CIA mischaracterized Iraq WMD & abused intelligence position.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Conclusion 1. Most of the major key judgments in the Oct. 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq’s Continuing Programs for WMD, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence.
Conclusion 2. The Intelligence Community (IC) did not accurately or adequately explain to policymakers the uncertainties behind the judgments in the Oct. 2002 NIE.
Conclusion 3. The Intelligence Community suffered from a collective presumption that Iraq had an active and growing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. This “group think” dynamic led IC analysts, collectors and managers to both interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program as well as ignore or minimize evidence that Iraq did not have active and expanding WMD programs.
Conclusion 4. In a few significant instances, the analysis in the NIE suffers from a “layering” effect whereby assessments were built based on previous judgments without carrying forward the uncertainties of the underlying judgments.
Conclusion 5. IC managers did not encourage analysts to challenge their assumptions, fully consider alternative arguments, accurately characterize the intelligence reporting, or counsel analysts who lost their objectivity.
Conclusion 6. The Committee found significant short-comings in almost every aspect of human intelligence collection efforts against Iraq’s WMD activities, in particular that the IC had no sources collecting against WMD in Iraq after 1998. Most, if not all, of these problems stem from a broken corporate culture and poor management, and will not be solved by additional funding and personnel.
Conclusion 7. The CIA, in several significant instances, abused its unique position in the IC, particularly in terms of information sharing, to the detriment of the IC’s prewar analysis concerning Iraq’s WMD programs.
Source: The Senate Intelligence Committee unanimous report on Iraq 04-SIC1 on July 7, 2004
Iraq-al-Qaida contacts, but no complicity or assistance.
IRAQI LINKS TO TERRORISM
Conclusion 90. The CIA’s assessment that Saddam Hussein was most likely to use his own intelligence service operatives to conduct attacks was reasonable, and turned out to be accurate.
Conclusion 91. The CIA’s assessment that Iraq had maintained ties to several secular Palestinian terrorist groups was supported by the intelligence. The CIA was also reasonable in judging that Iraq appeared to have been reaching out to more effective terrorist groups and might have intended to employ such surrogates in the event of war.
Conclusion 92. The CIA’s examination of contacts, training, safehaven and operational cooperation as indicators of a possible Iraq-al-Qaida relationship was a reasonable and objective approach to the question.
Conclusion 93. The CIA reasonably assessed that there were likely several instances of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida throughout the 1990s, but that these contacts did not add up to an established formal relationship.
Conclusion 94. The CIA reasonably and objectively assessed that the most problematic area of contact between Iraq and al-Qaida were the reports of training in the use of non-conventional weapons, specifically chemical and biological weapons.
Conclusion 95. The CIA’s assessment on safehaven—that al-Qaida or associated operatives were present in Baghdad and in northeastern Iraq in an area under Kurdish control—was reasonable.
Conclusion 96. The CIA’s assessment that to date there was no evidence proving Iraqi complicity or assistance in an al-Qaida attack was reasonable and objective. No additional information has emerged to suggest otherwise.
Conclusion 97. The CIA’s judgment that Saddam Hussein, if sufficiently desperate, might employ terrorists with a global reach—al-Qaida—to conduct terrorist attacks in the event of war, was reasonable. No information has emerged thus far to suggest that Saddam did try to employ al-Qaida in conducting terrorist attacks.
Source: The Senate Intelligence Committee unanimous report on Iraq 04-SIC10 on July 7, 2004
CIA knew State of the Union Iraq-Niger connection was false.
NIGER CONCLUSIONS
Conclusion 16. The language in the Oct. 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that “Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake” overstated what the Intelligence Community (IC) knew about Iraq’s possible procurement attempts.
Conclusion 18. When documents regarding the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting [weakening the Iraq-Niger connection] became available to the IC in October 2002, CIA analysts and operations officers should have made an effort to obtain copies. As a result of not obtaining the documents, CIA Iraq nuclear analysts continued to report on Iraqi efforts to procure uranium from Africa and continued to approve the use of such language in Administration publications and speeches.
Conclusion 19. Even after obtaining the forged documents and being alerted by a State Department analyst about problems with them, analysts at both the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) did not examine them carefully enough to see the obvious problems with the documents. Both agencies continued to publish assessments that Iraq may have been seeking uranium from Africa. In addition, CIA continued to approve the use of similar language in Administration publications and speeches, including the State of the Union.
Conclusion 21. When coordinating the State of the Union, no CIA analysts or officials told the National Security Council (NSC) to remove the “16 words” or that there were concerns about the credibility of the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting. A CIA official’s original testimony to the Committee that he told an NSC official to remove the words “Niger” and “500 tons” from the speech, is incorrect.
Conclusion 22. The Director of the CIA should have taken the time to read the State of the Union speech and fact check it himself. Had he done so, he would have been able to alert the NSC if he still had concerns about the use of the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting in a Presidential speech.
Source: The Senate Intelligence Committee unanimous report on Iraq 04-SIC3 on July 7, 2004
Iraq was not reconstituting its nuclear program.
NUCLEAR CONCLUSIONS
Conclusion 27. The judgment in the NIE, that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program, was not supported by the intelligence. The Committee agrees with the State Department’s alternative view that the available intelligence “does not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution.”
Conclusion 29. Numerous intelligence reports provided to the Committee showed that Iraq was trying to procure high-strength aluminum tubes. The Committee believes that the information available to the Intelligence Community indicated that these tubes were intended to be used for an Iraqi conventional rocket program and not a nuclear program.
Conclusion 31. The Intelligence Community’s position in the NIE that the composition and dimensions of the aluminum tubes exceeded the requirements for non nuclear applications, is incorrect.
Conclusion 33. The suggestion in the NIE that Iraq was paying excessively high costs for the aluminum tubes is incorrect. In addition, 7075-T6 aluminum is not considerably more expensive than other more readily available materials for rockets as alleged in the NIE.
Conclusion 34. The analysis that the material composition of the tubes was unusual for rocket motor cases was incorrect, contradicted information later provided to the Committee, and represented a serious lapse for the agency with primary responsibility for conventional ground forces intelligence analysis.
Conclusion 38. The CIA’s initial reporting on its aluminum tube spin tests was, at a minimum, misleading and, in some cases, incorrect. The fact that these tests were not coordinated with other Intelligence Community agencies is an example of continuing problems with information sharing within the Intelligence Community.
Conclusion 39. Iraq’s performance of hydrostatic pressure tests on the tubes was more indicative of their likely use for a rocket program than a centrifuge program.
Source: The Senate Intelligence Committee unanimous report on Iraq 04-SIC4 on July 7, 2004
Iraq was not developing its biological weapons program.
BIOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS
Conclusion 48. The assessment in the Oct. 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that, “We judge that all key aspects—research & development, production, and weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive biological weapons program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War” is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
Conclusion 49. The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that “Baghdad has biological weapons” overstated what was known about Iraq’s biological weapons holdings. The NIE did not explain the uncertainties underlying this statement.
Conclusion 50. The statement in the NIE that “Baghdad has mobile transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin biological weapons agents,” overstated what the intelligence reporting suggested about an Iraqi mobile biological weapons effort and did not accurately convey to readers the uncertainties behind the source reporting.
Conclusion 53. The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that “Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq’s offensive biological weapons program” is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
Conclusion 55. The NIE misrepresented the United Nations Special Commission’s (UNSCOM) 1999 assessment concerning Iraq’s biological research capability.
Conclusion 56. The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that “Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered biological weapons agents,” overstated both the intelligence reporting and analysts assessments of Iraq’s development of genetically engineered biological agents.
Conclusion 57. The assessment in the NIE that “Iraq has … dry biological weapons (BW) agents in its arsenal” is not supported by the intelligence information provided to the Committee.
Source: The Senate Intelligence Committee unanimous report on Iraq 04-SIC5 on July 7, 2004
Iraq was not developing its chemical weapons program.
CHEMICAL CONCLUSIONS
Conclusion 58. The statement in the key judgments of the October 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate that “Baghdad has … chemical weapons” overstated both what was known about Iraq’s chemical weapons holdings and what intelligence analysts judged about Iraq’s chemical weapons holdings.
Conclusion 59. The judgment in the October 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq was expanding its chemical industry primarily to support chemical weapons production overstated both what was known about expansion of Iraq’s chemical industry and what intelligence analysts judged about expansion of Iraq’s chemical industry.
Conclusion 61. The Intelligence Community’s assessment that “Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of chemical weapons agents — much of it added in the last year,” was an analytical judgment and not based on intelligence reporting that indicated the existence of an Iraqi chemical weapons stockpile of this size.
Conclusion 62. The Intelligence Community’s assessment that Iraq had experience in manufacturing chemical weapons bombs, artillery rockets and projectiles was reasonable based on intelligence derived from Iraqi declarations.
Conclusion 63. The National Intelligence Estimate assessment that “Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited chemical weapons production hidden within Iraq’s legitimate chemical industry” was not substantiated by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
Conclusion 64. The National Intelligence Estimate accurately represented information known about Iraq’s procurement of defensive equipment.
Source: The Senate Intelligence Committee unanimous report on Iraq 04-SIC6 on July 7, 2004
Iraq was developing missiles, but not to reach the US.
DELIVERY CONCLUSIONS
Conclusion 65. The Intelligence Community (IC) assessment that Iraq retains a small force of Scud-type ballistic missiles was reasonable based on the information provided to the Committee. The estimate that Iraq retained “up to a few dozen Scud-variant missiles,” was clearly explained in the body of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) to be an assessment based “on no direct evidence.”
Conclusion 66. The assessments that Iraq was in the final stages of development of [missiles] which exceed the 150-km UN range limit, were reasonable judgments based on the intelligence available to the Committee.
Conclusion 68. The IC assessment in the key judgments section of the NIE that Iraq was developing an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) “probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents” overstated both what was known about the mission of Iraq’s small UAVs and what intelligence analysts judged about the likely mission of Iraq’s small UAVs. The Air Force footnote which indicated that biological weapons (BW) delivery was a possible, though unlikely, mission more accurately reflected the body of intelligence reporting.
Conclusion 70. The IC’s assessment that Iraq’s procurement of US-specific mapping software for its UAV “strongly suggests that Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the US” was not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
Conclusion 71. The CIA’s failure to share all of the intelligence reporting regarding Iraq’s attempts to acquire US mapping software with other IC agencies left those analysts with an incomplete understanding of the issue. This lack of information sharing may have led some analysts to agree to a position that they otherwise would not have supported.
Conclusion 72. Much of the information provided or cleared by the CIA for inclusion in Secretary Powell’s speech was overstated, misleading, or incorrect.
I have to admit that I thought the Bush Lied camp was more rhetoric based than it turns out to be. And I’m personally embarrassed I never looked more closely into the actual evidence that was available. I was looking at the NIE’s MUCH more superficially.