chappachula:
First off, the satellite photos Powell presented to the UN are not related to the intelligence derived from “Curveball,” which concerned mobile weapons labs. So please, let’s get our story straight here and not conflate different intelligence claims.
Secondly, again on a technical matter, Powell never claimed that the trucks in the satellite photo were “full of germ weapons.” He claimed they were “decontamination vehicles,” which he argued were specific “signature items” that enabled analysts to conclude, with a strong degree of certainty, that the bunkers contained chemical weapons. The question here then becomes one of how reasonable this conclusion really is. I judged the conclusion to be fairly speculative, myself, and time has shown that I was correct. Of the approximately 65 sites named by the US intelligence as possible chemical dumps, none have been shown to house chemical weapons. It is almost certain that the trucks in the photo were fire trucks, not “decontamination vehicles” (no decontamination vehicles have been found in Iraq since the invasion).
So, if we leave that aside for a moment and turn “Curveball,” here is what we know:[ul]
[li]An important section of Powell’s presentation to the UN on Feb. 5, 2003 was dedicated to discussing so-called “mobile germ labs” allegedly designed by Hussein’s regime. Powell argued that these mobile production facilities were “One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq’s biological weapons,” and claimed to possess “eyewitness accounts” as well as “first-hand descriptions” of the labs. He goes on to give some of the details of the eyewitness account, and corroborates them with three additional sources.[/li][QUOTE]
** Although Iraq’s mobile production program began in the mid-1990s, UN inspectors at the time only had vague hints of such programs. Confirmation came later, in the year 2000. The source was an eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of these facilities. He actually was present during biological agent production runs. He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998. 12 technicians died from exposure to biological agents.
He reported that when UNSCOM was in country and inspecting, the biological weapons agent production always began on Thursdays at midnight, because Iraq thought UNSCOM would not inspect on the Muslim holy day, Thursday night through Friday.
He added that this was important because the units could not be broken down in the middle of a production run, which had to be completed by Friday evening before the inspectors might arrive again.
This defector is currently hiding in another country with the certain knowledge that Saddam Hussein will kill him if he finds him. His eyewitness account of these mobile production facilities has been corroborated by other sources.
A second source. An Iraqi civil engineer in a position to know the details of the program confirmed the existence of transportable facilities moving on trailers.
A third source, also in a position to know, reported in summer, 2002, that Iraq had manufactured mobile production systems mounted on road-trailer units and on rail cars.
Finally, a fourth source. An Iraqi major who defected confirmed that Iraq has mobile biological research laboratories in addition to the production facilities I mentioned earlier.**
[/QUOTE]
Taken together, these four sources might appear quite credible, especially if their stories were consistent. But what if, let us say, 3 of the 4 were Chalabi plants, all told to give more-or-less the same story?
[li]Powell’s statements jive well with the LA Times news report, but perversely call into doubt the credibility of his claims. Of importance here is the fact that inspectors first suspected that such facilities existed, and then contacted Chalabi, who surreptitiously managed to provide an eyewitness.[/li][li]US intelligence officials were warned that “Curveball’s” story was of doubtful authenticity, but chose to believe it anyway. There is some disagreement between agencies regarding when this warning was issued. At any rate, US intelligence did not know Curveball’s true identity, nor had they ever directly interrogated him. Powell chose to keep these facts hidden in his presentation. (In general, the administration has displayed an almost perverse insistence on believing only those intelligence reports that support the case for war and disregarding any reports that call into doubt the asserted nature of the Iraqi threat. The results of this insistence are easy to see.)[/li][li]None of the other sources had actually seen the facilities, and their testimony amounted to little more than hearsay, really. Powell obscures this fact by referring to them as people “in a position to know.”[/li][li]David Kay, a US weapons inspector and ardent supporter of the invasion (who originally believed that Iraq possessed “WMDs”), flatly states that the administration’s reliance on “Curveball’s” story, and its use in Powell’s presentation, “really looks like a lack of due diligence and care in going forward.” He claims that “Curveball” was the “absolute heart” of the allegations regarding the mobile labs, that Powell’s presentation was “disingenuous” on that matter, and that “If Powell had said to the Security Council: ‘It’s one source, we never actually talked to him, and we don’t know his name,’ as he’s describing this, I think people would have laughed us out of court.” To my mind, that seems like unbelievably damaging testimony from the former weapons inspector.[/li][li]There are so many “mistakes” of this nature that have come up since the invasion – the entire issue of the aluminum tubes, the “yellowcake” claims subsequently proven false, the allegations of a connection between Hussein and al Qaida, the complete lack of any sort of nuclear facilities or program, etc., that I really find it hard to believe that all of them could be the result of misjudgments made in good faith. Add to this the administration’s refusal to address the issue afterwards; Bush’s assertion, for example, that a single vial of a common strain of botulinum found in a scientist’s refrigerator was proof that Saddam was “threat to the world,” Cheney’s continued assertions that the helium trailers were actually mobile labs, etc., etc., and it’s literally impossible not to see a clear pattern of willful mendacity on the part of the Bush administration.[/ul][/li]You ask why evidence has to be “rock solid.” To begin with, in answer to your question, I would say that launching an unprovoked war of aggression against the will of the majority of world opinion ought to require a very, very strong evidential basis. War should always be the last resort, because it involves so much terrible human suffering. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that before going to war, a state has very, very strong reasons for doing so. With regard to Iraq, however, the administration’s case for war was based on the flimsiest basis imaginable; so much so that virtually none of its pre-war claims regarding the Iraqi threat have proven to be correct. That’s why I object to your use of the word “reasonable” as a characterization of the evidence Powell presented to the UN. It was not “reasonable;” it was bunch of trumped up charges based on faulty logic, rhetoric, and hearsay.
Secondly, you note that “It would be nice if spying was a precise science --but in war, you can’t always have scientific proof.” I would like to point out that we who opposed the war were making precisely this argument. In point of fact, prior to the invasion, it was the proponents of war who claimed to possess complete certainty that Iraq was a threat, again and again. In his address to the nation prior to military operations, Bush claimed that “Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.” On these boards, doubters were ruthlessly lambasted by pro-war posters who claimed to have incontrovertible evidence of Iraq’s possession of “WMDs.” Bush did not sell this war to the American public with the argument that he suspected that Iraq might possession “WMDs;” he and other administration officials claimed absolute certainty. You can’t simply go back after the fact and pretend like they didn’t. As far as I can tell, their claims amount to nothing more than a maze of lies.
This is a gross oversimplification of the situation. These are separate issues and have to be judged each on their own merits. There was more to the intelligence info prior to 9/11 than mere “vague warnings by a low-ranking FBI agent in Arizona,” and the “specific warnings” of “Curveball” were doubtful at best.
Finally, for the purposes of this debate, I would like to request that you refrain from accusing your debating opponents of hypocrisy unless you can point to a specific example.