Questions about U.S. Appeals Court decisions

Wow, thank BNS! I had given up on this thread, but I’m glad I checked back. It sounds like Circuit Court judgements are not then binding on districts not party to the suit, and the media simply has has that wrong. I’ve noticed lately they tend to say the precedents apply to the districts instead of the decisions are binding, but I’m not sure even that much is true, or what it means if it is.

For Bostic (not Bostick), the governor of Virginia was the original principal defendant, but that was changed to Rainey when the new governor came into office and supported the plaintiffs. For the appeal, Rainey was replaced by Schaefer, a court clerk. Again, I’m missing the fine distinctions that made this happen in Virginia, but not in Pennsylvania or Oregon. I sort of take your word for it that these distinctions are complicated, yet valid. However, I also can’t kick the feeling that the judges are muddling around in a gray area and just doing what feels right to them personally.

Meanwhile, the 4th Circuit decision will go into affect in just over two days making Virginia the 20th SSM state. That is unless the Supreme Court stays the Bostic decision again. I assume they will, but they’re cutting it pretty close.

I think you’ve misunderstood. An Circuit Court ruling (which has not been stayed or overturned) is binding on all the states for which it has jurisdiction. But, if the other states do not voluntarily change their laws to conform to the ruling, then somebody has to go sue those states and get rulings against them.

Ok, we’re going to have to be clear on the terminology we’re using, because you’re getting confused. For the Federal government, the lowest level court is a District Court. District Court rulings are appealed to the Circuit Court (which is the appellate court). Appellate court rulings are appealed to the Supreme Court. Supreme Court rulings are binding on all Circuit and District Courts. Circuit Court rulings are binding only on the District Courts that are under them.

You seem to be using the terms “district” and “state” and “party” interchangeably, and these are not interchangeable terms. If you can get clear on those distinctions, then that should help you understand.

Come on, dude. There’s some gray area with regards to private citizen standing in these types of suits, but just because you don’t understand (yet) what’s going on, that doesn’t mean that judges are “doing what feels right to them personally.” They make rulings, and they justify their rulings with legal precedent.

But here’s one distinction that I think you are having trouble with. You are comparing plaintiffs and defendants interchangeably. Plaintiffs are the ones who have to establish standing. Defendants don’t establish standing. Defendants can try to have themselves removed from a suit, but that’s not called “standing.” So, it makes a big difference whether someone is a plaintiff or a defendant.

You’re also going to have to explain what it is you don’t understand about the distinctions, so I can clarify for you better. I explained the Pennsylvania ruling was based in part on Pennsylvania law – which means that it doesn’t necessarily apply to other states. I think that’s pretty clear, so please clarify for me what you’re not getting.

Well, defendants may have to establish standing to pursue an appeal if the original defendant(s) refuse to.

Yeah, you got me. And since we’re talking about intervenor-defendants, I shouldn’t have phrased my statement this way. Scratch what I said there.

Hmm, I don’t think I confused districts, states, and parties, but maybe I did get lazy with phrasing. Yes, a district court is a federal entity with jurisdiction over some region, but that region is often one state. Also, in these particular cases, a state is always the defendant, regardless of who is representing that state.

I definitely do understand the hierarchy of district courts, circuit courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court. Whether or not appeals courts’ decisions are “binding” on all states in their jurisdictions may depend on how we define binding. If, for example, one state can maintain its ban on SSM even when its circuit court has ruled another state’s ban unconstitutional, and the only recourse for the oppressed parties is to re-litigate starting at the district level … well, to me that sounds like “not binding”. The legal definition may differ.

Usually the named defendant is a clerk of the courts or whatever official issues marriage licenses in the jurisdiction, not the state. And relitigation doesn’t necessarily mean a full trial on the merits. The next challenger will move for summary judgment on res judicata grounds. At that point the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a factual dispute exists or that the previous ruling is not controlling (presumably by showing its scheme is somehow distinguishable).

IANAL but…
A state (and the feds) can do whatever they want in terms of laws. The can pass laws that say anything, and if the governor signs it, it’s the law. The trick is to enforce it and not have it declared unconstitutional. To enforce a law, you have to charge people who break it, or deny applicants a marriage license, or some such. These people can then go to court to argue against the state.

If an appeal court rules on another state’s law and that ruling appears to suggest this state’s law will be equally invalid (unconstitutional) the state can do several things:

it can fight it tooth and nail. probably for political theatre if they know they will lose, or possibly because they think the wording of the previous decision does not match the circumstances of their case and they can expect a different outcome.

However, that requires someone to challenge the state’s action. When there’s between half a million to thirty million people in a state, odds are someone with a valid standing will challenge the law pretty quickly.

Someone with legal knowledge can chime in about the circumstances of others affected during this dispute. Depending on the court, there may or may not be an injunction ordering the state to stop enforcing the law pending an outcome?

The state may look at the other appeal court ruling and their lawyers say “you haven’t a hope in hell of winning”. Rather than spending money fighting in court, they either (a) cave in, stop doing whatever that’s unconstitutional or (b) change the laws to conform (Or (c) both.)

And that brings up another question. When the 10th Circuit refused to stay Kitchen, the Supreme Court stepped in and stayed it. Shouldn’t that act as controlling authority on the 4th Circuit to stay its own decision?

And further, let’s say that the Supremes don’t stay the 4th Circuit decision. Why does only Virginia have to recognize SSM? Why not West Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina (other states in the 4th Circuit)?

No, they were not parties to the suit, but Arkansas was not a party to Brown either. *scratches head.

Ideally, the state would look at the Circuit Court ruling and make adjustments to its laws to conform. But states don’t always do that, because of any number of reasons. Like, for example, they may not be able to get the law changed for political reasons. Plus a state might think it’s ban is different enough that the ruling doesn’t apply to it.

As Really Not All That Bright points out, that doesn’t necessarily mean that you have to do a full blown-trial. But if a state thinks that the Circuit Court ruling doesn’t apply to it or if it doesn’t change its ban to conform, then we have to get a ruling from a court to overturn the second states’ ban.

You’ve come into this with an assumption that all these states have identical bans and that the rulings apply to each ban in an identical fashion. That may very well be true, but the court doesn’t just get to assume things.

Stays are generally discretionary, and the factors involved (likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, etc., are usually fact-specific). An order granting a stay (including the one in Kitchen) doesn’t include findings of fact or conclusions of law or anything so it would be pretty hard to argue that it was in some way precedential.

I think you’re overthinking things. Brown was a more or less unique situation.

Not saying that this is the actual status of the laws in question but here’s my attempt to answer how two states in the circuit could have their laws disposed of differently.

State of Franklin has a law limiting marriage to a man and woman. State of Jefferson has the same law but also has a second law allowing civil unions between any two consenting adults. In Jefferson, a civil union gives the parties all of the same contractual rights (I don’t know if I’m using that term right) as a married couple such as next-of-kin rights, community property, etc. The only difference is that while a marriage must be solemnized (that is an official must marry the couple), for a civil union the parties merely need to sign a contract. Yes some churches and mothers come out and say that if you’re in a civil union you are not “married” but the state really doesn’t care one way or the other.

I think that while Franklin’s law might be unconstitutional discrimination, Jefferson’s law may be upheld as “separate and equal”.

I don’t think that would stand post-Windsor given that marriages are recognized by the federal government while civil unions are not. I believe Chris Christie tried that argument for a while in NJ - that civil unions had all the same rights as marriage under NJ law - but it didn’t hold up.

What could possibly be different between the Kitchen ruling and the 4th Circuit? Utah has a constitutional amendment banning SSM, doesn’t allow for civil unions, and want to enforce its law. Lower court says that is unconstitutional and refuses to stay the decision. 10th Circuit refused to stay. Supremes stay the decision.

Virginia has a constitutional amendment banning SSM, doesn’t allow for civil unions, and wants to enforce its law. 4th Circuit says it is unconstitutional and is deciding on a stay. Well, the Supreme Court has spoken with regards to a stay on the very same fact pattern. The only thing you have to do is substitute “Virginia” for “Utah.”

I realize that Brown was unique, but it is still precedential. And Aaron v. Cooper told Arkansas that simply because you were not a party to Brown, we have decided this issue, so piss off. I didn’t read the 4th Circuit’s refusal of a stay. Did it try to distinguish?

What about now, though? Twice the Supremes have stayed this same issue. What if, say, the 11th Circuit finds a right of SSM? Should it stay its decision under the controlling authority of the Supreme Court?