I think the comparison is somewhat apt (must say I don’t know a whole lot about Mexico) - but as it stands, Russia *is *very effectively authoritarian (not totalitarian, since that is associated more with an actual penetration into society and an attempt to change it, which is not really happening it seems).
As compared to similar regimes in the region (eg. Kazakhstan, Armenia, Ukraine (less so), and Georgia) it manages to control and pre-empt dissent much better, and it seems like it will continue to do so in the more proximate future. Case in point is elections: they hold them, but don’t have to steal them - ie, they don’t have to change the results on election day by fraud, so that everyone knows someone else really won but the incumbent is trying to hold on to power. To be sure, the Russian regime engages in electoral fraud in a big way, presumably even on election day itself, but, and here’s the thing: they probably wouldn’t even have to, since they’d win anyway. I find this puzzling, it has to do with some sort of authoritarian reflex that some lower-tier people cannot suppress I think.
The stealing as opposed to fraud distinction is important, as the notion that someone else *actually *got more votes has really managed to get people out to protest much more than other examples of fraud or violations of human rights, even the killings of journalists by the regime (like Gongadze in Ukraine or Politkovskaya in Russia). This is what got the color revolutions going, and this explains why such a revolution is not too likely in Russia anytime soon since the regime doesn’t seem to need to steal elections, creating such a clear and risky bone of contention in the process.
The Transparency Index has a score of methodological problems. It gauges public perception of corruption, which is not necessarily a valid or reliable way of actually measuring corruption - in fact, we know that TI goes up when media publish more about corruption, for instance in cases where people are actually prosecuted for it!
That said, it is not necessary to rule out that Mexico and Russia are about equally corrupt - but this may have very different meanings in practice, and may affect the state’s reach in different ways. Again, I don’t know nearly enough about Mexico to make a reasonable comparison, but in the case off the post-communist realm, there’s different types of corruption to consider. For one, there’s bribes that citizens pay to lower-level bureaucrats to get things done (eg get a permit for this or that). Such bribes do not necessarily impede the state’s reach, they just redistribute wealth and provide a second source of income for bureaucrats. Another type of corruption is actually more pernicious as it asks officials to overlook and not enforce the law. This affects the state in ways that are more serious, but again this can depend on what law is being overlooked. Traffic laws: less serious; tax laws: more serious. Finally, there’s the kind of corruption where you pay not to have the law overlooked, but to have it changed in your favor. This is state capture, and it’s like in Terminator II when that guy actually morphs into whomever he kills.
In sum, your claim that ‘corruption always undermines a regime’s stability to some degree’ is true perhaps - but not to the same degree necessarily. I’d say that regime strength is less impeded by the different types of corruption in Russia than it is in Mexico. In fact, it may even be the case that the regime uses corruption by lower-tier kingpins in its favor by using evidence of it as blackmail material. Tapes smuggled out of Ukraine have shown this to be the case under Kuchma’s regime. link | another link
He is authoritarian compared to say Barack Obama or David Cameron or Angela Merkel but it should be noted that he’s dealing with massive insurrections in his country by various rebel groups who perpetrated horrific atrocities like Belsen. Plus he is the most pro-Western and pro-capitalist of the major parties, the other major parties are the Communists (who try to defend Stalin still) and other Westophobic, ultra-nationalists. Finally he’s quite awesome like Teddy Roosevelt.
I’m a proponent of authoritarian socialism, yes, but I put much more emphasis on results rather than labels. Putin, despite not calling himself a socialist, has directly reversed any capitalist projects and reinstituted socialist policies. He has crushed organized crime and the oligarchy, renationalized much of the economy, funded and extended social benefits programs, and strengthened ties with our socialist neighbor to the East. Overall, he is a perfect example of just how much good a single powerful and dedicated socialist can do for a nation. That, I believe, is his ultimate legacy: saving a mighty nation on the brink of collapse and restoring much of its former Soviet glory.
The mind boggles. I’ll just say that it’s funny to see how in two consecutive posts, one person lauds Putin for being ‘pro-Western and pro-capitalist’, and not ‘defending Stalin’, whereas someone else lauds him for ‘revers[ing] any capitalist projects and reinstitut[ing] socialist policies’ as well as ‘restoring much of [Russia’s] former Soviet glory’.
Both can be true. Putin is pro-western in that, despite the occasional saber rattling, he really does not want to return to the bad old days. He’s not BFF with the US or (most) other western powers, but no one seriously worries that Russian tanks will be driving around the German countryside like they used to either. As well, socialist policies are ‘pro-capitalist’ compared to the Soviet era.
He has restored some of Russia’s former glory. The fact than invading Georgia can be viewed as ‘restoring former glory’ just indicates how far they really did fall in the 90’s. These days, Russia is a major regional power. While it’s not a superpower like it used to be, it doesn’t want to be either.
I was kind of joking about the oil prices, but honestly Yeltsin never stood a chance, and Putin has looked strong, effective, and so forth, precisely because Russia’s most important product was worth about 3 times as much during Putin’s time as it was during Yeltsin’s. (The graph on this page looks reasonably good; Putin took over at the end of '99.)
Oil prices alone explain nothing. Keep in mind that the traitor Yeltsin allowed most of the oil and gas reserves to be privatized, effectively placing them in the hands of criminally-minded oligarchs. Tax evasion and corruption was rampant, meaning that the profits benefited the oligarchs themselves, rather than the workers or the government. Had things remained as they were, the surge in prices would have tripled the oligarchs’ immense fortunes but done nothing to increase tax revenues.
By nationalizing most of the gas and oil, Putin put all revenues back under national control. When the prices surged, the nation as a whole enjoyed the windfall. If not for Putin’s bold plan, the profits would simply have been siphoned off by a handful of parasites.
Commissar pines to be a Soviet Citizen, not realizing the actual history of that horrid amalgam of dictatorship and police state, and despite his not actually being from Russia, and his inability to move to an actual Communist Socialized state, believes that Russia, past or present, can do no wrong.
Attempting to debate with him can be frustrating, as he has a typical Soviet style slipperiness in what he says, and an amazing ability to both put words in your mouth while not actually saying anything at all with his.
As for the OP, I think we’re too close to the now to truley know what that legacy may be. Putin is in many ways an old school dictator (which makes sense, as he was a cog in the Soviet Machine) who is making sure that true power resides with him, no matter who is actually president.
The first indication of how things are going to go is when, and if, he gives up that power willingly. I predict he will arrange to stay on, and running the show for a looooong time.
Which is why I think Russia is such a weak state, if it relies so heavily on one man to mediate all the competing interests from destroying the country as a viable entity, then it doesn’t bode well for the future of Russia.
Considering that in 1991 living Russians had zero experience with multiparty democracy, the rule of law, etc., and considering that nobody in the country knew anything about running a non-state business above the black-market level, and considering that the Soviet Communist system abruptly collapsed all at once instead of being gradually and experimentally phased out, is it even possible that things could have gone significantly better post-1991?
