# Question regarding the attack on Pearl Harbor **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [August 19, 2013, 10:26am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-regarding-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor/666628 "2013-08-19T10:26:03Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 10\ **Page:** 10
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 7:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-regarding-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor/666628/181 "2013-09-05T19:05:15Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > It doesn’t matter why he didn’t serve, no one is calling him a shirker. But his opinions differ greatly from other well known historians- who were decorated serving officers. I didn’t say you called him a shirker. I mocked your contention that he is somehow to be held in low regard as a historian since he didn’t serve in the military by pointing out the reason for his lack of military service was TB, which made him physically unqualified for military service. I hate to be the one to break it to you, but military service or the lack thereof doesn’t make one a more or less qualified historian. Or shall we toss all of the works of [Tacitus](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tacitus) into the bonfire rather than regard him as one of the greatest historians of the Roman era since he probably didn’t serve in the Roman military, and if he did it was being appointed to command of a legion based solely on his being a member of the aristocracy, not on any prior military experience? Here’s another shocker for you: historians have different opinions from each other all the time. Their military service record or lack thereof doesn’t on its face give greater weight to their opinions. To claim that it does is frankly childish. Here, I’ll even link the wiki entry for [RMA Sandhurst](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Military_Academy_Sandhurst) for you. It’s the officer training academy for the British Army. Keegan was the senior lecturer in military history there for a number of his 26 years in that post. His lack of military service didn’t seem to bother the British Army when it came to teaching military history to their officers. > [@DrDeth](#): > > In any case, you claimed Keegan said XX, but were unwilling to back it with an actual quote. I quoted actual decorated serving officers, men with boots on the ground, recognized experts in the field- at least two of which said Keegan was wrong. All you have is a name, not even what he said. Hang on a second - weren’t you the one trying to claim that other posters were arguing with different posters in their head? Oh yeah, you were: > [@DrDeth](#): > > You may be continuing your argument with Musicat in your head > > Not by me. Are you arguing with Musicat in your head also? > > As I claim? Still continuing your argument with Musicat ? Here’s a clue: I never said Keegan said anything. That’s **Sailboat**. You are literally arguing with me over something another poster said as if I had said it. ---
**Author:** ![Irishman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/b487fb/32.png) [@Irishman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Irishman)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 9:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-regarding-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor/666628/182 "2013-09-05T21:34:00Z")
Thank you, **TokyoBayer** , for the far more nuanced and informed position than either Oliver Stone or my own previous knowledge. I have certainly heard the claim that the bombs prevented US soldier deaths. I only recently became aware that the Soviets joined the War against Japan. I was aware there was a lot of internal debate in Japan and that it took Hirohito to sway the surrender. [QUOTE=TokyoBayer] There were a number of concerns which could have lead to the decision by the Emperor to break the deadline. There was a real concern that if the Soviets joined the attack on the homeland, that the emperor would not be allowed to continue even in the limited role, as he was under US occupation. [/QUOTE] Could you clarify, allowed by whom? Are you saying that Japanese people (or elements of the government) would oust him, or that in the eventual surrender that the conquerers would deny him that role? Or both? ---
**Author:** ![barath\_s](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/90ced4/32.png) [@barath\_s](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/barath_s)\ **Post date:** [September 6, 2013, 6:14am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-regarding-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor/666628/183 "2013-09-06T06:14:15Z")
I came across this argument first many years ago; Isaac Asimov had referenced the debate on the use of the atom bomb and felt that it was justified by the show of force to the Soviet Union, thereby preventing worse during the Cold War, and not so much by the need to force japan to surrender. Recently, there were some threads on reddit AskHistorians and [this article](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/29/the_bomb_didnt_beat_japan_nuclear_world_war_ii?page=full) arguing that the Bomb didnt accomplish the surrender but helped save face for the US and for the Emperor (during surrender) and that the Soviet declaration was critical. The article’s argument places emphasis on the timing of the meeting of the Supreme Council on Aug 9 & the argument that devastation by nuclear bomb of two more cities was not different in scale/impact than the devastation already wrought upon 66 other cities by the american bombers that year. I mean, dropping more atom bombs would have just helped to make the rubble bounce at that point; there was equally no material defense against conventional bombing at that point. An equally significant point (of the article) is that the entry into war of the Soviet Union removed Japan’s strategic end-game options in a way that no bombing could have. At that point the hopes for Stalin to mediate a cease fire or for a last ditch strike against the US to force concessions would have been eliminated and the prospect of surrender to the soviet union would have been surely less appetizing than surrender to the US; (as it was for many germans who voted with their feet). (i.e. any concession by the US would simply have been swallowed/negated by a greater Soviet claim. The Soviet Union had a VERY sizeable war machine that had just chewed up German army and the speed of the collapse in Manchuria was also stunning. The article does seem to have omitted the fact that the soviets had far less amphibious/expeditionary equipment and experience than the US, even if logistically they were far closer.) The article does seem cogent to me, and makes a case that the Soviet declaration was a more significant factor as the straw that broke the camel’s back than the atom bomb. However, since roosevelt/churchill had [pushed for exactly this](http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/yalta-conference-foreshadows-the-cold-war)commitment from Stalin at Yalta, (Stalin in response to roosevelt & churchill promised to declare war against Japan 90 days after V-E day, and as duly committed, did so on the 90th day), it surely couldn’t have been a surprise to the US/UK. In fact I wonder if any argument has been made by any historians that knowing this schedule, the timing of the US dropping of the atom bomb was aimed at enlarging the US control of post war Japan. (i.e. In Germany, Eisenhower kept his forces at the Elbe river un-reinforced while the Soviets pushed for Berlin, thereby assuring themseloves a stronger hand in post war Germany. By this time, under Truman, who was far less trusting of the Soviet Union than Stalin\*, the US must have had generals determined not to minimize Soviet influence in the east and the atom bomb as the best way to achieve that at that specific time. - I think Roosevelt had far more confidence in his ability to influence Stalin, mistakenly or otherwise, so not sure if trusting is the right word.) Would appreciate more information/insight. – In ref to the below: > [@Irishman](#): > > Recently I read an article via LinkedIn where Oliver Stone was in Japan claiming that the US story of the bomb ending WWII by forcing Japan to surrender was a “lie”. I find that a ludicrous exaggeration. My feeling is that it is believed Japan was prepared to fight to the last man, woman, and child defending their homeland from a US invasion, that they would not contemplate defeat to conventional invasion. … The A Bomb changed the dynamic - no longer was Japan facing an enemy they could combat face to face, but rather they were facing destruction from above with not recourse. But I admit to being ill-informed and would love to hear more on the reasoning. [quote=“TokyoBayer, post:170, topic:666628”] We’ve done this on a number of times, but there really isn’t a way to determine which of the two factors, the atomic bombs or the Soviet entry into the war was more important in the decision to surrender. The facts are: Hiroshima occurred August 6, the Soviet declared war on the night of August 8th and the second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9th. The Japanese government made a counter offer on the terms of surrender on August 10th. The debate among scholars has gone on for decades and will likely go on for decades more. However, the average person isn’t really aware of the importance of the Soviet entry into the war and believes that it was simply the dropping of the bombs. I don’t think it was a “great lie” but it was a gross simplification of history, and there certainly were many factors which contributed to that becoming the quick explanation. Among them was the interservice rivalry post WWII and fighting for budget. Others was the minimization during the cold war of the Soviet contributions to WWII. As for the decision, I always have to stress this, but one simply cannot use broad terms such as “Japan” when discussing the decision to surrender. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [September 6, 2013, 3:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-regarding-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor/666628/184 "2013-09-06T15:43:30Z")
> [@Little\_Nemo](#): > > Tokyo you’re nitpicking. Obviously when I say “Japan surrendered” I’m referring to Japan in a somewhat abstract sense. I’m talking about the consensus among a group of individual people who had roles in the government of the Empire of Japan. > > Duh. And by that very definition, it didn’t happen. There was not a consensus in any sense of the word. After days of bitter debate and an attempted coup, most of the military finally acquested in resignation when the Emperor finally pushed them. > [@](#): > > I stand by my theory (with the acknowledgement that it is a theory). Fair enough. I don’t debate creationists, either. If someone refused to discuss their unsupported, crazy assertions, then there’s nothing left to talk about. > [@](#): > > If you have a different theory maybe you’d like to contribute to the conversation. It seems all you’re doing here is telling other people they’re wrong without coming up with anything yourself. Give me a break, fighting ignorance is a full time job. Others don’t seem to share your opinion on my contributions to the thread. The only ones who are complaining are the ones with the absurd ideas. > [@Irishman](#): > > Thank you, **TokyoBayer** , for the far more nuanced and informed position than either Oliver Stone or my own previous knowledge. Thanks, I guess. I’ve gone back and forth myself, growing up in America believing that it was only natural to use the atomic bombs, then after living less than a kilometer from point zero in Nagasaki and reading more material, I was antibomb for a while in my youth. I’m back to believing they were necessary. Tragic, but necessary. That was a horrible war and it needed to be ended with the militants out of power. I have seen nothing by any of the critics which makes a better moral case other than “it was a new way to kill so it was much more evil.” Not only were less US and Allied soldiers killed, but the end of the war saved the Allied POWs which were slated to be mass excecuted. And the civilians, both in Japan and the occupied countries. And the Japanese soldiers as well. > [@](#): > > I have certainly heard the claim that the bombs prevented US soldier deaths. I only recently became aware that the Soviets joined the War against Japan. I was aware there was a lot of internal debate in Japan and that it took Hirohito to sway the surrender. > > Could you clarify, allowed by whom? Are you saying that Japanese people (or elements of the government) would oust him, or that in the eventual surrender that the conquerers would deny him that role? Or both? The was real danger of both. There would be hardliners within the military who would ever want to isolate him and ruling in his name or depose him and find another member of the imperial family who would follow their lead. For most of the history of the Chrysanthemum Throne, the Emperor was a figurehead at best and a royal prisoner at worst. The mid 19th century drive to overthrow the _bakufu_ (_shogun_) government and “restore” the emperor was yet another case of one faction of Japan’s powers using the symbolic power to persuade people to join their cause. The Emperor’s principal responsibility was quasi religious in nature, performing the symbolic ceremonies and then being part of the longest royal dynasties in the world. The Japanese didn’t take this lightly. In addition, from the 20s and 30s, the military, primarily the army had developed a sort of personality cult around the Emperor which had not existed prior to that. As there was compulsory military service for all Japanese males, a generation had grown up with greater attachment to him. Up until the very end, there had been placed an equal weight on what is called _kokutai_, a word which has no exact English translation, and has been called “national policy” but is really much more. From wiki > [@](#): > > Kokutai (Kyūjitai: 國體, Shinjitai: 国体, literally “national body/structure”) is a politically loaded word in the Japanese language, translatable as “sovereign”, “national identity; national essence; national character” or “national polity; body politic; national entity; basis for the Emperor’s sovereignty; Japanese constitution”. “Sovereign” is perhaps the most simple translation.[citation needed] For example, in pre–World War II Japan, the Emperor alone was sovereign, while in other countries sovereignty is held or shared by the people collectively, legislature and/or monarch. For the military leaders, it was the essence of every unique and special about Japan and it naturally required them, the _Yamato_ warriors to lead the country. The military had demanded that any talks of surrender could not touch either the emperor or the _kokutai_. At the end, that had to be jettisoned and they settled on insisting on some sort of preservation of the emperor. There had been real danger of the emperor being tried as a war criminal. In my opinion, in a just world he should have. However, the US decided to do the politically expedient things and utilized him in order to change the nation. Hirohito escaped being used by his own army into being used by a foreign army. The US allowed him to remain as a figurehead emperor but severely limited his personal powers and dismounted the greater imperial household, making commoners out of all but a few direct relatives. > [@barath\_s](#): > > I came across this argument first many years ago; Isaac Asimov had referenced the debate on the use of the atom bomb and felt that it was justified by the show of force to the Soviet Union, thereby preventing worse during the Cold War, and not so much by the need to force japan to surrender.(snip) > > In fact I wonder if any argument has been made by any historians that knowing this schedule, the timing of the US dropping of the atom bomb was aimed at enlarging the US control of post war Japan. (i.e. In Germany, Eisenhower kept his forces at the Elbe river un-reinforced while the Soviets pushed for Berlin, thereby assuring themseloves a stronger hand in post war Germany. By this time, under Truman, who was far less trusting of the Soviet Union than Stalin\*, the US must have had generals determined not to minimize Soviet influence in the east and the atom bomb as the best way to achieve that at that specific time. > > - I think Roosevelt had far more confidence in his ability to influence Stalin, mistakenly or otherwise, so not sure if trusting is the right word.) > > Would appreciate more information/insight. This has been hotly debated by many scholars. I’m not going to rehash all the arguments here, but I agree with those who argue there was _perceived_ need to drop the bombs in order to end the war. There are clear paper trails demonstrating that everything was being driven by a desire to beat the Japanese as soon as possible. The timing of the bomb was driven by its completion date. It was simply coincidental that the two bombs were dropped at the same time as the Soviet declaration of war. As a little more history, there was a strong feeling of destiny in Japan. They had come out of a feudal society less than 100 years prior, buzzed through their own industrial revolution, beat the Chinese, the great Middle Kingdom and the Russians, winning an empire in the process. By July of 1945, that empire was in tatters. Japan’s cities lay in ruins, her once proud navy destroyed and her army beaten up. Still, they were delusional. Although they new they were defeated, they still occupied a great deal of territory and believed that they could negotiate favorable terms. I can’t agree with many of the things in the article linked in the post but parts are spot on. Speaking of not agreeing and agreeing, let’s look at this part. > [@](#): > > The Japanese were in a relatively difficult strategic situation. They were nearing the end of a war they were losing. Conditions were bad. The Army, however, was still strong and well-supplied. Nearly 4 million men were under arms and 1.2 million of those were guarding Japan’s home islands. > > Even the most hardline leaders in Japan’s government knew that the war could not go on. The question was not whether to continue, but how to bring the war to a close under the best terms possible. The Allies (the United States, Great Britain, and others – the Soviet Union, remember, was still neutral) were demanding “unconditional surrender.” Japan’s leaders hoped that they might be able to figure out a way to avoid war crimes trials, keep their form of government, and keep some of the territories they’d conquered: Korea, Vietnam, Burma, parts of Malaysia and Indonesia, a large portion of eastern China, and numerous islands in the Pacific. > > They had two plans for getting better surrender terms; they had, in other words, two strategic options. The first was diplomatic. Japan had signed a five-year neutrality pact with the Soviets in April of 1941, which would expire in 1946. A group consisting mostly of civilian leaders and led by Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori hoped that Stalin might be convinced to mediate a settlement between the United States and its allies on the one hand, and Japan on the other. Even though this plan was a long shot, it reflected sound strategic thinking. After all, it would be in the Soviet Union’s interest to make sure that the terms of the settlement were not too favorable to the United States: any increase in U.S. influence and power in Asia would mean a decrease in Russian power and influence. > > The second plan was military, and most of its proponents, led by the Army Minister Anami Korechika, were military men. They hoped to use Imperial Army ground troops to inflict high casualties on U.S. forces when they invaded. If they succeeded, they felt, they might be able to get the United States to offer better terms. This strategy was also a long shot. The United States seemed deeply committed to unconditional surrender. But since there was, in fact, concern in U.S. military circles that the casualties in an invasion would be prohibitive, the Japanese high command’s strategy was not entirely off the mark. OK, Ward Wilson the author of the piece is not an unbiased historian, he’s committed to curtailing nuclear weapons and cherry-picks facts. For example, his description of the IJA as being “well-equipped.” Not really. It had enough weapons to cause a lot of damage to the US, but it wasn’t unbeatable. The point is that some of the Japan leaders were hoping for Soviet intervention. The military was also using that as a stalling tactic to postpone any hard discussions. The Foreign Service had sent a list of proposals to the Japanese ambassador to the Soviets and had been waiting for a reply. Stalin had kept them unanswered for a long time in order to string them along as his generals prepared their attack on Japanese positions in Asia. Ward makes a big deal of the timing of the Big Six on the 9th, after the Soviet declaration of war. I believe he is ignoring so many facts that it’s misleading at best. From here: > [@](#): > > Togo recognized the possibility that the United States had exaggerated the bomb for propaganda purposes, he was impressed that American radio broadcasting was “rampant” and “massive.” He probably recalled that the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, had threatened Japan with “prompt and utter > destruction.” Galvanized by a sense of urgency, he took the initiative in convening an emergency meeting of key cabinet ministers on the afternoon of August 7.37 > Deliberations at this cabinet meeting can be reconstructed from Togo’s memoirs and other sources. The bombing of Hiroshima was the subject of discussion. Togo tried to find a breakthrough to surrender by quoting at great length American radio reports about the bomb. The U.S. government claimed that it had now “added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction,” and that, unless Japan surrendered, the > United States would keep dropping atomic bombs until Japan was extinct. Togo was resorting to the time-honored device of making the most of “external pressure”-the atomic bomb-to counter the army, which was adamant for a “decisive battle on > the homeland” against an American invasion. In a line of argument that was to be repeated by the peace party, Togo reasoned that “the introduction of a new weapon, which had drastically altered the whole military situation, offered the military > ample grounds for ending the war.” He proposed that surrender be considered at once on the basis of terms presented in the Potsdam Declaration. This author, Sadao Asada, is Professor of International History at Doshisha Universityi n Kyoto, Japan. He received his doctorate from Yale University. [His paper](http://www.google.co.jp/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CEAQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mconway.net%2Fpage1%2Fpage15%2Ffiles%2FShock%2520of%2520Atomic%2520Bomb.pdf&ei=JvQpUoj8M8rtkAXIvoDQBg&usg=AFQjCNH9kt7cM-hVVQXcZUQCN0Q1i8tUtA&sig2=eHY5o0YYku-RA6i8cYJpRg&bvm=bv.51773540,d.dGI) is a must read for understanding the end game in Tokyo. And, for **Little Nemo** , the reason I don’t propose my own reasons is that scholars do a far better job. ---
**Author:** ![Irishman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/b487fb/32.png) [@Irishman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Irishman)\ **Post date:** [September 6, 2013, 10:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-regarding-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor/666628/185 "2013-09-06T22:06:13Z")
Thanks to both of you. > [@barath\_s](#): > > I came across this argument first many years ago; Isaac Asimov had referenced the debate on the use of the atom bomb and felt that it was justified by the show of force to the Soviet Union, thereby preventing worse during the Cold War, and not so much by the need to force japan to surrender. I have heard that statement. I think that there certainly is an element of wanting to use the bomb to show up the Soviets, but I don’t think that was the primary reasons why the A-bombs were dropped on Japan. > [@](#): > > Recently, there were some threads on reddit AskHistorians and [this article](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/29/the_bomb_didnt_beat_japan_nuclear_world_war_ii?page=full) arguing that the Bomb didnt accomplish the surrender but helped save face for the US and for the Emperor (during surrender) and that the Soviet declaration was critical. That article certainly sounds well-argued. However, **TokyoBayer** links to a great rebuttal. > [@](#): > > The article’s argument places emphasis on the timing of the meeting of the Supreme Council on Aug 9 Yes, he does rely on the argument of the timing. Specifically, he says > [@](#): > > Hiroshima isn’t a very good candidate either. It came 74 hours – more than three days – earlier. What kind of crisis takes three days to unfold? The hallmark of a crisis is a sense of impending disaster and the overwhelming desire to take action now. How could Japan’s leaders have felt that Hiroshima touched off a crisis and yet not meet to talk about the problem for three days? He then says > [@](#): > > On August 8, Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori went to Premier Suzuki Kantaro and asked that the Supreme Council be convened to discuss the bombing of Hiroshima, but its members declined. So the crisis didn’t grow day by day until it finally burst into full bloom on August 9. Any explanation of the actions of Japan’s leaders that relies on the “shock” of the bombing of Hiroshima has to account for the fact that they considered a meeting to discuss the bombing on August 8, made a judgment that it was too unimportant, and then suddenly decided to meet to discuss surrender the very next day. Either they succumbed to some sort of group schizophrenia, or some other event was the real motivation to discuss surrender. Whereas the Soviets declared war and invaded on early August 9, and Nagasaki didn’t happen until after the meeting was underway. Sounds convincing, except it isn’t quite accurate. From the article **TokyoBayer** linked, as soon as Truman announced the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Foreign Minister Togo tried to get information from the army concerning the blast. But the army was in denial, refusing to admit it was an atomic bomb. It was mid-August 7th when Kido Kiochi took word of the atomic bomb to Emperor Hirohito, and Hirohito was displeased by the lack of information available to him. Information was slow going, the army was either too-discoordinated or too embarrassed to confirm the attack was an atomic bomb. Furthermore, > [@](#): > > In compliance with imperial wish, Togo met [Prime Minister] Suzuki and proposed that, “given the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, the Supreme War Council be convened with all dispatch.” This council was Japan’s inner war cabinet, consisting of the “Big Six” – the prime minister, foreign minister, army and navy ministers, and chiefs of the army and naval general staffs. However, there was a full day’s delay because some of the military members of the Supreme War Council were not available earlier – a strange, almost criminal excuse when time was so urgent. This is cited from a source document: Kiruhana and Hatano, eds., _Shusen kosaku_ 2: 356; Gaimusho, ed., _Shusen shiroku_, 4: 98. So which was it? Was the request for war council refused and then recalled, or was the war council delayed a day because military members were unavailable (perhaps even stalling)? Seems to me the War Council was already planned prior to the Soviets declaring war and invading Manchuria, so it’s hard to see that as the _cause_ of their meeting. Seems like we’re back to Hiroshima and complications of actual real-time confusion and disagreement. > [@barath\_s](#): > > & the argument that devastation by nuclear bomb of two more cities was not different in scale/impact than the devastation already wrought upon 66 other cities by the american bombers that year. I mean, dropping more atom bombs would have just helped to make the rubble bounce at that point; there was equally no material defense against conventional bombing at that point. Yet **TokyoBayer** ’s article shows Emperor Hirohito and Togo were explicitly concerned over the atomic bomb and the difference it made. [SIZE=2] > [@](#): > > On the morning of August 8, with Suzuki’s approval, Togo took it upon himself to visit the Imperial Palace and make a direct appeal to the emperor in his underground air-raid shelter. According to his postwar account (in September 1945), Togo reported in detail that American and British broadcasts were “most enthusiastically” repeating news of the atomic bomb. Characteristically, he invoked the enemy’s broadcast to buttress his case for a prompt surrender. “The atomic bomb,” Togo said, “has not only revolutionized modern warfare but has also brought about a great social upheaval and transformation of the daily lives of ordinary individuals as well. This is to be used as the turning point in bringing an end to the war”- on condition, of course, that the emperor system be retained. Emphasizing the urgency of the situation, Togo said that the United States would continue to drop atomic bombs on Japanese cities, as President Truman had warned, unless Japan ended the war at once. As Togo recalled in his memoirs, Hiro-hito emphatically concurred. “That is just so,” he replied, and went on to divulge his own firm determination: > > Now that such a new weapon has appeared, it has become less and less possible to continue the war. We must not miss a chance to ter-minate the war by bargaining [with the Allied powers] for more favorable conditions now. Besides, however much we consult about [surrender] terms we desire, we shall not be able to come to an agreement. So my wish is to make such arrangements as will end the war as soon as possible. > > In these words the emperor expressed his conviction that a speedy surrender was the only feasible way to save Japan. Hirohito urged Togo to “do his utmost to bring about a prompt ter-mination of the war” and commanded him to apprise Prime Minister Suzuki of his wish. [/SIZE] Furthermore, > [@](#): > > On the night of August 8, Suzuki told Sakomizu Hisatsune, chief cabinet secretary, “Now that we know it was an atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima, I will give my views on the termination of the war at tomorrow’s Supreme War Council, and I want you to make preparations for me.” After the war Suzuki recalled: “The atomic bomb provided an additional reason for surrender as well as an extremely favorable opportunity to commence peace talks. I believed such an opportunity could not be afforded by B-29 bombings alone.” The hitherto vacillating and sphinx-like Suzuki had finally made up his mind. It is important to note that Suzuki did so before he was informed of the Soviet entry into the war early on the following day. Sakomizu also felt that “the army will admit that now that the atomic bomb has come into existence, it precludes war be-tween a nation that possesses the atomic bomb and one that does not.” That’s not looking good for Ward Wilson’s premise. [QUOTE=barath\_s] An equally significant point (of the article) is that the entry into war of the Soviet Union removed Japan’s strategic end-game options in a way that no bombing could have. At that point the hopes for Stalin to mediate a cease fire or for a last ditch strike against the US to force concessions would have been eliminated and the prospect of surrender to the soviet union would have been surely less appetizing than surrender to the US; (as it was for many germans who voted with their feet). [/QUOTE] This is a fair point. It is reasonable to think that the Soviet entry into hostilities added to the momentum to accept the terms rather than push back. However, it cannot take the primary role for triggering the War Council meeting, because the meeting was already scheduled before the attacks. And it cannot be considered the most salient feature, because the Emperor was already pushing for acceptance of the Potsdam terms with only the condition of retaining his position. > [@](#): > > By this time, under Truman, who was far less trusting of the Soviet Union than Stalin\*, the US must have had generals determined not to minimize Soviet influence in the east and the atom bomb as the best way to achieve that at that specific time. Pardon? I think you’ve got an extra “not” in there or something. ---
**Author:** ![septimus](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/septimus/32/410_2.png) [@septimus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/septimus)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2013, 10:38am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-regarding-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor/666628/186 "2013-09-07T10:38:28Z")
Thanks for your brilliant post **TokyoBayer**. It seems to be a good objective summary of the Japan War endgame. There’s a quote I once read from a Japanese General(?) that I’ve not been able to find with Google. It was made shortly after the Hiroshima bombing, IIRC, and stated in effect that “the suicide of the Japanese nation would be like beautiful poetry.” Does anyone recall this quote? ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2013, 10:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-regarding-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor/666628/187 "2013-09-07T22:27:55Z")
> [@septimus](#): > > There’s a quote I once read from a Japanese General(?) that I’ve not been able to find with Google. It was made shortly after the Hiroshima bombing, IIRC, and stated in effect that “the suicide of the Japanese nation would be like beautiful poetry.” Does anyone recall this quote? I don’t recall that specific quote, but suicide in battle as romanticized poetic beauty was a common motif in Japan as the war drew closer to the end. _Gyokusai_ or “shattering like a jewel” was the term used to describe suicidal attacks such as banzai charges - those taking part in banzai charges were not expecting the charge to succeed, they were expecting to honorably die in battle. _Ichioku gyokusai_ - “100 million shattered jewels” was the propaganda slogan endlessly drummed out by the government from the end of 1944; the hundred million should die together in battle rather than surrender. Notably the 100 million was itself an exaggeration, the population of Japan was only 70 million. The slogan [_ichioku tokkō_](http://books.google.com/books?id=R5p7cRyK748C&pg=PA484&lpg=PA484&dq=ichioku+tokk%C5%8Dtai&source=bl&ots=76jPCc_yAm&sig=BIYNYoup3MAS-BRCROMC2_k0PH8&hl=en&sa=X&ei=56UrUpCLENP94APA9YGoCQ&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=ichioku%20tokk%C5%8Dtai&f=false) was also used, “one hundred million as a special attack force”, special attack (_tokkōtai_) being the euphemism for suicide attack units such as kamikazes. ---
**Author:** ![dropzone](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/dropzone/32/7515_2.png) [@dropzone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/dropzone)\ **Post date:** [September 8, 2013, 2:27am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-regarding-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor/666628/188 "2013-09-08T02:27:04Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > This author, Sadao Asada, is Professor of International History at Doshisha Universityi n Kyoto, Japan. He received his doctorate from Yale University. > > [His paper](http://www.google.co.jp/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CEAQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mconway.net%2Fpage1%2Fpage15%2Ffiles%2FShock%2520of%2520Atomic%2520Bomb.pdf&ei=JvQpUoj8M8rtkAXIvoDQBg&usg=AFQjCNH9kt7cM-hVVQXcZUQCN0Q1i8tUtA&sig2=eHY5o0YYku-RA6i8cYJpRg&bvm=bv.51773540,d.dGI) is a must read for understanding the end game in Tokyo. Why would that be? He isn’t even a combat veteran. :dubious: ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [September 9, 2013, 6:49am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-regarding-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor/666628/189 "2013-09-09T06:49:33Z")
> [@Irishman](#): > > I have heard that statement. I think that there certainly is an element of wanting to use the bomb to show up the Soviets, but I don’t think that was the primary reasons why the A-bombs were dropped on Japan. That element of wanting to show the Soviets has been documented, but the overwhelming purpose was the to get the Japanese to surrender. > [@](#): > > That article certainly sounds well-argued. However, **TokyoBayer** links to a great rebuttal. If you enjoyed that, here’s a handout for a class at Stanford taught by Prof. Martin Hellman which specifically addresses Ward Wilson, although for an earlier article with the same conclusion. I’ll quote from it below. > [@](#): > > Yes, he does rely on the argument of the timing. Specifically, he says > > > [@Ward Wilson](#): > > > > Hiroshima isn’t a very good candidate either. It came 74 hours – more than three days – earlier. What kind of crisis takes three days to unfold? The hallmark of a crisis is a sense of impending disaster and the overwhelming desire to take action now. How could Japan’s leaders have felt that Hiroshima touched off a crisis and yet not meet to talk about the problem for three days? Wilson bases almost his entire argument on how other country leaders immediately reacted to crises by having meetings and because Japan did not, then the Hiroshima bomb could not have set off the stage. Not only does my earlier quoted source refute the timing issues, it can be clearly shown that Japan was in a situation completely incompatible to the ones he cites. > [@Wilson](#): > > President John F. Kennedy was sitting up in bed reading the morning papers at about 8:45 am on October 16, 1962 when McGeorge Bundy, his national security advisor, came in to inform him that the Soviet Union was secretly putting nuclear missiles in Cuba. Within two hours and forty-five minutes a special committee had been created, its members selected, contacted, brought to the White House, and were seated around the cabinet table to discuss what should be done. The most obvious difference is that with JFK, the United States could actually _do_ something about about the crisis. All that Japan could \*do \*would be to surrender and three of the four Big Six members of the Supreme War Counsel were dead set against surrender. They would gain nothing by having a session of the Supreme War Counsel. They wanted to continue waiting and they didn’t have to have a meeting to do that. I’m going to interrupt the narrative to plug a book which became a bible for me in business, _Getting to Yes_ written by members of the Harvard Negotiation Project, and which focused on the psychology of negotiation. In the book, they explain that when negotiating, you must consider the Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) for both yourself and the person on the other side of the table. Sometime ago, I became convinced that the key to understanding the surrender of Japan was to study the situation as a negotiation process _within_ the factions of the military, the Big Six, the Emperor, the Lord Privy Seal and the Elderly States. Were I independently wealthy, I would return to the states and do this as a dissertation, because it’s a book to be written. I really like Prof. Hellman, not only because he’s brilliant, but also because his analysis is exactly what I had independently observed. > [@Prof. Hellman](#): > > Japan was not of one mind. While almost self-evident once stated, and clearly applying more > broadly than just to Japan, this is often overlooked by blanket statements about a nation. An example occurs in President Eisenhower’s 1963 memoir, Mandate for Change, when he writes of a July 1945 meeting with Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, “It was my belief that Japan was, at the very moment, seeking to surrender with a minimum of loss of face.” Critical thinking would deconstruct such statements and ask what factions within the nation think that way, what factions think otherwise, and then weigh their relative power to implement policy. We do that with Eisenhower’s assertion – also made by many others – immediately below. I should note that, in spite of this admonition, either to avoid cumbersome phrases or out of carelessness, I will sometimes be guilty of this very sin. > > In the months prior to Hiroshima, some factions within Japan were seeking peace on the terms that were eventually allowed (primarily allowing the Emperor to continue as a figurehead), while other factions were adamant in seeking better terms. I lied to **Little Nimo** when I said I wasn’t intending to contribute anything original to the process. The following are my thoughts. Most of it is based on what I’ve read both in English and Japanese, as well as almost 25 years of business experience in Japan including conducting negotiation. The analysis isn’t batshit insane, irrelevant to the discussion or based on war gamming so I don’t know if it belongs in this thread, though. This is a limited examination of various parties’ positions and BATNAs. Prime Minister: Admiral Suzuki Kantarō. Position: More pro peace faction, but wavering. Style: Taciturn. Often people didn’t know if he were awake or not. Not particularly forceful. BATNA: If the deal to surrender fail, he not only would be out of a job as the military was preparing to impose martial law, but likely arrested > [@](#): > > The cabinet system, as inaugurated in 1889, in practice required a unanimity of views among its members for any decision making. The army and navy ministers were privileged members and, by resigning and refusing to name their successors, they could overthrow the government. Summary: The first wartime PM who was not Army, Admiral Suzuki had been brought on board after the defeat in Okinawa by Hirohito to bring about the surrender of Japan. Faced with the unspoken threat by the Army, he moved at a glacier pace. He wavered and also almost sunk the agreement after the initial acceptance and before the final agreement. He wasn’t the most powerful man in the room, as that would be General Anami. The only wartime PM who actually had any power was Tojo, and that due to his holding the Minister of War (Army) concurrently. Minister of Foreign Affairs: Togo Shigenori Position: Pro surrender. The driving force for the “peace faction” Style: Faced off against Anami, the leader of the hardliners. BATNA: Extremely weak. If the deal to surrender fail, he would also be out of a job and arrested. Summary: Togo had been attempting to nudge the cabinet into considering not committing national surrender from months prior. He seized on the atomic bombing to force the issue, successfully got PM Suzuki on board, managed to keep pressure on the militants without provoking a constitutional crisis. As the sole civilian of the Big Six, he had to move extremely carefully. Minister of War: General Anami Korechika Position: Fight to the last man, woman and child. The strongest of the no surrender allies. BATNA: This is where it gets interesting. Amani (or Admiral Yonai) could unilaterally overthrow the government just 'cuz. Yup. Resign and refuse to allow anyone else to be appointed as War Minister. This severely limited Togo’s ability to press the issue. All General Amani or Admiral Yonai had to do to change Japan’s destiny was to step out of the meeting room for a piss and keep walking out the door. The government would fall. The Emperor could invite a candidate to become Prime Minister but it required an active duty general and admiral for the positions of ministers of War and Navy. Without the support of the services, no government could be formed and the Army would then declare martial law, appointing General Amani as the leader. How is that for a BATNA? All the negotiations were conducted under the threat of a bloodless, 100% assured coup d’etat. Normally, there is a certain risk for attempting a coup, but in this case, there would be no downside. It was, in fact, what his most of fellow officers wanted him to do. When you look at the Kyujo Incident, it was clear that the Army would have backed the leaders had Anami nodded his head. How is that for pressure on Togo? I’ll abbreviate the analysis of the following members of the Big Six Minister of the Navy: Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa No surrender. BATNA: Could also cause the government to fall. Chief of the Army General Staff: General Yoshijirō Umezu No surrender Chief of the Navy General Staff: Admiral Toyoda Soemu Surrender Hitorito I’m sure that the term “despicable coward” is disrespectful to my former adopted country, and undoubted not fair to the late emperor, but he certainly placed the imperial interests above all. While I agree with the US’s politically expedient decision to not hold him responsible for his war crimes, in my private alt-hist, he goes straight to hell. However, in reality, the “sacred decision” to impose his will on the government was unprecedented under the Meiji Constitution, and for the man who was raised to protect the constitution and the imperial imperial institution, many people argue that the was very brave. Postion: Cautiously pro surrender BATNA: Life in a gilded cage if he agrees with the military and life in a little more tarnished cage otherwise when the find a relative to become the new emperor. Summary: Damn near everything concerning his responsibility for the war and failure to take more steps to end it were purged from history. With the Big Six in hopeless deadlock, he finally did push the issue and brought about the surrender. While stopping the suffering of his subjects was the stated reason, he was very concerned about the real possibility of the ordinary man rejecting the Imperial family post war. I belief that was a – if not the most – significant factor in his decision. The Army: Position: Fucking nuts Not really, but they had bought in their own myths too far. The nature of Japanese society is such that there is rarely a case where the top leadership can force things on the levels just below them, and the militants in the meetings repeatedly reminded everyone that they couldn’t control their own men. BATNA: Die in glory protecting the homeland. The people: Position: Wanting the war to end, but cowed and unable to say anything. Martial law would The only reason they play a part in here is that the emperor was concerned about their reaction to the imperial family should the government not surrender. One of the point of discussion was if the people under an American occupation would reject the emperor if they didn’t give up. BATNA: Death for many of them. Back to the main story, if you critically reread the various accounts of the final days with the above in mind, it seems to present a clear, understandable picture. By not resigning, as he was urged by other generals, and by not giving his approval to the attempted coup, Anami changed the outcome of the war. Let’s look at what happens it him if the negotiations are successful? He dies. Either as martyr sharing the gallows with Tojo, or as a samurai by his own hand. His BATNA is to be the leader fighting the good fight to protect Daippon from the impure barbarians. It may take sacrificing everyone, but really would you expect anything less from a military? Was the Alamo remembered because Sam Houston decided that it was more rational to give up? Had the world been completely different, and the USSR much stronger than the US, had they invaded the US, and knowing that everyone was to become atheists at gun point, all land taken from owners and the world completely turned upside down, wouldn’t you expect voices within the Pentagon to vow to carry the fight as long as possible? For the ultanationalists, it was be a similar belief. What then made these people end it? Togo knew from a long time prior that it was hopeless and that the longer the war continued, the worse it would be. If it were up to him, Japan would have surrendered much earlier, but he needed a game changer to convince Hitohito and the military, and used the excuse of Hiroshima to force the issue. Hirohito was in favor of ending the war, also from several months prior and was looking for a way to bring it about, within the limits to his direct actions dictated by the constitution. He as well, latched onto Hiroshima For the militants, none of the Big Three, were willing to surrender, even after Hiroshima, the Soviet entry into the war and Nagasaki. It look being told by the emperor and even then things were dicey. Why did Anami decide to follow his leader and not resign or permit the coup? The other top generals were deferring to his lead. My guess is that his deep personal commitment and loyalty to Hirohito as a man and the emperor as an institution was the reason that Japan didn’t have to fight on the beaches of Kyushu and Kanto, and finish somewhere in the Japan Alps of Nagano, with part of Japan divided into a red country, with more than a million additional casualties. However, would he have made that decision without the atomic bombs or the Soviet entry into the war? As he killed himself, we’ll never really know the answer to that question. It’s my guess that the double shock of both events did play a part. But I don’t know for sure. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [September 9, 2013, 2:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-regarding-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor/666628/190 "2013-09-09T14:51:36Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > All that Japan could \*do \*would be to surrender and three of the four Big Six members of the Supreme War Counsel were dead set against surrender. That should have read : three of the four military representatives out of the Big Six members of the Supreme War Counsel e.g., there are six members, four of whom are representing their services (two for army, two for the navy) and three out of the four of these were dead set against surrender. The point I’m attempting to make in my post is that there wasn’t some magical thing which suddenly transformed Japan from absolutely hell bent on fighting until the last man, woman, child and great grandmothers were killed in the process into a peace-seeking country in the flash of a fission light. The atomic bombs provided a way to force the issue from those who had already decided they wished to surrender, including the Emperor, and directed to those who would never surrender on their own accord, but who, in the end, acquiesced to the decision of that emperor. One of the best books is the 1968 _Japan’s Longest Day_ written by Japanese researchers and translated into English. An excerpt is here and includes the following account of the showdown at the War Ministry (Army HQ) > [@](#): > > The next morning, Friday, August 10th, Anami ordered all personnel in the War Ministry above the chief-of-section rank to gather at nine-thirty in the Ministry’s underground bomb shelter. When he recounted what had occurred at the Imperial conference, their reaction was one of disbelief and shock. Though they had anticipated that some action of this sort might be taken, the reality of it caught them unprepared. The Army, which for so long had been the most powerful force in Japan, which had run the government and disobeyed the Emperor when his commands seemed “ill-advised,” was now about to cease to exist, to disappear entirely from the life of Japan. That this would be one of the consequences of surrender, all the officers knew; and many feared that Japan also would cease to exist-in any recognizable form, at least. > > So many emotions seemed to be raging in the hearts of the young officers, so many strange blends of emotion-love and hate, fear and dismay, the horror of defeat, the terror of dishonor, bewilderment at seeing the total imminent collapse of everything they had lived and sworn by: it is not surprising, perhaps, that their passions wçre sometimes uncontrollable, that their actions, as they tried to fight their way out of a trap that had no exit, shifted from moment to moment, unvarying only in loyalty to the Emperor. Whatever the officers did, they were convinced, they did in loyalty; some, unfortunately, decided they knew better than the object of their loyalty how to be loyal. > > The Minister’s voice was firm, his attitude unequivocal. “We have no alternative,” he said, “but to abide by the Emperor’s decision. Whether we fight on or whether we surrender now depends on the enemy’s reply to our note. No matter which we do, you must all remember that you are soldiers, you must obey orders, you must > not deviate from strict military discipline. In the crisis that faces us, the uncontrolled actions of one man could bring about the ruin of the entire country.” > > A younger officer stood up. “The War Minister,” he said, “has told us to obey his orders whether we fight on or whether we surrender. Is the War Minister actually considering surrender?” > > A cold wind swept across the room, fanning the smoldering fires of rebellion. > > There was a silence. > > Then the crack of Anami’s swagger stick on the table sounded as loud as a gunshot. “Anyone who isn’t willing to obey my orders,” said the Minister coldly, “will have to do so over my dead body.” Anami goes on to further equivocate, and as noted by Dissonace, knew about the coup attempt but did not attempt to stop it. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/question-regarding-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor/666628.md?page=9)