# Question about police searching a minor? **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [May 22, 2008, 3:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253 "2008-05-22T15:38:27Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 16\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![diggleblop](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/ac91a4/32.png) [@diggleblop](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/diggleblop)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2008, 3:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253/1 "2008-05-22T15:38:27Z")
Ok, when I was 16, I was driving a car with like 6 of my friends in it, all of us minors. Anyways, we get pulled over by two undercover cops, they showed us their badge then asked us to get out one by one. They did the pat down routine which was fine, but then they made each one of us pull open the front of our pants and underwear to reveal anything hidden in our crotch. I was naturally very uncomfortable with this. Mainly because I didn’t want to embarrass the cop with my gargantuan manhood, but, low-and-behold, he did blush. Alright, did they have a right to do this (make us open our pants) with us being minors and not having one of our legal guardians present at the time? ---
**Author:** ![Bricker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/977dab/32.png) [@Bricker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bricker)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2008, 4:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253/2 "2008-05-22T16:03:43Z")
It depends. I’m sorry I can’t be any more specific, but it really does depend. Police may briefly detain you to investigate a possible crime, even if they don’t have probable cause, and they may pat down your outer clothing if they have a _reasonable, articulable suspicion_ that you have a weapon or some other threat to their safety. They may conduct a more thorough search if they have _probable cause_ to believe that a crime has been committed. They may search to their hearts’ collective content if they have been given _consent to search_. I have no idea what level of suspicion they had, if any at all. ---
**Author:** ![diggleblop](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/ac91a4/32.png) [@diggleblop](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/diggleblop)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2008, 4:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253/3 "2008-05-22T16:50:51Z")
They literally told us that we looked like a bunch of hoodlums and decided to pull us over for being in a bad neighborhood being young and white. We were driving about 25mph in a 30mph zone because we were looking for my friend’s brother who had not been home for a few days. We had no drugs on us at all, no alcohol either. They simply pulled us out of the car and searched us. I don’t remember them asking, they may have, but this was 15 years ago and I was scared at the time. We were searched in the middle of a parking lot called The Rod-n-Reel in Chesapeake Beach MD. Not really THAT bad of a place really. I just did what they said. But the more that I look back on it now, the more I say to myself, I bet they violated some kind of law by looking down the pants of a bunch of minors without permission or probably cause. Because they found absolutely no drugs, weapons or anything else illegal before doing it. I mean, think about it. A grown up 35 yr old man, pulling a bunch of kids out of the car and telling them to pull open the fronts of their pants and underwear and then looking down there for two or three seconds. Pretty pedophilic I must say. I mean, the patdown and crotch squeeze first wasn’t enough? ---
**Author:** ![Rhythmdvl](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/85f322/32.png) [@Rhythmdvl](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Rhythmdvl)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2008, 5:07pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253/4 "2008-05-22T17:07:55Z")
[QUOTE=diggleblop] without … probably cause. [/QUOTE] Which they don’t need (_see_ Gotcha v. Ya). I think something missing from a lot of “did the police have a right to …” threads is whether or not you had a choice at the moment. For example, if the police said "Son, based on the size of your package, we’re going to have to jump rope with it to prove it’s not a prosthetic.” If you let them, then whether or not there was a legal requirement for you to comply (i.e., the officer had the right to ask) is basically irrelevant—you voluntarily did what the officer asked. I think with very few exceptions, the police can _ask_ you to do anything. I don’t believe the officer is under any duty (Federally speaking, state jurisdictions may differ) to tell you that you needn’t comply if you don’t want to. (I’m thinking a Florida (?) case where the police searched everyone on a bus without telling them it was voluntary—despite the confined nature of the bus and that walking past the officers would cast suspicion on an individual. A classic case, but I can’t remember any of the names at the moment.) Without ascertaining—at the time—if the police were giving you an _order_ (and not many people, let alone kids, can muster the gumption to ask), it’s really difficult to tell whether they had the \*right \*to expect compliance. Possible answers to the question (is that a pistol in your pocket or are you just happy to be pulled over) get lost in the subjective memory of the event. Again, jurisdictions may differ, and there may be additional (probably statutory) restrictions as to what a policeman can ask of a minor. ---
**Author:** ![Rhythmdvl](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/85f322/32.png) [@Rhythmdvl](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Rhythmdvl)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2008, 6:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253/5 "2008-05-22T18:50:27Z")
[QUOTE=Rhythmdvl] I’m thinking a Florida (?) case where the police searched everyone on a bus without telling them it was voluntary—despite the confined nature of the bus and that walking past the officers would cast suspicion on an individual. A classic case, but I can’t remember any of the names at the moment. [/QUOTE] [Florida v. Bostick](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florida_v._Bostick) is the case I was thinking of. I don’t know this case included rhetoric addressing whether the police should have told Bostick he had a right to terminate the encounter—that bit may have come from somewhere else. I may be imagining things. ---
**Author:** ![Cyberhwk](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/7993a0/32.png) [@Cyberhwk](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Cyberhwk)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2008, 7:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253/6 "2008-05-22T19:49:56Z")
[QUOTE=Rhythmdvl] Without ascertaining—at the time—if the police were giving you an _order_ (and not many people, let alone kids, can muster the gumption to ask), it’s really difficult to tell whether they had the \*right \*to expect compliance. [/QUOTE] If you DO ask, are they required to give you an accurate answer? If not, then how can any layperson tell what you are required by law to do and what is voluntary? ---
**Author:** ![Rhythmdvl](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/85f322/32.png) [@Rhythmdvl](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Rhythmdvl)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2008, 8:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253/7 "2008-05-22T20:32:21Z")
[QUOTE=Cyberhwk] If you DO ask, are they required to give you an accurate answer? If not, then how can any layperson tell what you are required by law to do and what is voluntary? [/QUOTE] I think by definition their answer is accurate as to whether or not you are in a custodial situation or not. If they answer no, then you are (ostensibly) free to go about your business. If they answer yes, then you are subject to the extent of their powers. (Whoa, am I talking in generalities!) That was the gist of my earlier post – whether they have a right to compel a search or other action depends on the factors that **Bricker** touched on. But most of those factors (generally) won’t come into play unless you know if you were compelled to do them. If you don’t ask, it’s (generally) likely that your consent will be deemed voluntary. If you do ask, and they say you’re not obligated to comply but you comply anyway, again, it’s voluntary so (generally) no rights question really arises. If they tell you wrongfully that you are obligated to comply, you (generally) still have the obligation to comply with an order given by a policemen. The cure for that harm isn’t you standing up for a particular right at the moment, but (generally) the suppression of evidence found from it. Generally. ---
**Author:** ![Really\_Not\_All\_That\_Bright](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/e8c25b/32.png) [@Really\_Not\_All\_That\_Bright](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Really_Not_All_That_Bright)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2008, 8:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253/8 "2008-05-22T20:51:19Z")
Nobody seems to have touched on whether being a minor grants (or removes) any specific protections, which is the OP’s real question. Looking at the specific instance discussed, I will point out that in some (most?) jurisdictions drivers under 18 are prohibited from driving with more than one minor passenger in the vehicle, so you may have been stopped for cause even if they didn’t say so. ---
**Author:** ![Cyberhwk](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/7993a0/32.png) [@Cyberhwk](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Cyberhwk)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2008, 9:11pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253/9 "2008-05-22T21:11:41Z")
Thank you **Rhythmdvl**! Good thread guys! ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2008, 10:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253/10 "2008-05-22T22:24:30Z")
> [@](#): > > RILEY, Judge > > STATEMENT OF THE CASE > > Respondent-Appellant C.D.T., a juvenile, appeals from a juvenile adjudication finding him to be a delinquent child for possession of cocaine, a class D felony 1 if committed by an adult. > > 1 IND. CODE 35-48-4-6 (1993). > > We reverse and remand with instructions to vacate C.D.T.'s delinquency adjudication. > > ISSUE > > One issue is presented for our review: Whether the juvenile court properly denied C.D.T.'s motion to suppress evidence and any testimony regarding the evidence obtained in a warrantless search of his person. > > FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY > > On the evening of [\*\*2] August 9, 1993, South Bend Police Officers Andrews and Jordan were dispatched to the vicinity of Lindsey and Scott Streets to investigate complaints of “open air” drug dealing. (R. 22). While heading southbound on Scott Street, Officer Andrews observed a large, white car stopped in the middle of the street and blocking traffic. Officer Andrews further observed C.D.T. bending into the passenger side of the car with his hands inside the passenger window. Standing behind C.D.T. was an unidentified male. > > Officer Andrews became suspicious and pulled up behind the vehicle in his “semi-marked” squad car. 2 When Officers Andrews and Jordan exited the squad car, the unidentified male fled, and Officer Jordan chased after him. Officer Andrews then directed C.D.T. to step away from the car window and place his hands on the trunk. Officer Andrews conducted a patdown weapons search of C.D.T.'s outer garments. The search revealed no weapons; however, near C.D.T.'s right front pants pocket, Officer Andrews felt a crumbled plastic bag. Based on his nine years of experience as a police officer, Officer Andrews immediately suspected drug-related activity, so he reached into C.D.T.'s pocket and removed [\*\*3] the bag. Inside the plastic bag was a smaller zip-lock bag which Officer Andrews opened and examined. The smaller inside bag contained an off-white colored substance. This substance was later confirmed to be cocaine. > > 2 The squad car had lights on the grill, on the deck, and a light on the dash. At the time of the stop, Officer Andrews was a member of a special drug unit. > > A petition alleging delinquency was filed by the State alleging that C.D.T. committed an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult, to-wit: possession of cocaine, a class D felony. Following the hearing, C.D.T. was adjudged a delinquent and placed on probation for 30 days. > > Prior to the delinquency hearing, C.D.T. filed a motion to suppress evidence. Following a suppression hearing, the trial court denied the motion. At trial, Officer Andrews testified as to the evidence he obtained during the search. C.D.T. objected, reiterating his prior arguments and the trial court overruled the objection. Therefore, the issue was [\*1044] properly preserved [\*\*4] for our review. C.D.T. appeals. > > DISCUSSION AND DECISION > > C.D.T. contends that the trial testimony regarding the fruits of the illegal search was improperly admitted. Specifically, C.D.T. argues that Officer Andrews’ search exceeded the scope of a lawful Terry 3 stop and frisk. > > 3 Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868. > > [HN1] The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. We will not disturb its decision absent a showing of abuse of that discretion. Moore v. State (1994), Ind.App., 637 N.E.2d 816, 818, trans. denied, cert. denied in Moore v. Indiana (1995), 130 L. Ed. 2d 1093, 115 S. Ct. 1132. > > [HN2] The juvenile code provides that "in cases in which a child is alleged to be a delinquent child, the procedures governing criminal trials apply. . . . " I.C. 31-6-7-1 (a) (1988). C.D.T. was adjudicated a delinquent pursuant to the Code which defines a delinquent child as “[one] who commits an act that would be an offense if committed by an adult. . . .” I.C. 31-6-4-1 (a)(1) (1993). Having [\*\*5] established that the adult criminal procedure rules apply to delinquency cases, we look to search and seizure law. > > Our State Constitutional provision against unreasonable search and seizure provides as follows: > > [HN3] The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. > Article I, section 11, Ind. Const. The Indiana provision is virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [HN4] Generally, a judicially issued search warrant is a condition precedent to a lawful search. Searches and seizures conducted outside of the judicial process are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. However, this general rule is subject to a few well-delineated exceptions. Thompson v. Louisiana (1984), 469 U.S. 17, 19-20, 83 L. Ed. 2d 246, 105 S. Ct. 409; Johnson v. State (1993), Ind.App., 617 N.E.2d 559, 565. The burden of proof is on the State to prove that the warrantless search was conducted within the confines [\*\*6] of one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 774, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 89 S. Ct. 2034; Moore, 637 N.E.2d at 818; Rabadi v. State (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 271, 274. Here, the State seeks refuge under the Terry investigatory stop and frisk exception to the warrant requirement. > > I. Terry Stop and Frisk Exception > > A. The “Stop” > > It is undisputed that Officer Andrews was justified in his initial “investigatory stop” of C.D.T. [HN5] One exception to the warrant requirement is an investigatory stop whereby a police officer can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity “may be afoot,” even if the officer lacks probable cause. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; Johnson, 617 N.E.2d at 565. The Terry standard is intended to ameliorate the harshness of the strict probable cause requirement and permit police officers to stop on something less than probable cause. However, we note that investigative stops remain a relatively narrow exception to the warrant requirement and cannot be used to provide a haven for unjustified stops. Under these facts, the [\*\*7] officers were justified in stopping C.D.T. to determine if he was engaged in criminal activity. > > B. The “Frisk” > > Having decided that the initial stop of C.D.T. was proper, we next consider whether the subsequent search was permissible. The general exclusionary rule states as follows: > > [HN6] Evidence seized illegally or obtained as a result of an illegal seizure by a government [\*1045] agent is not directly admissible in a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding against a person whose expectation of privacy was violated by the illegal seizure. > Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684. > > [HN7] Under the Terry stop and frisk analysis, a police officer is permitted to make a Terry stop without a warrant and without probable cause. Because the suspects may be armed and dangerous, the police officer is entitled for his own protection and for the protection of others in the area, if he has a reasonable fear of danger, to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of the suspect in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Such a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and any weapons seized may properly be introduced [\*\*8] into evidence against the accused. Id. at 29-30. It is undisputed that Officer Andrews was justified in feeling endangered by the situation, so as to permit the frisk. > > However, [HN8] the Terry frisk is a “patdown” of outer garments for concealed weapons strictly. If the officer finds something that feels like a weapon, then he can reach inside the clothing and check to see if it is a weapon. Id. The purpose of the Terry search is not to discover evidence of crime, but rather to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence. The Terry search should be confined to its protective purpose. Id. at 27. We are asked to consider whether Officer Andrews’ search of C.D.T. exceeded the scope of a lawful Terry frisk. The State contends that the so-called “plain feel” doctrine is controlling. > > II. The “Plain Feel” Doctrine > > [HN9] The “plain feel” doctrine was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993), 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 2130, wherein the Court determined that police officers may seize non-threatening contraband detected during a protective patdown search of the sort permitted by Terry [\*\*9] , so long as the search stays within the confines of a valid Terry search. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2136. > > In Dickerson, after making a valid Terry stop and conducting a valid patdown search which revealed no weapons, the officer felt a small lump in the defendant’s jacket pocket. Upon further examining it with his fingers, the officer believed it to be crack cocaine so he reached into the defendant’s pocket and seized a small bag of cocaine. The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the officer determined that the lump was contraband only after “‘squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant’s pocket’- a pocket which the officer already knew contained no weapon.” Id. at 2138. > > The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding that the seizure was unconstitutional. Id. Specifically, the Court said that > > [HN10] if a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless [\*\*10] seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain view context. > Id. at 2137. > > Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the plain feel doctrine as valid; however, the Court said that the police officer clearly overstepped the bounds of the “strictly circumscribed” search for weapons allowed under Terry. Id. The Court went on to say that “here, the officer’s continued exploration of respondent’s pocket after having concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated to ‘the sole justification of the search [under Terry] . . . the protection of the police officer and others nearby.’” Id. at 2138-39. The Court concluded that the search amounted to an impermissible search under Terry and thus the evidence was properly suppressed. Id. at 2139. > > Because Indiana has no cases directly applying the plain feel test, we look to our [\*1046] neighboring state of Illinois for guidance. In People v. Blake (1995), Ill.App., 268 Ill. App. 3d 737, 645 N.E.2d 580, 206 Ill. Dec. 575, the Illinois Appellate Court held that because the so-called “patdown” search went beyond that which was necessary to determine whether the suspect had a weapon and because the officer [\*\*11] lacked probable cause to arrest the suspect, the evidence should have been suppressed. Blake, 645 N.E.2d at 583. The facts in Blake are similar to the facts presently before us. While on routine patrol, the officer drove through a tavern parking lot where there had been recent problems with drug dealing. The officer thought he saw Blake and another man exchanging something, so he stopped Blake and asked him to submit to a patdown search. The Officer found nothing that resembled a weapon, but he felt a “bulge” in Blake’s pants pocket. Believing it to be a plastic bag of marijuana, the Officer reached into Blake’s pocket and seized the bag. > > In concluding that the marijuana should have been excluded as the fruits of an improper search, the Illinois Court reasoned that the continued exploration of Blake’s pocket after the officer knew that it did not contain a weapon exceeded the scope of a valid Terry frisk, and that the facts known to the officer at the time were insufficient to support a finding that probable cause existed to arrest Blake. Id. at 583; See also People v. Spann (1992), Ill.App., 237 Ill. App. 3d 705, 604 N.E.2d 1138, 178 Ill. Dec. 615 (Tactile sensation of a soft powder did not give officer [\*\*12] probable cause to arrest the defendant); Cf. People v. Mitchell (1993), Ill.App., 257 Ill. App. 3d 157, 630 N.E.2d 451, 196 Ill. Dec. 516 (Officer’s tactile perceptions made during a valid Terry stop and frisk provided him with information which, taken together with his previous observation of paraphernalia and his experience, gave him probable cause to arrest). continued in next post ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2008, 10:25pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253/11 "2008-05-22T22:25:13Z")
> [@](#): > > Application of the foregoing standards to the facts presently before us leads to a result in favor of C.D.T. The record reveals that during the course of the patdown search, Officer Andrews felt a “crumbled plastic baggie” in C.D.T.'s pants pocket. (R. 25). Because Officer Andrews knew that drugs are sometimes packaged in plastic bags, he reached into C.D.T.'s pocket and seized the bag. Officer Andrews then opened the outer bag and found a smaller blue bag inside. Upon opening the smaller blue bag and examining its contents, he found the cocaine. The record clearly indicates that at the time Officer Andrews seized the contraband, he had already satisfied himself that C.D.T. possessed no weapons. The following colloquy occurred on cross-examination: > > Q. The purpose of the pat down was to search for any weapons, correct? > > A. That’s correct, sir. > > Q. [\*\*13] Weapons that might be a threat to you and others, correct? > > A. Yes, sir. > > Q. Did you recover any weapons? > > A. No, sir, I didn’t. > > Q. Did you, in the course of your pat down, feel anything that you thought was a weapon? > > A. Not that I recall at this time, sir. > > (R. 29-30). > > Q. Would it be true to say then, at the point when you patted on the baggie, you could not say one way or the other whether something was in the baggie? > > A. No, sir, I could not – > > Q. You could not tell? > > A. I could not tell if it was full or empty. > > Q. It could have been empty? > > A. Could have been empty. > > Q. Okay. So the contents, namely, the smaller, blue baggie and ultimately this off-whitish, colored rock, that was not determined until you actually went into the pocket and pulled out the baggie, correct? > > A. Yes, sir. > > (R. 32). On re-direct examination, Officer Andrews clarified his answers to say that once he felt the plastic bag, he immediately suspected contraband. > > Q. I want to know what was in your mind at that exact instant that you – [felt the plastic bag]. > > A. Anytime I have encountered a small, plastic baggie on someone in the past, [\*\*14] it has contained an illegal substance. [\*1047] So, in my mind, as soon as I hear and feel a plastic baggie in somebody’s pocket, I automatically think of drugs. > > Q. Now, you didn’t know that for sure until you removed the bag? > > A. Exactly. > > Q. At that instant, that is what you believed it to be? > > A. Exactly. > > Q. Did you make any effort to manipulate or do anything with that thing you were feeling through the pants pocket? > > A. No, sir. > > (R. 33-34). On re-cross, the following transpired: > > Q. . . . At the time you touched the baggie, you could not tell physically whether or not anything was in it, correct? > > A. I could tell that it was a plastic baggie. > > Q. And that’s it? > > A. Yes, sir. > > (R. 34-35). > > We do not find Officer Andrews’ abstention from intrusive manipulation of the plastic bag prior to the seizure as a dispositive fact. Rather, we find it far more significant that at the time of the seizure, Officer Andrews had already ascertained that C.D.T. possessed no harmful weapons. [HN11] A protective Terry patdown for weapons must not go beyond that which is necessary to determine if the person being detained is armed. Terry does not permit the [\*\*15] continuation of a curiosity search once an officer has dispelled his reasonable fear for his safety and the safety of others. The State has failed to meet its burden of proving that the incriminating character of the plastic bag was immediately apparent to Officer Andrews. The further intrusion of reaching into C.D.T.'s pocket and seizing the contraband was not justified under the Terry stop and frisk exception. > > However, the inquiry does not end here. We must also consider whether prior to the seizure, Officer Andrews had probable cause to arrest C.D.T. based upon suspected possession of contraband. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137. [HN12] “Probable cause to arrest depends upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and circumstances within the arresting officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect had committed or is committing an offense.” Adams v. Williams (1972), 407 U.S. 143, 147, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 92 S. Ct. 1921; Johnson, 617 N.E.2d at 566. > > Based on the facts known to Officer Andrews at the time, we cannot say that probable cause existed to support a full custodial arrest and [\*\*16] a full physical search incident thereto. 4 Furthermore, [HN13] a search which provides probable cause to arrest cannot be justified as a search incident to that arrest. Smith v. Ohio (1990), 494 U.S. 541, 543, 108 L. Ed. 2d 464, 110 S. Ct. 1288; Johnson, 617 N.E.2d at 568. The Court in Dickerson discussed a useful analogy between the plain feel doctrine and the well-established plain view doctrine. The Court explained the plain view doctrine as follows: > > 4 [HN14] The search incident to a lawful arrest is probably the most broad of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Pursuant to a full custodial arrest, the arresting officer is permitted to search the arrestee in order to remove any weapons which may be used to resist arrest or escape. This is to ensure the officers’ safety and to prevent the arrest from being frustrated. Additionally, the arresting officer may search for and seize any incriminating evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment and/or destruction. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. > > [HN15] If contraband is left [\*\*17] in open view and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment-or at least no search independent of the initial intrusion that gave officers their vantage point. . . . The warrantless seizure of contraband that presents itself in this manner is deemed justified by the realization that resort to a neutral magistrate under such circumstances would often be impracticable and would do little to promote the objectives of the Fourth Amendment. > [\*1048] Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137 (citations omitted). Arizona v. Hicks (1987), 480 U.S. 321, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347, 107 S. Ct. 1149, a case which the Supreme Court decided under the plain view doctrine is particularly germane to the case before us. In Hicks, while executing a valid search warrant for particularized evidence, the police happened upon and seized some stolen stereo equipment. The Court held that although the police were lawfully conducting a search pursuant to a valid warrant, they did not possess probable cause to believe the stereo equipment was stolen until they lifted it up to look at the serial numbers, and thus [\*\*18] the seizure was invalid. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326-27. The Court explained that because the incriminating character of the stereo equipment was not immediately apparent, its seizure could not be justified under the plain view doctrine. Probable cause to believe that the equipment was stolen arose only after the officer seized the equipment, i.e. lifted it up to read the serial numbers. Id. > > Similarly, here Officer Andrews’ tactile sensation of “crumbled plastic” did not make the contraband’s incriminating character immediately apparent. Rather, the fact that the plastic bag contained contraband was not known until after the seizure and further examination of the inner bags’ contents. Furthermore, probable cause to arrest did not exist without the fruits of the search-which we are now deeming as inadmissible evidence. > > C.D.T.'s detention did not rise to the level of a full-blown arrest and because the probable cause required for a full custodial arrest was lacking, we find that the seizure was not justified under any exception to the warrant requirement. > > CONCLUSION > > Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the investigative stop and patdown search were reasonable under Terry [\*\*19] . However, Officer Andrews overstepped the bounds of a permissible Terry patdown search for weapons when he reached into C.D.T.'s pants pocket and seized the plastic bag, after he had ascertained that no dangerous weapons were on C.D.T.'s person and when probable cause for a full-blown arrest and search incident thereto was lacking. > > Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate C.D.T.'s delinquency adjudication. > > Darden, J. and Barteau, J. Concur. _C.D.T. v. State_, 653 N.E.2d 1041; 1995 Ind. App. LEXIS 927 (Indiana Ct. App. 1995) Courts seem to apply the same search and seizure standards to juveniles and adults, at least outside of the school setting. The cases do afford minors slightly different rights in the school setting, [http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=CASE&court=US&vol=469&page=325](http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=CASE&court=US&vol=469&page=325) Cases also indicate that a juvenile’s capacity to consent to a search must be considered by the judge, so there’ some play in the joints regarding validity of consent. ---
**Author:** ![samclem](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/a9a28c/32.png) [@samclem](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/samclem)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2008, 11:48pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253/12 "2008-05-22T23:48:38Z")
My 17-year old son can’t consent to enter into a contract. I believe that’s the law, at least in Ohio. How, then, is it legal for an officer to ask my son to consent to a search of his vehicle, absent something in plain site which might warrant it? ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2008, 12:08am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253/13 "2008-05-23T00:08:40Z")
> [@](#): > > A police officer encountered a juvenile sitting in a tunnel underneath a bridge. n1 Although the only thing “suspicious” about the youth was that he was wearing a heavy jacket in warm weather, n2 the officer told the minor to come towards him with his hands out of his pockets. n3 When the minor did not remove his hands from his pockets as he approached the officer, the officer grabbed the minor’s hand and told him to drop whatever he was holding. n4 The minor complied and dropped a brown vial with a spoon. n5 The officer arrested the minor, and found drugs during a subsequent search. n6 The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the officer’s conduct was not a seizure under the standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio. n7 The court further found that even if it were a seizure, it was not an unreasonable one. n8 The court applied a balancing test n9 and held that the public’s “strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of its children” n10 outweighed the officer’s minimal interference with the minor’s liberty. n11 > > Police officers boarded a bus at a terminal in the District of Columbia at 2:30 a.m. to conduct consent searches of passengers for [\*763] drugs. n12 A detective approached a fourteen-year-old seated in the back of the filled bus and began questioning him. n13 In response to the detective’s questions, the youth denied carrying any drugs or weapons. n14 The detective searched the minor’s bag after asking and obtaining the juvenile’s agreement to search it. n15 The detective then did a pat-down search of the minor and found crackcocaine. n16 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals en banc held that under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would not have concluded that he had been seized. n17 The court en banc specifically noted that it did not consider the defendant’s young age, including whatever effect that may have had in making him more vulnerable to coercion, in its seizure analysis. n18 > > The above cases illustrate two different ways that courts treat juvenile status in assessing searches and seizures of minors. In the first case, the Arizona court determined that the juvenile was not seized, even though Arizona courts have held that adults were seized in comparable circumstances and thus entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. n19 Moreover, the court found that the minor had a limited liberty interest which was [\*764] outweighed by society’s interest in his welfare. n20 Thus, the Arizona court provided the minor with less protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than that which is afforded adults under the Fourth Amendment. > > * * * > > By contrast, some lower courts recognize the unique cognitive development of juveniles. These courts have attempted to develop standards for consent searches and seizures on the street that account for the critical differences in how juveniles, as compared to adults, think and make decisions. n22 However, these lower court opinions have not provided a coherent approach for factoring youth into a Fourth Amendment analysis. > > The Supreme Court had the opportunity to develop a standard to assess seizures of juveniles on the street in California v. Hodari D. n23 The Hodari Court, however, declined to factor the defendant’s youth into its analysis. n24 The gap in Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area has resulted in a lack of uniformity among lower courts as to how “juvenileness” should count in search and seizure inquiries. n25 Lourdes M. Rosado, NOTE: MINORS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: HOW JUVENILE STATUS SHOULD INVOKE DIFFERENT STANDARDS FOR SEARCHES AND SEIZURES ON THE STREET, 71 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 762 (1996) ---
**Author:** ![askeptic](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/eb9ed0/32.png) [@askeptic](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/askeptic)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2008, 12:18am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253/14 "2008-05-23T00:18:40Z")
[QUOTE=samclem] My 17-year old son can’t consent to enter into a contract. [/QUOTE] That is a common misconception. He certainly can enter into a contract but under certain conditions it is voidable by him. Minors may consent to certain things even sexual intercourse, that is why there is a difference between Rape and Statutory Rape. Anyway you are comparing apples to oranges even if a minor could not contract, consenting to a search is not a contract. Eighteen year olds can vote but they cannot buy beer. Just like they may be able to void a contract while still being able to consent to a search. Of course despite all this, a persons minority MAY be a winning argument to negate consent. ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2008, 12:24am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253/15 "2008-05-23T00:24:20Z")
> [@](#): > > The voluntariness of a consent to search is ‘a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.’" In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497, 500 (D.C. 1992) (en banc) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-249)). The test is subjective, focusing specifically on the consenting person’s characteristics and subjective understanding and on whether consent was “freely given.” 16 Burton, 657 A.2d at 745; see Jackson v. United States, 805 A.2d 979, 985 (D.C. 2002). The court can take into consideration “the youth of the accused . . . his lack of education . . . or his low intelligence . . . .” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (citations omitted). Additional factors include the length of the detention prior to consent, repeated and prolonged questioning, and physical punishment. Id. “Account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents.” Id. at 229. \*\*In situations where a juvenile has purportedly consented to a search, the trial court must “expressly and thoroughly” deal with “the significance of age,” In re J.M., 619 A.2d at 504, although its findings on that issue “need not be in writing.” \*\* Id. at 503. \*Basnueva v. U.S., \* 874 A.2d 363; 2005 D.C. App. LEXIS 255 (D.C. Ct. App. 2005) \*And Cf. \* > [@](#): > > A decision to consent to a police search has consequences for a juvenile at least as grave as those facing the purchaser of a motor scooter. Nevertheless, the cited authorities, derived from other areas of the law, have not resulted in the adoption of a doctrine that a minor [\*\*32] has no capacity to admit to an offense. When the police, during custodial interrogation, properly advise a juvenile in conformity with Miranda, for example, a voluntary statement made thereafter is admissible in evidence, provided that the court finds, after considering the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background and intelligence, that he or she “has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S. Ct. 2560, 61 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1979). Moreover, this [\*971] court has declined to embrace a per se doctrine holding invalid any statement of a juvenile which was made in the absence of a parent or counsel, because such a rule would “sacrifice, in many cases . . . , the vital interests underlying the policies and goals of the juvenile court system.” In re J.F.T., 320 A.2d 322, 324 (D.C. 1974). > > But even where Miranda warnings have been given, great care must be taken to ensure that a juvenile’s statement is voluntary. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967); In re W.B.W., 397 A.2d 143, 145 (D.C. 1979). [\*\*33] Juveniles are not simply treated as smaller adults. As a four-Justice plurality of the Supreme Court stated in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599, 601, 68 S. Ct. 302, 92 L. Ed. 224 (1948), in setting aside the conviction of a fifteen-year-old boy who had confessed to murder during prolonged custodial interrogation, > > what transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were involved. And when, as here, a mere child – an easy victim of the law – is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence produces. > > * * * > > But we are told that this boy was advised of his constitutional rights before he signed the confession and that, knowing them, he nevertheless confessed. That assumes, however, that a boy of fifteen, without aid of counsel, would have a full appreciation of that advice and that on the facts of this record he had a freedom of choice. We cannot indulge those [\*\*34] assumptions. Moreover, we cannot give any weight to recitals which merely formalize constitutional requirements. Formulas of respect for constitutional safeguards cannot prevail over the facts of life which contradict them. \*In re J.M., \*, 596 A.2d 961; 1991 D.C. App. LEXIS 244 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990) (J.M. case in the lower court), _vactated_, 601 A.2d 609 (D.C. Ct. App. ), _remanded by_, 619 A.2d 497, 1992 D.C. App. LEXIS 348 (D.C. Ct. App. 1992) (en banc) (citing quoted discussion with approval) ---
**Author:** ![Patty\_O\_Furniture](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/96bed5/32.png) [@Patty\_O\_Furniture](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Patty_O_Furniture)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2008, 12:27am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-about-police-searching-a-minor/450253/16 "2008-05-23T00:27:00Z")
Dear Penthouse Forum, I never thought something like this would happen to me but…