Not hung on meat hooks. Strangled by piano wires. Don’t be so dramatic. Meet hooks are gauche, even by National Socialist standards. This was a highly cultured society we are talking about.
According to Panzer Battles by Maj. Gen. F. W. Von Mellathin, Rommel could have easily handed the Allies their asses if Hitler had given him the materiel he’d wanted. Patton read Rommel’s writings on his WW I experiences in order to not only understand Rommel, but to learn from Rommel.
I don’t think that the term “hero” or “villian” can be applied to Rommel. He was a remarkable man, doing what he has trained for, which, unfortuantly happened to be in the service of a madman.
IIRC from my “Bodyguard of Lies” book, Rommel was pretty darn involved with plots against the regime. The board is about to shut down for the upkeep hour, or I’d research more right now.
In my view Rommel ranks as one of the most overrated Generals of WWII. I’m not claiming he was a bad General, just praised to a much higher level than he deserves.
I’ll grant that he was energetic, resourceful, and willing to take great risks with his forces, which paid off in spades against incompetent Generals like Ritchie, but whenever he met up with a competent General his attacks proved ineffective and ultimately futile. Alam El Halfa 31 August 1942 (The six day race) and Medenine, 6 March 1943, being two examples from the North African campaign. Of the latter, General Montgomery was quite critical of Rommel’s tactics, declaring that he must have gone mad Link
Some claim that Rommel did more with less. Maybe so, but British General O’Connor in the late 1941 campaign against Italian forces in North Africa achieved even more with very little in the way of resources, yet he is given nothing like as much credit by historians as the fulsome praise many of them lavish on Field Marshall Rommel.
Oh yes. He was a good soldier too, not a villain.
I wouldnt say he is a hero… not exactly… but that he was a brilliant general and a honorable soldier would be much more appropiate. Heroism involves much more…
The tone of Panzer Battles suggests they could’ve taken New York City by spring '43 if only Hitler had let his uber-generals have what they wanted.
In any case, it’s probably true - every battle in the desert war went to the side who entered it with more supply. This is generally true of battles in general, but especially there. The result pretty much directly correlated with supply on every occasion.
Oh, and I have to side with “overrated general”. He was an excellent tactician, a great batallion and perhaps even brigade commander - but being a general, and commanding divisions or corps takes an entirely different skillset for which he wasn’t especially suited.
He was a truly outstanding divisional commander actually, and the 7th Panzer Division under his command in France in 1940 was extremely effective. That level of command suited his style of command which was to personally visit the front and take command of units. He was also in the main a very good corps commander and inflicted repeated defeats on the British. I agree with your basic point about the different skillsets for higher command, his personal style of leadership became less effective as the forces he commanded got larger. He was away from his headquarters at critical moments leaving his army group bereft of his leadership because he had decided to go visit Battalion X of Regiment Y and no-one knew where he was. Higher level commanders just cant afford that and as an army level commander I don’t rate him that highly.
It’s still worth pointing out though in response to Alan Owes Bess that much of Rommel’s success was due to surprise and momentum and keeping his enemies off balance. This became harder and harder to achieve as the war progressed as the allies gained air supremacy in the desert and the effective aerial reconnaisance that went with it. The allies also had comprehensive intelligence from Ultra. So Rommel’s surprises weren’t surprises. Montgomery’s comments need to be considered in the light that he was defending against (and later attacking) a smaller force that was poorly supplied and over which he had both air superiority and very accurate intelligence. Hardly surprising he won.
You may be right about his service as a division commander - it’s been a while since I’ve read up on him. From what I do recall, the lower level of command he served at, the more his particular talents suited him. Of course, the problem was that he could be the greatest batallion commander whoever lived - and would barely influence large battles. But moving him to a position where he would have more influence also meant that his particular skills became less and less extraordinary. A nasty catch, I guess.
Almost every battle in the coastal desert of North Africa, by both sides, used the standard and predictable outflank and hook around to the coast tactic. So the intelligence derived from Ultra was not important in giving away any tactical secrets at either Alam El Halfa or Medenine.
It was of much greater importance as a naval force multiplier in that the British Navy, including submarines, could position themselves to best effect for sinking supply ships from Italy. (incidentally, because of his supply losses, Rommel was convinced even before the battle of El Alamein that Axis communications had somehow been severely compromised, but his warnings had no effect).
Before Medenine, Field Marshal Rommel had just completed a successful campaign in the Gafsa and Kasserine sector of Tunisia, and his forces were not as strong in that success as they were in his failure at Medenine.
It is possible that Rommel incorrectly assumed that the Eighth Army had not had time to establish itself properly folllowing its fairly rapid advance to Medenine. However, I believe that Montgomery’s criticism was probably directed more to the way in which the attack at Medenine was conducted than anything else.
Interesting points there Eolbo and SenorBeef.
I wonder, with hindsight, if the German High Command had provided Rommell with an Eisenhower style Army Level Commander, along with all of the supplies he needed - including long range fighters and long range aerial reconnaisance - let alone perhaps creating a 2nd Rommel - I just wonder how much havoc the North Africa campaign could have caused.
I know, I know… we all have 20/20 vision with hindsight - but I think we all agree that Hitler, as military strategists go, was about as brilliant as your typical idiot savant. And yet, he had some outstanding men like Rommel at his disposal.
So purely as an exercise in “what ifs?”, if Hitler had neither embarked on the London blitz, nor the various Eastern fronts in 1940 and 1941, and instead, had merely concentrated everything on the North Africa campaign with a view to totally locking up the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal - I wonder how things might have panned out differently.
Could a locked down Mediterranean have been achievable without taking Gibraltar? Would a captured Suez Canal have opened up the oil reserves of Iraq or Iran to Germany? Could this have also choked off suplly lines to the USSR?
Anyone care to buy into this?
While you are correct in pointing out the importance of Ultra to the sinking of Rommel’s supply ships you are drastically understating its importance to the land fighting. One of the very factors contributing to Rommel’s pre-Medenine success in Tunisia was that Ultra coverage in Tunisia was lacking.
Ultra pre-warned the British of both the Alam Halfa and Medenine attacks, and gave precise operational plans and unit strengths and dispositions. It wasn’t guesswork that put a strong anti-tank system right where the attack was coming at Medenine.
Now intelligence isn’t decisive in itself and nor was Ultra the only source. You can still lose a battle even if you possess your enemy’s total plan and the British managed to do just that at Crete for instance. Sometimes you just aren’t strong enough to defeat an attack even though you know its coming. But fore-warning is a considerable advantage and its especially so when your opponent is outnumbered and more reliant on surprise and momentum then brute force.
Well, it’s not like we were expecting such a thing to happen. Had a buncha German tanks suddenly appeared in New York on 1/1/43, we’d have been in trouble.
**
Air superiority is the utmost in desert warfare. The side that has it, is the side that’s able to triumph.
From Casablanca:
Major Stroesser: Are you one of those people who cannot imagine the Germans in their beloved Paris?
Rick: Not particularly my beloved Paris.
Herr Heinz: Could you imagine us in London?
Rick: When you get there, ask me.
Louis: Hmm! A diplomatist!
Major Stroesser: What about New York?
Rick: Well, there are certain sections of New York, Major, that I wouldn’t advise you to try to invade.
My point was that after the war, lots of members of the German general staff would claim that everything they did was perfect, and only Hitler’s interference prevented anything but Germany taking over the world in 3 days flat. Von Mellathin’s claims often go in that sentiment.
Granted, Hitler screwed a whole lot up - but the German army and general staff made quite a few bad decisions and had some serious organizational problems.
Investing my two cents – I’d describe Rommel as a great and able commander, as demonstrated by his accomplishments. If I were ranking the German General Staff of the era, only Manstein would rival him overall (though one could argue the merits of primarily defensive commanders like Kesselring or Heinrici). Ranking him against allied commanders runs into “Batman vs…” territory. I’d say he was perhaps a bit more adaptable and versatile than Patton, vastly moreso than Montgomery, and all-around comparable to Zhukov.
Moving toward the “heroism” issue, I’d describe Rommel as a courageous, and even heroic, commander, in light of the personal risks inherent in his practice of “commanding from the point of contact”. He had at least one aide killed at his side in France, as I recall. The benefit of this command technique was the best access to information about “where the action is” and shortest decision loop possible given the technology of the day. So long as Rommel had the initiative, and knew “where the action was”, the edge this short decision loop gave him could be decisive. The downside of the technique was considerable, though. Not only personal risk to the commander, but a considerable increase in the decision loop if the broader strategic situation evolved in unforseen ways.
The simple tag “hero”, though is usually associated with Rommel in connection with his involvement in the plot against Hitler, and in this regard I think he has been somewhat overrated. His suicide has made him a useful martyr figure for post-Nazi Germany – I believe there’s even a German destroyer named after him today. Rommel, like most of the rest of the German people, followed the Nazis down a slippery slope of moral compromises, mostly because they seemed to offer the only credible opposition to Soviet communism, and the only hope for stability and prosperity in Germany. Ultimately they found themselves fighting in defense of a genocidal tyranny because the only apparent alternative was extinction. To Rommel’s credit, he did gradually see some sort of coup as the only way out, but it remains my impression that his support for a coup was motivated by Hitler’s failing effectiveness as a leader, not his brutality.
I’d also like to second SenorBeef’s motion, and note that I think Hitler has been at least a bit over-criticized as a military commander. I’m sure there have been threads specifically focused on the subject (and will likely be more) but in a nutshell I think he was no worse than mediocre. If some of his strategic and tactical decisions led to Germany’s defeat, others were arguably responsible for it getting as close to victory as it did.
Whoosh, baby, whoosh.