Daniel
I have an idea. Perhaps you could invite McHugh to join the discussion, since you are interested in his proof. That’s what I did when we had a discussion on Tisthammer’s proof. He joined us, and he and we were all edified.
By way of analogy:
My hair is red, but my hair’s existence doesn’t depend on being red. If tomorrow I dye my hair blue, it will still exist as my hair. In this way, my hair doesn’t depend on being red.
However, my hair’s existence DOES depend on my liking it. If tomorrow I decide I hate my hair, I’ll cut it all off and burn it, and it will no longer exist as my hair. In this way, my hair is dependent on something else.
McHugh’s God is like my hair, inasmuch as it doesn’t depend on any inherent characteristic: to understand God’s other characteristics, we’ve got to look elsewhere in McHugh’s definition.
McHugh’s God is unlike my hair, inasmuch as it isn’t “dependent on anything else”, i.e., no external entities. We know from McHugh’s definition that there’s no possible universe in which Daniel can say, “I hate God!” and burn God, ending its existence.
But Daniel’s inability to do that – God’s independence from Daniel’s hatred of (or love for) God – doesn’t help us understand God’s inherent characteristics.
In order to understand God’s inherent characteristics, we’ve got to look at the definition: God has no inherent characteristics that can be described in positive terms. Unlike my hair, God is not red. Unlike my hair, God is unable to turn blue (depending on my mood). And like my hair (I hope), God is non-sentient.
Daniel
ON PREVIEW:
How, then, does McHugh avoid the second criticism of the ontological argument – that the God described may be a god of perfect hatred?
That way, we could ask him what he meant. I will gladly admit to an error if he contradicts me.
He covers that. Parodies of the “perfect devil” have been popular for centuries. God, as McHugh defines Him, is not contingent on morality.
(Before anyone jumps the gun, I will pre-concede for the hundredth time that this proof does not prove the existence of Christ.)
But as I said, invite him here. You can ask him for yourself.
Lemme see if I can find an address for McHugh; if I can, I’ll invite him.
Okay, I found someone by that name at yahoo.uk, and sent off an email; let’s see if I found the right guy, and if he’ll join us.
Daniel
It’s a great idea to invite him. Of course, he can be useful to suggest how to best understand the proof. The proof isn’t a sacred text, though; it should stand on its own merits. I still say that he dispenses with the perfect devil parody by not allowing his God to have ANY characteristics, including goodness OR evilness. Given previous ontological proofs, the deity described could be good or evil; given McHugh’s, God can be neither.
But I’m not sure we can get through to one another on this point; it’ll be interesting to see if McHugh agrees that this is a problem with his proof.
Daniel
Those are good points, but let’s give him a chance to explain himself. A misplaced prepostion here or there, even a simple typo can sometimes skew a whole point.
One of the results of Tisthammer’s visit with us was that he firmed up his proof. He moved Becker’s Postulate to the list of axioms, rather than as an inference. And he tweaked some of his objections section as well.
That’s true, Lib, but what difference do you see in
G = G
versus
G -> G?
The former I do see as defining god into existence as G->G so the proof is superfluous entirely. Sorry if I am missing something more obvious here.
DANIEL WITHROW–
“…Scott, if you’re looking for something to address, I’d love to see this addressed. I think this, my second objection to McHugh, is stronger than my first objection…”
DW, I’m flattered by the invite and the attention, but I’m not sure I have anything to contribute to the McHuvian debate.
I think it possible to “prove” the reality of a certain something that has something like the properties attributed to the traditional Judeo-Christian “God.” I think it unintelligible to assert that one can (literally) only assert of this entity nonpositive descriptors: if that be taken to mean “descriptors which cannot be expressed other than as negations”–in other words, which cannot possibly be alternatively expressed in positive form.
Whatever is not a member of some set X (the negative description) is a member of the set “that which is other than a member of set X” (the positive flipside). There is, of course, Russell’s Paradox, but where does that get us?
I continue to insist that The Real is The Knowable, and we can assert nothing whatsoever outside that condition.
Incidentally, does everyone know that Kurt Goedel posited an ontological proof (of “God”), and that a commentator years later (I think his name was Schumacher) attached a similar proof that an absolutely evil being could NOT possibly exist? And these guys are not dummies!
Once again, I will point out that the ontological argument provided makes use of certain assumptions that are unwarranted. We cannot simply assume that any given thing must be possible.
We still haven’t established what we mean by “exist”, so this entire series of arguments is ultimately pointless.
Further, I would like to complain about the concept of “positive” and “negative” descriptive terms. I can find no logical means of assigning descriptions to either of these two categories.
Is saying that something is sentient any different from saying that it’s non-sentient?
Any presence can be considered to be the absence of something else. The two concepts are not separable.
So you are saying that “presence = absense”? Of course not. Neither is anyone saying that “possible = exists”. Though something that exists is clearly possible.
Actually, I am.
A quality cannot be present without the absence of its opposite. If you have both, it’s the same as having neither.
And Libertarian has said that if “God” exists in a possible universe, it must exist in actuality. This can only be meaningful if merely being possible implies existence. Otherwise, we could simply postulate something that was possible but didn’t ‘exist’ in any universe, which would throw Lib’s whole argument out of whack.
Being possible implies existence in a possible world. It takes more than that to say more than that.
I know I’ve asked this a couple times, but I’d like a clarification in plain english (i.e., no symbols): Does the possibility of existence supercede the possibility of non-existence with regard to the implications of either possibility? I am making a distinction between the possibility of non-existence and the impossibility of existence.
In other words, if ‘being’ is possible, and therefore necessary, and therefore exists, does that override the assumption that if ‘not being’ is possible, it is not necessary, therefore existence requires further evidence.
zwaldd: not in the general sense.
<>A <-> <>~A iff ~A this is not a theorem so far as I know but I can motivate the discussion with the symbology:
I. <>A <-> <>A tautology
II. ~~A <-> <>A def’n of possible
III. ~A <-> <>~A uniform substitution of ~A for A
Impossibility would be necessary not, as in
~
so you can see that “possibility” means “not impossible”
<> = ~~
which is of course the definition.
This is one objection some have seen to the proof, that we may substitute as an assumption <>~G because they mean the same thing (we think) and come to the conclusion of ~G. If ~G, then ~G and god is in fact impossible. Thus further considerations in a meta-context (read: outside of modal logic) must be taken in order to determine which is more appropriate. As you can see, “saying” we can switch <>~ for <> seems clear enough, but if we do it we do so by a hidden assumption that ~[]. This is far from clear that such an assumption is warranted, and in fact as you might see begs the question of the necessity of G by demanding it be not necessary. And if it isn’t necessary, than it isn’t G, so ~G.
If something is necessary or necessary not, a substitution of <>~ for <> would not make sense. Since necessity of G is tied to its actuality, we would beg the question for sure if we freely assumed that we may make just such a substitution.
Think of it this way: the possibility of A demands that ~A is not necessary (if you wish, it implies that ~A is not always the case). The possibility of ~A demands that A is not necessary (that A is not always the case). Most of the time, no problem. But when we pull the
G -> G (which implies G <-> G since A->A)
out then we start having some problems. This is why someone might say that either choice, <> or <>~, will beg the question here.
Really, there is English in there zwaald. But the discussion requires symbols. What we mean by possible in English is not always what we mean by possible in modal logic.
Again, it seems innocuous enough to freely substitute “possible that” with “possible not that” but that comes with hidden assumptions. Sorry I can’t do better without the logic, but that’s where the rules are that we are concerned with, not English. 
It comes with hidden assumptions because “possible that” is true even if “that” is necessary. “Possible not that” cannot be true if “that” is necessary.
I hope that helps… 
Libertarian:
Necessary existence: is true in every internally consistent set of propositions with at least one true proposition.
What I am trying to do is get past the loaded words, like God, and see what we are actually saying.
What it turns out we are saying is that G is true in every set of consistent propositions with at least one true proposition. This understandably seems impossible to some people. They think that no matter what G is, they could just come up with their own “possible world”, or set of propositions, in which G is false.
But we have this proof, so we know they are wrong. Why? Because of the nature of possible worlds! There is one thing which cannot be avoided in any possible world: Truth. If a set of propositions contains no truth, then it does not constitute a possible world. There is no possible world for “nothing is true.”
Necessary existence/Truth must exist. There is no way around it. However, as has been stated several times, this in no way proves the existence of any creator or loving God.
For all the talk about how obvious the meanings of possibility and existence are, I am still unable to determine what you mean by them. You have just said that “possible worlds” refer to something that is there. Then you say that something that exists necessarily exists in actuality. But surely you are not saying that everything that exists in a possible world is necessary!
My question is, exactly what do you believe that the statements that make up “possible worlds” represent? In particular, do they represent a world that exists in the same way as our own? Keep in mind that there are an infinite number of sets of propositions. Does each set really represent an actual world that exists in the same way as our own?
It was written:
Then that would be “presence A = absence Not A”. It would not be “presence = absence”.
If you have both, it’s a contradiction.
A different angle might help:
**If A = B, then
If B -> C, then by substitution of A for B, A -> C.**
Same same here:
**If G = G, then
If G -> G (the [color=#0000ff]4-Axiom), then by substitution of G for G, G -> G.**[/color]
It does not mean that, in general, p -> p, but only that, in this instance, the subject G implies the predicate G. Just as A might not always imply C, depending on what A is and what C is.
Zwaldd wrote:
In a sense, yes. Here is the concept without symbols.
If you posit that the existence of SOMETHING is not possible, then you are positing that the existence of SOMETHING is contingent. But if the existence of SOMETHING is contingent then, by definition, the existence of SOMETHING is possible.
For that reason, denying the possibility of existence a priori is called “substantive denial of a positive ontological proposition”, and is a logical fallacy.