DrDeth
August 10, 2010, 6:09am
21
chappachula:
In the 1960’s, Jim Crow was limited to 12 southern states. The other 38 did not allow segregation. So when a “rogue judge” overturned the will of the voters, he was not making a new law–he was just invalidating a local law, and applying the national laws as they were already practiced in most of America.
Incorrect. Although Jim Crow in it’s more extreme forms was rare outside the South, the housing developement where I first grew up in CA had a strict “whites only” policy.
qazwart:
The problem is that California has a remedy in the Domestic Partner statute which grants almost the same rights and privileges that heterosexual couples have in marriage. And, this was never brought up in the court case. Instead, the focus was on procreation, civil society and acceptance, etc. which the judge rightly rejected.
What are you talking about? The District Court’s ruling discusses California’s domestic partnerships all over the place. Here’s a link (warning: pdf). Examples:
The evidence shows that domestic partnerships do not fulfill California’s due process obligation to plaintiffs for two reasons. First, domestic partnerships are distinct from marriage and do not provide the same social meaning as marriage. Second, domestic partnerships were created specifically so that California could offer same-sex couples rights and benefits while explicitly withholding marriage from same-sex couples. (p. 115-166 (I’m not doing a formal legal citation))
and…
The evidence at trial shows that domestic partnerships exist solely to differentiate same-sex unions from marriages. A domestic partnership is not a marriage; while domestic partnerships offer same-sex couples almost all of the rights and responsibilities associated with marriage, the evidence shows that the withholding of the designation “marriage” significantly disadvantages plaintiffs. The record reflects that marriage is a culturally superior status compared to a domestic partnership. California does not meet its due process obligation to allow plaintiffs to marry by offering them a substitute and inferior institution that denies marriage to same- sex couples. (p. 116, references stripped)