Possibility != Existence

Lib, your whole premise, even if we assume the rest to be ture (Debatable. VERY debatable…), only holds up if your definition is true. However, we have no evidence to support that definition, do we? And if the definition you’re using is false, your whole premise fails.

And while we’re on it, I’ve already posted what seems to be evidence that your definition is false. It is possible that god does not exist, so he does not exist on at least one world, meaning he can’t be necessary because he does not exist in all worlds.

…To top it off, your whole preposition assumes we use modal-logic “possible” (Something does exist, somewhere) as synonymous with plain-english “possible” (Something may or may not exist).

evidence… a priori proof… evidence… a priori proof. Hmm. What am I missing?

Evidence that it is possible that God exists?

Ok, gould,
well I would like to recommend books rather than websites .(you can google as well as I can)

For a good overview of classical physics try Stephen Hawkings. A Brief History of Time is a good place to start.

I’d also suggest just about anything by Richard Feynman, who has written extensively both on Quantum theory as well as classical physics.

For a good mix of philosophy and physics look for The Tao of Physics by Fritjof Capra.

Good luck and welcome to SDMB.

You think the proof is bad now, but you are actually giving it more credit than it deserves. You are assuming that “possible worlds” refers to possible worlds. Because of this, you may think it is not entirely illogical that if God exists in one world, and is necessary, then he exists in all worlds. But in this proof, you cannot assume anything, because words turn out to be referring to something completely different than usual.

In this case, “possible worlds” refers to sets of statements. The proof never asserts that there is an actual world somewhere where God exists. It merely seems to say so, blinding its opponents with its glaring stupidity.

What it actually asserts is that there is a set of statements in which the statement “something is true here which is true in all other sets of statements with at least one true statement” is true.

Well, now it becomes obvious just what we have proved: the existence of truth. If “possible worlds” actually refers to statement sets with at least one true statement, then “necessary existence” clearly means, simply, “truth.”

After all, if truth did not exist in any “possible world”, then it would not really be a “possible world.” So, truth is necessary existence. What does this have to do with God? Well, nothing, until we definte God as necessary existence.

So, in the end, this proof proves that truth exists in every possible world. Remember, possible worlds are statement sets with at least one true statement. So every statement set that contains a true statement contains truth. What a revelation! I am finally convinced that Jesus died for my sins.

Wow, thanks, Nightime. I think you really helped to put a finger on why the ontological argument bugs me so much. It has always struck me as nonsense but I couldn’t quite articulate why. It just seemed like a maddening semantic trick. Your clarification of what is meant by “possible worlds” is very helpful.

Thanks for the restatement ** Libertarian** with commentary.

Lib, if I may first briefly discuss your analogy of equilateral triangles.

There is a set of triangles which are equilateral, and a set of triangles which are not.

The definition of God as Necessary Existence dispenses with the set of possible worlds in which God does not exist.

In this way the analogy is not of proving whether or not a triangle is equilateral, but whether or not it has three sides.

So, since no possible world is ascribed to the materialist’s assertion that God does not exist, would I be justified in henceforth referring to this proof as “the nonmaterialist proof of the existence of God”?
Secondly, having fished around in the lining of the armchair I believe I have found the week-old prawn which smelt a bit funny.

“Being” in “Necessary Existence” is a present participle verb, not an object noun. This distinction is made in every language I know of. The confusion arises only because “to be” obeys slightly different linguistic rules in English than other verbs.

eg. To run: Present participle verb = “running”, associated object noun = “run” (as in “going for a run”)
To sleep: Present participle verb = “sleeping”, associated object noun = “sleep” (as in “having a sleep”).

To go from “being” to “a being” is unjustified. Existence -> Being only if “being” is a present participle verb, not an object noun.
Don’t worry, I’m also slowly climbing out of the armchair. Consider this the preceding sigh of reluctance having been told it’s my turn to wash the dishes.

You’re welcome, Iamthat. :slight_smile:


Phoenix Dragon wrote:

It looks like you’ve confused definitions with propositions. It is propositions that have truth value.


Nightime

Actually, I rather like your overall take that God is truth. “I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life.” — Jesus

Of course, the argument makes no pretense at proving that Jesus actually walked the earth. Nor does it pretend in any way to connect Jesus with God. That would be a separate argument. With modal logic, it isn’t just a case of some absolute truth that manifests identically in every possible world. From Stanford’s site:

Necessary existence is a metaworld. Note the truth clause that describes the 5 Axiom:

v(A, w)=T iff for every world w’ in W, v(A, w’)=T

There is no controversy over whether S5 is suitable for formulating a logic of necessity. Again, from Stanford:

You are correct that modal worlds represent statements. But it is cavalier to the exteme if we way that these statements represent nothing of significance. Your post, for example, consists of statements, and yet, with those statements, you are attempting to say something about phenomenal truth.

“The cat is orange” is just a statement, yes. But a statement and what a statement represents are not the same. “A” is not the same as A.

The actual world is representable by true statements, and in fact, that is what science attempts to do with its process of falsification — namely, to discern what statements about the actual world are false.

A rock is just a rock. But when you make statements about the rock, and your statements are true, then and only then are you assigning any significance to the rock. The rock qua rock, and not the statement about the rock, is what is meangingless.

When we speak of possible worlds, yes, we are speaking of true statements. But those statements represent something that is there. Something that exists necessarily exists in actuality.

I don’t know why you felt it necessary to go so overboard with your post. A pent up frustration of some sort, I suppose. But calling the argument stupid is, well, pretty stupid.

Sentient

With respect to the grammar, “being” in this case is a noun as described by American Heritage’s first definition: “The state or quality of having existence. See Synonyms at existence.”

With respect to the triangles:

Yes, and there is existence that is necessary as well as existence that is merely possible. That is the whole topic of alethic logic.

Well, then, the definition of equilateral triangle dispenses with the set of triangles that are not equilateral.

I don’t follow that. To prove that a triangle is equilateral, you must examine properties of the triangle and show that its three sides are of equal length, or else that its three angles are equal, or even that two of its angles are both 60 degrees. Likewise, there are various modal ontological proofs, each taking a slightly different approach. Some use Becker’s Postulate, for example, and some don’t.

I’m not sure.

The problem with not allowing the axiom <>G (it is possible that God exists) is that it is a substantive denial of a positive ontological proposition. To see what I mean, consider the restatement of <>G to ~~G. They mean the same. “Possible” and “not necessarily not”.

A man who says that he disagrees with <>G is saying that he agrees with ~G — which is ~(~~G), the negation of ~~G. He is saying that it is necessary that God does not exist. It takes balls the size of Jupiter for a man to demand that someone prove that it is possible that God exists while refusing himself to offer proof that it is necessary that He doesn’t.

I have read considerably on this matter for quite some time, and not once ever have I run across any materialist philosopher who actually demands that <>G be stricken as an axiom. They will certainly note that, like any other axiom, it may be brought into question. But so may the Induction Axiom upon which all of arithmetic is based.

Sentient

It took me several readings of this before it dawned on me what you might have meant:

Purely as stated, that is a contradiction. If God is defined as necessary existence and it is proved that He actually exists as defined (steps 9 and 10 in the proof), then there is no such thing as a possible world in which God does not exist. Necessary existence is not contingent. A world becomes possible by virtue of God’s presence in it.

~(<>G) is equivalent to <>(~G) iff G=NE

My beef is with G=NE.

That’s a dodge if I ever saw one. Definitions can’t “have truth value?” You mean, they can’t be true/false? Are you saying that we can define anything to be what we want it to be, and it has no “falseness” to it? If this is what you mean, then I’ve got to call “bull” on it.

What makes this definition any better than a definition I just make up on the spot? What’s to stop someone from “defining” god as being “A fictional being that <whatever>”? Basically, why is your definition the right one?

Sentient

~(<>G) is not equivalent to <>(~G) under any circumstance:

~(<>G) = ~(~~G) = ~G

But

<>(~G) = ~~(~G) = ~G

With respect to your beef about the definition, Christopher McHugh wrote a paper dealing with Michael Martin’s criticisms of Hartshornes original argument. McHugh restructured it such that Martin’s criticisms do not apply. Martin’s chief gripe was with the “coherence” of the concept of God, which is similar to your beef.

McHugh explains how the definition of God is coherent:

You might also be interested in the case of Trent Dougherty. He is (or was) a grad student at the University of Missouri. Here is his brief bio from the site:

He was an atheist who was convinced by the modal ontological argument that God exists. He developed his own five-step (!) proof, which you can examine here.

He writes:

Regarding those who think that the argument is some sort of trick, he writes:

I don’t appreciate directly answering questions and getting the absurd response that I am dodging. If you think I am such a ding-bat, it would behoove you not to engage me in a discussion.

It isn’t a matter of right or wrong. That’s why “love” has fifteen definitions, and “force” has a dozen or so, and “run” has more than thirty. Please see the pertinent section of my post to Sentient just above as to why necessary existence is a reasonable definition for God.

Thanks Lib. Feel free to quote my glowing tribute to your guidance at any appropriate juncture.

I have admitted it in the past, and I admit it again: Materialism is a faith. I have no problem with you using this stuff to ridicule my faith, indeed this barely registers as an itch compared to the full-blown echzema of quantum physics and its relationship with a conscious observer.

I do not assert ~<>G. That would be close-minded in the extreme.
If you asserted that the probability of my materialistic viewpoint being true is zero, I would accuse you of the same thing.

I assert ~G.

So sue me.

Cool off a little. I didn’t mean my post to sound hostile, but the post I was responding to did seem pretty unreasonable.

You state at one point that either someone believes it is modal-logic “possible” that god exists (IE, he exists in at least one world), or he believes god can not exist no matter what. That’s a big logical fallacy right there (Bifurcation). There are certainly more choices than that (Such as the above-mentioned “It’s possible god does not exist.” Or “It’s not necessary that god exists.” Or just “It’s not known if god is possible.”)

As for the definition, it seems to break down rather rapidly here (Assuming I’m reading the right part, and you weren’t reffering to a different “description”):

Why? How do we know this? Further, this seems to be directly contrary to defining god as “the supreme being,” a possitive description.

And I don’t think a word having multiple true definitions means it can’t have any false ones. For example, describing Homo Sapiens as being a “reptillian species, with quadrupedal locomotion” is quite obviously wrong.

Lib, I’d like to thank you for your patience in going over your argument several times.
But you still haven’t either demonstrated that God is possible, or given us any evidence about Him.

Sentient

What on earth made you think I am ridiculing you? In fact, I have only ever spoken of you in the most positive light, as an open minded person with intellectual honesty. When I present my side of a debate, I do not intend to imply that you are somehow inferior.

If you assert ~G, you’re entitled. But I’d be interested in hearing what you think God is contingent on.

Evidence? This is a modal proof, not a science experiment. As to whether God is possible, I stand by this:

The problem with not allowing the axiom <>G (it is possible that God exists) is that it is a substantive denial of a positive ontological proposition. To see what I mean, consider the restatement of <>G to ~~G. They mean the same. “Possible” and “not necessarily not”.

A man who says that he disagrees with <>G is saying that he agrees with ~G — which is ~(~~G), the negation of ~~G. He is saying that it is necessary that God does not exist. It takes balls the size of Jupiter for a man to demand that someone prove that it is possible that God exists while refusing himself to offer proof that it is necessary that He doesn’t.