It is not an inference, it is an observation: the spins are observed precisely as though the variable changed in mid flight, back then! Yet again, this is not us merely being unaware of what the variables happen to be.
I was referring to your contention that this occurence indicates ontological randomness – “could not act retroactivley”.
Ontological randomness? What the heck is that? You know I’m a physicalist, and therefore that I think that ontology is a bunch of hooey.
I’ve told you the physics experiment, and the physics conclusion. Dress it up in whatever language pushes your buttons.
Umm, ontology is about the nature of being. Physicalism is itself an ontological statement.
Only insofar as it declares ontology irrelevant. Just because anything can be translated into Klingon does bestow any utility upon learning Klingon.
How so? Physicalism is an ontological assertion. Nothing in there about being irrelevant. Someone’s ontological framework may include supernatural elements, but ontology per se has nothing to do with transcendant matters.
Ontology is solely to do with ‘transcendent’, metaphysical matters. That which can be known epistemically is ontologically irrelelevant.
And the status of physicalism or solipsism can’t be resolved epistemically.
Or indeed, any other way: all we can do is send screen-shapes to each other. I’ve provided umpteen links, and you’re free to interpret them any way you choose. Call it all whatever you like - translate it into Welsh or something if that provides words which you prefer the sound of.
As ever, I leave you the last one-liner on the subject.
1)You agree that physicalism can’t be known to be true epistemically
2)You said, “That which can be known epistemically is ontologically irrelelevant[sic].” Hence, physicalism, I presume, is not ontologically irrelevant.
3)But earlier, you said that physicalism “declares ontology irrelevant.” --and-- “You know I’m a physicalist, and therefore that I think that ontology is a bunch of hooey.”
Isn’t this inconsistent?