Hmmm… I don’t follow, but this is interesting.
In case I’ve been unclear about the topic (which maybe I have, given that Libertarian up to the end was still talking about conditions necessary for proof, when I thought it was clear we were only discussing situations when proof was unavailable)… when I say the question exempts purely theoretical or paper ideas, I mean we’re not concerned w/ conditions necessary to assume the falsity of abstract propositions such as the discussion of sets and axioms Libertarian introduced in the thread’s second post. I intended the OP to consider only assertions made about the real world, such as “Hillary Clinton is American {or Chinese}”, “Bush intentionally misled the public about WMD in Iraq”, “Tiger woods has won more PGA tournaments than any other golfer”, or “I already looked in the hall closet, honey, and I’m telling you it’s not in there”.
I don’t mean that the conditions themselves won’t ever be abstract. In fact, they’d have to be, wouldn’t they, to a certain extent at least?
So with that in mind, I don’t see how I’d be free to assume any conditions I want when dealing with real-world claims. That is, if you’re using the term “conditions” in the same way I’ve been using it. I mean, obviously, the condition “The claim is made by my brother” is not sufficient to assert that the claim is false. By contrast, I do think the condition Libertarian proposed, if even indirectly, that “The claim is false if it violates known fact” holds water.
I also agree with Colibri’s ideas – it’s difficult not to – but they seem to deal rather narrowly with propositions that can be tested and judged against possibilities of random chance.
For instance, if someone says “I believe that leprechauns exist”, it’s hard to see how Colibri’s standards could even apply.
You could apply the principle more generally, but then we’re left with the unsatisfying proposition of accepting that, somehow, by asserting the falsity of the claim “leprechauns are real”, we’re making a leap from “this is highly unlikely” to “this isn’t true” at some very low but still arbitrary level of probability.
Fact is, there is no probability that leprechauns exist, and we come to that conclusion not by observation of the entire world to check and see if they’re there, nor by resorting to classroom logic.
We can safely say that this claim is false (not just highly unlikely) because of certain conditions of rational thought. E.g.:
- The origins of the tales of leprechauns are mythic.
- The only area in which they were ever asserted to exist has been very thoroughly explored, and no such thing is there.
- There has never been any direct evidence that creatures of this sort (not just leprechauns, but fairies, ogres, gnomes, and the like) ever existed.
- The existence of leprechauns would require an overhaul of our understanding of the physical world.
- The conditions necessary to believe that this is a possibility stretch common sense so far as to be ridiculous.
That’s what I mean by conditions necessary to reject a non-abstract claim in the absence of direct proof to the contrary.