# relativism vs. objective morality **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [November 15, 2004, 6:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904 "2004-11-15T18:50:00Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 5
**Author:** ![Smartass](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/4491bb/32.png) [@Smartass](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Smartass)\ **Post date:** [November 22, 2004, 8:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/81 "2004-11-22T20:39:59Z")
> [@pervert](#): > > Without some agreement that morals exist how can they procede? 1. I don’t think it is a question of whether they exist, but of whether they are “right”. 2. In terms of how they proceed, this is what I was talking about. Since no one can be proven absolutely right, they have to find some “base” moral principle(s) that they can agree on. Like I said, you may be able to find a base moral principle that every living creature is willing to agree to–and if you do, it would surely be helpful–but that does not make it objective. The fact that everyone agrees to it would not make it objective. For it to be objective, the burden would be for a living creature to disprove it (as opposed to disagreeing). But at it’s base, you are not describing reality so much as deciding how reality should be. How can that ever be objective? As soon as you say “should”, you are moralizing (and I’m getting beat up over this fact in another thread–I cannot prove that my principles are “objective”). Even if the “should” equation is set equal to an objective “is”, this act of doing the setting is based on a moral distinction. -VM ---
**Author:** ![pervert](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/bbe5ce/32.png) [@pervert](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/pervert)\ **Post date:** [November 22, 2004, 8:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/82 "2004-11-22T20:45:11Z")
> [@Smartass](#): > > It’s not that it’s circular; it’s that it requires a moral determination that “the purpose of being what it is” is good and that “the purpose of not being what it is” is bad. I understand that you think the second option is silly, but I don’t think that you can escape that deciding that it is silly requires a moral framework. No, I am not calling the second formula silly, I am also not trying to shy away from the fact that a detrimental judgement on such a formulation is a moral judgement. What I am saying is that this detrimental judgement is made by reality, not me. I’m not saying in any way that living your life based on the ideal “To be the least human as possible” is beyond your choice. Go to it if you want. All I am saying is that such a morality is demonstrably less suited to the purpose of living life as a human. Given that you are human. Given that you have to live within reality. Some ideal along the lines of “Living life as a human” is effectively an absolute morality for you. We can postulate that the two givens are not universal, but I’m not convinced such a thing would be useful. > [@](#): > > From my perspective, you are trying to find some sort of root objectivity to rely on, and I just don’t see how this is possible. Right. For my part I don’t see how this is at all avoidable. I’m not sure at all what value there is in saying that reality itself does not provide just such an objectivity to rely on. > [@](#): > > Is it not good enough to find a root moral position that you think all living creatures can reasonably agree to? Well, it might be. It depends. Does such a moral position agree with the restrictions put on us by the givens I listed above? > [@](#): > > That would give you something to move on from; whereas, seeking an objective absolute keeps you lost in an endless search. I disagree. > [@](#): > > In the same way, you can only eliminate so much of the moral determinations from your argument, but on some level there always has to be a notion of what is good. The fact that you come up with such a notion that no one would disagree with does not make it objective; it makes it popular. I agree. I am suggesting that there is an objective absolute principle which is indifferent to its popularity. Having a principle to which all of us agree is good for some things. But if Reality disagrees it is moot. 😉 ---
**Author:** ![Smartass](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/4491bb/32.png) [@Smartass](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Smartass)\ **Post date:** [November 22, 2004, 8:54pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/83 "2004-11-22T20:54:07Z")
> [@pervert](#): > > Having a principle to which all of us agree is good for some things. But if Reality disagrees it is moot. 😉 In which case, you are saying that the conditions of reality make some notions impractical or some goals unachievable. But then, are you not making a moral determination that practicality and/or achievability are good? I’m not sure how well this will go over with some of our religious friends… -VM ---
**Author:** ![pervert](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/bbe5ce/32.png) [@pervert](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/pervert)\ **Post date:** [November 22, 2004, 10:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/84 "2004-11-22T22:03:51Z")
> [@Smartass](#): > > 1. I don’t think it is a question of whether they exist, but of whether they are “right”. Yes, that’s part of it. But the fundamentalist who believes he is right and brooks no disention is no different from the relativist who insists that no “right” exists apart from each other’s opinion. > [@](#): > > 1. In terms of how they proceed, this is what I was talking about. Since no one can be proven absolutely right, they have to find some “base” moral principle(s) that they can agree on. I disagree. They can discuss the value of their moralities without agreement on anything. All it requires is a bit of tolerance. It does _not_ require that they agree _neither_ morality is right. > [@](#): > > Like I said, you may be able to find a base moral principle that every living creature is willing to agree to–and if you do, it would surely be helpful–but that does not make it objective. Right, but I am not looking for a moral which everyone can agree to. > [@](#): > > But at it’s base, you are not describing reality so much as deciding how reality should be. I’m not sure I’m doing this. > [@](#): > > Even if the “should” equation is set equal to an objective “is”, this act of doing the setting is based on a moral distinction. Ah, but if the act of setting is an inescapable condition of the characteristics of the settee, or more acurately of the person who would accept or not the moral in question, then the act is an absolute, objective, moral. ---
**Author:** ![pervert](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/bbe5ce/32.png) [@pervert](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/pervert)\ **Post date:** [November 22, 2004, 10:10pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/85 "2004-11-22T22:10:40Z")
> [@Smartass](#): > > In which case, you are saying that the conditions of reality make some notions impractical or some goals unachievable. But then, are you not making a moral determination that practicality and/or achievability are good? I’m not sure how well this will go over with some of our religious friends… No. I am saying that some goals are a necessary consequence of the nature of what and where you are. ---
**Author:** ![Smartass](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/4491bb/32.png) [@Smartass](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Smartass)\ **Post date:** [November 22, 2004, 10:35pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/86 "2004-11-22T22:35:44Z")
> [@pervert](#): > > All it requires is a bit of tolerance. It does _not_ require that they agree _neither_ morality is right. Do they not have to agree that tolerance is good? More importantly, do they not have to agree that neither’s morality is better than the other’s? If you’ve looked at the other thread, I have suggested that we agree that our moralities are of equal value and am being attacked for not being able to prove this objectively. Needless to say, if you do find an objective basis for this, I’ll be as pleased as anyone. I just don’t think it exists–at least not in a way that we can discern. -VM ---
**Author:** ![pervert](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/bbe5ce/32.png) [@pervert](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/pervert)\ **Post date:** [November 22, 2004, 10:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/87 "2004-11-22T22:41:03Z")
> [@Smartass](#): > > Do they not have to agree that tolerance is good? No, not really. They only have to practice a little of it. My point was that they do not have to deny the possiblity that one of them could, in fact, be “right”. > [@](#): > > More importantly, do they not have to agree that neither’s morality is better than the other’s? Not at all. That is exactly what they would be discussing. Why would they agree to the object of their discussion? More importantly, why would they agree that their discussion had not object at all. > [@](#): > > If you’ve looked at the other thread, I have suggested that we agree that our moralities are of equal value and am being attacked for not being able to prove this objectively. I’ve not looked there, which thread is it? > [@](#): > > Needless to say, if you do find an objective basis for this, I’ll be as pleased as anyone. I just don’t think it exists–at least not in a way that we can discern. Well, not be careful. What exactly do you mean by “this”? I have not formulated an objective basis for any particular moral system. I have been very careful not to. I have postulated that the life of the individual who would adopt such a moral system should be at or near the top of it, but I have tried pretty hard not to argue that any particular moral system is in fact absolutely correct. I have only been arguing that there is one which is, and that we can know it. I have not been trying to convince anyone that I know it. 😉 ---
**Author:** ![pervert](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/bbe5ce/32.png) [@pervert](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/pervert)\ **Post date:** [November 22, 2004, 10:54pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/88 "2004-11-22T22:54:57Z")
> [@pervert](#): > > NoI’ve not looked there, which thread is it? [I assume you meant this thread?](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=287764) I think the problem is that there is a great distance from accepting that absolute moral principles exist to extrapolating the kinds of principles you are fighting over. I think a case for life can be made. I think a case for freedom can be made based on this. I also think a case for property rights can be made based on both of these. These cases are beyond the scope of this thread, let me try to do so there. The problem is that it requires accepting some of what I have already said here, and may be a bit difficult to do in one post. ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [November 22, 2004, 11:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/89 "2004-11-22T23:49:35Z")
> [@pervert](#): > > Perhaps not, but it implies that there is an absolute truth we are talking about. That is an interpretation I do not support. But that is also another thread. > [@](#): > > It does not allow that any and all theories concerning the characteristics of light are equally valid… Perhaps we can clear this matter up. From now on, every time you want to say something is equal, you shall inform me **what is determining that measure**. Because I don’t follow it. And from now on, when you declare something is valid, personally or hypothetically, I want you to suggest what determines validity in this case. We will never leave this very small point until you do this, because I probably will never understand what in the world you are talking about. > [@](#): > > It certainly does not allow that the absolute truth we are talking about does not exist. Of course, I have never denied that absolute truth exists. In a moral sense, I do not believe it does, but I have very little interest in arguing over it. > [@](#): > > Fair enough. I have not seen good reason to do so. How about this: unicorns are defined as the best possible horse ever. Unicorns exist. I see no reason to think otherwise, even if we can’t agree on what they are, it is clear that there are horses and horses have certain qualities and so I’m just not going to rule out a unicorn which is the perfect horse, and anyone who questions unicorns must be trying to tell me that all horses are the same, because what other alternative is there? That some people like some horses and other like others and no oracle exists to tell us which horses are the best? Impossible! There simply is a best horse. The very fact that horses exist suggest it! Can you deny that horses exist? Come now. > [@](#): > > I am not even claiming that such a thing exists down to the level of whether or not to wear hats, for instance. I don’t believe anyone is really asking for such a development. > [@](#): > > What I have meant by that is that yes indeed many people live very differently and may be to one extent or another living according to an absolute morality. I’m not sure why this seems unlikely to anyone. Don’t trouble yourself with that matter. I, for one, have not ascribed any measure of probability to the existence or non-existence of absolute morality. > [@](#): > > If the accusation that relativism means all moralities are equally good makes no sense, then the accusation that absolutism means everyone should live exactly alike seems equally foolish. 😕 In a broad sense, morality is what people **should** do. An absolute morality, then, is indeed what everyone **should** live like. Whether that means they all live exactly alike is not in question, because most of us feel that morality does not cover all things, like wearing hats or what job to take. Of course, this is why I mentioned the small issue of not having clearly defined what a moral issue is so that we may meaningfully address these questions. There is also the matter that people may act immorally. So an absolute morality does not suggest that everyone acts the same. Is-ought gap, remember? > [@](#): > > Yea, almost. But I think the argument that no moral claims can be made without morals implies that all morals are equal. Hypothetical conversation: **erl** : “No measurement can be made without some kind of ruler.” **pervert** : “Without rulers, all measurements are equal.” **erl** : “Without rulers, what do you mean by measurement?” **pervert** : ??? > [@](#): > > I am saying that there is a way to evaluate morals without accepting any of them. That is I am postulating an objective basis for an absolute moral principle based on the characteristics of the being which would have to adopt such a principle. Again I say: no one has disputed that you are incapable of assertion. What I, and others, would dispute is your ability to construct a basis for your assertion. The way out is clear. Relativism says two things: that judgments are relative to some system or framework, and that no framework is privileged over any other. If you wish to combat relativism, those are the two things you need to focus on. Tackle either one and relativism crumbles. So the matter is clear, though not simple: 1. Construct a definition of morality that does not allow judgments to be made, defeating the first condition 2. Demonstrate a way to assign privilege to systems without making judgments of some kind Now, I should say that (1) is an impossible task. I do hope you don’t tackle it. The second is more interesting, because beating it in any one area necessarily means beating it in all areas. How do you establish privilege without making judgments? > [@](#): > > I disagree. At least if we limit the level to which we require uniqueness. That’s a possibility. So restrict the definition of morality so that we may attempt a sketch. > [@](#): > > Specifically I am claiming that such a morality is objectively better for people living in the real world. I am clear that this is your claim. You’ve not told me how you are determining “better”, and why this represents a privileged judgment which is not itself subject to a relativistic critique. > [@](#): > > Now, this statement has nothing whatsoever to say about wearing hats. IF you were to require that a moral system is not unique unless it permits, requires, or forbids the wearing of hats with absolute certainty, then I would have to admit defeat and say I have no such formulation. You brought up hats. I do not personally feel morality generally has anything to say about the wearing of hats, though there could very well be some specific circumstances in which wearing a hat or not is a moral decision. Of course, until we understand what we mean by “morality” there is simply no way to decide. > [@](#): > > I disagree. Again, what a thing is determines what it aught to do. A thing determines what it does, or what it is capable of doing. For instance, I build you a machine. You look at it, find that it is meant to punch 3mm holes in sheet metal, and exclaim, “ **erl**! I said that the machine you built me should tap holes for M3 screws! This does nothing of the sort.” Can I simply respond, “Its nature determines what it should do…”? > [@](#): > > What is morality? What use is it put to? Does any person need one? The answers to these questions determine a method for evaluating moralities. They would define the scope of the problem. > [@](#): > > If we assume that we are only talking about people living on earth then some of these answers are objectively determinate. Again, reality determines the context. Reality is the context. You’ll get no disagreement from me here. ---
**Author:** ![pervert](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/bbe5ce/32.png) [@pervert](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/pervert)\ **Post date:** [November 23, 2004, 1:17am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/90 "2004-11-23T01:17:22Z")
> [@erislover](#): > > Perhaps we can clear this matter up. From now on, every time you want to say something is equal, you shall inform me **what is determining that measure**. Because I don’t follow it. And from now on, when you declare something is valid, personally or hypothetically, I want you to suggest what determines validity in this case. We will never leave this very small point until you do this, because I probably will never understand what in the world you are talking about. Forgive me. I thought the context was obvious. In the example this quote is refering to (various theroies about the nature of light) the objective absolute measure of validity is the experimentally observable phenomena in question. > [@](#): > > Of course, I have never denied that absolute truth exists. I’m not sure this is the case, but I’ll take your word for it. > [@](#): > > How about this: unicorns are defined as the best possible horse ever. Unicorns exist. I see no reason to think otherwise, even if we can’t agree on what they are, it is clear that there are horses and horses have certain qualities and so I’m just not going to rule out a unicorn which is the perfect horse, and anyone who questions unicorns must be trying to tell me that all horses are the same, because what other alternative is there? That some people like some horses and other like others and no oracle exists to tell us which horses are the best? Impossible! There simply is a best horse. The very fact that horses exist suggest it! Can you deny that horses exist? Come now. I really have no idea what this has to do with the proposition with “what a thing is determines what it aught to do”. > [@](#): > > 😕 In a broad sense, morality is what people **should** do. An absolute morality, then, is indeed what everyone **should** live like. Fair enough as long as we keep our definitions broad enough. > [@](#): > > So an absolute morality does not suggest that everyone acts the same. Right. I agree. Which is also why the fact that everyone does not act the same is not proof against an absolute morality. Which is, I believe, what I was addressing. > [@](#): > > Is-ought gap, remember? I don’t understand what this has to do with the above paragraph. > [@](#): > > Hypothetical conversation: > **erl** : “No measurement can be made without some kind of ruler.” > **pervert** : “Without rulers, all measurements are equal.” > **erl** : “Without rulers, what do you mean by measurement?” > **pervert** : ??? No, my response to the last would be “quantification of some existant’s physical characteristic.” Are you saying that without rulers there is no length? Surely not. > [@](#): > > The way out is clear. Relativism says two things: that judgments are relative to some system or framework, and that no framework is privileged over any other. If you wish to combat relativism, those are the two things you need to focus on. Tackle either one and relativism crumbles. Ok. > [@](#): > > So the matter is clear, though not simple: > > 1. Construct a definition of morality that does not allow judgments to be made, defeating the first condition > 2. Demonstrate a way to assign privilege to systems without making judgments of some kind As you suggest I will not quibble with 1). I happen to agree, to an extent with it. My answer to 2) has been made already. Reality itself provides a context beyond your and my personal judegment which is in effect a judgement. Specifically the nature of morality, the nature of a morality bearing entity, and the nature of the context within which both exist provide a basis for judgement for moral systems which is a moral judgement made from without a moral system. > [@](#): > > How do you establish privilege without making judgments? By the nature of the problem. > [@](#): > > That’s a possibility. So restrict the definition of morality so that we may attempt a sketch. In discussions such as this, I have been trying to suggest that the life of the individual has a unique place in any morality which can apply to human beings. What I mean by restrictions is that after we construct a few principles based on this (liberty, property, a few others) we have many options which are equally valid, based on reality, but are also not unique. > [@](#): > > I am clear that this is your claim. You’ve not told me how you are determining “better”, and why this represents a privileged judgment which is not itself subject to a relativistic critique. But I have. I have said that it is better because we are talking about moralities involving such individual human beings. Any morality which is to be used by an individual which does not include the life of that individual pretty high up is “better” suited to the purpose for which it is intended than a morality which puts that life pretty far down. Remember, I am not claiming that such a judgement can be made in a vacuum. That is, I am not claiming to violate your rule 1 above. Not really, at least. I am claiming that reality itself, the definitions of the terms we are using, provide such a judgement. Allow me to illustrate. A) Moral system in which the life of the individual means nothing. Every act must denigrate, harm, or in some way damage the individual actor or it is not moral. B)Moral system in which the life of the individual means everything. Every act must be to the benifit of the individual actor or it is immoral. Since the two proposed moral systems are to be used by individuals to live their lives, how can the A be said to be better than B? And what morality must I adopt to make this claim? Is the limitation that we only talk about individual humans living on the planet earth itself a morality? Just for clarification. I am not stating that B is a correct phrasing of the principle I advocate or believe in. I don’t want to get bogged down in rants against elfishness. I am talking about the judgement of these two systems. I think if I can show that judging B over A is objective (not based on the acceptance of any particular morality) and that judgeing otherwise requires changing the problem, then I have shown a unique objective framwork for morality. Specifically I am postulating that as you say “Reality is the context. You’ll get no disagreement from me here.” I would add, of course, that reality is **the** context suggests privilege. 😉 > [@](#): > > You brought up hats. I do not personally feel morality generally has anything to say about the wearing of hats, though there could very well be some specific circumstances in which wearing a hat or not is a moral decision. Of course, until we understand what we mean by “morality” there is simply no way to decide. Well, I only did so to limit the discussion so we would not get bogged down in trying to figure out if wearing hats is moral or not. I agree that such questions are uninteresting and not productive in deciding how useful relativism is. > [@](#): > > A thing determines what it does, or what it is capable of doing. For instance, I build you a machine. You look at it, find that it is meant to punch 3mm holes in sheet metal, and exclaim, “ **erl**! I said that the machine you built me should tap holes for M3 screws! This does nothing of the sort.” Can I simply respond, “Its nature determines what it should do…”? Yes. 😉 The nature of the machine you built is to punch holes in metal. The context in which it is to do this work (my factory or shop), however requires a machine to tap M3 holes. You have chosen a system (the particulars of the machine) which is not suited to this context. May I simply state that any such purpose is relative to the system on which such measurements are made? In this case the system is somewhat arbitrary. You could, for example sell your machine to another shop which needs a 3mm hole punching machine. If the machine is me, my capabilities are my morals, and the factory is the world we live in, how does relativism help me come to grips with the fact that I am punching holes while reality only needs tapped holes. > [@](#): > > They would define the scope of the problem. That’s another way to say it. If the answers to these questions provide a way to judge moralities which is both objective and “unique”, would it satisfy your requirement for rendering relativism? > [@](#): > > Reality is the context. You’ll get no disagreement from me here. Right. But then why is it so hard to imagine that this context itself provides a unique framework from which to make judgements? I think this is all I am saying. ---
**Author:** ![RaftPeople](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/6f9a4e/32.png) [@RaftPeople](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RaftPeople)\ **Post date:** [November 23, 2004, 2:40am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/91 "2004-11-23T02:40:05Z")
I am a moral absolutist. I believe there is no action that can be considered right or wrong. (But there are actions I would prefer people engage in, and other actions I prefer they do not engage in) ---
**Author:** ![Smartass](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/4491bb/32.png) [@Smartass](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Smartass)\ **Post date:** [November 23, 2004, 4:33am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/92 "2004-11-23T04:33:22Z")
> [@pervert](#): > > No, my response to the last would be “quantification of some existant’s physical characteristic.” Are you saying that without rulers there is no length? Surely not. I don’t think relativists would say that there is no morality any more than I would say that there is no length. In the same way, I can compare the length of a board to the lengths that are marked out on the ruler. I can say that a board is longer than a centimeter (one framework) and shorter than a foot (another framework). But unless I can say that a centimeter is the correct “absolute” measure or a foot is the correct absolute measure, I cannot say whether the board is too long or too short. I can make comparisons, but there is no “objective” way for me to prefer one over the other. From what I can tell, context (or “reality”) places limits on choices (I cannot make a board that is longer than the tree it came from) but it does not help me to choose between what is left. Morality, as I understand it, is about choosing among available choices, not about determining what they are. Until you tell me what kind of board you prefer, I am limited to comparing boards with respect to each other. It may be that “reality” or “context” has a preference for our moral choices, but I don’t see how we could tell what that preference is. Let me put it this way, I can reward my daughter with a candy bar that costs a dollar or with a pile of manure that costs $10.00. The manure is “preferable” to me because it is worth more money. To my daughter, though, it is just a pile of shit. In other words, “reality” may be indicating preferences to us, but we don’t have any way evaluating its “signals” except through our own notions of what is preferable. Reality seems to indicate that all of us will die eventually. Does this mean that dying is “good”, or that trying to postpone death is “immoral”? Is reality sending us a message that we are not wanted? -VM ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [November 23, 2004, 4:35am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/93 "2004-11-23T04:35:50Z")
Quick response before I drive home from a late night at the office. > [@pervert](#): > > > [@erislover](#): > > > > Reality is the context. You’ll get no disagreement from me here. > > Right. But then why is it so hard to imagine that this context itself provides a unique framework from which to make judgements? I think this is all I am saying. The question I think relativism places before you is not one of imaginability. It is not hard to imagine an absolute system. All we need do is pick some rule and assert it as absolute. The imagining part is easy. I am not discounting it, **pervert** , as impossible; I am discounting it because it has not met my response. To repeat: the assertion of something-or-other as the highest of high is, not to put too fine a point on it, trivial. It is definitional or axiomatic. I am perfectly willing to operate hypothetically or in other ways with such a rule. It is not the rule which I am discounting, it is the position you seem to place it in. ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [November 23, 2004, 5:07am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/94 "2004-11-23T05:07:54Z")
> [@Smartass](#): > > I don’t think relativists would say that there is no morality any more than I would say that there is no length. In the same way, I can compare the length of a board to the lengths that are marked out on the ruler. I can say that a board is longer than a centimeter (one framework) and shorter than a foot (another framework). But unless I can say that a centimeter is the correct “absolute” measure or a foot is the correct absolute measure, I cannot say whether the board is too long or too short. I can make comparisons, but there is no “objective” way for me to prefer one over the other. Quite so. And of course, to carry this further, it is also not to say that there are not other criteria we might use to help us select. The problem is that these, too, become subject to a relativistic critique. ([rhetorical]For example: the “easier” measurement system: is this an unambiguous criterion?[/rhetorical]) The measurement example is useful in other ways, too. For instance, suppose someone said, “All boards are equal.” We would have to ask: by what measure are you saying this? The standard meter being defined by so many wavelengths of a specific element burning is an objective standard. But could we not have chosen some other element? Someone I respect very much once said something along these lines: “There is only one object which is not more than one meter long and not less than one meter long, and that is the standard meter. But this is not to ascribe any special property to it.” Quite so. ---
**Author:** ![pervert](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/bbe5ce/32.png) [@pervert](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/pervert)\ **Post date:** [November 23, 2004, 5:12am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/95 "2004-11-23T05:12:59Z")
> [@Smartass](#): > > I don’t think relativists would say that there is no morality any more than I would say that there is no length. In the same way, I can compare the length of a board to the lengths that are marked out on the ruler. I can say that a board is longer than a centimeter (one framework) and shorter than a foot (another framework). But unless I can say that a centimeter is the correct “absolute” measure or a foot is the correct absolute measure, I cannot say whether the board is too long or too short. I can make comparisons, but there is no “objective” way for me to prefer one over the other. But this is not true. You have a very objective way to prefer one over the other. What purpose are you going to put the board to? This is a very good way to prefer one measurement technique over another without needing any particular measurement technique. > [@](#): > > From what I can tell, context (or “reality”) places limits on choices (I cannot make a board that is longer than the tree it came from) but it does not help me to choose between what is left. Morality, as I understand it, is about choosing among available choices, not about determining what they are. If I understand you I agree. Morality does not dictate which choices are available, but it does provide a tool (it is a tool) for choosing amongst them. But there is a circular relationship IMHO. While morality does not dictate which choices are available in allowing us to choose from among them, it only allows us to choose amongst them. That is the ideal in relativism that there is no way to prefer one morality over another falls away when we realize that this means there is not way to judge between a morality which exhaults impossible or non existant choices and a morality which limits our choices to that which exists. > [@](#): > > Until you tell me what kind of board you prefer, I am limited to comparing boards with respect to each other. It may be that “reality” or “context” has a preference for our moral choices, but I don’t see how we could tell what that preference is. The preference is the context itself. That is, the preference is for a board which fits it purpose. > [@](#): > > Let me put it this way, I can reward my daughter with a candy bar that costs a dollar or with a pile of manure that costs $10.00. The manure is “preferable” to me because it is worth more money. To my daughter, though, it is just a pile of shit. In other words, “reality” may be indicating preferences to us, but we don’t have any way evaluating its “signals” except through our own notions of what is preferable. Nonsense. In this case the purpose of the reward is to “reward” your daughter. Look up that word and tell me a definition of it which allows you to give your daughter a pile of shit and still have it qualify as a reward. > [@](#): > > Reality seems to indicate that all of us will die eventually. Does this mean that dying is “good”, or that trying to postpone death is “immoral”? Is reality sending us a message that we are not wanted? Reality does not send messages. Forgive me if I have anthropomorphized it in some way. It is difficult to avoid. Reality simply is. Existance exists, as it were. But to answer your question, postponing death, in some small sense, at least is extending life. If you are a living thing, that has to be one of your highest goals. Not because you chose that as a founding block of your morality, not because god commanded it, nor even out of habit. It has to be one of your highest goals because without it, you are not a living being. The fact that it is impossible to live forever does not alleviate you from the responsibility of living right now. It does not alleviate you from the responsibility of making choices which, in some measure, allow you to continue living. -VM [/QUOTE] ---
**Author:** ![pervert](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/bbe5ce/32.png) [@pervert](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/pervert)\ **Post date:** [November 23, 2004, 5:17am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/96 "2004-11-23T05:17:17Z")
> [@erislover](#): > > Quick response before I drive home from a late night at the office.The question I think relativism places before you is not one of imaginability. It is not hard to imagine an absolute system. All we need do is pick some rule and assert it as absolute. The imagining part is easy. I am not discounting it, **pervert** , as impossible; I am discounting it because it has not met my response. To repeat: the assertion of something-or-other as the highest of high is, not to put too fine a point on it, trivial. It is definitional or axiomatic. I am perfectly willing to operate hypothetically or in other ways with such a rule. It is not the rule which I am discounting, it is the position you seem to place it in. But that’s ok. FTR I am not trying to witness. All I am suggesting is that the principle that no system can be privileged because no measure can be made outside a system falls apart if we simply evaluate the purpose that moral systems must fulfill. I am simply claiming that the fact that they serve a purpose means that different ones can be evaluated, priveleged, if you will, over others based on their suitability for this purpose. This is one reason why I was a bit stymied by your insistence on uniqueness. I am not proposing that one or another particular moral system is actually unique. Although I agree that unless we find one we have not found the one true morality. I am only saying that the principle of non privilege breaks down if we limit the scope of the problem in what I think is a pretty trivial way. Namely that we limit it to humans living on earth. ---
**Author:** ![pervert](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/bbe5ce/32.png) [@pervert](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/pervert)\ **Post date:** [November 23, 2004, 5:41am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/97 "2004-11-23T05:41:06Z")
I want to try this from another angle. > [@erislover](#): > > The question I think relativism places before you is not one of imaginability. It is not hard to imagine an absolute system. All we need do is pick some rule and assert it as absolute. But this is not what I am doing. In fact, I am trying very hard not to assert any moral systems whatsoever. I agree that simply asserting a moral system, claiming it is the one true moral system, and then crying that Relativism is beaten would be foolish. I am not doing anything like this. I am suggesting that a judgement reference frame exists which is objective **and not itself a moral system**. It is in fact, the only framework for judgements which is not itself a moral system. That is, it obeys the first rule of relativism you laid out above, but breaks the second. It is both a framework from which to make judgements and unique (privileged if you will) among such frameworks. > [@](#): > > To repeat: the assertion of something-or-other as the highest of high is, not to put too fine a point on it, trivial. It is definitional or axiomatic. I am perfectly willing to operate hypothetically or in other ways with such a rule. It is not the rule which I am discounting, it is the position you seem to place it in. But it is not me which has placed existence in any position. I am not suggesting that I have a set of rules which is the one true morality. I am merely suggesting that there is a way to judge moralities without reference to any of them (or any others) and that this way is the one true way to do so. 😉 Perhaps I am confusing us with my misunderstanding. Allow me to propose another formulation which may not break relativism at all. I am using this definition for now. “_Relativism says two things: that judgments are relative to some system or framework, and that no framework is privileged over any other._” What I am saying is that not all frameworks are moral systems. If we can see that, we may be able to see a way to measure all moral systems (judge them) without referencing them at all. If reality is the context in which moralities must operate, the context in which they must be put to thier purposes, the perhaps it provides us a way to judge or privilege one over another. This might not break the main logic of relativism as you’ve laid it out. I’m perhaps proposing what **Tyrrell McAllister** (I think) earlier called ontological judgements. If “_Morality is a complex of concepts and philosophical beliefs by which an individual determines whether his or her actions are right or wrong._” Then there may be a necessary framework from within which to privilege some moral systems above others whithout itself being a moral framework. Again, I believe limiting the question to humans on earth does this. How am I wrong in this belief? ---
**Author:** ![Smartass](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/4491bb/32.png) [@Smartass](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Smartass)\ **Post date:** [November 23, 2004, 6:13am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/98 "2004-11-23T06:13:32Z")
> [@pervert](#): > > But this is not true. You have a very objective way to prefer one over the other. What purpose are you going to put the board to? Indeed. And unless there is only one purpose for which I can use a board, then I must “prefer” one over the others in order to choose. If I am building a house, choosing a board that fits my plan is an objective way of choosing, but choosing to build a house is preferential. This is what I mean when I say you are “pushing the decision up the chain”. Somewhere, someone has to have a preference. > [@](#): > > This is a very good way to prefer one measurement technique over another without needing any particular measurement technique. Because you have “assumed” a preference that has already been selected. If I don’t prefer to build a house, then I am back to having no way to think of the board as too long or too short. And the fact that I can’t build a rocket ship with it doesn’t particularly help me to choose. > [@](#): > > That is the ideal in relativism that there is no way to prefer one morality over another falls away when we realize that this means there is not way to judge between a morality which exhaults impossible or non existant choices and a morality which limits our choices to that which exists. How can a morality expand or limit our choices? Reality dictates choices, morality determines preference. If you only have one option, there is no choice to be made and thus there is no moral decision to be made. If I cannot build rocket ships from boards, then a preference for rocket ships has no bearing on what I choose to do with the board. > [@](#): > > That is, the preference is for a board which fits it purpose. I have a purpose in that I want to build a house, but there is nothing objective about it. As far as I can tell, the board has no purpose; it only has existence. If a board has a purpose, I cannot tell what it is by looking at the board, the table, the saw, the tree the board came from, or the rest of the neighborhood. And how do I know that the board’s “purpose” is not to remain a tree? It seems to me that you are either saying that the board would rather be a house than a swingset, or that my preference for houses is objective. > [@](#): > > Nonsense. In this case the purpose of the reward is to “reward” your daughter. Look up that word and tell me a definition of it which allows you to give your daughter a pile of shit and still have it qualify as a reward. A reward is something “good” or “pleasing” that is given someone after a desired behavior in order to encourage repetition of the behavior. The point is that unless my daughter knows what I find good or pleasing, she does not know whether my “purpose” was to reward or punish. She knows how SHE feels about it, but she cannot, by looking at a pile of shit (or a piece of candy) deduce my intentions. She thinks the shit is bad because it stinks; I think it is good because it costs money and I can make my garden grow better with it. My daughter does not know whether I value a pile of shit, but she can predict a situation where I might give her one. Even if my daughter agrees that I am “absolute morality”, she still doesn’t know what to do to be “right”. That is, she knows what to do to receive a pile of shit, but she doesn’t know whether this is moral. I’m not sure if it illuminates much, but I can also assert that, as a parent, I will have much better luck choosing rewards that she thinks are “good” than I will trying to make her appreciate a pile of shit. > [@](#): > > If you are a living thing, that has to be one of your highest goals. Not because you chose that as a founding block of your morality, not because god commanded it, nor even out of habit. It has to be one of your highest goals because without it, you are not a living being. In what way does the fact of my existence make my existence preferable in an absolute way? I can think of a number of people who find my existence distinctly UNpreferable–I hope that they are not objectively correct, but I cannot prove it. Nonetheless, I CAN choose to end my existence or to try to prolong it. What I can’t do is show you any “objective” way of saying one is better than the other. And have I not already thwarted the board’s “highest goal” to be a tree? > [@](#): > > The fact that it is impossible to live forever does not alleviate you from the responsibility of living right now. It does not alleviate you from the responsibility of making choices which, in some measure, allow you to continue living. Responsibility to whom? Whose preference am I compelled to honor? Does the board have a responsiblity to be a tree or a house? -VM ---
**Author:** ![pervert](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/bbe5ce/32.png) [@pervert](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/pervert)\ **Post date:** [November 23, 2004, 6:33am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/99 "2004-11-23T06:33:12Z")
> [@Smartass](#): > > Indeed. And unless there is only one purpose for which I can use a board, then I must “prefer” one over the others in order to choose. If I am building a house, choosing a board that fits my plan is an objective way of choosing, but choosing to build a house is preferential. This is what I mean when I say you are “pushing the decision up the chain”. Somewhere, someone has to have a preference. I agree, and this is the essential failure of all analogues. My point is that the “chain” with regards to morality has an end. You can (and probably should) push the decision up the chain as far as possible. But at some point you simply do not have the freedom to make non existant choices. This puts a limit which is neither arbitrary nor part of some moral system on how far you can push the decisions. > [@](#): > > Because you have “assumed” a preference that has already been selected. If I don’t prefer to build a house, then I am back to having no way to think of the board as too long or too short. And the fact that I can’t build a rocket ship with it doesn’t particularly help me to choose. But this is exactly my complaint about relativism. It provides no means to prefer one moral system over another. Indeed, it says that no system may be privileged over _any_ other. Denying the necessity to privilege moral systems which require only wood for rocket ships over those which don’t just seems silly to me. > [@](#): > > How can a morality expand or limit our choices? By determining our values. By defining our values, actually. This is what morality is. > [@](#): > > Reality dictates choices, morality determines preference. Maybe. But only if you pick your scope carefully enough. I think if you limit morality to only those possible moralities which choose between possible choices, you have effectively provided some moralities with a privilege over others. Have you not violated the tenets of relativism by doing so? > [@](#): > > As far as I can tell, the board has no purpose; it only has existence. If a board has a purpose, I cannot tell what it is by looking at the board, the table, the saw, the tree the board came from, or the rest of the neighborhood. Then, you have no purpose for that board. Remember, a board is not a person. It cannot make choices. So it cannot be said to have a purpose in the same exact sense that a person has a purpose. Your analoby seemed to find some fault in my thinking by proposing that there is no way to privilege or choose one measuring system or board from another just as there is not way to choose one morality from another. I simply pointed out that this argument loses sight of the fact that other frameworks from which to make such judgements might exist. I am making the same argument with regards to morality. > [@](#): > > And how do I know that the board’s “purpose” is not to remain a tree? It seems to me that you are either saying that the board would rather be a house than a swingset, or that my preference for houses is objective. No, not at all. I am not ascribing any asperations at all to the board. > [@](#): > > A reward is something “good” or “pleasing” that is given someone after a desired behavior in order to encourage repetition of the behavior. The point is that unless my daughter knows what I find good or pleasing, she does not know whether my “purpose” was to reward or punish. She knows how SHE feels about it, but she cannot, by looking at a pile of shit (or a piece of candy) deduce my intentions. She thinks the shit is bad because it stinks; I think it is good because it costs money and I can make my garden grow better with it. My daughter does not know whether I value a pile of shit, but she can predict a situation where I might give her one. Even if my daughter agrees that I am “absolute morality”, she still doesn’t know what to do to be “right”. That is, she knows what to do to receive a pile of shit, but she doesn’t know whether this is moral. I’m not sure if it illuminates much, but I can also assert that, as a parent, I will have much better luck choosing rewards that she thinks are “good” than I will trying to make her appreciate a pile of shit. This last bit is the crux of the matter. You were the one who said you could not evaluate the shit over the candy for purposes of a reward. But from what you are saying now, I think you are trying to draw another analogy with you standing in place of Reality while your daughter is everyman. I think this analogy consists of an over anthropomorphization of Reality. It does not have preferences nor does it “provide” rewards. Existence simply exists. You are trying to push the preferences too far up the chain, so to speak. 😉 > [@](#): > > In what way does the fact of my existence make my existence preferable in an absolute way? I don’t understand this question. What does it mean for a choice of yours (to exist or not) to be preferenced outside of you? What does it mean for one of your preferences to exist without you? > [@](#): > > Responsibility to whom? Whose preference am I compelled to honor? To you. Yours. > [@](#): > > Does the board have a responsiblity to be a tree or a house? As above, no. ---
**Author:** ![Lilairen](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/8491ac/32.png) [@Lilairen](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Lilairen)\ **Post date:** [November 23, 2004, 7:42am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904/100 "2004-11-23T07:42:17Z")
> [@pervert](#): > > But this is exactly my complaint about relativism. It provides no means to prefer one moral system over another. Providing such a means is not a part of its purpose. If relativism were a system for selecting moral systems, then its lack of providing a means to do so would be a flaw. It is a _description_ of one way of looking at the process of that selection, not a process itself. > [@](#): > > Indeed, it says that no system may be privileged over _any_ other. False. Any set of moral systems can be ranked. This merely requires that one _define the standards to rank them by_. (Further, any selection of standards can be ranked as well for superiority, though this requires yet another standard for doing so, and thus do we escape into metagenie land.) On the subject of absolutism – well, I’m willing to allow for the possibility that if I go back through the recursive process far enough I will stumble across The Standard. I don’t see any logical process by which that could happen, nor any evidence for the existence of The Standard, however, so I’m disinclined to belief that The Standard exists. (I have encountered a number of people who have submitted potential The Standards. Most of them require that I believe in the tenets of a religion not my own, which is a bit of a non-starter. The others have mostly been variations on raising sociobiology to a moral system and either defining the core instinctual stuff in humans as good-because-it’s-the-way-we-are or bad-because-it’s-what-we-must-overcome.) [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904.md?page=4) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/relativism-vs-objective-morality/274904.md?page=6)