# Perry Mason endings

**URL:** <https://boards.straightdope.com/t/perry-mason-endings/696304>\
**Category:** Factual Questions\
**Created:** [August 23, 2014, 5:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/perry-mason-endings/696304 "2014-08-23T17:31:12Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 7\
**Page:** 4

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**Author:** ![Bricker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/977dab/32.png) [@Bricker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bricker)\
**Post date:** [August 27, 2014, 9:48pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/perry-mason-endings/696304/61 "2014-08-27T21:48:59Z")

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> [@YogSosoth](#):
>
> What justification would the lawyer (other than the fact that he’s a lawyer) have for having an uncoerced confession suppressed and why would the judge grant it?

> [@RivkahChaya](#):
>
> If the prosecutor does not believe the confession, and thinks it is an attempt to confuse the jury and get the defendant off. If the defendant is being tried on a capital charge, there may be someone willing to risk a perjury charge so his/her son/brother/spouse doesn’t get the death penalty. This is particularly true if the confessor has an alibi, and is confident of not getting convicted on the actual murder charge, and at worst will be charged with perjury.

Interesting. It never occurred to me until I read this response that you were talking about suppression in the original trial.

In other words, Abby is on trial for the murder of her Great-aunt Bertha. During her trial, Cecilia stands up at a dramatic moment and confesses that she, not Abby, killed Bertha.

Are we talking about the admissibility of Cecilia’s statement in Abby’s trial, or in the presumably subsequent trial of Cecilia?

> [@](#):
>
> FWIW, juries are not allowed to consider things not presented to them as evidence (no matter what happened in _12 Angry Men_). There was a case of a guy named David Dowaliby who was accused of murdering his daughter, and was tried and convicted. During the trial, the jury was shown photographs of the girl’s bedroom, and on the inside of the door, were dents that looked like they could have been made by a fist. Nothing whatsoever was said about them by either lawyer; they were just part of the photos that were shown to give the jury an idea of the layout of the house. However, during deliberations, the jury discussed the dents, and decided that 1) David Dowaliby must have made them; that 2) he punched the door; and 3) therefore had a bad temper and was capable of violence against a child.
> 
> As it happened, the dents in the door were made somehow by the previous owners, and already there when the Dowaliby’s bought the house.
> 
> David Dowaliby had already had lost his first appeal. Then, somehow, his lawyer found out about the jury having discussed the door (maybe he met with some of the jurors to plan strategy for appeal). Anyway, when the lawyer found out about this, he applied for a mistrial, and got it. I’m not sure if that qualifies as “jury misconduct,” or what, but part of any jury’s instructions is not to consider anything not presented as evidence, and the jury ignored that instruction.

That is either:

(a) absolutely incorrect, or  
(b) an incredible coincidence: David Dowaliby of Cook County, Illinois, was convicted of murder for the 1988 death of his daughter, but you meant some OTHER David Dowaliby whose case I am unable to locate

The David Dowaliby in Cook County, Illinois did not lose an appeal, and his conviction was not reversed for any reason similar to what you describe above.

The case is _People v. Dowaliby, 582 NE 2d 1243_ (Ill. App Ct 1991). Dowabily and his wife Cynthia were co-defendants, and at the conclusion of the trial the judge ruled that as to Cynthia, the prosecution had simply not presented enough evidence as a matter of law to support a conviction. He let David’s case go to the jury, and they convicted. David’s first and only appeal was to the Illinois Appellate Court, First Division. In 1991 that court reversed his conviction on the grounds that the only evidence against him that was not also present against Cynthia was the identification of a photograph of David by witness Everett Mann:

> [@](#):
>
> Mann testified that at 2 a.m. on September 10, 1988, from 75 yards away, he saw a dark-colored car in the rear parking lot of the Islander Apartments near the location where Jaclyn’s body was later discovered. When the car’s headlights went on, Mann looked and saw a head inside the car near the front where the driver would sit. Mann stated that he saw the profile of a large nose. He was not sure whether the person was white or African-American.
> 
> On September 16, 1988, after being shown five front view and full-faced photographs, including one of David, Mann stated that David’s nose structure looked similar to the profile nose structure of the person he saw on September 10, 1988. We note that for some unexplained reason, David’s photo was 30% larger than the other photos in the array. On September 28, 1988, the police showed Mann photographs of the Dowalibys’ two vans, truck, and light-blue Malibu car. Mann told the police that the Malibu, not the two vans and truck, most resembled the car he saw on September 10, 1988. Although the Dowalibys’ Malibu was light blue and Mann described the car he saw on September 10, 1988, as dark-colored, Mann explained that a light blue car could have appeared dark because the lighting in the parking lot was not very good on September 10, 1988.
> 
> A conviction cannot be sustained on doubtful, vague, and unreliable identification testimony. [internal citation omitted] At best, Mann’s identification was a vague identification of a nose profile. Mann, however, was never shown a profile photo of David, but only a frontal and full-faced view. Moreover, Mann never identified David or his nose in court. Mann was unable to state whether the man in the car was white or African-American, young or old, had or did not have a mustache, was bald or had a full head of hair, or wore glasses, or had other identifying characteristics. We, therefore, conclude that Mann’s identification testimony was doubtful, vague, unreliable and of no probative value.

I checked because I knew your story of an impeached jury verdict was not correct – jury verdicts generally cannot be impeached by the method you describe.

By the way, if your story had been correct the prosecution would have been free to re-try Dowaliby. But as events actually occurred, the appellate court reversed the conviction for lack of evidence, which meant the prosecution was unable to retry him.

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**Author:** ![YogSothoth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/y/8edcca/32.png) [@YogSothoth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/YogSothoth)\
**Post date:** [August 27, 2014, 10:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/perry-mason-endings/696304/62 "2014-08-27T22:56:54Z")

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I was actually assuming that the suppression would come in the new trial for the guy who confessed, not in the original trial where it might taint the prosecution

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**Author:** ![RivkahChaya](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/rivkahchaya/32/8919_2.png) [@RivkahChaya](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RivkahChaya)\
**Post date:** [August 28, 2014, 1:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/perry-mason-endings/696304/63 "2014-08-28T01:15:30Z")

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> [@Bricker](#):
>
> By the way, if your story had been correct the prosecution would have been free to re-try Dowaliby. But as events actually occurred, the appellate court reversed the conviction for lack of evidence, which meant the prosecution was unable to retry him.

I thought he did get a new trial, and the second time, the photos were not used, and he was acquitted. I read it in a book about people wrongly convicted that I got from the public library back when people used to get books from the public library, and I could have sworn I had a clear memory of the photo of the door. I guess I just remembered it incorrectly.

\*\*I do think I’m correct that the jury is charged with not considering information other than what is presented by one side or the other during the trial.  
\*\*  
Something else I remember, which I suppose I could be wrong about, was that there was once a trial where the defendant, who was accused of rape, had a bad stutter, and the victim said the rapist did not stutter. Apparently one jurist gave the jury a long lecture on how he stuttered, but could overcome it by force of will for a certain amount of time if it was important, causing another jurist to ask the judge if they could consider that jurist’s “testimony” (for lack of a better word) as evidence. The answer was an unequivocal “No,” and IIRC, the defense may have asked for a mistrial.

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**Author:** ![Bricker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/977dab/32.png) [@Bricker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bricker)\
**Post date:** [August 28, 2014, 1:26am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/perry-mason-endings/696304/64 "2014-08-28T01:26:36Z")

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> [@YogSosoth](#):
>
> I was actually assuming that the suppression would come in the new trial for the guy who confessed, not in the original trial where it might taint the prosecution

Me, too. But then I read this:

> [@RivkahChaya](#):
>
> If the prosecutor does not believe the confession, and thinks it is an attempt to confuse the jury and get the defendant off. If the defendant is being tried on a capital charge, there may be someone willing to risk a perjury charge so his/her son/brother/spouse doesn’t get the death penalty. This is particularly true if the confessor has an alibi, and is confident of not getting convicted on the actual murder charge, and at worst will be charged with perjury.

This seems to be talking about the evidentiary effect of the spontaneous outburst _on the current trial_.

If that’s the question, then the answer is: it depends on whether the outburst comes from a witness or a bystander.

A bystander’s outburst is not evidence. The jury must be instructed to ignore it, and it may require a mistrial.

A non-defendant witness who confesses on the stand is a trickier question. If the confession is responsive to a proper question, then it’s admissible. If. It’s an evidentiary harpoon, it’s not.

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**Author:** ![RivkahChaya](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/rivkahchaya/32/8919_2.png) [@RivkahChaya](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RivkahChaya)\
**Post date:** [August 28, 2014, 2:26am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/perry-mason-endings/696304/65 "2014-08-28T02:26:21Z")

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> [@Bricker](#):
>
> A non-defendant witness who confesses on the stand is a trickier question. If the confession is responsive to a proper question, then it’s admissible. If. It’s an evidentiary harpoon, it’s not.

Something that happened on _Law & Order_, and was supposedly based on a real case, albeit, which parts, I don’t know, was that a guy who had immunity for his testimony against the defendant suddenly confessed to three other serious, unrelated crimes, including a hit, because he had immunity.

Would that really work?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bricker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/977dab/32.png) [@Bricker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bricker)\
**Post date:** [August 28, 2014, 2:37am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/perry-mason-endings/696304/66 "2014-08-28T02:37:15Z")

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> [@RivkahChaya](#):
>
> I thought he did get a new trial, and the second time, the photos were not used, and he was acquitted. I read it in a book about people wrongly convicted that I got from the public library back when people used to get books from the public library, and I could have sworn I had a clear memory of the photo of the door.

Nope. One trial, conviction, followed by one appeal, conviction reversed for insufficiency of the evidence.

> [@](#):
>
> \*\*I do think I’m correct that the jury is charged with not considering information other than what is presented by one side or the other during the trial.  
> \*\*

Yes, sorta.

By that I mean: the jury may not consider extrinsic evidence. But they are certainly allowed to use their common experience and understanding to reach inferences.

For example, a jury’s deliberation might include the following exchange:

JUROR 1: C’mon, he obviously did it. Remember the 911 call? He was completely unemotional.

JUROR 2: That doesn’t prove anything. My uncle called 911 when my aunt was having a heart attack and he was as cool as could be. He only broke down after she went into surgery.

That’s absolutely proper jury discussion.

> [@](#):
>
> Something else I remember, which I suppose I could be wrong about, was that there was once a trial where the defendant, who was accused of rape, had a bad stutter, and the victim said the rapist did not stutter. Apparently one jurist gave the jury a long lecture on how he stuttered, but could overcome it by force of will for a certain amount of time if it was important, causing another jurist to ask the judge if they could consider that jurist’s “testimony” (for lack of a better word) as evidence. The answer was an unequivocal “No,” and IIRC, the defense may have asked for a mistrial.

Here, though, you’re probably right.

So what’s the difference?

It’s not always a bright-line obvious answer. But the aspirational rule is that juries may share their common sense observations and life experiences – such as how people respond under stress – because that’s the role of the jury: to bring to the court their common sense and life experiences.

What they can’t do is learn new, specific facts about issues that relate to the case from any source other than the trial. So the physiologic and behavioral aspects of a stutter is not something that would be in the common ken of the population … It’s one juror leveraging his supposed expertise in stuttering to a source of authority.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bricker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/977dab/32.png) [@Bricker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bricker)\
**Post date:** [August 28, 2014, 2:56am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/perry-mason-endings/696304/67 "2014-08-28T02:56:10Z")

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> [@RivkahChaya](#):
>
> Something that happened on _Law & Order_, and was supposedly based on a real case, albeit, which parts, I don’t know, was that a guy who had immunity for his testimony against the defendant suddenly confessed to three other serious, unrelated crimes, including a hit, because he had immunity.
> 
> Would that really work?

Maybe.

The sudden confession must be responsive to a question. This wouldn’t work:

Q: What is your name?  
A: Jeremy Jones.  
Q: And what do you do for a living, Mr. Jones?  
A: I’m a hit man, a hired killer, and last month I killed Anderson, Baker, and Carlson.

But if there’s a legitimate question, and the witness has immunity, then the immunity applies.

There are two types of immunity: use and transactional. Typically “use immunity” is granted in order to compel testimony. This means that what you say can’t be used against you, but you can still be prosecuted for the crimes if independent evidence is developed implicating you.

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