise.
> 
> You seem to suggest that an alternate premise is unacceptable. If you do not accept that what you propose is “possible” might not be true, how can you say you’ve proved anything?

On the contrary, I explicitly said that the alternative premise makes for a valid argument. I just think it is unsound for the reason I’ve stated.

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**Author:** ![Greymot](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/ebca7d/32.png) [@Greymot](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Greymot)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 3:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/83 "2004-03-01T15:40:30Z")

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> [@Libertarian](#):
>
> “It is possible god doesn’t exist” is the same as saying “It is not necessary that god exists”.

IANAL(logician) or whatever it is i need to be here, but those two statements do not mean the same thing.

the first statement says to me - that there is a possiblity - which is to say it can go either way and the second statement says - the existance is not necessary- which says nothing at all about possibility.

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**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 3:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/84 "2004-03-01T15:45:44Z")

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> [@Nametag](#):
>
> Why the proof? It’s a trivial result of your (thoroughly invalid, IMHO) definition of “god.” If you define god as “necessarily existing,” you’ve already eliminated the possibility of god not existing – the proof is mere window dressing for dogma. Merely stating that “x is true” doesn’t make it true; definitions (or postulates) have to be agreed upon.

Indeed they do. Who is the reputable philosopher whom you would cite who disagrees with everyone from Kant to Hartshorne?

“The following is, therefore, the natural course of human reason. It begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary being. In this being it recognizes the characteristics of unconditioned existence. It then seeks the conception of that which is independent of all conditions, and finds it in that which is itself the sufficient condition of all other things - in other words, in that which contains all reality. But the unlimited all is an absolute unity, and is conceived by the mind as a being one and supreme; and thus reason concludes that the Supreme Being, as the primal basis of all things, possesses an existence which is absolutely necessary.”

— Immanuel Kant, _Critique of Pure Reason_

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**Author:** ![Shade](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/2bfe46/32.png) [@Shade](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Shade)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 3:48pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/85 "2004-03-01T15:48:31Z")

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> [@Libertarian](#):
>
> It is important that g represent necessary existence.

Then don’t you think you should have said that in the proof? What do you mean by ‘representing recessary existance’? I’m having trouble seeing why g–\>N(g) should be true for any statement at all (except obvious tautologies).

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**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 3:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/86 "2004-03-01T15:49:04Z")

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> [@Greymot](#):
>
> IANAL(logician) or whatever it is i need to be here, but those two statements do not mean the same thing.
> 
> the first statement says to me - that there is a possiblity - which is to say it can go either way and the second statement says - the existance is not necessary- which says nothing at all about possibility.

Possibility is defined as the negation of necessary negation. Something is possibly true if it is not necessarily not true. See [Possible World Semantics](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/#6).

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**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 3:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/87 "2004-03-01T15:52:22Z")

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> [@Shade](#):
>
> Then don’t you think you should have said that in the proof? What do you mean by ‘representing recessary existance’? I’m having trouble seeing why g–\>N(g) should be true for any statement at all (except obvious tautologies).

Well, that’s what N(g) _means_. [Informal proof](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/actualism/ltrueNE.html). [Formal proff](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/actualism/proofNE.html).

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**Author:** ![Shade](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/2bfe46/32.png) [@Shade](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Shade)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 3:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/88 "2004-03-01T15:57:09Z")

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> [@Shade](#):
>
> Then don’t you think you should have said that in the proof? What do you mean by ‘representing recessary existance’? I’m having trouble seeing why g–\>N(g) should be true for any statement at all (except obvious tautologies).

On re-reading the rest of your thread, I see you’re defining g differently to how I expected, in which case I was too hasty in agreeing with ~N(~g).

Apologies for any confusion. Let me enumerate my objections by cases:

(1) You define g to be existance of a being which is “omnipotent” or “infinitely good” or some other property traditionally assigned to God. Then (subject to seeing how it is actually defined) I agree g is possible (~N(~g)), but don’t see why g–\>N(g).

(2) You define g to be the statement “g–\>N(g)” Then I no longer see why g must be possible. (But agree that if g were possible g is necessary.)

(3) You define g to be “g–\>N(g) AND exists(omnipotent being)” (or some other property instead of omnipotent. Then I dont’ see why g is possible for the same reason as in (2).

(4) You define g in some way I haven’t thought of. Please, explain it to me - I may yet be convinced.

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**Author:** ![Greymot](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/ebca7d/32.png) [@Greymot](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Greymot)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 3:59pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/89 "2004-03-01T15:59:47Z")

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> [@Libertarian](#):
>
> Possibility is defined as the negation of necessary negation. Something is possibly true if it is not necessarily not true. See [Possible World Semantics](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/#6).

I think, as someone mentioned earlier, that the layman’s definition of possible is not the same as the logician’s. The two statement’s i was talking about still do not mean the same thing.

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**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 4:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/90 "2004-03-01T16:01:32Z")

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> [@Shade](#):
>
> On re-reading the rest of your thread, I see you’re defining g differently to how I expected, in which case I was too hasty in agreeing with ~N(~g).
> 
> Apologies for any confusion. Let me enumerate my objections by cases:
> 
> (1) You define g to be existance of a being which is “omnipotent” or “infinitely good” or some other property traditionally assigned to God. Then (subject to seeing how it is actually defined) I agree g is possible (~N(~g)), but don’t see why g–\>N(g).
> 
> (2) You define g to be the statement “g–\>N(g)” Then I no longer see why g must be possible. (But agree that if g were possible g is necessary.)
> 
> (3) You define g to be “g–\>N(g) AND exists(omnipotent being)” (or some other property instead of omnipotent. Then I dont’ see why g is possible for the same reason as in (2).
> 
> (4) You define g in some way I haven’t thought of. Please, explain it to me - I may yet be convinced.

G means ontological perfection. See the quote above from Kant.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![paulberserker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/c4cdca/32.png) [@paulberserker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/paulberserker)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 4:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/91 "2004-03-01T16:01:41Z")

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So, if N(g) = possiblility of god, and  
g = god exists, does that then mean that (L) = a bunch of superlogical nerdy bollocks that makes no sense to anyone but you Libertarian?

you can be as logical as you want, but it still doesnt mean God does or does not exist. I bet you’re a real laugh down the pub you.

fucking making my head spin this thread. ‘My friends reckon they hear ghosts’ ‘bleh blah bleh logical progression existence/non existence g(N) god klfy8owgbf’

little numbers and letters written down like (g)N =B if (paul)=U(2) don’t prove fuck all. thankyou.

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**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 4:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/92 "2004-03-01T16:03:29Z")

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> [@Greymot](#):
>
> I think, as someone mentioned earlier, that the layman’s definition of possible is not the same as the logician’s. The two statement’s i was talking about still do not mean the same thing.

Well, I don’t think the layman’s definition of “successor” is the same as Peano’s either. But that doesn’t mean that his proof that 1 + 1 = 2 is dubious.

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**Author:** ![Shade](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/2bfe46/32.png) [@Shade](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Shade)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 4:11pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/93 "2004-03-01T16:11:03Z")

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> [@Libertarian](#):
>
> Well, that’s what N(g) _means_. [Informal proof](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/actualism/ltrueNE.html). [Formal proff](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/actualism/proofNE.html).

Thanks for replying so quickly. Hold on while I try to assimilate those pages.

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**Author:** ![Cheesesteak](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/cheesesteak/32/3694_2.png) [@Cheesesteak](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Cheesesteak)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 4:11pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/94 "2004-03-01T16:11:18Z")

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> [@Libertarian](#):
>
> An argument is valid if all its inferences follow from its premises; it is sound if it is valid and its premises are true.

Ok, so we have my alternate premise resulting in a “valid” argument that god does not exist. However, you say the argument is unsound. Valid, but unsound arguments are that way because the premise is not true, if the premise were true, then the argument would be sound.

I take issue with you saying the premise “It is possible for god to not exist” is untrue. As you said, the revised premise becomes “It is not necessary for god to exist” in contrast to the original “It is not necessary for god to not exist”.

I do not see any reason to take one as a true premise, but not the other.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Shade](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/2bfe46/32.png) [@Shade](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Shade)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 4:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/95 "2004-03-01T16:15:14Z")

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> [@Libertarian](#):
>
> G means ontological perfection. See the quote above from Kant.

Can you express that in logic terms?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![mkl12](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/b4bc9f/32.png) [@mkl12](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/mkl12)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 4:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/96 "2004-03-01T16:16:14Z")

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Is it possible to have a premise like “it is possible that god exists and it is possible that god doesn’t exist”? What would the proof make of that?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Greymot](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/ebca7d/32.png) [@Greymot](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Greymot)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 4:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/97 "2004-03-01T16:16:43Z")

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> [@Libertarian](#):
>
> Well, I don’t think the layman’s definition of “successor” is the same as Peano’s either. But that doesn’t mean that his proof that 1 + 1 = 2 is dubious.

I have no idea who Peano is or why he needed to redefine ‘successor’ to prove 1+1=2, i still don’t see how those two statements say the same.

possible - capable of being true without contradicting proven facts, laws, or circumstances.

necessary - Absolutely essential  
so not necessary would be not absolutely essential

thats from [dictionary.com](http://dictionary.com) and the definitions i use to parse the statements, so that can’t mean the same.

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**Author:** ![CheekyMonkey613](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/e480ec/32.png) [@CheekyMonkey613](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/CheekyMonkey613)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 4:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/98 "2004-03-01T16:18:42Z")

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S5 Axioms Invoked … N(g) whatevers …  
Way over my head boys.

The only way you know if ghosts exist is if you see one. If you want to believe ghosts exist (and your grandma is sitting with you), that’s faith, not proof. Some people who don’t want to believe they exist have seen them, such as my father.

No science you offer will convince someone that they haven’t seen a ghost if they have. I’ve seen more than one ~ I’d say about 6 in my life, I guess. In different forms. Some are like what you see in the movies ~ a person is just see-through. Some are the shapes of people, filled with the kind of wavy air you see over a hot BBQ in the summer. (Note: I did not see those ghosts standing over a hot BBQ in the summer).

I still know the creeks in my house is the building settling. I still know the _tick tick tick_ is something wrong with the pipes. And I know I’ve indeed LOST the business card with my next hair apointment written on the back of it, not that a ghost is hiding one on me, because they like my hair the way it is.

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**Author:** ![Dead\_Badger](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/848f3c/32.png) [@Dead\_Badger](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dead_Badger)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 4:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/99 "2004-03-01T16:20:20Z")

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> [@Libertarian](#):
>
> A reasonable point of view, Dead Badger, although I disagree.
> 
> As I see it, the dishonesty comes from the opposing side…

Oh fine - I wasn’t trying to take issue with your treatment of the OP, rather with the modal proof itself. Sorry if this is to hijack the thread, but it seemed like we’d gotten away from ghosts somewhat. I also am not accusing you of dishonesty, but I do think that the modal proof fundamentally “works” by taking advantage of a misunderstanding, whether consciously or otherwise.

Now, however, things have indeed moved on to the fundamental question of the definition: god as that which is necessary. You seem now to be justifying this by an appeal to authority, and a paragraph in which Kant describes _a_ process of reason leading to the concept of god as that which is necessary. Even assuming that one ought to accept such an appeal to authority, I would take quite some convincing that Kant and every other reputable philosopher mean by their terms exactly what you do, and that they consequently accepted without reservation the existence of god.

From your paragraph, shorn of context, it’s not really possible to derive much other than that Kant wrote at least one paragraph in which he said that some people will reach the conclusion that the supreme being’s existence, _should one first accept its existence at all_, is necessary. Here again, he has used the _word_ “necessary”, but it is unclear as to whether he is using your concept. More than one source I can find ([example](http://www.mun.ca/phil/codgito/vol3/v3doc1.html)) holds that Kant’s Critique of Reason treats god in an epistemic sense, rendering quotations of his irrelevant in this context. To complete your proof, you really need to demonstrate to everyone’s satisfaction why god should be considered to be that which must exist at all possible worlds. Presumably it’s fairly evident, if every reputable philosopher subscribed to such a notion.

Oh, and my apologies Lamia - you’re quite right, I ended up wholly repeating you; I missed your post on preview.

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**Author:** ![Nightime](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/n/e9c0ed/32.png) [@Nightime](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Nightime)\
**Post date:** [March 1, 2004, 4:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/people-who-believe-in-ghosts/231885/100 "2004-03-01T16:38:39Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> Who is the reputable philosopher whom you would cite who disagrees with everyone from Kant to Hartshorne?

Why not Kant himself?

You realize, of course, that Kant believed your proof to be unsound.  
I think his objection was something along the lines of not accepting that existence in possible worlds makes a being “greater”.  
I have to agree with Kant, and reject the proof.

In fact, I have an alternative to your “existence in more possible worlds makes a being greater” idea:

The greatest possible being exists in the greatest possible world.

Unless you are going to argue that our actual world is the greatest possible world, we are not graced with the presence of the greatest possible being.

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