Proof for a higher order?

I think you’re confusion is in dwelling on the modus tollens and modus ponens when the problem is with the unstated premise (or audiatur et altera pars). The unstated premise of Descartes’ argument is “I exist”, and it is the same as his conclusion. All circular arguments are valid, but no circular argument is sound. For example…

I work on Mondays.
Today is Monday.
Therefore, I’m working.

…is both valid and sound. But suppose you said…

I work on Mondays.
Today is not Monday.
Therefore, I’m not working.

…while leaving unstated the premise that you work every weekday. Though your argument is valid, it is unsound.

Dear Liberal,

Apologies, I was letting my thoughts run away with me there; should have realized that I’d be the only one to understand them :). Here goes.

Modal Ontological Proof – I like that, by the way, has a nice ring to it.

I acknowledge that this proof refers to nothing other than the existence of the given being; it’s specific to the scope of modal status. However, the equivocation does not really come on my part, but there are leaps of logic in the proof at that link. I’ll try to explain what’s going on.

GPB – Greatest possible being.
OP – Being with ontological perfection

Tisthammer, at that link there, defines God as the greatest possible being. With regard to ontological status, it is pretty obvious that this would indicate, as you call it “ontological perfection” – necessary existence. There are also other attributes given to the being, such as omnipotence (powerful to the greatest possible extent), omniscience (knowing all that there is) etc… Now, from this argument, it indeed, follows that if such a being exists, then it would have to exist necessarily. If we attribute the status of necessary existence to anything, and then posit that it is possible, it exists both in all possible worlds and in actuality.

The leap of logic, however, comes when the attributes of “omnipotence” and “omniscience” are attributed to the being. Indeed, when any property is attributed to the being other than ontological perfection. What is there to say that this being has all the knowledge (temporarily assuming that it is at least logically possible – a problematic presupposition). All that we know of this being is that it has necessary existence - it will always be the case that it exists; perhaps also that it cannot be “destroyed”, but that neither implies omniscience or omnipotence.

It follows, therefore, that if GPB –> OP; however, affirming the consequent here would be fallacious. The argument, itself, only tells us that a being with ontological perfection exists; it does not follow (and no substantiation was provided at your link), and it does not follow that OP –> GPB.

OP is a pretty vacuous attribute, anyhow. All the axioms of logic have ontological perfection/necessary existence. (On another note, what do you mean by “being”? “Being” and “existence” are quite different from one another, but most people don’t know that so I treated them as synonymous here). For all it’s worth, the Modal Ontological Proof, only proves that there is a thing such that it has necessary existence (which is already proved at your first link).

On a final note, I would be interested in seeing the logics that do not recognize truth. Truth is something we simply cannot get away from (and per Russell, possibly provides a refutation of materialism ;)). Interesting point about the axioms of logic - I suppose you are correct for some of that part, the fundamentals are purely analytic.

I agree that the second case is unsound. But Descartes’ argument is structured as the first… why is he necessarily assuming he exists?

Cogito Ergo Sum; “I Think, therefore I am”. Descartes set out to doubt everything, and eventually came back to the idea that he cannot doubt his own existence (he later thought that the other things he couldn’t doubt was God’s existence, but that’s a separate issue). Or, conversely, to think that he wasn’t thinking. It’s basically a nonsense to say that “I think that I don’t think”, but what goes over so quickly that we don’t even notice it is the “I”. I think, therefore I am"? Who is this “I”? We might say that something is thinking, but what is there to say that “I” is the “doer”:smiley: of the thinking. He already presumes his existence; it’s the hidden premise and hence, the argument is pure circular reasoning. Knowing the short-extent of my eloquence, perhaps this extract will help; an extract from Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy:

I’m definitely citing Russell too much today.

So it seems the problem is that ‘I’ can be interpreted to have too broad a meaning? Would it be more valid to say “I - meaning the entity forming this statement at this instantaneous moment - think, therefore I - same entity, since this is occurring instantaneously - am.”?

I don’t really think anything about it having a “broad meaning”. I think it’s really quite specific and well defined; not much equivocation on what we mean by “I”. As Russell notes, the problem is that we only know that something is diong the thinking. That something, consequently, exists, since existence precedes thought. However, we assume that it is “I” – us, doing the thinking. How do we know that?

In this case, the entity doing the thinking is the one that chose the word ‘I’, so it’s entirely accurate. :wink:

Ex animo

If you look at Tisthammer’s argument a bit more carefully, you’ll see that he does not attribute qualities like omnipotence to the Being in the proof. Rather, he says that “For instance, God is said to have perfect power: omnipotence.” That is, he acknowledges, by grammatical passive voice, that such qualities are routinely attributed to God. He in fact goes on to explain that such qualities cannot be so attributed from the MOP outside the context of modal status, i.e., if power exists, then God, existing necessarily, can be only as powerful as is possible. He can be only as good as is possible, and only as evil as is possible, depending on whether or not goodness and evil exist. And so on.

Regarding theories of truth, the Revision Theory proposed by Gupta and Herzberger in the late 20th century holds that truth is circular in nature, and cannot be understood except in the context of a “Tarski biconditional”. For example, “I exist” is true if and only if I exist. You can Google on the names and terms and likely find plenty of references to it.

Well, as I explained earlier, in order to do anything at all, including prove your existence, you must first exist. Therefore, even as you contemplate your proof, your existence is an unstated premise ahead of all others that you might conceive.

Liberal,

With all due respect, that changes nothing. Tisthammer suggests that “the greatest possible being” implies that the being has “greatest possible power”, and “greatest possible knowledge”. He draws this in later on to rebut the proposition that the concept of God contains no intrinsic maximum. The MOP is within the context of modal status, and we can now infer that something exists necessarily (which we could already do, from the first proof), however, we know nothing else of the Being.

You could call that “God”, I guess, but that is not what I mean by God. The God of the MOP is far more similar to a truth or axiom of logic, rather than a personal entity – a conscious being, as I see him. From the proof, is there reason to infer that he is anything more (taking the argument outside the scope of modality). It would have to be shown that a necessarily existing being would have to have the additional attributes which you might propose to it. Speculation won’t get us anywhere.

Thanks for the recommendations on the truth theories etc… Truth might be circular, I don’t know. All truth is apodictic truth. I have only started learning Modal Logic recently, even though I skipped out a lot on propositional logic and predicate calculus. Temporarily put logic on hold for things which have interested me a little more, like free-will, and the contradictions surrounding us if we deny it. :wink:

Ah. So you’re saying Descartes’ proof was useless. I do exist, but I can never prove it, because to prove it requires you assume it in the first place.

Yes, exactly.

You still with us, Liberal?

when it is said “I exist”, it tends to imply that “I” am a distinct being. there’s no proof of that. there’s no proof the images we label external are real, including the physical body. the only thing that is real is the most basic assumption of consciousness. “it comes from somewhere” is the the best description i can come up with.

Distinct being in what sense? For example, perhaps we’re all shards of some galactic superconsciousness… in essence, one being. “I” in that case would be ‘The portion of the galactic superconsciousness that identifies itself as CandidGamera’.

Not so. As I have pointed out to you before, if you substitute “It’s possible that God doesn’t exist” for “It’s possible that God does exist” as your first premise you can use the same logical machinery to prove that God can’t exist.

This hole in the ontological argument is actually acknowledged on the page you link to, but the author fails to plug it … he merely dismisses it with handwaving.

(Basically he confuses his definition with an assertion that has a truth value assigned to it. Defining God as “the greatest possible being” says nothing about whether such an entity actually exists or not.)

The “God must not exist” proof is perfectly sound and contains no INTERNAL contradictions. The author can only attack it by introducing an additional premise: “The greatest possible being must exist” – or basically “God must exist!” He then uses this additional premise to contradict line #9 in the proof.

As I’ve said before in these discussions, if you take “God must exist” as one of your premises, the proof of his existence is trivially easy … .

Well, try proving anything without first assuming something. Can it be done?

that requires the assumption of a consciousness other than my own.

Which would matter if I was trying to prove something, and not just making an attempt to clarify your definition of distinct.

But, here we go.

Something thinks. Therefore something exists. It’s a tautology. It’s true.

I think. This one’s not as clear, but - whatever your definition of “I”, “I” have cognitive processes. I am not saying that I am exactly what I think I am. But I do exist - as a cognitive unit.

I am a distinct being. In the sense that : When I think of the word “I”, I refer to a specific cognitive unit - me. I cannot prove the existence of any other consciousnesses. I cannot prove that the cognitive unit that I identify as “I” isn’t part of a larger consciousness … which was why I was trying to clarify your use of ‘distinct.’

there’s no proof that there is an “I”. just like all concepts, “I” is a manifestation of consciousness, built on top of the images we call external. i could be the lone Creator of Everything; every sensation nothing more than my own consciousness. rather than ‘shards of a galactic superconscious’, i AM the superconscious - i am the source of Everything. there are no lines to separate “me” from anything else. there’s nothing to indicate that thought is an action undertaken by a distinct entity - it could just be another thing that manifests itself, similar to a physical object.

whatever can be categorized conceptually does not exist - “me”, “you”, “I”, “we” are all beyond the basic assumption of consciousness.