It’s the only military we’ve got. If the military’s having problems, then the volunteer military is having problems.
In no way is it the fault of those in the volunteer military. Just the way that, if I were to try to drive my car 1000 miles at 150 miles an hour without stopping, it wouldn’t be the fault of my car, or its designers and manufacturers, if anything went wrong.
OK then, what do you do if you need more troops than the volunteer army can provide? Pray for ponies?
Ever hear of a guy named Shinseki?
Abiziad has also said we are unable to put more troops into Iraq on a sustained basis.
Funny coinkydink that the maximum number we seem to be able to sustain there, by hook and by crook, is also magically the right number, and more couldn’t possibly help, but fewer troops would also be bad. Or maybe he got the Shinseki memo.
Look, it’s really simple: there are a lot of very bright people in the military, including at places like West Point and the Army War College and so forth. They think about military issues, great and small, and even go so far as to write (IIRC) peer-reviewed papers and stuff.
One of the things they surely have had to think about is, how many combat troops they can field, for how long, given the current attributes of the volunteer army?
The point being that if you’re going to try to field more troops than that, for longer than that, then you’re going to either need a bigger volunteer army, or you’re going to need to institute a draft. Or settle for fewer troops in the field than you’d like, or for less time than you’d like.
Can I get agreement on this, that those really are the only options?
In mid-war, particularly in mid-war in a war that isn’t going so well and meeting recruiting targets has been a challenge, a bigger volunteer army is off the table. You could’ve done it before the war (one more argument for waiting a year to invade Iraq, if they were adamant about doing it eventually), but now you’re stuck. Either fewer troops than ideal, or for less time than ideal, or a draft.
At this point in the devolution of the Iraq war, talking about a draft is silliness. It might’ve made sense in early 2004, when it might’ve delivered troops into battle by, say, late last year. But if we were to start gearing up tomorrow to draft and train conscripts, there’d be no point. Iraq’s already lost, and it’ll be even further down the tubes by the time we got draftees into combat.
But that still doesn’t negate the main point that the volunteer army is engaging in a whole string of responses to overload conditions. And that in and of itself means the happy talk by those credentialed two doofuses paints a false picture of how well the volunteer army is really bearing up.
