This is simply untrue. Japan’s internal production of oil was for practical purposes nil, when the US embargoed oil to Japan the Dutch joined the embargo and in no case was Japan ending its aggression in China going to end the embargo. The only thing that was going to end it was Japan leaving China, rolling back the spoils of four years of its aggression, which it was never going to willingly do.
Repeating your same cite again does not make it any more true. If you’d been paying attention, this is not what I am referring to. How on earth you manage to parse out the phrase “and ordered the U.S. Navy to attack any vessel threatening ships under American escort” as being the important part from what I cited trying to remove it from any context is beyond me. The context is that the vessels under American escort were the aforementioned British HX and ON convoys. I don’t know how much clearer I can be. In August 1941 the US agreed to start escorting British convoys of British merchant ships carrying British war supplies from Halifax to Iceland and on return trips from Iceland to Halifax. They were ordered to attack any Axis vessels encountered on sight, and FDR publically announced that Axis vessels entered the neutrality zone at their own risk.
Horseshit. The US was not protecting “any” merchant ships inside that zone from belligerent acts; it was escorting British convoys and protecting them from attack. It was in no way a neutral act, not even theoretically. It was an act of war. The US was escorting the convoys of one belligerent in a war with orders to attack any vessels of the other belligerent encountered on sight. The US was depth charging German U-boat contacts near these convoys and two US destroyers escorting British convoys had been torpedoed and sunk by U-boats. Those are flatly acts of war.
As for your bizarre notion that the US was being neutral in that it would also protect Axis shipping from British submarines, again, horseshit. For your edification, there is a timeline here of US action in the pre-war years. Note in particular the entry on March 30, 1941:
Oh, and might as well note April 10, 1941 as well:
And if you want to see the pictures in black and white from LIFE magazine of 45 of the 69 German, Italian and Danish merchant ships seized in US ports, it’s right here.
Japan did have some limited sources of oil. Japan produced about 2.7 million barrels of oil domestically. The domestic wells were located at Akita, Niigata and Nutsu. Expansion into Korea and Manchuria (Manchuko) managed to acquire many needed resources. Manchukuo fields provided another 1.0 million barrels. They obtained another 1.0 million tons from fields in Formosa (Taiwan). Japan also had a small synthetic petroleum industry.
Japan was getting 13% of it oil from the DEI and they even offered to increase that, then they cut off all oil in June 1941 due to USA pressure- but were still in negotiations.
Well, actually cites do contain facts. Thanks for a couple pf them.
But yes, convoys- all convoys, all ships, were protected from belligerent activities in the** Pan-American Security Zone**. Yes, later FDR ordered more and more aggressive actions.
The **Pan-American Security Zone ** (October 1939) wasnt a act of war as it was in theory a neutral act- the USA declared a Zone where it would protect all shipping from attacks. Of course, since the Germans couldnt benefit from it, it was clearly meant to benefit the Allies- altho of course Neutral shipping was also protected. Later FDR added more and more protections and the convoys & protections grew steadily more aggressive. You seem to be conflating the quite neutral start of the Pan-American Security Zone in 1939 with some of more aggressive acts by FDR in late October 1941.
No one denies that those later acts were heavily biased towards the Allies, *grew steadily more aggressive * and were part of FDR’s Anglophile policies. But the Pan-American Security Zone, as originally passed by treaty- was by no means a act of war. Later actions by FDR? Well, maybe. Depends on whose opinion you want to take.
Of course 'acts of war" is purely subjective, unless someone takes it to the World Court or something- which Hitler was unlikely to do. Germany did state that as of October 27, 1941 the USA had crossed the line. However, that was not due to the Pan-American Security Zone per se but due to other actions ordered by FDR, such as attacking any German Uboot on sight. I guess if you want to take Ribbentrop’s side,:dubious: then the USA crossed the line into Acts of War as of October 27, 1941, with some earlier issues in Sept 1941. But FDR said those acts were “just short of war”. I accept FDR’s opinion over Ribbentrops, myself. You apparently take the other side.
As I said, Japan’s internal oil production was for practical purposes nil. 2.7 million barrel a year is essentially nil.
What the hell are you talking about? When do you think the US led oil embargo began? Here’s a clue: July 1941 (you even got the month wrong). Use some basic logic skills; if Japan could buy the oil from the Dutch, why the hell would they need to conquer it? Again, for your edification
You’ll note Japan would run out of oil in 3 years even if it was not at war, and 3/4 of its overseas trade had been cut off as a result of the embargos. So much for your absurd notion that Japan wasn’t being threatened with economic collapse, just its war machine. You’ve got the cart before the horse, the war machine needs the economy to be functional before it can be functional. Need another cite? From here (warning, pdf) JAPAN’S DECISION FOR WAR IN 1941: SOME ENDURING LESSONS, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Complete and utter horseshit. The US was not escorting convoys; the US wasn’t forming convoys and in fact didn’t even form convoys when war broke out. The US was doing nothing to actively protect convoys in the Pan-American Security Zone from belligerent activities. For the third time, I am not talking about the Pan-American Security Zone.
What conversation have you been reading? You’re the one who has been conflating the two, this is now the third time I’m telling you that. Oh, and yet again you have your dates wrong. For the third time now, FDR agreed to have the US Navy escort British convoys of British merchant ships carrying British war materials in HX and ON convoys from Halifax to Iceland and Iceland to Halifax on the return trip in August 1941. That is a clear act of war, there is nothing subjective about it. The US Navy and German U-boats were in a full blown shooting war from August to December 1941 before war was formally declared. There had been earlier sporadic acts, the first of which was the USS Niblack depth charging a German U-boat off of Iceland on April 10, 1941 - again, an act of war, there is nothing subjective about it.
Considering your inability to understand something after it’s been explained to you three times, your inability to know what constitutes an act of war, your inability to get your dates straight, to know that the Dutch were embargoing oil to Japan, that Japan’s entire economy was facing collapse, that the conditions for the lifting of the oil embargo was for Japan to quit China, not to merely cease the war, you should really question your ability to tell which side I am taking in an FDR vs. Ribbentrop debate that is occurring entirely in your head. There is absolutely nothing “just short of war” in a shoot on sight policy. I guess I’m taking the side of reality, per wiki and an interesting note on how ‘isolationist’ the US actually was in how popular FDR’s undeclared naval war was:
Or maybe wiki is taking Ribbentrop’s side.:rolleyes:
Not really - it seemed to the Japanese that the US were out to screw them royally by cutting off their supplies of oil, steel and other raw materials, and using control over US dollar transactions to bankrupt Japan, while the US was building up a massive navy that was clearly aimed at the IJN. The Japanese got that impression because that’s exactly what was happening.
Esactly. It was called the Two-Ocean act because that’s what it very obviously was. And who was the only possible opponent in the Pacific? The Japanese knew that sooner rather than later they would either have to roll over and play nice doggie to US foreign policy, or fight that navy. Not unreasonable to expect them to start the fight on their terms.
Indeed. The classic mistake of “we couldn’t do that, so there’s no way those grotty foreigners could do it”. Despite the fact the Japanese had been at war for several years and used their combat aviation heavily. And despite the RN already having pulled off a textbook nightime harbour attack with carrier aircraft.
I couldn’t agree more. Being caught 100% off-guard despite several “war is imminent” warnings was a pretty piss-poor performance by Short, but MacArthur managed to top it by being caught just as badly after the Pearl Harbour attack had already happened. The only thing that can be said in their defence is that the British proceeded to screw the pooch just as badly even after all that. The Japanese were ridiculously fortunate in the ineptitude of their enemies.
They should have known very well that there might be a naval war with Japan in the Pacific at a time and location most advantageous to Japan, i.e. before the two-ocean navy hit the water. When you are rapidly growing more powerful than your enemy, you can expect them to hit you as soon as they can and make the first blow count.
Personally I think the Allies suffered a lot from timing. All of them were caught just in the midst of expanding from a small cadre of long-time professionals to a massive wartime force. So across the board many commanders were dead-wood old codgers who had stayed in uniform through the twenties and early thirties when the military were respected like brothel-keepers and paid like potato-pickers, while the lower ranks were chock-full of draftees struggling to remember whether they should spit-shine superiors and salute footwear, or vice-versa. The old guys were expecting things to move at WW1 pace and the new guys hadn’t yet realised that ‘the management’ had little more of a clue than they did.
Only if Imperial Japan managed to ignored the fact that the embargo was a result of Imperial Japan’s treatment of it’s neighbors. The invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the continued aggression against China that began in 1937. The U.S. renounced it’s trade agreements with Imperial Japan in 1939 and, along with other nations, began embargos in 1940.
Western nations had chosen not to support Imperial Japan’s war efforts. Imperial Japan’s response was to blame the West for Imperial Japan’s lack of war materials, which directly led to Imperial Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec 8th (JST), British warships on Dec 10th, and British, Dutch, and American holdings in Southeast Asia and the Central Pacific.
To some extant, I imagine that some Japanese leaders must have seen the Western indictment of Imperial Japan’s land grabs as hypocritical. Japan wasn’t doing anything new.
They were legitimate military targets after war had been declared. Imperial Japan’s (not to be confused with modern, post-war Japan) chosen methods of land and resource-conquest only hardened the resolve of it’s enemies to destroy the Imperial war machine. Or as I like to say, “If you don’t want Hiroshima, don’t start Pearl Harbor”.
Heh. Reminds me of the skit in Dr. Strangelove. “Gentlemen! Gentlemen! You can’t fight in here! This is the War Room!”
To suggest that there are honorable ways to commence killing each other on such massive scales (and involving ever inventive ways of doing so, such as napalm) strikes me as ironic, this morning.
We are an insane species.
So, to me that statement seems to imply that Japan’s imperialistic reasons to choose war (instead of backing down to economic pressure) was not “correct” or “right”, and offered as proof: they lost.
Does that mean that the U.S. was “correct” in it’s imperialistic goals in 1898, because, after all, we won?
Furthermore, do you suggest that if the Japanese had not struck Pearl Harbor, and had restricted itself to attacking the P.I., Wake, & Guam, the U.S. would not have used the A-bomb in 1945?
[Of the letter, Churchill later wrote: “Some people did not like this ceremonial style. But after all when you have to kill a man it costs nothing to be polite.”
Japan’s imperialistic reasons to choose war (instead of backing down to economic pressure) was not “correct” or “right”, and as a result of their bad decision, they pissed off the wrong people and they lost.
It was the “sneak” part of the sneak attack that changed so many minds in the U.S… News that Imperial Japan had attacked Wake Island would not have produced the long lines of volunteers hoping to kill some Japs. The death marches and the cannibal thing certainly didn’t do anything to smooth over any heard feelings.
What sort of logic is that? Why should the Empire of Japan accept a bunch of funny-colored foreigners ordering them about? Regardless of the background, announcing “stop doing what you want and start doing what I want or I’m gonna make you my bitch” is overtly hostile, and that’s exactly what the US was saying to Japan.
No, the western nations chose to cripple the overseas trade of Imperial Japan in order to make it impossible for the Empire of Japan to pursue its sovereign policies, because those policies were basically batshit crazy. Imperial Japan’s response was to recognize that the West was implacably hostile to it’s long-term aim of running the whole of east Asia, so it went to war rather than give up those aims.
And I’m pretty sure everyone participating in this thread knows the where and when so you don’t need to patronise us with those.
