So having seen the report, having got to where we’ve got-- Do you feel, at this point in time, [that] we can say that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?
Unless you include the missiles there, everything points in the direction that there were no weapons of mass destruction there; and the missiles were, after all, means of delivering weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, chemical and biological. So I think you could probably conclude, yes, there were means of delivering, but there were not actual weapons of mass destruction.
Is that the point that you’ve reached yourself, in your own mind?
I don’t think anyone would totally exclude that you could stumble upon some hidden anthrax, or that you could stumble upon something. But every day, it’s more unlikely, and the question becomes more interesting – why did they behave as they did for 10 years, vis-›-vis UNSCOM? Why did they come with figures that they had to walk away from later on? Why did they deny access to UNSCOM if there actually were no weapons of mass destruction? This is the question that I think preoccupies me a lot, and I’ve been thinking a lot about it.
So why did Saddam Hussein deny access? Why did he act in a way that, to most people, seem very suspicious? Why – if there were no weapons of mass destruction?
I have some theories. One is the theory that they wanted to, on the one hand, send a message to the U.N. – “Yes, we have done away with it all. You should lift the sanctions,” but on the other hand, send a message sort of back door, that, “Well, you know, we might still have them.” As I said, it’s like putting up a sign on the door, “Beware of the dog” and you don’t have a dog. A little more respect among the neighbors and others.And the Americans actually thought they had chemical weapons. [So] that’s one possibility.
Another possibility is, why should they cooperate with inspectors if they weren’t rewarded for it? And the reward should be a lifting of sanctions. But the U.S. made it fairly clear, at least periodically, that they were never going to lift sanctions until Saddam was gone. If Saddam would not go, well, then the sanctions would remain; so why cooperate? That’s the second possibility. They were less relevant at the end, because the sanctions were not biting at the end. They could export as much oil as they wanted. The sanctions were more like glorified export controls to Iraq.
A third reason could be that they didn’t want the inspectors to get to places where they had conventional weapons. After all, the lines were pretty open between UNSCOM inspectors and intelligence organizations. Since the U.S. and the U.K. were there in the no-fly zones and could go bombing them any day, maybe they didn’t like the inspectors to pass on information to these intelligence [organizations about] where they had conventional weapons, that they could be bombed the next day; that’s a possibility.
…
Do you believe that there was an alternative to this war? And what was it?
Yes, I think the alternative would have been to continue the inspections. We might have clarified more, though I think that, with the American attitude, it would have taken a lot to convince them, and convince us, too, that there weren’t any weapons of mass destruction. They would probably have said that the inspectors are incompetent, they are too soft and Blix is too soft, etcetera. … So that would have been a hard thing to do.
But the inspectors would have been there, and in reality, would have achieved a containment. Iraq would not have gone ahead and restarted biological and chemical programs under our noses. If they didn’t do it between 1998 and 2002, when there were no inspectors, they were not likely to do it when the inspectors have come back.
…
The defectors – what do we think about the testimony of men like that now?
It’s a bit odd, I must say. There must have been many of them who came out, because the sites that were given to us by intelligence service must have come in most cases from defectors. But they have, of course, reasons. In some cases, they want to have asylum or they want to be settled. That may be the reason why they tell more than they actually know. They might have heard somebody say something, or they might believe-- How that psychology works, I really don’t know. But when you listen to it, you have to be very critical. You have to have corroboration. Someone like Rumsfeld, for instance, he said on some occasion …“The real knowledge you get from defectors.” Well, I think you should rethink that. He’s an intelligent man, so maybe he does.
…
Do you think David Kay will deliver for the administration, for the Bush government, which is what seems to be what is required of him?
I hope that he will be objective, because what he says will be scrutinized, and I will not take it as evidence if he simply says that one source [is] cooperating said this or that. That’s not evidence. We did not accept this as evidence. Or if he says that he has found something that could have been convenient for producing biological weapons, that’s not evidence, again. I think he has to be very careful about that, because the whole world will want to have truth.
Do you think that’s what it risks turning into already?
No, I wouldn’t say he’s done it yet. But I see in the 13 pages that they have published that I’ve seen some wordings of the kind that I’ve just quoted. And that will not be enough to prove the case that there were programs on biological and chemical weapons.
…
When you read David Kay’s Iraq Survey Group interim report which came out October 2003, what did you think?
Of course I took note, like everybody else, that they haven’t found any weapons of mass destruction, which really was a negation of what the governments were saying. … But I don’t think there was anything else you could do in the circumstances. I felt rather that they wanted very much to come to the conclusion that there were still programs – the intention was there. Saddam never abandoned the intention of building up his weapons of mass destruction. They talked, for instance, about things that were dual use, and hinting that yes, this might be an indication of the existence of weapons.
Take the contention that they have found a series of laboratories which belonged to the Muhabharat, the secret intelligence organizations, and they were “suitable” – if I remember the right word they used – they’re suitable for research and development of biological and chemical weapons. Well, let’s have the evidence – did they actually use it for that purpose? Was it ever used? But this innuendo is not enough to convince me. It could be, but we’d like to see more about that.
You sound pretty skeptical, as if this report really didn’t amount to much.
I’ve been skeptical all through, but I’ve also been skeptical about what the Iraqis told us. You see, I think that we need a critical thinking in this. When you look at evidence, a court uses examination of witnesses and cross-examination. At university, when you submit your thesis for your doctorate, you have an opponent appointed by your faculty who is there to cross-examine you and say what’s behind this. I think that here, we are talking about the guilt of a nation, and we also need some cross-examination. We need a critical eye to look at it.
