[QUOTE=Chronos]
So, then, there is some quality which “humans” have, but which HeLa cells do not, and it is due to this quality, whatever it is, that “humans” have rights. Now, then, if it is possible for a Homo sapiens to lack this right-bearing property, is it not possible for a non-Homo sapiens to have the same property?
[/QUOTE]
Chronos that is a fantastic argument and I’ve been banging my head against it all night trying to think how to build upon it. I think you’re neck deep in culture of life territory there, so some of this should have been argued quite thoroughly already.
The best objection I’ve got is that (to my knowledge) everything that you might call H. Sapiens but might not grant rights to, either once was or once had the potential to become a walking, talking, human being; and while these non-WTHBs may not have interests, or at least interests due equal consideration as those of a WTHB, they are due a special consideration to see if they might, whereas a thing which derives none of its body from such materials is not due such consideration. (So cyborgs and other trans-humans get a pass.)
I could come back at this and say that being H. Sapiens is not a prerequisite for having legally recognized interests, but now we’re back to the subhuman problem, and we still haven’t demonstrated suffering, which in addition to being the best indicator of interests, is the reason humane laws got enacted to begin with.
I can’t think at the moment of conditions that would indisputably make a machine consciousness suffer, so what does a robot need not to suffer?
[Some Research Occurs]
I just checked a plain-text version of the U.S. Constitution online, and my browser’s search feature doesn’t find any instances of the word “human” or even “man”. All I see is lots of "people"s and "person"s. I feel like a bad citizen for not knowing this stuff; it looks like I have to rewind the argument a bit. What is a ‘person’? Chronos, you’ve at least established that it isn’t, in the strictest sense, H. Sapiens.