# Recording Industry takes action against 12 year old girl, forces settlement

**URL:** <https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697>\
**Category:** The BBQ Pit\
**Created:** [September 10, 2003, 5:40am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697 "2003-09-10T05:40:39Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 17\
**Page:** 27

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**Author:** ![World\_Eater](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/w/f04885/32.png) [@World\_Eater](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/World_Eater)\
**Post date:** [October 7, 2003, 12:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/521 "2003-10-07T12:31:06Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by aryk29 \*  
> **No, the copyright is the right to copy and belongs to the owner. The copyright protects the work. Why would you say it protects the owner?**

We are saying the same thing differently.

\*\*

> [@](#):
>
> It doesn’t? Then what exactly does it involve, if I may be so bold as to ask?\*\*

A good business model (from a company POV) involves giving away your product for free?

Yeah look at all those fourtune 500 companies that give their shit away for free. :rolleyes:

Maybe Yahoo or Google, (are they even F500?) but that’s about it.

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**Author:** ![serenitynow](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e9c0ed/32.png) [@serenitynow](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/serenitynow)\
**Post date:** [October 7, 2003, 12:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/522 "2003-10-07T12:36:25Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by Princhester \*
> 
> I am not very familiar with US copyright law. Certainly in every jurisdiction with which I am familiar this might be legal (ie not criminal) but it would certainly be actionable at the suit of the copyright owner, absent their permission. So why don’t you provide one of those specific cites so that we can all be educated. After all, there is a “specific law that covers that” so: citey witey?

There are actually a number of laws that would apply, but the most direct is the Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. 1008. This law was an amendment to existing copyright laws to quell the music industry position that making one’s own tapes is illegal. There is also a position that the AHRA does not apply to non-musical works, but the full application and interpretation of that statute is another discussion for another day reserved for people who care and have too much time on their hands.

> [@](#):
>
> Because from what I can see, according to [this](http://www3.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/copypol2.htm) and [this](http://wcts.whitman.edu/resources/copyright/filesharing.html) you are dead wrong. \*\*

Check your sources. The first cite is from the University of Texas, and is a private policy meant for the covering of their butts. They will ask their employees and students to take the highest road possible so they can avoid being sued. As they state:

“We have reviewed all the Guidelines and have decided to take a different approach to protecting our component institutions and our faculty, staff and students from the dangers of the no-man’s land while supporting our exercise of fair use rights. We call our approach “Rules of Thumb” for the Fair Use of Copyrighted Materials. Like the Guidelines from which they are in some cases derived, the Rules of Thumb are tailored to different uses of others’ works. But unlike the Guidelines, they are short, concise, and easy to read. And they are part of a larger strategy to meet our needs for permission when fair use is not enough; to reduce our need for permission in the future by licensing comprehensive access to works; and to take a more active role in the management of the copyrighted works created on our campuses for the benefit of our university community.”

The second cite is from Whitman College, and is basically the same thing. To wit:

“This document provides an overview of Whitman’s policies and procedures governing music and movie sharing and how we deal with alleged violations.”

If I am not “dead wrong” does that make me “dead right?” “Live right?” Maybe something else. By the way, the point of the “the copyright law” comment was that while there is a body of law that can be called “the copyright law accurately,” the impression I had when reading some of the posts was that people think there is this single magical law that governs all circumstances and applies to everything. In the US, the courts interpretations of those laws (which often conflict in the Circuits) become as much a part of the law as the statutes themselves. The argument about file sharing is very complicated, as are most issues that require the application of laws that did not foresee where technology was going.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Princhester](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/3e96dc/32.png) [@Princhester](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Princhester)\
**Post date:** [October 7, 2003, 1:10pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/523 "2003-10-07T13:10:15Z")

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I note that the trade off under the Audio Home Recording Act is a royalty on equipment, paid to copyright owners.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Princhester](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/3e96dc/32.png) [@Princhester](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Princhester)\
**Post date:** [October 7, 2003, 1:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/524 "2003-10-07T13:32:24Z")

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Damnit hit submit too early.

It seems to me that the AHRA is an explicit recognition of copyright holder rights that recognises their concerns in that it requires home digital recording gear to be limited so that it will only make first and not second generation copies, and in that it requires a royalty to be paid by manufacturers to copyright owners.

In other words, yes you can make a million copies but you have to make them yourself. Not going to happen. And the real danger for copyright holders, that of geometric copying of copies, is alleviated.

> [@](#):
>
> There is a logical disconnect in saying that a cd burner that is part of a stereo component yields legal copies, but a cd burner attached to a computer yields illegal copies.

Isn’t this statement somewhat intellectually dishonest in that you don’t mentino what is the logic, namely that the latter burner is not restricted to first generation copying, and does not pay any royalty?

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**Author:** ![umop\_ap\_sdn](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/u/dbc845/32.png) [@umop\_ap\_sdn](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/umop_ap_sdn)\
**Post date:** [October 7, 2003, 6:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/525 "2003-10-07T18:33:17Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> _originally posted by World Eater_  
> \*\*Even if through some techinical legal loophole I’ve never heard of, it’s possible to copy a million CDs, that has nothing to do with whether it’s a nice thing to do.  
> \*\*

**World Eater** , so what if the legalities have fuck all to do with whether it’s right or wrong. But legalities are held up in court, unless you get a jury. Believe me, morality has fuck all to do with how some court decisions are made.

So if you want to get into morality, fine. I already addressed morals in the analogy where my flat broke friend copies the damn lawnmower. He wasn’t going to buy one in the first place, so who lost the deal on that one? Who can show material damages? In fact, IRL can the recording industry show material damages from filesharing?

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**Author:** ![Ms2001](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ms2001/32/18463_2.png) [@Ms2001](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ms2001)\
**Post date:** [October 8, 2003, 1:49am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/526 "2003-10-08T01:49:54Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> _Originally posted by Princhester_  
> **And wouldn’t that be poetic justice…**

Yeah, I suppose it’d be ironic if a cloning ray meant the end of my job, but at least I’d be able to get a Viper. And all the gas I’d ever need for it. And, oh yeah, no one would ever go without food, water, or medicine.

Though of course there would be drawbacks. Currency and precious metals would become worthless. No military would ever run out of supplies, vehicles, or perhaps even troops, so wars might last forever.

I think we’d all have a lot more to think about than me losing my job. 😉

> [@](#):
>
> **It is not a question of having a right to profit, it is a question of wanting to live in a world where people are motivated to provide services that I want, and do so because I pay them for doing so fairly. And others who leech from those service providers are ultimately leeches on me.**

Well, I guess that explains why art and music didn’t exist until the last few centuries. I knew those people at the museum were lying!

And with that, it seems we’ve come full circle. I don’t have anything to say to the other points in your post that I haven’t already said before, and no amount of repeating our points is going to change each other’s minds or make the thread any more interesting.

> [@](#):
>
> _Originally posted by World Eater_  
> **Even if through some techinical legal loophole I’ve never heard of, it’s possible to copy a million CDs, that has nothing to do with whether it’s a nice thing to do.**

If you’ve never heard of the AHRA, you must not have read many of the copyright threads here.

> [@](#):
>
> _Originally posted by Princhester_  
> **In other words, yes you can make a million copies but you have to make them yourself. Not going to happen.**

I’m sure people didn’t expect Napster to happen either. Letting millions of strangers download files from your hard drive, wasting your modem bandwidth for what? Just so you can download files from _their_ hard drives? It’ll never happen. No one would spend 20 minutes downloading a song he could hear on the radio for free.

It would be simple for someone to put a “wish list” of albums on his web page, along with a list of albums he owns, and tell people “Send me a copy of one of your albums from column A, and a self-addressed stamped envelope, and I’ll send you a copy of any of my albums from column B.” Get enough people doing that and just wait for the industry to start blaming their failures on it.

> [@](#):
>
> **And the real danger for copyright holders, that of geometric copying of copies, is alleviated.**

Not quite - you just have to make an analog copy, then you can make another generation of digital copies from it. There may be a slight loss of quality (depending on how good your equipment is), but the people who listen to FM radio and 128 kbps MP3s won’t care.

And in fact, with some equipment, a digital copy that you make from an analog source isn’t copy protected (SCMS bits = 00), so you only lose quality once. You can then make generation after generation of digital copies.

Pragmatically speaking, I think the AHRA is a fine compromise that should be extended to file sharing. It eliminates the copyright holder’s control over who can have or make a copy of the work, the copyright holder keeps his exclusive right to exploit the work for profit, and the consumer pays a flat rate per MB of storage no matter what he copies.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![serenitynow](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e9c0ed/32.png) [@serenitynow](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/serenitynow)\
**Post date:** [October 8, 2003, 3:46am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/527 "2003-10-08T03:46:43Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by Princhester \*
> 
> Isn’t this statement somewhat intellectually dishonest in that you don’t mentino what is the logic, namely that the latter burner is not restricted to first generation copying, and does not pay any royalty?

No it is not, and had I not accidently closed the window I replying in that contained pages of explanation, you would have fully understood why I say that. (Whether you would agree, of course, is a different matter entirely) Here is a reader’s digest version of what I was saying before, and I will stipulate in advance that what I wrote previously was far more comprehensive, erudite and thought-provoking. Instead, since I am too occupied and irritated to go through it all again, we will have to take the surgery with a sledge hammer approach.  
Back in the late 80s, if you were around and of an age, you might recall the advent of the digital tape recorder. You probably did not own one. Not many people ever did. An analog tape recorder records sound waves, and so with each passing recording, the sound quality deteriorates from the original. The digital recorder, on the other hand, records the source in the form of 0’s and 1’s and it can create an exact duplicate of the original. A duplicate of the duplicate is likewise an exact duplicate of the original.

Prior to digital tape recorders, the RIAA was not overly worried about tape recordings. In the late 80s, there was a lot of new and good music coming out, and cds were a relatively new technology. Sales were good. CD burners did not exist, and so to copy a cd, one had to tape the cd on an analog tape that would not recreate the cd sound quality. The digital tape recorder threatened to change that, and it was heralded as the ultimate replacement for cds. In the late 80s, many were saying that cds would be obsolete before they ever really caught on.

The RIAA, seeing the danger of perfect duplicates, threatened to sue the manufacturers of digital recorders and to seek an injunction to prevent the sale of digital recorders based on claims of copyright infringement. (This is not the only time the RIAA would take this approach, as we will see momentarily) You might be wondering where the copyright infringement was by merely creating this piece of equipment, but that is a question never answered because of the way history unfolded. The RIAA and the manufacturers ultimately entered into a settlement (or more accurately a compromise) that they presented to Congress stating that it was acceptable to both the music industry and the digital tape recorder manufacturers. Congress enacted that settlement into law, and that law became known as the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992.

The digital tape recorder never caught on. The reasons are up for debate, but are not really relevant to this discussion. Suffice it to say that the AHRA was a very limited exception to the existing copyright law because it was meant to control the next great thing. Unfortunately for the RIAA, the next great thing happened to be MP3s. The RIAA went to great lengths to quell the use of MP3 technology, and the RIAA will readily admit that it seeks to quell the use of any technology that could result in copyright violations, even if that technology has other purposes. They were unable to stop MP3 technology, however.

Enter Rio, the first major portable MP3 device. When Diamond Multimedia Services began to manufacture the Rio, the RIAA threatened to sue and to seek an injunction to prevent the sale of the Rio based on claims of copyright infringement – the exact same threat it made to digital recorder manufacturers. The RIAA’s case was stronger against Diamond than it was against the digital tape recorder manufacturers, because now it had the AHRA, which it had a direct hand in bringing about. Unlike the digital recorder manufacturers, however, Diamond refused to fold. The RIAA filed suit in California, where the courts zealously protect the music and movie industries that are at the core of its prosperity.

The RIAA asked the court to make Diamond stop selling the Rio. The court refused. The RIAA appealed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court, and so having lost twice with no chance of getting their incredibly asenine arguments heard by the Supreme Court, the RIAA settled the case for the hollow agreement that Diamond would assist in working on some secure technology. The opinion of the Court is at The Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (1999).

Among other things, the Court said:

> [@](#):
>
> The district court concluded that the exemption of hard drives from the definition of digital music recording, and the exemption of computers generally from the Act’s ambit, "would effectively eviscerate the [Act] " because “[a]ny recording device could evade regulation simply by passing the music through a computer and ensuring that the MP3 file resided momentarily on the hard drive.” RIAA I, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 630. While this may be true, the Act seems to have been expressly designed to create this loophole…
> 
> In fact, the Rio’s operation is entirely consistent with the Act’s main purpose – the facilitation of personal use. As the Senate Report explains, “[t]he purpose of[the Act] is to ensure the right of consumers to make analog or digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for their private, noncommercial use.” S. Rep. 102-294, at \*86 (emphasis added). The Act does so through its home taping exemption, see 17 U.S.C. S 1008, which "protects all noncommercial copying by consumers of digital and analog musical recordings, " H.R. Rep. 102-873(I), at \*59. The Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or “space-shift,” those files that already reside on a user’s hard drive. Cf. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984) (holding that “time-shifting” of copyrighted television shows with VCR’s constitutes fair use under the Copyright Act, and thus is not an infringement). Such copying is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act.

Therefore, there is no problem with the computer cd burner not being subject to royalties, because the law does not require it, and there is no intellectual dishonesty on my part in not assuming it does.

That is the short version of it all. The questions you raise are at the heart of the issue, but there is a practical side that I don’t think you are considering. Ownership is nothing more than a bundle of rights relating to an object. When you buy a cd (at least in the States) you have the right to make a copy, or a million or a billion. That it would be difficult to do so does not mean you have lost the right. That it would be easy to do so does not mean you have lost the right.

No matter which side you fall on the current debate, it is hard to ignore that the RIAA made a tactical error in going after MP3 technology rather than trying to secure ways of protecting their royalties. Now they are trying to recover from their blunders, and I think the way they are doing so (i.e. suing the helpless) is reprehensible. They don’t want to have another Diamond Media on the books, so they sue those with too little to gain and too much to lose to actually fight the issue out. Let’s face it, for the average user, it is one thing to talk about rights, but it is an entirely different thing to have to risk uncertain results if you are wrong.

A complete discussion of the legality of filesharing and the cases that followed Diamond would take a while, and I have probably put you to sleep already.

I haven’t proofed this, so pardon the misspellngs, missing words and incoherency that are bound to exist.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Princhester](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/3e96dc/32.png) [@Princhester](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Princhester)\
**Post date:** [October 8, 2003, 9:45am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/528 "2003-10-08T09:45:28Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by Mr2001 \*  
> \*\*Yeah, I suppose it’d be ironic if a cloning ray meant the end of my job, but at least I’d be able to get a Viper. And all the gas I’d ever need for it. And, oh yeah, no one would ever go without food, water, or medicine.

\*\*

Except of course that cloning rays would put an end to anyone investing the time and effort into designing and building something like a Viper.

> [@](#):
>
> \*\*Well, I guess that explains why art and music didn’t exist until the last few centuries. I knew those people at the museum were lying!

\*\*

Huh?

> [@](#):
>
> \*\*And with that, it seems we’ve come full circle. I don’t have anything to say to the other points in your post that I haven’t already said before, and no amount of repeating our points is going to change each other’s minds or make the thread any more interesting.

\*\*

True. And I’m about to go on holiday for 10 days with no internet connection, so a good point to end this.

> [@](#):
>
> \*\*I’m sure people didn’t expect Napster to happen either. Letting millions of strangers download files from your hard drive, wasting your modem bandwidth for what? Just so you can download files from _their_ hard drives?

\*\*

A pretty good exchange for everyone except the copyright owner. And several orders of magnitude less painful than sitting over a cd burner cranking out individual copies. Get real.

> [@](#):
>
> \*\*Pragmatically speaking, I think the AHRA is a fine compromise that should be extended to file sharing. It eliminates the copyright holder’s control over who can have or make a copy of the work, the copyright holder keeps his exclusive right to exploit the work for profit, and the consumer pays a flat rate per MB of storage no matter what he copies. \*\*

Holy shit, Mr2001, careful! You’re nearly admitting to the moral rights of copyright holders here!

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Princhester](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/3e96dc/32.png) [@Princhester](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Princhester)\
**Post date:** [October 8, 2003, 10:03am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/529 "2003-10-08T10:03:57Z")

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Is that decision on line anywhere, Serenitynow? From what you have quoted it sounds like the decision is patently correct in terms of the RIO itself. But when I consider a comment like this:

> [@](#):
>
> The Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or “space-shift,” those files that already reside on a user’s hard drive

and then consider the type of “domestic” copying that involves sharing your mp3’s with the entire worldwide online community with a few keystrokes, I have to say that the decision doesn’t influence much or at all my views of the morality of online file sharing.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![serenitynow](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e9c0ed/32.png) [@serenitynow](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/serenitynow)\
**Post date:** [October 8, 2003, 12:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/530 "2003-10-08T12:42:18Z")

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Here ya go, **Princhester**. Google is your friend. We can discuss the case, but realize that I have cited it for a specific reason, and I don’t claim that this case hits the heart of whether filesharing is “piracy”, as the RIAA likes to claim. Also realize, that the part in this decision that talks about illegal use of individual files is dicta – that is not binding precedent because it is not truly an issue before the court or the holding of the case.

There are future decisions from the Ninth Circuit that conflict with this case, and some – including myself-- believe irreconcilably so. Nevertheless, the principle is there, and this case is somewhat unique because it came from the court that is the RIAA’s staunchest ally.

If you are not familiar with the U.S. Federal legal system (and there is no reason you should be), we have twelve circuit courts of appeal, and each circuit covers a territory. The Supreme Court covers the entire nation all courts must yield to it. Aside from the Supreme Court, the ciruit courts are the final authority in their territories. The end result is that you often get one circuit court saying the law is “x” and another court saying the law is “y.” The true state of the law in such circumstances remains unresolved until the Supreme Court takes the issue or until Congress changes the law.

The Ninth Circuit’s territory covers California, and it is known to be very entertainment industry oriented for obvious reasons. Therefore, when the Ninth Circuit sides against the entertainment industry, you pretty much know their position was complete and utter crap. Realize that by the time we get to the Diamond Media case, the RIAA relies completely on the AHRA. They don’t even try to peddle an argument such as they would have had to make before the AHRA, and that should tell you something.

As an aside, you seem to think the evil of file sharing is one based on numbers. I would suggest to you that the numbers are not as extreme as you think. When one makes a file available for sharing online, it may be available to millions, but millions can’t honestly get to it because there is not enough bandwith. Maybe 5 or 10 people at a time could so if you have a really good connection. Even hardcare sharers probably don’t give up more than a cd or two a day, in reality. What makes the numbers astronomical is not the effect of any one user, but the effect of millions of users, each giving a little.

In reality, the numbers don’t matter. Either you have a right to give away what you have bought, or you do not. Copyright laws are technical and are laws of exclusion. In other words, you have a right to do whatever you want with yours or someone else’s creative work unless the law says you do not have that right. There are exceptions based on knowledge of wrong use and I don’t believe that anyone can state dogmatically what the law is in this country short of a new statute or a Supreme Court decision on the issue. The RIAA does not want a Supreme Court decision on this issue, as they have had several cases that were ripe for appeal. They have, to my knowledge, universally refused to appeal to the Supreme Court, doubtlessly because the risk and costs of losing are too high. That is why they want to pick on the poor and defenseless, who will settle because the risks for those hapless individuals are too high to fight the lawsuit. As long as they can scare people into believing something is illegal, the RIAA will never have to have their position looked at outside of the Ninth Circuit, where they can feel reasonably assured they will win.

The true defense of filesharing, or the illegality of it, would take 50 or more pages of sequential legal argument, and that is beyond the scope of these boards and way beyond the scope of my interests or time in the issue, and yours as well, I am sure. My goal in all of this was to simply suggest that (1) the law is not necessarily what the RIAA claims it is, and the way they are going about using the law to harm individuals without ever having to prove their interpretation of the law is correct is morally repugnant to me; (2) the law is unsettled, and absent a final word on the subject from Congress or the Supreme Court, claims of “stealing” or “piracy” or “illegality” are not well-founded; and (3) that we have entered a new phase in technology that has never been contemplated by the existing laws, and current laws are inadequate to deal with the situation. For the benefit of all, there needs to be balancing of what is good for individuals and artists so that free expression is promoted, but not the exclusion of individuals’ rights to the enjoyment of the property they paid for. Inevitably, these argument begin at the extremes and moderate as time goes on and the parties realize that certain positions will never pass muster with the courts.

This post got too long, so the text of the case follows in the next post.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![serenitynow](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e9c0ed/32.png) [@serenitynow](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/serenitynow)\
**Post date:** [October 8, 2003, 12:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/531 "2003-10-08T12:44:57Z")

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[quote]

U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals  
RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA  
v.  
DIAMOND MULTIMEDIA SYSTEMS INC.,

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

In this case involving the intersection of computer technol-  
ogy, the Internet, and music listening, we must decide  
whether the Rio portable music player is a digital audio  
recording device subject to the restrictions of the Audio Home  
Recording Act of 1992.

I

This appeal arises from the efforts of the Recording Indus-  
try Association of America and the Alliance of Artists and  
Recording Companies (collectively, “RIAA”) to enjoin the  
manufacture and distribution by Diamond Multimedia Sys-  
tems (“Diamond”) of the Rio portable music player. The Rio  
is a small device (roughly the size of an audio cassette) with  
headphones that allows a user to download MP3 audio files  
from a computer and to listen to them elsewhere. The dispute  
over the Rio’s design and function is difficult to comprehend  
without an understanding of the revolutionary new method of  
music distribution made possible by digital recording and the  
Internet; thus, we will explain in some detail the brave new  
world of Internet music distribution.

A

The introduction of digital audio recording to the consumer  
electronics market in the 1980’s is at the root of this litigation.  
Before then, a person wishing to copy an original music  
recording – e.g., wishing to make a cassette tape of a record  
or compact disc – was limited to analog, rather than digital,  
recording technology. With analog recording, each successive  
generation of copies suffers from an increasingly pronounced  
degradation in sound quality. For example, when an analog  
cassette copy of a record or compact disc is itself copied by  
analog technology, the resulting “second-generation” copy of  
the original will most likely suffer from the hiss and lack of  
clarity characteristic of older recordings. With digital record-  
ing, by contrast, there is almost no degradation in sound qual-  
ity, no matter how many generations of copies are made.  
Digital copying thus allows thousands of perfect or near per-  
fect copies (and copies of copies) to be made from a single  
original recording. Music “pirates” use digital recording tech-  
nology to make and to distribute near perfect copies of com-  
mercially prepared recordings for which they have not  
licensed the copyrights.

Until recently, the Internet was of little use for the distribu-  
tion of music because the average music computer file was  
simply too big: the digital information on a single compact  
disc of music required hundreds of computer floppy discs to  
store, and downloading even a single song from the Internet  
took hours. However, various compression algorithms (which  
make an audio file “smaller” by limiting the audio bandwidth)  
now allow digital audio files to be transferred more quickly  
and stored more efficiently. MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3 (com-  
monly known as “MP3”) is the most popular digital audio  
compression algorithm in use on the Internet, and the com-  
pression it provides makes an audio file "smaller " by a factor  
of twelve to one without significantly reducing sound quality.  
MP3’s popularity is due in large part to the fact that it is a  
standard, non-proprietary compression algorithm freely avail-  
able for use by anyone, unlike various proprietary (and  
copyright-secure) competitor algorithms. Coupled with the  
use of cable modems, compression algorithms like MP3 may  
soon allow an hour of music to be downloaded from the Inter-  
net to a personal computer in just a few minutes.

These technological advances have occurred, at least in  
part, to the traditional music industry’s disadvantage. By most  
accounts, the predominant use of MP3 is the trafficking in  
illicit audio recordings, presumably because MP3 files do not  
contain codes identifying whether the compressed audio  
material is copyright protected. Various pirate websites offer  
free downloads of copyrighted material, and a single pirate  
site on the Internet may contain thousands of pirated audio  
computer files.

RIAA represents the roughly half-dozen major record com-  
panies (and the artists on their labels) that control approxi-  
mately ninety percent of the distribution of recorded music in  
the United States. RIAA asserts that Internet distribution of  
serial digital copies of pirated copyrighted material will dis-  
courage the purchase of legitimate recordings, and predicts  
that losses to digital Internet piracy will soon surpass the $300  
million that is allegedly lost annually to other more traditional  
forms of piracy.1 RIAA fights a well-nigh constant battle  
against Internet piracy, monitoring the Internet daily, and rou-  
tinely shutting down pirate websites by sending cease-and-  
desist letters and bringing lawsuits. There are conflicting  
views on RIAA’s success – RIAA asserts that it can barely  
keep up with the pirate traffic, while others assert that few, if  
any, pirate sites remain in operation in the United States and  
illicit files are difficult to find and download from anywhere  
online.

In contrast to piracy, the Internet also supports a burgeon-  
ing traffic in legitimate audio computer files. Independent and  
wholly Internet record labels routinely sell and provide free  
samples of their artists’ work online, while many unsigned  
artists distribute their own material from their own websites.  
Some free samples are provided for marketing purposes or for  
simple exposure, while others are teasers intended to entice  
listeners to purchase either mail order recordings or record-  
ings available for direct download (along with album cover  
art, lyrics, and artist biographies). Diamond cites a 1998  
“Music Industry and the Internet” report by Jupiter Communi-  
cations which predicts that online sales for pre-recorded  
music will exceed $1.4 billion by 2002 in the United States  
alone.

Prior to the invention of devices like the Rio, MP3 users  
had little option other than to listen to their downloaded digi-  
tal audio files through headphones or speakers at their com-  
puters, playing them from their hard drives. The Rio renders  
these files portable. More precisely, once an audio file has  
been downloaded onto a computer hard drive from the Inter-  
net or some other source (such as a compact disc player or  
digital audio tape machine), separate computer software pro-  
vided with the Rio (called “Rio Manager”) allows the user  
further to download the file to the Rio itself via a parallel port  
cable that plugs the Rio into the computer. The Rio device is  
incapable of effecting such a transfer, and is incapable of  
receiving audio files from anything other than a personal  
computer equipped with Rio Manager.

Generally, the Rio can store approximately one hour of  
music, or sixteen hours of spoken material (e.g., downloaded  
newscasts or books on tape). With the addition of flash mem-  
ory cards, the Rio can store an additional half-hour or hour of  
music. The Rio’s sole output is an analog audio signal sent to  
the user via headphones. The Rio cannot make duplicates of  
any digital audio file it stores, nor can it transfer or upload  
such a file to a computer, to another device, or to the Internet.  
However, a flash memory card to which a digital audio file  
has been downloaded can be removed from one Rio and  
played back in another.

B

RIAA brought suit to enjoin the manufacture and distribu-  
tion of the Rio, alleging that the Rio does not meet the  
requirements for digital audio recording devices under the  
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. S 1001 et seq.  
(the “Act”), because it does not employ a Serial Copyright  
Management System (“SCMS”) that sends, receives, and acts  
upon information about the generation and copyright status of  
the files that it plays. See id. S 1002(a)(2).2 RIAA also sought  
payment of the royalties owed by Diamond as the manufac-  
turer and distributor of a digital audio recording device. See  
id. S 1003.

The district court denied RIAA’s motion for a preliminary  
injunction, holding that RIAA’s likelihood of success on the  
merits was mixed and the balance of hardships did not tip in  
RIAA’s favor. See generally Recording Indus. Ass’n of Amer-  
ica, Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 624  
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (“RIAA I”). RIAA brought this appeal.

II

[1] The initial question presented is whether the Rio falls  
within the ambit of the Act. The Act does not broadly prohibit  
digital serial copying of copyright protected audio recordings.  
Instead, the Act places restrictions only upon a specific type  
of recording device. Most relevant here, the Act provides that  
“[n]o person shall import, manufacture, or distribute any  
digital audio recording device . . . that does not conform to  
the Serial Copy Management System [“SCMS”] [or] a system  
that has the same functional characteristics.” 17 U.S.C.  
S 1002(a)(1), (2) (emphasis added). The Act further provides  
that “[n]o person shall import into and distribute, or manufac-  
ture and distribute, any digital audio recording device . . .  
unless such person records the notice specified by this section  
and subsequently deposits the statements of account and  
applicable royalty payments.” Id. S 1003(a) (emphasis added).  
Thus, to fall within the SCMS and royalty requirements in  
question, the Rio must be a “digital audio recording device,”  
which the Act defines through a set of nested definitions.

The Act defines a "digital audio recording device " as:

```
   any machine or device of a type commonly distrib-
   uted to individuals for use by individuals, whether or
   not included with or as part of some other machine
   or device, the digital recording function of which is
   designed or marketed for the primary purpose of,
   and that is capable of, making a digital audio copied
   recording for private use . . . .

```

Id. S 1001(3) (emphasis added).

A “digital audio copied recording” is defined as:

```
   a reproduction in a digital recording format of a
   digital musical recording, whether that reproduction
   is made directly from another digital musical record-
   ing or indirectly from a transmission.

```

Id. S 1001(1) (emphasis added).

A “digital musical recording” is defined as:

```
   a material object-

    (i) in which are fixed, in a digital recording for-
   mat, only sounds, and material, statements, or
   instructions incidental to those fixed sounds, if any,
   and

    (ii) from which the sounds and material can be
   perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
   either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.

```

Id. S 1001(5)(A) (emphasis added).

[2] In sum, to be a digital audio recording device, the Rio  
must be able to reproduce, either “directly” or “from a  
transmission,” a “digital music recording.”

Continued:

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![serenitynow](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e9c0ed/32.png) [@serenitynow](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/serenitynow)\
**Post date:** [October 8, 2003, 12:46pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/532 "2003-10-08T12:46:52Z")

</div>

III

We first consider whether the Rio is able directly to repro-  
duce a digital music recording – which is a specific type of  
material object in which only sounds are fixed (or material  
and instructions incidental to those sounds). See id.

A

[3] The typical computer hard drive from which a Rio  
directly records is, of course, a material object. However, hard  
drives ordinarily contain much more than “only sounds, and  
material, statements, or instructions incidental to those fixed  
sounds.” Id. Indeed, almost all hard drives contain numerous  
programs (e.g., for word processing, scheduling appoint-  
ments, etc.) and databases that are not incidental to any sound  
files that may be stored on the hard drive. Thus, the Rio  
appears not to make copies from digital music recordings, and  
thus would not be a digital audio recording device under the  
Act’s basic definition unless it makes copies from transmis-  
sions.

[4] Moreover, the Act expressly provides that the term  
“digital musical recording” does not include:

```
   a material object-

    (i) in which the fixed sounds consist entirely of
   spoken word recordings, or

    (ii) in which one or more computer programs are
   fixed, except that a digital recording may contain
   statements or instructions constituting the fixed
   sounds and incidental material, and statements or
   instructions to be used directly or indirectly in order
   to bring about the perception, reproduction, or com-
   munication of the fixed sounds and incidental mate-
   rial.

```

Id. S 1001(5)(B) (emphasis added). As noted previously, a  
hard drive is a material object in which one or more programs  
are fixed; thus, a hard drive is excluded from the definition of  
digital music recordings. This provides confirmation that the  
Rio does not record “directly” from “digital music  
recordings,” and therefore could not be a digital audio record-  
ing device unless it makes copies “from transmissions.”

B

The district court rejected the exclusion of computer hard  
drives from the definition of digital music recordings under  
the statute’s plain language3 (after noting its “superficial  
appeal”) because it concluded that such exclusion “is ulti-  
mately unsupported by the legislative history, and contrary to  
the spirit and purpose of the [Act].” RIAA I, 29 F. Supp. 2d  
at 629. We need not resort to the legislative history because  
the statutory language is clear. See City of Auburn v. United  
States, 154 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[W]here statu-  
tory command is straightforward, `there is no reason to resort  
to legislative history.’ " (quoting United States v. Gonzales,  
520 U.S. 1, 6  
(1997))). Nevertheless, we will address the leg-  
islative history here, because it is consistent with the statute’s  
plain meaning and because the parties have briefed it so  
extensively.4

1

[5] The Senate Report states that “if the material object  
contains computer programs or data bases that are not inci-  
dental to the fixed sounds, then the material object would not  
qualify” under the basic definition of a digital musical  
recording.5 S. Rep. 102-294 (1992), reprinted at 1992 WL  
133198, at \*118-19. The Senate Report further states that the  
definition “is intended to cover those objects commonly  
understood to embody sound recordings and their underlying  
works.” Id. at \*97. A footnote makes explicit that this defini-  
tion only extends to the material objects in which songs are  
normally fixed: “[t]hat is recorded compact discs, digital  
audio tapes, audio cassettes, long-playing albums, digital  
compact cassettes, and mini-discs.” Id. at n.36. There are sim-  
ply no grounds in either the plain language of the definition  
or in the legislative history for interpreting the term “digital  
musical recording” to include songs fixed on computer hard  
drives.

[6] RIAA contends that the legislative history reveals that  
the Rio does not fall within the specific exemption from the  
digital musical recording definition of “a material object in  
which one or more computer programs are fixed.” 17 U.S.C.  
S1001(5)(B)(ii). The House Report describes the exemption  
as “revisions reflecting exemptions for talking books and  
computer programs.” H.R. Rep. 102-873(I) (1992), reprinted  
at 1992 WL 232935, at \*35 (emphasis added); see also id. at  
\*44 (“In addition to containing an express exclusion of com-  
puter programs in the definition of `digital musical record- ing'. . . .") (emphasis added). We first note that limiting the exemption to computer programs is contrary to the plain meaning of the exemption. As Diamond points out, a com- puter program is not a material object, but rather, a literary work, see, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[A] computer program . . . is a `literary work.’ “), that can be fixed in a vari-  
ety of material objects, see 17 U.S.C. S 101 (” `Literary  
works’ are works . . . expressed in words, numbers, or other  
verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the  
nature of the material objects, such as books . . . tapes, disks,  
or cards, in which they are embodied.”) (emphasis added).  
Thus, the plain language of the exemption at issue does not  
exclude the copying of programs from coverage by the Act,  
but instead, excludes copying from various types of material  
objects. Those objects include hard drives, which indirectly  
achieve the desired result of excluding copying of programs.  
But by its plain language, the exemption is not limited to the  
copying of programs, and instead extends to any copying  
from a computer hard drive.

Moreover, RIAA’s assertion that computer hard drives do  
not fall within the exemption is irrelevant because, regardless  
of that portion of the legislative history which addresses the  
exemption from the definition of digital music recording, see  
id. S 1001(5)(B)(ii), the Rio does not reproduce files from  
something that falls within the plain language of the basic  
definition of a digital music recording, see id. S 1001(5)(A).

2

The district court concluded that the exemption of hard  
drives from the definition of digital music recording, and the  
exemption of computers generally from the Act’s ambit,  
"would effectively eviscerate the [Act] " because “[a]ny  
recording device could evade regulation simply by passing  
the music through a computer and ensuring that the MP3 file  
resided momentarily on the hard drive.” RIAA I, 29 F. Supp.  
2d at 630. While this may be true, the Act seems to have been  
expressly designed to create this loophole.

a

[7] Under the plain meaning of the Act’s definition of digi-  
tal audio recording devices, computers (and their hard drives)  
are not digital audio recording devices because their “primary  
purpose” is not to make digital audio copied recordings. See  
17 U.S.C. S 1001(3). Unlike digital audio tape machines, for  
example, whose primary purpose is to make digital audio cop-  
ied recordings, the primary purpose of a computer is to run  
various programs and to record the data necessary to run those  
programs and perform various tasks. The legislative history is  
consistent with this interpretation of the Act’s provisions, stat-  
ing that “the typical personal computer would not fall within  
the definition of `digital audio recording device,' " S. Rep. 102-294, at *122, because a personal computer's "recording function is designed and marketed primarily for the recording of data and computer programs," id. at *121. Another portion of the Senate Report states that "*f the`primary purpose’ of  
the recording function is to make objects other than digital  
audio copied recordings, then the machine or device is not a  
`digital audio recording device,’ even if the machine or device  
is technically capable of making such recordings.” Id.  
(emphasis added). The legislative history thus expressly rec-  
ognizes that computers (and other devices) have recording  
functions capable of recording digital musical recordings, and  
thus implicate the home taping and piracy concerns to which  
the Act is responsive. Nonetheless, the legislative history is  
consistent with the Act’s plain language – computers are not  
digital audio recording devices.6

b

[8] In turn, because computers are not digital audio record-  
ing devices, they are not required to comply with the SCMS  
requirement and thus need not send, receive, or act upon  
information regarding copyright and generation status. See 17  
U.S.C. S 1002(a)(2). And, as the district court found, MP3  
files generally do not even carry the codes providing informa-  
tion regarding copyright and generation status. See RIAA I, 29  
F. Supp. 2d. at 632. Thus, the Act seems designed to allow  
files to be “laundered” by passage through a computer,  
because even a device with SCMS would be able to download  
MP3 files lacking SCMS codes from a computer hard drive,  
for the simple reason that there would be no codes to prevent  
the copying.

[9] Again, the legislative history is consistent with the  
Act’s plain meaning. As the Technical Reference Document  
that describes the SCMS system explains, “[d]igital audio sig-  
nals . . . that have no information concerning copyright and/or  
generation status shall be recorded by the[digital audio  
recording] device so that the digital copy is copyright asserted  
and original generation status.” Technical Reference Docu-  
ment for the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, II-A, P 10,  
reprinted in H.R. Rep. 102-780(I), 32, 43 (1992) (emphasis  
added). Thus, the incorporation of SCMS into the Rio would  
allow the Rio to copy MP3 files lacking SCMS codes so long  
as it marked the copied files as “original generation status.”  
And such a marking would allow another SCMS device to  
make unlimited further copies of such “original generation  
status” files, see, e.g., H.R. Rep. 102-873(I), at \*47 (“Under  
SCMS . . . consumers will be able to make an unlimited num-  
ber of copies from a digital musical recording.”), despite the  
fact that the Rio does not permit such further copies to be  
made because it simply cannot download or transmit the files  
that it stores to any other device. Thus, the Rio without SCMS  
inherently allows less copying than SCMS permits.

c

[10] In fact, the Rio’s operation is entirely consistent with  
the Act’s main purpose – the facilitation of personal use. As  
the Senate Report explains, “[t]he purpose of[the Act] is to  
ensure the right of consumers to make analog or digital audio  
recordings of copyrighted music for their private, noncom-  
mercial use.” S. Rep. 102-294, at \*86 (emphasis added). The  
Act does so through its home taping exemption, see 17 U.S.C.  
S 1008, which "protects all noncommercial copying by con-  
sumers of digital and analog musical recordings, " H.R. Rep.  
102-873(I), at \*59. The Rio merely makes copies in order to  
render portable, or “space-shift,” those files that already  
reside on a user’s hard drive. Cf. Sony Corp. of America v.  
Universal City Studios,  
464 U.S. 417, 455  
(1984) (holding  
that “time-shifting” of copyrighted television shows with  
VCR’s constitutes fair use under the Copyright Act, and thus  
is not an infringement). Such copying is paradigmatic non-  
commercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes  
of the Act.

IV

Even though it cannot directly reproduce a digital music  
recording, the Rio would nevertheless be a digital audio  
recording device if it could reproduce a digital music record-  
ing “from a transmission.” 17 U.S.C. S 1001(1).

A

[11] The term “transmission” is not defined in Act,  
although the use of the term in the Act implies that a transmis-  
sion is a communication to the public. See id. S 1002(e) (plac-  
ing restrictions upon “[a]ny person who transmits or  
otherwise communicates to the public any sound recording in  
digital format”) (emphasis added). In the context of copyright  
law (from which the term appears to have been taken), “[t]o  
`transmit' a performance or display is to communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent." 17 U.S.C. S 101. The legislative history confirms that the copyright definition of "transmission" is sufficient for our purposes here. The Act originally (and circularly) provided that "[a] `transmission’ is  
any audio or audiovisual transmission, now known or later  
developed, whether by a broadcast station, cable system,  
multipoint distribution service, subscription service, direct  
broadcast satellite, or other form of analog or digital  
communication.” S. Rep. 102-294, at \*10. The Senate Report  
provides a radio broadcast as an example of a transmission.  
See id., at \*119 (referring to “a transmission (e.g., a radio  
broadcast of a commercially released audio cassette).”). The  
parties do not really dispute the definition of transmission, but  
rather, whether indirect reproduction of a transmission of a  
digital music recording is covered by the Act.

B

RIAA asserts that indirect reproduction of a transmission is  
sufficient for the Rio to fall within the Act’s ambit as a digital  
audio recording device. See 17 U.S.C. S 1001(1) (digital  
audio recording devices are those devices that are capable of  
making “a reproduction in a digital recording format of a digi-  
tal musical recording, whether that reproduction is made  
directly from another digital musical recording or indirectly  
from a transmission”) (emphasis added). Diamond asserts that  
the adverb “indirectly” modifies the recording of the underly-  
ing “digital music recording,” rather than the recording “from  
the transmission.” Diamond effectively asserts that the statute  
should be read as covering devices that are capable of making  
a reproduction of a digital musical recording, “whether that  
reproduction is made directly[,] from another digital musical  
recording[,] or indirectly[,] from a transmission.”

[12] While the Rio can only directly reproduce files from  
a computer hard drive via a cable linking the two devices  
(which is obviously not a transmission), the Rio can indirectly  
reproduce a transmission. For example, if a radio broadcast of  
a digital audio recording were recorded on a digital audio tape  
machine or compact disc recorder and then uploaded to a  
computer hard drive, the Rio could indirectly reproduce the  
transmission by downloading a copy from the hard drive.  
Thus, if indirect reproduction of a transmission falls within  
the statutory definition, the Rio would be a digital audio  
recording device.

1

[13] RIAA’s interpretation of the statutory language ini-  
tially seems plausible, but closer analysis reveals that it is  
contrary to the statutory language and common sense. The  
focus of the statutory language seems to be on the two means  
of reproducing the underlying digital music recording –  
either directly from that recording, or indirectly, by reproduc-  
ing the recording from a transmission. RIAA’s interpretation  
of the Act’s language (in which “indirectly” modifies copying  
“from a transmission,” rather than the copying of the underly-  
ing digital music recording) would only cover the indirect  
recording of transmissions, and would omit restrictions on the  
direct recording of transmissions (e.g., recording songs from  
the radio) from the Act’s ambit. This interpretation would sig-  
nificantly reduce the protection afforded by the Act to trans-  
missions, and neither the statutory language nor structure  
provides any reason that the Act’s protections should be so  
limited. Moreover, it makes little sense for the Act to restrict  
the indirect recording of transmissions, but to allow unre-  
stricted direct recording of transmissions (e.g., to regulate  
second-hand recording of songs from the radio, but to allow  
unlimited direct recording of songs from the radio). Thus, the  
most logical reading of the Act extends protection to direct  
copying of digital music recordings, and to indirect copying  
of digital music recordings from transmissions of those  
recordings.

2

Because of the arguable ambiguity of this passage of the  
statute, recourse to the legislative history is necessary on this  
point. Cf. Moyle v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensa-  
tion Programs, 147 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998) ("\*f the  
statute is ambiguous, [this court] consult[s] the legislative his-  
tory, to the extent that it is of value, to aid in[its]  
interpretation."), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1454 (1999). The  
Senate Report states that "a digital audio recording made from  
a commercially released compact disc or audio cassette, or  
from a radio broadcast of a commercially released compact  
disc or audio cassette, would be a `digital audio copied  
recording.’ " S. Rep. 102-294, at \*119 (emphasis added). This  
statement indicates that the recording of a transmission need  
not be indirect to fall within the scope of the Act’s restric-  
tions, and thus refutes RIAA’s proposed interpretation of the  
relevant language. Moreover, the statement tracks the statu-  
tory definition by providing an example of direct copying of  
a digital music recording from that recording, and an example  
of indirect copying of a digital music recording from a trans-  
mission of that recording. Thus the legislative history con-  
firms the most logical reading of the statute, which we adopt:  
“indirectly” modifies the verb "is made " – in other words,  
modifies the making of the reproduction of the underlying  
digital music recording. Thus, a device falls within the Act’s  
provisions if it can indirectly copy a digital music recording  
by making a copy from a transmission of that recording.  
Because the Rio cannot make copies from transmissions, but  
instead, can only make copies from a computer hard drive, it  
is not a digital audio recording device.7

V

For the foregoing reasons, the Rio is not a digital audio  
recording device subject to the restrictions of the Audio Home  
Recording Act of 1992. The district court properly denied the  
motion for a preliminary injunction against the Rio’s manu-  
facture and distribution. Having so determined, we need not  
consider whether the balance of hardships or the possibility of  
irreparable harm supports injunctive relief.

AFFIRMED.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Princhester](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/3e96dc/32.png) [@Princhester](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Princhester)\
**Post date:** [October 8, 2003, 1:00pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/533 "2003-10-08T13:00:35Z")

</div>

> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by serenitynow \*  
> **… dicta – that is not binding precedent because it is not truly an issue before the court or the holding of the case.**

Yeah that taught me that one in law school too.

Couldn’t you just have linked? 😉

What is the nutshell argument that the 12 year old could use to argue that her filesharing is fair use, assuming she does it a lot and with many people?

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![umop\_ap\_sdn](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/u/dbc845/32.png) [@umop\_ap\_sdn](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/umop_ap_sdn)\
**Post date:** [October 9, 2003, 12:26am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/534 "2003-10-09T00:26:00Z")

</div>

So it sounds like if a hard drive had only music files on it, then it would be subject to the AHRA?

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Ms2001](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ms2001/32/18463_2.png) [@Ms2001](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ms2001)\
**Post date:** [October 9, 2003, 12:52am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/535 "2003-10-09T00:52:56Z")

</div>

> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by Princhester \*  
> **Except of course that cloning rays would put an end to anyone investing the time and effort into designing and building something like a Viper.**

Possibly true - inventions were certainly made before patents existed, though I suppose one could argue that a sports car requires so much investment in engineering and manufacturing that no one would take the time to make any more.

OTOH, even if no more sports cars were ever designed, would it be worth giving that up in order to eliminate famine and poverty?

> [@](#):
>
> \*\*Holy shit, Mr2001, careful! You’re nearly admitting to the moral rights of copyright holders here! \*\*

Ha, I didn’t say “pragmatically speaking” for nothing. I’m not acknowledging any moral right for the companies to profit from the people who use their content, any more than the companies are acknowledging any moral right of individuals to share music with their internet pals.

> [@](#):
>
> _Originally posted by aryk29_  
> **So it sounds like if a hard drive had only music files on it, then it would be subject to the AHRA?**

Not really… from 17 USC 1001:

> [@](#):
>
> (4)(A) A “digital audio recording medium” is any material object in a form commonly distributed for use  
> by individuals, that is primarily marketed or most commonly used by consumers for the purpose of  
> making digital audio copied recordings by use of a digital audio recording device.  
> (B) Such term does not include any material object–
> 
> (i) that embodies a sound recording at the time it is first distributed by the importer or manufacturer; or
> 
> (ii) that is primarily marketed and most commonly used by consumers either for the purpose of making  
> copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual works or for the purpose of making copies of nonmusical  
> literary works, including computer programs or data bases.

A computer hard drive would have to be specially marketed as audio storage to count as a “digital audio recording medium”, and I believe a computer would have to implement the Serial Copy Management System to count as a “digital audio recording device”.

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**Author:** ![umop\_ap\_sdn](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/u/dbc845/32.png) [@umop\_ap\_sdn](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/umop_ap_sdn)\
**Post date:** [October 9, 2003, 1:05am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/536 "2003-10-09T01:05:20Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by Mr2001 \*  
> \*\*A computer hard drive would have to be specially marketed as audio storage to count as a “digital audio recording medium”, and I believe a computer would have to implement the Serial Copy Management System to count as a “digital audio recording device”. \*\*

Right. :smack: I’ll go back and read the whole article when I have time.

OTOH, what about those CD-Rs that are being marketed specifically for storing music. First time I saw those I was suspicious. If you’re storing 0’s and 1’s on a disk it shouldn’t make any difference on the medium itself whether the files are music or programs or documents or images. I’ll have to look into the pricing of CDs next time I’m in an office supply store. If they’re more then odds are those extra are royalties.

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**Author:** ![Ms2001](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ms2001/32/18463_2.png) [@Ms2001](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ms2001)\
**Post date:** [October 9, 2003, 2:19am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/recording-industry-takes-action-against-12-year-old-girl-forces-settlement/200697/537 "2003-10-09T02:19:51Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by aryk29 \*  
> \*\*OTOH, what about those CD-Rs that are being marketed specifically for storing music. First time I saw those I was suspicious. If you’re storing 0’s and 1’s on a disk it shouldn’t make any difference on the medium itself whether the files are music or programs or documents or images. I’ll have to look into the pricing of CDs next time I’m in an office supply store. If they’re more then odds are those extra are royalties. \*\*

Yes, they cost more, and that’s exactly why. A standalone CD burner is a “digital audio recording device” and music CD-R media is a “digital audio recording medium”. The standalone burners won’t work with regular CD-R media.

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