Re-educating The Taleban

Great Debates
21

However right you are that all human beings should find the Taleban worthy of condemnation, I should think that women would especially feel this way. That is the only reason for my gender specific comments.

And this is where we abruptly depart. I am wholly unable to cede any religious credibility to a group that treats half of their population as “non-human”. You are making what I consider to be a dire mistake in swaddling the Taleban with the least shred of religious dignity. The indignities they perpetrate upon women as a whole completely divest them of any such mantle of respectability.

Since you have already “Godwinized” this discussion by accusing me of being a “Feminazi”, I’ll ask you a simple question. If Nazism had purported itself to be some sort of religion, would you have granted it similar liberties in its practice? How can there be “individual freedom” to commit female genocide? I fail to see your logic. I feel it is incumbent upon all civilized societies to intervene when such blatant and repellent abrogation of human rights occurs.

I also feel you are direly mistaken to willingly conflate dietary prohibitions and other relatively minor theological nuances with profoundly abusive and generally intolerable practices. Regardless of whether or not they are carried out in the name of religion, such monstrous deeds must be labeled for what they are, namely crimes against humanity.

Again, no it’s not “too bad that their women are treated like dirt”. It’s criminal conduct and no amount of psuedo-religious mumbo jumbo can possibly disguise or justify the disgusting way they seek to dehumanize women. I fully agree that it is not America’s job to “re-educate” the Taleban. It is the entire world’s job to do so and to do it quickly with all of the resolve that centuries of moral progress in a free society has brought us.

While other cultures do in fact delimit the rights of women in atrocious ways, none of them seem to have refined it to the systematic extent that the Taleban have. Just about the only component missing in order for them to be the most revolting bunch of women haters imaginable is female circumcision. That they have fallen short of this last horror in no way dissuades me from wishing for their immediate downfall. While I fully agree with you that sorting out the Taleban from the general population is nowhere near as easy of a proposition that I might have made it seem, I still fully maintain that any leadership and additional adherents than can be identified should be charged with the crimes against humaity that they are so manifestly guilty of. You may feel that such a notion is “ridiculous”, but I can only reply that to not attempt the dissolving of such a pathologically misogynist group is beyond “ridiculous” and amounts to tacit cooperation with such morally unacceptable practices.

I have yet to see Messers Graham or Roberts advocating the bombing of abortion clinics or the execution of abortion doctors. Until that time, I do not find the ideas they espouse (however unworthy they might be) to merit the sort of measures I am prescribing for the Taleban. I do not seek so much of an “indoctrination” as some attempt at palpably demonstrating to those who have instigated this horrid mistreatment of women a vision of exactly what their twisted vision precipitates upon those who are unfortunate to be on the receiving end. Any “backlash” that you seem to fear so much is entirely secondary when compared to the requirement that all civilized people expeditiously rectify such an insult to the unalienable rights of human beings.

To quote the survivors of Hitler’s genocide, “NEVER AGAIN”. I do not know how many times I will have to repeat this but what is happening to the women in Afghanistan is nothing short of genocide and must be dealt with accordingly (your protests notwithstanding).

What, do like Uncle Joe did and purposely or tacitly permit genocidal pogroms against the Jewish people, or in this particular case, women? The monstous crimes being perpetrated against women in Afghanistan utterly pales in comparison to whatever flaws there might be in my proposition. I am fully aware of the mindset you seek to decry in your mention of “re-education”. I feel there is a vast difference between the object lesson I advocate and the re-education instigated by the Soviet or Chinese authorities. Again, you seem willing to write off the ghastly abuse of women as merely a facet of their right to “practice the religion of their choice.” I am unable to do so.

Please remember that Lincoln was also willing to implaccably prosecute those who would shatter the fledgling nation he held so dear. In a similar fashion the entire world must rise up to protect the recent beginnings of Global democracy and human rights that are being assailed by the Taleban in Afghanistan and with their willing complicity in terrorism that both serve to threaten the civilized world. There must not be any “sending home” of these viscious and hateful thugs. To return them unscathed to their plotting of further atrocities would be an atrocity in and of itself.

22

Please reverse the elements in the above statement.

“Whatever flaws there might be in my proposition utterly pale in comparison to the monstous crimes being perpetrated against women in Afghanistan.”
Once again, dyslexia heads its ugly rear!

23

Collounsbury, a simple-minded assertion that invading Afghanistan doesn’t hurt Al Qaeda doesn’t make it so. And if I can take you calling me Rambo a thousand times, then you can sit there and take whatever card I choose to pull on you. When you stop with the ad hominem, I’ll stop. Until then, you’ll just have to take the same garbage you’re spewing out.

24

Listen chappie,

I did not say that invading Afghanistan might not hurt a portion of al-Qaeda. I noted the cell-based structure of al-Qaeda, of which Afghanistan is but part. The head? Perhaps one the heads. Recent events show all the signs of sharing an Egyptian print to them, meaning an operative influence of Egyptian groups like al-Gamaa al-Islamiya and related groups like al-Higra wa Takfiir. Removing Bin Laden does nothing to solve these issues in and of themselves. Above since it appears to me that al-Gamaa and perhaps elements of the GIA are providing operative experience.

You will note I posed the issue as one of different gains and losses. To quote myself:

Is this really so very hard to grasp? Nowwhere there do I imply that invading Afghanistan might not hurt al-Qaeda, but the Hydra has many heads and Afghanistan is not necessarily its heart.

Else, in regards to actually fighting al-Qaeda, I see no need to repeat analysis which I have offered in other threads, I merely direct you to Zenster’s threads on terrorism and my past comments on the issue.

There is no ‘simple-minded’ assertion, rather an understanding of the issues from direct and indirect experience. As I said, this is not a Rambo movie, not hollywood script.

25

Rambo, Rambo, Rambo…

Collounsbury - You seem to think you are an expert on Afghanistan and America’s military effort in the region. Hmmmm.

  1. This will not be “a simple invasion.” Who ever said it will be? This will be a very complex, strategical invasion by people who know a hell of a lot more about this than you (thank God).

  2. Big difference between this attack and the attempts by the USSR: The fact that the entire world is supporting our efforts should clue you in. And there doesn’t appear to be another superpower training and arming their forces this time, does there?

But you do say that “invading Afghanistan…does nothing to break up al-Qaeda in the USA.” How do you know this? Could the relationship between al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and in the US be disrupted by its destruction in Afghanistan?

And how do you know that “Hydra’s heart” is not in Afghanistan? And even if it isn’t, it’s clear that this “head” is an extremely important one and needs to be destroyed. That doesn’t mean we go storming in like Rambo (why are you so obsessed with that guy anyway?).

Better call the President, then, and tell him we give up. Time to call back the troops. Seriously, though, is it impossible to fathom that we will be able to “round-up” the leaders of the Taliban and al-Qaeda? If not, then what exactly are we doing in Afghanistan? (Is it impossible to capture and try war criminals, e.g. Milosevic?)

5)“Pull out your map…” Launching an attack and invasion in the area is very difficult, but we have already amassed an enormous number of troops and equipment in the region. Or is that my imagination?

Yes, this is going to be extremely difficult; no, not impossible. And no one’s talking about Rambo or Hollywood except you. We’re talking about a very complex, deliberate and clear invasion with the purpose of capturing the perpetrators of the 9-11 attacks. There may actually be some people in the government and military who know a tiny bit more than you about this…I know, it’s difficult to believe, but anything’s possible, right?

There are obviously a number of other “facts” in your little diatribe, chappie, that have no basis in the real world. You’re spreading opinion, not truth, and it’s both annoying and antithetical to these boards. So either slow down, cite your “ideas” and debate, or go climb on a soapbox elsewhere. The high horse has ridden away.

26

No, but I am a damn-sight better informed than most folks on the region and certainly most people here. However do feel compelled to note your either lack of understanding or your straw man. My interventions in this thread revolved not around current policy or the prosecution of the war but fantasies about the same: that is the OP in re an implied occupation of Afghanistan and the explicit call for “reeducation” of the Taleban.

Hmnm, who said? I was replying to our folks who believe the Taleban are going to be rounded up in reeducation camps, not to our military leadership. Straw man, try again.

Indeed. There are also other differences such as:
(a) No fully secure base of operations
(b) an unstable, nuclear-power next door. Pakistan. It is both a significant platform for tactical strikes and fairly important airspace for naval based air power to pass through. The President, General Mousharef faces rising internal dissent in re cooperation with US attacks, most importantly in his power-base: the military and related security agencies, largely politically and religiously conservative. Recall he came to power in a military coup d’etat. The political situation is none-too-encouraging.
© there is further the continued sympathy and assistance from within Pakistan — the folks who in fact actually did much of the training of the mujahidiin and supported the Taleban.

None of this means the US can not launch strikes, including ground-based ones, nor even that they should. It means that the equation of risk is not that of a Rambo film. It means occupation has “blowback” and could endanger other, more pressing objectives — that is not the fairly useless territory of Afghanistan, but the pursuit and break up of al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda appears to be based on a cell model used by, for example, the FLN and by Islamist groups later in Egypt. Cells operate independently, the structure of the organization is conceived of as to survive having many parts dismembered, up to its head. Should Afghanistan be decapitated, there is nothing per se to prevent reconstitution based on separate cells or independent activity based on prior plans. Destroy bin Laden and you still have the Egyptian organizations, for example. It does not solve the problem in and of itself. Past experience in other situations proves this.

In noting this, I’m reminding you of precisely what US policy makers clearly understand. Review past remarks by Rumsfeld and others. I actually feel quite reassured they are thinking about these issues very, very clearly. Obsessing and going all out for the mediatized target does not solve the problem. It can certainly contribute, but one has to keep one’s eyes on the larger game. Too much effort, too much obsession with one part can lead to disaster in another.

Example, for a worst case scenario of occupation of Afghanistan, per the assumptions behind Zenster’s OP. US occupies Afghanistan. Aborted coup d’etat in Pakistan: American forces necessary to stabilize Pakistan. Occupation of Pakistan. Low grade insurgencies in tribal areas. Destabilization of pro-US Middle Eastern governments who are necessary in getting practical action against the remainder of al- Qaeda. Government of Egypt, for example, has to break off support for US policy and pursuit of radicals because of mass unrest over US occupation of “Muslim” lands. Near coup d’etat in Egypt. Saudi monarchy also destabilized. Yemen ceases cooperation. Al-Qaeda continues to operate in mountainous Afghanistan, US unable to locate at least some elements who continue to emit videotapes from mountain hideaways in propaganda war against US infidel imperialism in Muslim lands.

A simple set of scenarios, none of them far-fetched I am afraid, as to the results of an occupation of Afghanistan, per the OP.

How do I know destroying al-Qaeda in Afghanistan doesn’t unravel the game? Because of what I’ve seen in Egypt, Algeria etc. how these things operate. Al-Gamaa al-Islamiya has reconstituted numerous times. Same scenario with the GIA in Algeria.

I suggest if you reread my comments you will see that they are directed towards the easy idea we go in and round up the Taleban, not against going after — militarily by hook or crook — al-Qaeda.

My comments on Rambo simply are underlining my sensation that far too folks understanding of these issues start and end with the nice, neat scenarios of action movies, where things get wrapped in the end.

Having fun with straw men? Where did I say call off anything? It strikes me that critical thought is lacking here.

Rounding up the Taleban and reeducating them (* that is the proposition ** I ** was commenting on *) is not possible because they are not a structured organization. They are a Pashtu based accretion of militias, tribal groups and ‘religious students’ from various medresas. Unless one plans to carry on a war against the Pashtun, one’s not going to round up the Taleban. Luckily, it is quite clear to me that responsible parties in planning understand this very well and thus are trying to put together some kind of post Mullah Omar et al government which will include Pashtun elements. And including Pashtun elements will mean including folks who are Taleban in the widest sense of the word — that is folks who have been ‘within’ the movement if only out of opportunism.
Now, rounding up the “leaders” of the Taleban is not the same proposition, factually or logically as “rounding up” and reeducating the “Taleban” now is it? Yes? That is clear to you, is it not? I doubt it is something US forces will do, for multiple reasons, both political and military, but it could happen. Killing them is rather preferable, but that will be a non-trivial endeavor.

It must be since the phrase enormous does not leap to mind. The Rangers and special forces in Ouzbekistan and Pakistan do not amount to an occupation force, and in the later case, their presence is precarious in the sense of the unstable political situation. The massive air forces and naval forces need to pass through Pakistani airspace. Again, that situation is precarious.

Let me repeat: these comments have been directed to the idea of an invasion and occupation and “reeducation” program — rather implying some large US presence — contra the Taliban. That is clearly not the same issue as strikes and commandos against specific targets.

Further, realism needs to be trotted out. The US lacks a stable base of operations. Pakistan’s internal situation is very, very dangerous. Neither are the Central Asian Republics terribly stable or easily used by the US.

That in no way indicates that I am contra using military force against either the Taleban or al-Qaeda. However, one has to understand the delicate, unstable nature of the game. Chest beating, assertions that we have the force, ipso facto, get us nowhere in understanding the costs and risks of a course of action.

I referred Rambo for good reason. Of course, as I noted above, you’re shifted the conversation. My comments were in regards to the initial OP — the presumption of occupation of Afghanistan and reeducation of the Taleban. Let me quote my original post:

An alternate hypothesis is rather that the President of Pakistan gives a green light to US occupation. How bloody likely is this? Already he is finding it difficult to permit air-strikes. How long can he hold? Perhaps all way, perhaps not. It becomes rather less likely with the idea of US occupation forces on the ground. From Pakistan?

Pantom and now you are blithely abstracting away from real, serious problems. Impossible? Reread my comments. It’s not a matter of impossible, its a matter of costs and benefits. Do you lose more by taking an action than you gain. There is not a question in my mind that the US could occupy both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The question is rather would it achieve the goals?

Perhaps the concept is too subtle. Luckily it is clearly not for actual responsible parties.

Hah. Of course there are folks who know more than I working on this. Our current policy shows very good signs that there are people quite aware of the very issues that I’ve raised here. If you’d stop mistaking your straw men for my argument you would note that. Invasion of Afghanistan in the sense required by the OP fantasy? Little sign of that. Tactical strikes and support to developing Afghan-based resistance to the Taleban with support from key US forces, there seems to be signs of that. The air strikes may or may not be helpful in this regard. Something to monitor and adjust.

Snort. Whatever.

27

The process dubiously named “reeducation” is an interesting prospect. However, the semantics of the OP versus its practical effects are at odds; hence, the charge of “simple” revenge (for those who find revenge to be such a petty affair—perhaps a different debate, for I disagree).

So Zenster, let us assume that the plan outlined by your friend takes hold. Is it really an aim to educate Taliban members? for example: suppose a Taliban member—we shall call him “Bob” for the sake of convenience—were to actually “learn” something along the lines of what his brutal treatment is meant to teach: Bob becomes aware of the not entirely simple notion that men and women should be treated equally in the realm of politics and non-romantic social interaction. Then what? Can we release him now, “Job well done?”

In fact, as far as I can tell philosophically and practically there is no method for determining such a lesson has got across and not “I, Bob, will tell them that I now realize that men and women should be treated equally in the realm of politics and non-romantic social social interaction, when in fact I feel no such thing.” Using punative measures for behavioral manipulation brings functionalism (the theory that if something appears to be a thing, it is that thing) up to the surface like a stealthy croc to bite us in the ass.

Contrast such methodology with the also-ran “prison reformation” tactic, releasing many persons who are then only to be repeat offenders.

In fact, the crime we would seek to punish the Taliban for isn’t even something that the industrial world has quite got its head around; true, we don’t subject women to requiring a male presence, but “we” (I amusing a non-personal “we” here, I do not feel there is an overwhelming conscious motivation for what I describe) hand women lower wages. Do we imprison CEOs whose comapnies can be shown to have a statistically significant portion of its female employees working at sub-standard wages in these same Taliban camps? The answer would probably be “no,” but why? What is the fundamental difference?

In fact, even if such a thing can be learned by the Taliban inmates, the easier thing to learn is imitation, and our inability to tell the difference in the limited interactive zone offered by prison camps would provide the anti-functionalists with no method of determination between he imposer and the imposee.

As such, we wold be bound by the original convention and healthy skepticism to never release prisoners, in which case the functionalists will respond en masse that we aren’t trying to teach anyone anything: it looks like a concentration camp, it acts like a concentration camp, it is a concentration camp. The Taliben will die in that camp.

If, then, the goal is the simple extermination of the Taliben, surely no camp is necessary. We have weapons available which will be much less resource intensive.
————————————————————
So, then, in the spirit of a fair debate, what exactly do I offer instead of refutation of the OP? Well, this is not altogether a simple thing. I propose we do the exact opposite of what the Taliban and Al-Quaeda propose and swamp Afghanistan with money, American (or Western) culture, businesses, and so on. We should treat them just like we would treat California oh-so-many years ago. We should go there, raise any ol’ flag (hell, we can even let Aghanis choose their flag) install military bases to protect our business interests, bring union representatives to avoid sweatshop labor situations, and do our best to treat Afghanistan as another ally with which to share resources and technology.

This is, to me, wove entirely out of revenge-cloth; it serves to undermine religious nationalism through the imposition of pluralistic entities (labor unions and corporations); it serves to undermine sexual segregation through the imposition of pluralistic entities; it serves to undermine the very essence of the terrorists’ goals of US leaving the area.

The plan I sketch will work so long as the people of that area are, at their core, guided by rational self-interest. As the lynchpin in my scaffolding we would need to, in some way, impose that as well should we find it lacking; however, I am not certain of how to accomplish such a thing. Stark poverty in the face of wealth breeds corruption and rational self-interest over time, but stark poverty itself breeds no such thing (as far as I can tell).

28

leander, as friendly advice, collounsbury doesn’t argue about things he doesn’t feel confidently in-the-know about, and often uses good old-fashioned British empiricism to make his bold and strong claims. In short, not the guy to fuck with :slight_smile:

Not that it ever stopped me, either, but just to prepare you…

Collounsbury, I would like to commend you again, as ever, on masking sharp wit in strong arguments. Your ability to synthesize information with insults make you, as ever, a great poster. LOL
[sub]query for you: I recently spent a good deal of time in a bookstore trying to dig up some game theory books, and only wandered across a seemingly out of stock or difficult to find book by von Neumann… could you email me or reply here with a more contemporary title(s) to look for?[/sub]

29

Zenster, I got to this part-- “If Nazism had purported itself to be some sort of religion, would you have granted it similar liberties in its practice?”–and I was nodding my head, thinking, “Yes, yes, that’s an excellent point, I’ll have to think about that one for a little bit before I post.”

And then you shot yourself in the foot by adding, “How can there be “individual freedom” to commit female genocide?”

Sudden total catastrophic credibility meltdown, dude. Sorry. :frowning: In no way can I stretch my imagination to encompass the idea that the way the Taliban are treating their women amounts to genocide.

Dirt, yes. Shit, yes. But genocide? No. Think about it–if they really were committing genocide on their female population, well, that would be pretty stupid, wouldn’t it? They’d be out of business within a generation, with no women to have babies.

A little less rhetoric would be a Good Thing. :wink:

30

Is Taleban an accepted spelling of it? I’ve only seen “Taliban.” I’m pretty sure it must be seeing as all of you continue to use it and how often different spellings come from the same words when translated…just wanted some confirmation.

31

This is from the United Nations Convention on Genocide, 1948.

http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/documents/gncnvntn.htm

I don’t see that any of this applies to the severe lack of civil rights granted to certain Islamic Fundamentalist women. Are their menfolk systematically rounding them up and killing them? Not that I’ve heard. And it’s questionable whether being forced to wear a burqa qualifies as “being caused serious mental harm”. “Causing serious mental harm” in a genocidal context means the constant and implicit threat of abduction, rape, torture, imprisonment, brainwashing (“re-education”). The Taliban’s women may be miserable, but suffering mental torture? Umm…

32

First in re Taliban, Taleban:
Either is fine.

The word is a transliteration of the Farsi plural form of the Arabic Taalib, meaning student. (Some Arabic also sometimes uses this Farsi origin plural form) (Not necessarily a religious student despite translations to the contrary.) The second internal vowel, in Arabic, is a short e/i sound. Arabic does not distinguish between the two and one can hear the e or i (to our ears) according to regional pronounciation differences.

I don’t speak Farsi, however Farsi, Urdu and Central Asian languages use a modified Arabic script which do not show vowels by default, although one can put them in by various forms. Transliterations depend on the subjective sense of using e or i. I frankly vary between the two, often depending on what dialect I last heard. Just goes to show what an inconsistant person I can be.

To be clear ERL, I don’t consider revenge petty or even necessarily unworthy. However, other, more important goals trump revenge, for me, when they conflict. As I see, revenge fantasies against the Taliban (or perhaps one should use the superlative plural) distract from much more important goals.

See my comments in the Bahrain thread generally about the possible perverse effects of this sort of thing (understanding of course you’re proposing this tongue in cheek). It is worth noting one of the best ways of discrediting our way of life is to force it upon folks.

Slowly, carefully.

The West is seductive, and we can be more so if we promote ourselves in a careful, aware manner. Ideas floated in the past of bombarding the Taliban with porn videos and game boys miss the gap in culture and the real resentments. tongue in cheek to be sure, but I think it is helpful to remind oneself that rationality is bounded and informed by context.

(PS: ERL – I’ll try to look up some game theory cites later on today. Should I go for the less mathematical stuff – frankly the heavy math stuff makes me brain hurt too but perhaps you’d do better with it than I? In any case, if one desires to email me, my user name and yahoo are the proper referants. But please no debates. I debate on board or not at all.)

PPS: In re the entire invasion issue. Let me be clear without my usual … sharpness. I am not taking a position against military strikes in Afghanistan of any kind, except of course weapons of mass destruction. What I am doing is attempting to give a geo-political reality check to folks who think 'cause we’re big and we’ve suffered that this is all a done deal. There is a lot of risk to look at. Not to be paralyzed by, but to understand in balanced equation so that one can make intelligent tactical and strategic choices.

My qualifications for these checks: Understanding risk in the Middle East is my job from a corporate perspective, or has been until my actual leave of absence while I pursue other avenues. Central Asia is a bit peripheral to that, but I’m kept myself informed on rather by accident, one tends to run into the information when keeping up with the Islamist threat

33

As it happens, Zenster, there is already a blueprint posted on the Internet for just the sort of thing you’re looking for.

[quote]
The Taliban Conference
Stamp: Top Secret

The Director of Homeland Security will be entrusted with the official handling of the final solution of the Taliban question without regard to geographic borders.

The essential points of this plan will be the following:
a) the expulsion of the Taliban from every sphere of life of the Afghan people,
b) the expulsion of the Taliban from the living space of the Afghan people.

In carrying out these efforts, an increased and planned acceleration of the emigration of the Taliban from Afghan territory will be started.

A Central Office for Taliban Emigration will be set up and the Office of Homeland Security will be entrusted with the management. Its most important tasks will be:

a) to make all necessary arrangements for the preparation for an increased emigration of the Taliban,
b) to direct the flow of emigration,
c) to speed the procedure of emigration in each individual case.

The aim of all this will be to cleanse Afghan living space of members of the Taliban in a legal manner.

The work concerned with emigration will be not only an Afghan problem, but also a problem with which the authorities of the countries to which the flow of emigrants are being directed will have to deal. Financial difficulties, such as the demand by various foreign governments for increasing sums of money to be presented at the time of the landing, the lack of shipping space, increasing restriction of entry permits, or the cancelling of such, may increase extraordinarily the difficulties of emigration.

The Taliban themselves, or their Islamic political organizations, will finance the emigration. In order to avoid impoverished members remaining behind, the principle will be followed that wealthy members of the Taliban will have to finance the emigration of poorer members; this will be arranged by imposing a suitable tax, i.e., an emigration tax, which will be used for financial arrangements in connection with the emigration of poor members of the Taliban and will be imposed according to income.

Foreign currency will have to be presented at the time of landing. In order to save foreign exchange held by Afghanistan, foreign Islamic financial organizations will, with the help of Islamic organizations in Afghanistan, be made responsible for arranging an adequate amount of foreign currency.

Another possible solution of the problem has now presented itself, i.e. the evacuation of the Taliban to labor camps in China, provided that the Chinese give the appropriate approval in advance.

These actions are, however, only to be considered provisional, but practical experience is already being collected which is of the greatest importance in relation to the future final solution of the Taliban question.

Under proper guidance, in the course of the final solution the Taliban are to be allocated for appropriate labor in China. Able-bodied members of the Taliban, separated according to sex, will be taken in large work columns over the mountains to certain areas for work on roads, in the course of which action doubtless a large portion will be eliminated by natural causes.

The possible final remnant will, since it will undoubtedly consist of the most resistant portion, have to be treated accordingly, because it is the product of natural selection and would, if released, act as a the seed of a new Taliban revival (see the experience of history.)

In the course of the practical execution of the final solution, the entire Islamic world will be combed through from west to east. Afghanistan proper will have to be handled first due to the housing problem and additional social and political necessities. The evacuated Taliban will first be sent, group by group, to so-called transit points, from which they will be transported to the East.

Certain preparatory activities for the final solution should be carried out immediately in the territories in question, in which process alarming the populace must be avoided.

[document ends]
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Link. :frowning:

34

The deprivation of the Afghan women goes beyond mere (as if the word “mere” could possibly apply) abuse. Please try to remember that due to limited resources, the Taleban have decided that the worthless women of their society are not only undeserving of education but also of medical care.

A) The Taleban prohibit women from seeing male doctors.

B) The Taleban prohibit women from obtaining the education to become doctors themselves.

To doom a given percentage of over half of your population to certain and completely needless death via the totally unnecessary suffering of breast and cervical cancer (to mention only a pair of obvious risks) is merely a form of slow slaughter. BUT SLAUGHTER IT REMAINS. You may wish to split philosophical hairs and call it benign genocide. I prefer to call a spade a spade and genocide is what I see happening. Yes, we can only hope that the Taleban manage to eradicate themselves, but doing so at the cost of so many of their women dying slow, painful and completely avoidable deaths is genocide and I for one cannot abide it.

Again DDG, I would think that you, as a woman, would be more keenly attuned to such a horrible and intentional foredooming of a female population. Your willingness to ascribe variations in culture as privilige to commit mass murder (however slowly) does not well suit the rather routinely compassionate stance I have come to respect you for at these boards. I am deeply concerned that your own religious background may be clouding your ability to separate the wheat from the chaff in this equation. However, that is exactly none of my business and strictly speculative upon my part. I wish you no insult by mentioning this so much as to hope that this is not the case.

35

Your link is repellent and insulting, DDG. The European Jews did nothing to merit the slaughter of the Nazis. The Taleban have repeatedly shown themselve to utterly disregard the sanctity of human life in the most foul ways imaginable. Any attempt to equate the two is insanely disrespectful of the Holocaust and an insult to all who either lost their lives at the hands of the Nazis or died fighting them in battle. You have Godwinized this argument in a truly reprehensible fashion.

Frankly, I expected better of you. Seeing as how I have been told the exact same thing of late, I can only suppose this is another manifestation of how dire the after effects of this recent tragedy are.

36

Well, C, the differences between “forcing our culture through business and money” and “forcing our culture through bombs” is realy one of implementation. I would wager that there is resolve that this method of existence is not tolerable with respect to its profound anti-american influence.

If you can’t beat them, so it goes, join them. As it stands the terrorist factions that are either an offshoot of or a direct consequence of the Taliban have done just that; in fact, that is what makes it such a potent weapon. “We will functionally represent American interests while all the while harboring ill-will until such time that we may effectively act on that ill-will.”

Thus, the terrorists we fear most are not susceptible to cultural absorbance. However, persons who would be sympathetic to a cause, and would join that cause, are—by definition—open to cultural absorbance. We must, in some way, offer these people something better than terrorism.

Bombs as a method of cultural imposition only serve to draw a line between “live our way or die,” which is certainly the moral equivalent of terrorism even if the ultimate justification would mask such an affair (in fact, I do personally draw such a distinction; I am not a moral functionalist!). The essence of market-based personal goal achievement is certainly an affair of practical pluralism: you are free to pursue your individual goals so long as they both allow your survival and do not immediately serve to undermine pluralism itself. Such a choice is much more appealing than “our way or the highway” because “our way” is then encapsulated in “a bunch of different people’s ways, possibly yours!”

The strategic implementation of such an affair may well be impossible in practice, but it seems to be the optimal solution in theory. As I feel that theory should outweigh practice as a method of goal-setting I have a hard time being dissuaded from such a view. :slight_smile:

37

Collounsbury-

I see - you return to these boards after a leave and just naturally assume you know more than others. Nice.

How do you connect “simple invasion” with rounding up the Taliban?

Again, who brought up Rambo? (You) It seems your only purpose here is to show how much (you think) you know about the region, not directly address the issues at hand. Do you actually have any solutions or are you just going to continue spreading your “wisdom”? (For a short but informed opinion about the differences between Soviet and U.S. invasion, see this guy)

Your original statement was “invading Afghanistan…does nothing to break up al-Qaeda in the USA.” My response was that frankly you DO NOT KNOW. Destroying al-Qaeda in Afghanistan may disrupt terrorist networks in the U.S. (and around the world.) Our military leaders seem to think so.

So, you’re basing this on experiences with other terrorist networks in other regions of the world? That may seem fine and dandy, but this is a simplistic approach much like the one you are condemning. This network is clearly different than any others we’ve ever dealt with, as evidenced by their actions; and this assault is a first, which hopefully will produce a different outcome than before.

As for the “easy idea” of “rounding-up” the Taliban, you are once again attacking an assertion that doesn’t exist. Nowhere in this thread does anyone (aside from you) state that this is going to be a Rambo-type invasion, complete with Hollywood ending.

Of course it’s not - and, as you readily admit, it’s a feasible option. Perhaps we agree on one point - I can’t imagine that anyone could believe we could round-up the entire Taliban, but after re-reading the OP it appears that way(??). I was under the assumption that we were discussing the leaders of the Taliban, and not all the Taliban - much like the leaders of Milosevic’s party, and not every single member - since it was the leaders who imposed the inhumane rules and not all members.

Hmmmm…what, then, is your definition of enormous?

I still don’t see anywhere in the OP anything about a massive occupation. Yes, an invasion is implied; but an occupation? No. Don’t get it? I’ll try to spell it out for ya: The party that eventually controls Afghanistan (not us) will follow the “rules” of the OP. Understand? Goooooood.

(emphasis mine)
Again, occupation is not necessary. As for having a base in the region, we actually have several already (some in Pakistan)- with the potential for many more, and not necessarily all over the former Soviet Republics. Also, I don’t see how any of this would “involve mass airlifts through Russian airspace.” For someone who professes such knowledge of the region, you seem to lack some basic geographical skills. Not to mention some facts…

I’ll leave you with that little gem of rhetoric.

38

I’ll state simply that I don’t see the conception of the attacks as forcing our culture. Quite the opposite, my impression is that we have conspicuously avoided a “culture war” for infinate good reasons. Rather, the message, to my reading, is don’t fuck with us. Have your culture as you wish, but don’t fuck with us.

Zenster. A word. Your presumptions in regards to what DDG should feel, the whole reeducation camp thing fully merited DDG’s links. You need to think rather more carefully about the real implications of what you post.

39

Assume? I assume nothing, I see the evidence on this board. Frankly the number of people here who know one damned substantial thing about the region is fucking pitiful.

Love you too Leander.

Short-hand amigo, short-hand. The OP posits reeducation camps for the Taleban, abstracts away from the universe of problems associated with the idea of how this would happen, what conditions and what it would actually achieve, as compared to other costs. Simple invasion was my short hand for “simple mindedly assuming that occupation of Afghanistan and rounding up “the Taleban” and setting up reeducation camps etc. etc.”

Yes, I brought up Rambo, it remains in my mind a perfect metaphor for capturing too many folks understandings of the issues. Not directly address the issues at hand? I don’t see that raising issues in re the stability of the Musharef regime, stability issues in re the Central Asian Republics, stability issues in re countries currently host to al-Qaeda cells etc. as not directly addressing the issues at hand.

A balanced examination of strategy requires a full-examination of costs and benefits of the strategy throughout the ‘theatre’.

Do you have * substantive * issues with the points raised?

Solutions? In what sense? I rather approve of current policy, although I have begun to suspect that an alternate strategy of waiting until after Ramadan while building up in theatre intelligence capacity as well as capacity to dissolve the Taleban from within might, might, have been a better choice. However that is hindsight, at the time attacks commenced I rather was for them in the false expectation that the Taleban were more fragile than they have proved to be.

Reassessing tactics and strategy is a good thing, I might suggest that a pause during Ramadan is a strategy to consider while using the pause to develop intelligence, supply and build up in Afghanistan assets such as the surer factions of the Northern Alliance and to help stabilize the Musharef regime.

However, that is simply an idea I’ve commenced to toy with.

As I said, I find current strategy as I understand it to be quite good.

To be fair my original statement was too strong. You’re quite right on that. As for what our military leaders think, I submit you don’t have a correct understanding.

It appears to me that attackiing ObL and the Taleban is a long term strategy not concieved of as ‘breaking up’ any al-Qaeda cells in the USA, but destroying a part of future capacity.

My understanding when I responded was the poster was thinking of near term threat. In that context, I stand by my statement, with the modification that it will do little in the short run.

In the end, know one knows very much. One can have informed or uninformed best opinions.

In re Schwartzy’s comments, I see little to disagree with per se, at the same time I don’t see he brings much beyond the valid and correct observation that our tactics and strategies are going to be a damned sight better than the Russians. But then there are new complications in re launching and maintaining given we do not control any contiginous airspace or land. None. Pakistan instability is a non-trivial matter which is only going to get worse. I hope that it remains manageable.

Further the supposed lack of support in re the Taleban runs into a bit of problem. Few folks in the North like them. Very true. In the Pashtun dominated south and east there appears to be every sign that ethnic solidarity and anti-foriegner/outsider sentiment is rallying otherwise marginally disaffected folks to the Taleban. Rally-round-the-flag is not a phenomena unique to the USA. Recall Somalia and the rally round Aidid (previously widely hated) effect. Very careful management of hearts and minds would be required to make a full-out invasion/occupation, even in the North, work properly.

Not impossible but frankly, my sense is we currently lack the specialists to make it work properly. I, of course, don’t know this, but given my contacts over the years with USGOV in the Mid East, we have tiny pool of human talent for the Mid East and even less for Central Asia. I take the rather aggressive recruiting of Pashtu, Urdu, Arabic and other regional langauge speakers as evidence that this impression is correct. You’d be amazed how fast the proper CV gets a response.

That doesn’t mean sit with one’s thumb up one’s butt bemoaning our lack of culture specialist, it means one has to be careful and start developing the capacity and fast. I have every impression this is being done.

Haha. My dear, dear * Leander *, do you not know who these folks are? Clearly you do not. These groups * are * the historical and present roots of al-Qaeda. When you hear talk of al-Qaeda cells, it means GIA, it means al-Gamaa al-Islamiya (as well of course as others.).

This is not “other regions” – these guys are the fucking problem every bit as much as al-afghan al-arab in Afghanistan. They are more or less one in the same.

Simplistic approach. No mate, hardly that, I know the connections.

We’ve dealt with. Precisely, they are not PLO or other groups, they are GIA, they are al-Jihad, they are al-Higra wa Takfiir, etc.

If you don’t know the background, how do you expect to understand the structure and who these people are?

I’m all open for scenarios where you expect to round up the Taleban or something not out of a Hollywood Rambo script where the Taleban get “reeducated.” Else, I stand by my analysis.

[quote]

Of course it’s not - and, as you readily admit, it’s a feasible option.
[/qutoe]

Yes, wasn’t making an argument against that at all.

Well, all other points aside, I don’t see another way to read Zenster, above all if one places his comments in the stream of OPs he’s made. Thus, up to engaging your arguments, which are I will give you a damned sight better than his, I was addressing what was my best read of his scenario.

Well, like I said that’s another game which I see as fully possible although not necessarily likely. Frankly, I rather perfer special ops raids to kill them, all things being equal.

Leander, desptie my bile, I am developing a sense this conversation has gone wrong from misreadings.

My definition of enormous is predicated on the number of ground troops in place to undertake the Zensterish full-out occupation scenario.

Insertion and assasination strikes, support to key NA elements etc., now that’s another game. I think that is our game and it’s a good one.

Come on now Leaner, read Zenster’s comments. How the hell does one reeducate the masses of backward women haters per his OP without occupation? That was his damned point after all!

Eh? A coalition Pashtun-Tadjik-Ouzbek government is going to undertake a radical transformation of Afghan mores (However varied they are)?

If anyone beleives that, well, I got’s me some opium for you.

For our actual strategy? Of course not. Do I have to repeat again, I was responding to the OP?

We have permission to use Paki bases and territory. Obstensibly for non-offensive purposes. Already Musharef is in deep, deep hot-water domestically over this. The military, filled with folks who came up through the Zai ul-Haqq period is fairly reactionary and has ties with the Taleban. The upper level folks understand where their bread it buttered, but that is not something which is going to shift easily the on the ground folks or mid-level security apparatus.

Further, the Paki border regions are fairly rife with pro-Taleban sentiment and only sketchily under central government control.

Actual full-scale on the ground operations by large numbers of Western troops against their Pashtun brothers (this again in the context of Zenster’s OP, not our actual policy which to my eyes understands these issues very well) is going to create explosive conditions in Pakistan. Hell continued bombardment is already creating serious problems. Without Pakistan… you’ve got problems getting to Afghanistan. In fact, without a pro-US government in Pakistan, you have a world of shit.

The full scenario sketched was based on Pakistan’s public stated opposition to whole-sale invasion of Afghanistan, their current political issues and the high level of risk involved in attempting to stage ground operations of any size through hostile Paki border regions.

So, what does this leave us? Well, approach from the north through Central Asia. The best routes, safest politically are through Russian airspace, even skirting them really requires Russian gov winking at the issue.

Oh really now leander. Don’t try to patronize me, it just makes you look silly.

I await them. If only for the novelty value.

40

I gotta agree with Leander on one thing. Collunsbury posts as if he is the expert of all things MENA :rolleyes: but hasn’t presented any credentials to justify this.

Plus his spelling and grammar suck :slight_smile: