# Rumsfeld's Strategy **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [April 2, 2003, 8:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041 "2003-04-02T20:27:40Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 2
**Author:** ![Fugazi](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/f08c70/32.png) [@Fugazi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Fugazi)\ **Post date:** [April 3, 2003, 7:20am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/21 "2003-04-03T07:20:52Z")
I have a slightly different take on why we went in quickly with ground troops. This is just my guess, but I believe we went in to prevent Hussein from blowing up all the southern oil wells. It also explains why we bypassed the towns & saved them for later, they weren’t part of the 1st objective. If my guess is right, I’m glad we did it that way too. Cleaning up the environmental mess from 1000 burning oil wells would have been a pain in the ass. Capturing what we could in the west was to try and prevent missiles from being launched at Israel. I think the strategy was to capture as much as we could quickly to limit Husseins options. After that we can take our time to get the tougher objectives. What I can’t figure out is why people are complaining about this strategy. So far it seems to be working. If it fails, then jump all over it. ---
**Author:** ![OliverH](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/278dde/32.png) [@OliverH](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/OliverH)\ **Post date:** [April 3, 2003, 8:41am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/22 "2003-04-03T08:41:05Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Spiritus Mundi \* > \*\* > What I think: > **We are failing in both the propoganda effort and the humanitarian effort:** > The first of these was predictable and quite possibly unavoidable. No war is 100% “clean”. There will always be civilian casualties and collateral damage which the current regime can play up to effect. We also were beginning under the triple handicap of: deep suspicion of the US throughout the Arab nations, a target population that has had heavily restricted access to information for more than a decade, and a target population that remembers quite clearly that teh US abandoned them the last time we had an army in teh region and asked them to rise up against Hussein. \*\* I disagree. I propose that your argument is precisely a CAUSE for the failure of the propaganda effort. An attitude of ‘shit happens’ suggests that the life of the own soldiers is considered infinitely more valuable than that of the locals. The fact that the British have serious concerns about US interactions with civilians shows that there is more involved than unavoidable problems. > [@](#): > > \*\* > The second is a side-effect of the strategic plan. Because we did not move more slowly and secure our logistic paths, we are left in a position where we claim to be “in control” of much territory yet are unable to move supplies through that territory. We have yet to even truly secure a primary port-of-entry. \*\* I disagree with the reasoning. The failure seems to be in no small part due to a)US troops having serious difficulties acting within a potentially hostile civilian population (as opposed to, for example, the British), and b)US troops not being capable of setting up an organized distribution system for humanitarian aid. The result is the plundering of trucks by the young and strong, leaving the elderly and infirm without any help whatsoever. > [@](#): > > \*\* > While there will always be “misses”, it is imperative to the long term goal of Iraqi self-determination that we make every effort to minimize both civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. As a whole, our campaign has been very effective at keeping those to goals in mind while inflicting damage to military and governmental targets. > > \*\* On the contrary. From a Clausewitzian point of view, the campaign so far was a complete and utter failure, since the US did not come closer, but further away from any political goal pursued with the war aside from removing Saddam Hussein. Which, in and of itself, is not a valid goal, since it is a detail, but does not describe a situation. The US has increased recruiting of militant organisations, destabilized stable governments all across the muslim world, and has turned even pro-war Iraqis against itself. Aside from that, sorry, throwing cluster bombs at villages, as documented by several independent sources, including the ICRC is NOT minimizing civilian casualties. > [@](#): > > \*\* > **The initial gambit for a “quick solution” has failed.** > _BUT_ it was still a good gamble to take. While I think that it was wildly overoptimistic to expect a general uprising/troop defection, there was at least a small chance that the “road to Baghdad” would have laid wide open to a very rapid assault. The upside of that would have been huge (minimized infrastruicure damage, minimized civilian casualties, propoganda coup, minimized coalition casualties, minimized “ripple effects” in other Arabian nations). Even in “failure” this thrust managed to: rapidly secure the southern oil fields with minimal Iraqi saboutage, gain vital river crossing before they could be secured/destroyed, pin Iraqi armor into a closed theatre in which manueverability is constrained (increasing vulnerability to our unquestioned air superiority). > \*\* Iraqi armor was hardly pinned. Quite the contrary, they had been largely concentrated around cities from the beginning and have been moving OUT from there. The fabled ‘quick advances’ were illusions, based on the fact that the Iraqis avoided facing the US in the open desert, knowing fully well that would be suicidal. Instead they concentrate on defending the cities, where ample cover negates some of the technological advantage and prevents a lot of the superiority from being used without risking massive civilian casualties. ---
**Author:** ![Spiritus\_Mundi](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/c68b51/32.png) [@Spiritus\_Mundi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Spiritus_Mundi)\ **Post date:** [April 3, 2003, 12:00pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/23 "2003-04-03T12:00:44Z")
**OliverH** > [@](#): > > I disagree. I propose that your argument is precisely a CAUSE for the failure of the propaganda effort. An attitude of ‘shit happens’ suggests that the life of the own soldiers is considered infinitely more valuable than that of the locals. I cannot imagine where in my post you found an argument for an attitude of ‘shit happens’. I did say that it is not possible to prosecute a war effecetively while **never** inflicting collateral damage and civilian casualities. Acknowleging that fact is not expressing a disregard for those consequences. Do you disagree with that fact? > [@](#): > > The fact that the British have serious concerns about US interactions with civilians shows that there is more involved than unavoidable problems. It does? Would you care to be explicit about: [ul][li]How British concerns demonstrate specific avoidable problems.[/li][li]Exactly what problems those are.[/li][li]Precisely how those problems reflect an error in strategy.[/ul][/li] [quote] I disagree with the reasoning. The failure [in humanitarian effort] seems in to be in no small part due to a)US troops having serious difficulties acting within a potentially hostile civilian population (as opposed to, for example, the British), and b)US troops not being capable of setting up an organized distribution system for humanitarian aid. The result is the plundering of trucks by the young and strong, leaving the elderly and infirm without any help whatsoever. [quote] (a) Can you pease provide some examples of what you mean? Exactly what failures of US troops in interacting with the civilian population have resulted in a failure of delivery for humanitarian aid? Reports from both ICRC and the Red Crescent indicate that the major impedimet to larger-scale independent relief efforts is the danger associated with armed conflict. In other words, it’s because the territory has not yet been secured. (b) You seem to bear a grudge against US troops. The relief trucks and water trucks that were swarmed in Umm Qasr (the example that I saw reported most aften) were operating under the umbrella of British troops. You also seem to be under the imression that the aid will be primarily distributed and delivered by the milirtary. This is not the case. Whiel military units are carrying some humanitarian supplies for “front line” distribution, the bulk of the humanitarian aid is targetted for distribution by international relief agencies. > [@](#): > > From a Clausewitzian point of view, the campaign so far was a complete and utter failure, since the US did not come closer, but further away from any political goal pursued with the war aside from removing Saddam Hussein. I listed some apparent goals of the campaign in the OP. Would you like to argue which of those goals are being moved further away from by the current strategy? Alternatively, I would be happy to hear about other goals that you think can be inferred from the strategy and how they are being met or not met. What this looks like, though, is a statement that **your political goals** are not being met by this strategy (or perhaps this conflist, regardless of strategy). That might be true, and I might well be on your side there, but that’s not what this thread is about. > [@](#): > > [Removing S.H.], in and of itself, is not a valid goal, since it is a detail, but does not describe a situation. This statement is just silly. Removing the current authoritarian leader of a nation is not a “valid goal” because it does not “describe a situation”? I think you need to define the terms I marked of with “”. Your statement is difficult to credit using stadard English. > [@](#): > > The US has increased recruiting of militant organisations, destabilized stable governments all across the muslim world, and has turned even pro-war Iraqis against itself. Agreed, though the “destabilized stable governments” part suffers from excessive hyperbole. How, exactly, does that relate to teh question of whether our bombing campaign has been largely successful in limiting civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure whil effectively targetting Iraqi military and governmental structures? > [@](#): > > Aside from that, sorry, throwing cluster bombs at villages, as documented by several independent sources, including the ICRC is NOT minimizing civilian casualties. Documented? Please provide some examples of what you consider to be persuasive documentation of the use of cluster bombs against civilian targets. > [@](#): > > Iraqi armor was hardly pinned. Quite the contrary, they had been largely concentrated around cities from the beginning and have been moving OUT from there. Really? I must have missed the reports of those movements. Can you provide some sources for Iraqi armored activity in the regions more than 100 miles south or west of Baghdad? > [@](#): > > The fabled ‘quick advances’ were illusions, based on the fact that the Iraqis avoided facing the US in the open desert, knowing fully well that would be suicidal. This makes no sense. The advances are factual. The troops are where they are. Pressure is being aplied to Baghdad. Are you under the impression that a strategy of rapid advancement calls for large amounts of direct contact with enemy forces? It does not. > [@](#): > > Instead they concentrate on defending the cities, where ample cover negates some of the technological advantage and prevents a lot of the superiority from being used without risking massive civilian casualties. Which in no way invalidates the fact that a rapid advance happened. Now, if the cities which were bypassd maintained an offensive capability that could seriously threaten to close off coalition supply lines and threaten the rear, then this would be an argument that the strategy of rapid advance was flawed because it exposed the front line troops to threats of envelopment or counterattack from the rear. That isn’t happening, though, and even if it were it would not make the advance itself “an illusion”. ---
**Author:** ![Measure\_for\_Measure](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/measure_for_measure/32/557_2.png) [@Measure\_for\_Measure](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Measure_for_Measure)\ **Post date:** [April 3, 2003, 9:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/24 "2003-04-03T21:52:08Z")
**Questions** : Once we get to the gates of Baghdad, then what? Are we planning commando raids on Saddam HQ? Block by block fighting? I understand that a siege is not in the works, for humanitarian reasons. I assume that carpet bombing would not advance our political goals, on balance. If the answer is urban warfare, where is the decisive US hardware advantage? These are genuine questions; I have no military background. How does one take over a city occupied by large numbers of trained irregulars, aside from bombing it to smithereens or overwhelming it with a numerically larger force? ---
**Author:** ![js\_africanus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/87869e/32.png) [@js\_africanus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/js_africanus)\ **Post date:** [April 4, 2003, 6:56am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/25 "2003-04-04T06:56:44Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Spiritus Mundi \* > **The “stall” before attacking Baghdad is a molehill playing Matterhorn:** > Given the extended lgoistical paths through unsecured territory, it would be foolish to rush all the way to Baghdad and then engage a determined defending force before regrouping, reorganizing, and resupplying. While one hope of the plan might have been to march directly into Baghdad against light opposition, it would have been a poor plan indeed if it put all of its eggs in that single basket. Actually, doesn’t it make more sense to send up three armored divisions to fix the Republican Guard in place while the Brits, et. al., mop up in the south? Kind of like how Scipio Africanus used his light infantry to fix the Carthiginain heavies at Baecula? No need to fight. If the Guard comes out of its defensive position, they get hammered from the air. If they abandon Baghdad, then it’s ours. They are forced to just sit and watch southern Iraq fall and there’s nothing they can do to help. ---
**Author:** ![CyberPundit](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/76d3ee/32.png) [@CyberPundit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/CyberPundit)\ **Post date:** [April 4, 2003, 7:52am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/26 "2003-04-04T07:52:10Z")
Flowbark, This article, apparently based on a secret Pentagon briefing, discusses different strategies for taking Baghdad. [http://slate.msn.com/id/2081098/](http://slate.msn.com/id/2081098/) ---
**Author:** ![OliverH](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/278dde/32.png) [@OliverH](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/OliverH)\ **Post date:** [April 4, 2003, 8:06am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/27 "2003-04-04T08:06:46Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Spiritus Mundi \* > \*\ ***OliverH** > It does? Would you care to be explicit about: > [ul][li]How British concerns demonstrate specific avoidable problems.[/li][li]Exactly what problems those are.[/li][li]Precisely how those problems reflect an error in strategy.[/ul][/li] > \*\* a)The British have extensive experience with military operations in a civilian background with a constant threat of terrorist operations against them and a large percentage of hostile civilians. If they consider a certain conduct unnecessary, it likely is. b)Excessive use of armed force against the civilian population, shooting first and thinking later, up to and including non-interaction with the civilian population, remaining in an ‘unapproachable’ stance. You realize the Brits went as far as removing their helmets and sunglasses to look less threatening to civilians? c)It does not help to win the hearts and minds if you make them stop working. It has already now turned numerous opposition activists against the US. A strategy which does not contribute to the goal, but rather makes it less attainable is flawed. > [@](#): > > \*\* > I listed some apparent goals of the campaign in the OP. Would you like to argue which of those goals are being moved further away from by the current strategy? Alternatively, I would be happy to hear about other goals that you think can be inferred from the strategy and how they are being met or not met. > \*\* You listed military goals. Those are not goals of a war, they are tools to achieve the goals of a war, which are political in nature. Which is why I specifically stated I was arguing from a Clausewitzean perspective. > [@](#): > > \*\* > What this looks like, though, is a statement that **your political goals** are not being met by this strategy (or perhaps this conflist, regardless of strategy). That might be true, and I might well be on your side there, but that’s not what this thread is about. \*\* Which is precisely the problem. > [@](#): > > \*\* > This statement is just silly. Removing the current authoritarian leader of a nation is not a “valid goal” because it does not “describe a situation”? I think you need to define the terms I marked of with “”. Your statement is difficult to credit using stadard English. \*\* Suggested reading: Clausewitz ‘On war’. Famous quote: ‘War is continuing politics with other means.’ War is waged to achieve political goals. Removing a leader is only half the situation. It is not a possible outcome of a war to just remove Saddam Hussein, because something or someone will be replacing him, and if it is total anarchy. As such, the goal has to be ‘Remove Hussein and replace him with X’. That, in turn, however, is only a detail, since it will influence the situation in the entire country. It will be hard to see how the campaign has achieved anything favorable if Iraq descends into pre-Taliban Afghanistan style anarchy and civil war. > [@](#): > > \*\* > Agreed, though the “destabilized stable governments” part suffers from excessive hyperbole. \*\* Hardly. The protests in Egypt were the most severe since the death of Nasser. There and in many other nations, governments were only able to maintain stability by use of violence. That, in turn, merely aggravates the situation, since the people on the street were not just protesting against the war, but against their governments’ lack of action against it. Being beaten up is unlikely to reduce their antipathy against their government. Numerous middle east experts warn that it might be better to let some of the regimes protected by the US fall now and be replaced with a moderate Islamic government selected by the people rather than waiting until the regime has no means anymore to contain the pressure and goes down in a huge explosion to be replaced by a more radical power. > [@](#): > > \*\* How, exactly, does that relate to teh question of whether our bombing campaign has been largely successful in limiting civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure whil effectively targetting Iraqi military and governmental structures? \*\* It’s totally irrelevant to the success of the campaign whether you perceive that to be the case. What’s relevant is what the Iraqis think, and they disagree with you. > [@](#): > > \*\* > Documented? Please provide some examples of what you consider to be persuasive documentation of the use of cluster bombs against civilian targets. \*\* I take it you don’t consider the international committee of the red cross a credible source? In any case, take a look at [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/ED04Ak07.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/ED04Ak07.html) as one example of ‘limiting civilian casualties’. Also [http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030402-084841-7116r](http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030402-084841-7116r) > [@](#): > > \*\* > Really? I must have missed the reports of those movements. Can you provide some sources for Iraqi armored activity in the regions more than 100 miles south or west of Baghdad? > \*\* Movements around Basra, as one example. The city has been closed off on three sides only, and only recently. Only a few days ago, a sortie was made to attack the coast, which, however, did not succeed. > [@](#): > > \*\* > This makes no sense. The advances are factual. The troops are where they are. Pressure is being aplied to Baghdad. Are you under the impression that a strategy of rapid advancement calls for large amounts of direct contact with enemy forces? It does not. \*\* It ain’t a strategy when you’re playing the other guy’s game. It isn’t a success when no failure was possible. ---
**Author:** ![Spiritus\_Mundi](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/c68b51/32.png) [@Spiritus\_Mundi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Spiritus_Mundi)\ **Post date:** [April 4, 2003, 2:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/28 "2003-04-04T14:56:26Z")
> [@](#): > > a)The British have extensive experience with military operations in a civilian background with a constant threat of terrorist operations against them and a large percentage of hostile civilians. If they consider a certain conduct unnecessary, it likely is. > > b)Excessive use of armed force against the civilian population, shooting first and thinking later, up to and including non-interaction with the civilian population, remaining in an ‘unapproachable’ stance. You realize the Brits went as far as removing their helmets and sunglasses to look less threatening to civilians? > > c)It does not help to win the hearts and minds if you make them stop working. It has already now turned numerous opposition activists against the US. A strategy which does not contribute to the goal, but rather makes it less attainable is flawed. (a)I asked you to list specific concerns, not justify why th eBritish perspective was convincing. (b)I have already noted that it made sense to use British troops to stabilize bypassed southern areas. I thnk it is quite possible that troops overeacted in the two “checkpoint shooting” incidents, but this has yet to be demonstrated. If a vehicle truly does refuse to respond to warnings and posted instructions then it is not an overreaction to stop that vehicle using extreme force. ©Yes, having a war fought on one’s home soil tends to disrupt trade. I can hardly set that as a fault in US strategy or tactics. It is an unavoidable consequence of war. > [@](#): > > You listed military goals. Those are not goals of a war, they are tools to achieve the goals of a war, which are political in nature. You read carelessly, or else you have a different definition of politics than I. I listed both polical goals and military strategic objectives. Both need to be considered when evaluating a military strategy. I asked you to provide your own evaluation of **the goals of this administration** in prosecuting this war. You declined to do so. The fact that this strategy may not be the best means of achieving the goals **that you wish were being pursued** is not relevant to this OP. There are several other threads currently running where such things are being discussed. > [@](#): > > Suggested reading: Clausewitz ‘On war’. Famous quote: ‘War is continuing politics with other means.’ Suggested tactic: do not assume that people who disagree with you are necessarily ignorant. I am familair with both Clausewitz (required reading when I was at West Point) and his famous quote. I simply disagree with you that “rmoving the current regime” is not a valid goal. It is a political end being achieved by military means. True, it is a short-sighted end, but that does not make it invalid. No political situation is static. Your argument that “it isn’t really a goal unless we include what we replace him with” extends just as easily to [ul][li]. . . unless we include how we are going to stabilize the new rgime[/li][li]. . . unless we include how we are going to trade with the new regime in future years[/li][li]. . . unless we include how we are going to handle conflict potentials between the new regime and its neighbors[/li][li] . . . unless we include how we are going to address the new regime’s relationship to radical Islamic movements locally and among expatriate Iraqis[/li][/ul] etc., etc., ad nauseum. Again, I am not arguing that I think the current administrations goals, as best that I can understaand/extrapolate them, are teh best goals for us to be pursuing. In fact, I disagree with them strongly. That is a separate issue. In this thread I am trying to discuss solely the current strategy as a means for acheiving those goals. > [@](#): > > The protests in Egypt were the most severe since the death of Nasser. . . I agree, but I would hardly call the current Egyptian government stable. As I said, though, I do not disagree with you that the current war is having deleterious effects on US interests in the region. > [@](#): > > It’s totally irrelevant to the success of the campaign whether you perceive [success in limiting casualties during the bombong campaign]. What’s relevant is what the Iraqis think, and they disagree with you. Irrelevant? Hardly, since I am offering my opinion of the success or failure of different strategic elements. What you reference is the success/failure of the propoganda effort, which I dealt with elsewhere. > [@](#): > > I take it you don’t consider the international committee of the red cross a credible source? That’s not what I said at all. I asked yo uto provide documentation. I did so because on Thursday morning I had not yet heard about Hilla and assumed that you were referencing the earlier reports that a cluster bomb was responsible for thedeaths in the Baghdad market. That report seems to have been clearly in error. The report of cluster bomb use in and around Hilla is, at present, much more convincing and certainly indicates a severe misstep by the coalition commanders. > [@](#): > > Movements around Basra, as one example. The city has been closed off on three sides only, and only recently. Only a few days ago, a sortie was made to attack the coast, which, however, did not succeed. Ah–I understand our disagreement, then. I was not trying to suggest that every single Iraqi armored unit was concentrated around Baghdad, merely the majority of it. It is certainly the case that small concentrations of armor were centered in other areas, including those cities bypassed by the initial thrust toward Baghdad. > [@](#): > > It ain’t a strategy when you’re playing the other guy’s game. I disagree, but it’s pretty irrelevant since we are not playing the other guy’s game. Of course, I don’t see how even if we were playing the other guy’s game it would support your claim that the rapid advance had been “an illusion”. It happened. We are pressuring Baghdad. That is reality. > [@](#): > > It isn’t a success when no failure was possible. That’s silly. Having no failure be possible is the ideal of every strategy. It isn’t often realized, of course, but that’s always the target. ---
**Author:** ![OliverH](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/278dde/32.png) [@OliverH](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/OliverH)\ **Post date:** [April 7, 2003, 9:56am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/29 "2003-04-07T09:56:48Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Spiritus Mundi \* > \*\*(a)I asked you to list specific concerns, not justify why th eBritish perspective was convincing. \*\* If you’d familiarize yourself with the British concerns, you’d know what specific points they addressed. In detail, they considered the setup of the American checkpoints as causative of both the number of dead in the suicide bomb attacks and the problems with the shooting of civilians. Second, they objected to the way US soldiers act in the presence of civilians, and to demonstrate what they meant took off their helmets and sunglasses in many cases to look more approachable. Third, the British are ordering Union Jacks in numbers the manufacturers have trouble keeping up with to drape their tanks and other vehicles in them for even the most paranoid US soldier to realize he’s looking at allies. > [@](#): > > \*\* > (b)I have already noted that it made sense to use British troops to stabilize bypassed southern areas. I thnk it is quite possible that troops overeacted in the two “checkpoint shooting” incidents, but this has yet to be demonstrated. If a vehicle truly does refuse to respond to warnings and posted instructions then it is not an overreaction to stop that vehicle using extreme force. > \*\* And that justifies riddling the PASSENGER ROOM with bullets, let alone the vehicles BEHIND a car that fails to stop? By the way, the british set up their checkpoints in such a fashion that the vehicle has to slow down long before reaching the actual checkpoint, or crash in some hard obstacle. > [@](#): > > \*\* > ©Yes, having a war fought on one’s home soil tends to disrupt trade. I can hardly set that as a fault in US strategy or tactics. It is an unavoidable consequence of war. \*\* I wasn’t talking about trade. I was very literal in my speaking of hearts and minds stopping to work. And as for so-called unavoidable consequences of war, I’d like to remind you that it was not the Iraqis who chose for this war to happen now and in this fashion. > [@](#): > > \*\* > You read carelessly, or else you have a different definition of politics than I. I listed both polical goals and military strategic objectives. Both need to be considered when evaluating a military strategy. \*\* You listed broad slogans, not specific goals. Changing the ruling structure is not a goal, it is blind actionism, until you have a clear perspective as to WHAT you are changing it. > [@](#): > > \*\* > I asked you to provide your own evaluation of **the goals of this administration** in prosecuting this war. You declined to do so. The fact that this strategy may not be the best means of achieving the goals **that you wish were being pursued** is not relevant to this OP. There are several other threads currently running where such things are being discussed. \*\* I’d suggest to stick to what I am saying, not what you would like me to have said in order to launch a quick response. I think I have made quite clear that I do not consider the current strategy as conductive towards the goals the administration has claimed it is pursuing. > [@](#): > > \*\* > Suggested tactic: do not assume that people who disagree with you are necessarily ignorant. > > I am familair with both Clausewitz (required reading when I was at West Point) and his famous quote. > \*\* Having read, and having understood it, are quite different things. The ‘famous quote’ is just about one of the most misinterpreted quotes out there. I, for one, have read him in the original language. > [@](#): > > \*\* > I simply disagree with you that “rmoving the current regime” is not a valid goal. It is a political end being achieved by military means. True, it is a short-sighted end, but that does not make it invalid. No political situation is static. \*\* The problem with your argument is that ‘removing the current regime’ is NOT a political situation. ‘Saddam not in power’ is NOT a situation, since it does not describe who, if anyone is running Iraq. It merely describes who is not. ‘Your leg is not broken’ is not a description of your health. ‘Your leg is not broken’ does not say you are well, and it doesn’t say you are ill. It just states that you are not suffering from a broken leg. It is not a health situation, and ‘Saddam is removed from power’ is not a political situation. > [@](#): > > \*\* > Your argument that “it isn’t really a goal unless we include what we replace him with” extends just as easily to > [ul][li]. . . unless we include how we are going to stabilize the new rgime[/li][li]. . . unless we include how we are going to trade with the new regime in future years[/li][li]. . . unless we include how we are going to handle conflict potentials between the new regime and its neighbors[/li][li] . . . unless we include how we are going to address the new regime’s relationship to radical Islamic movements locally and among expatriate Iraqis[/li][/ul] > etc., etc., ad nauseum. > \*\* Sorry, but “it isn’t really a goal unless we include what WE replace him with” is not my argument at all. I was speaking about what replaces him, not necessarily out of action by the US, but equally well out of inaction. And sorry, if you actually read Clausewitz, you would have to recognize that he IS, in fact, arguing in situational goals. And no, ‘how we are going to trade with the new regime in future years’ has no connection whatsoever to anything said by you or by me, since it is no part at all of the situation at the day X of declaring ‘objective achieved’. Which is the only thing I am talking about. > [@](#): > > \*\* > I agree, but I would hardly call the current Egyptian government stable. \*\* That doesn’t mean it cannot deteriorate even more. > [@](#): > > \*\* > Irrelevant? Hardly, since I am offering my opinion of the success or failure of different strategic elements. What you reference is the success/failure of the propoganda effort, which I dealt with elsewhere. \*\* Sorry, but the separation you are postulating is entirely artificial. It doesn’t exist in the real world. Whether the Iraqi population believes in the benevolence of US troops translates into the number of bullets the GIs have to dodge. > [@](#): > > \*\* > Of course, I don’t see how even if we were playing the other guy’s game it would support your claim that the rapid advance had been “an illusion”. It happened. We are pressuring Baghdad. That is reality. \*\* What’s equally a reality is that there was nothing unusual, or particularly successful about said advances. Anyone with half a brain would have expected them. There is nothing the least remarkable about them. > [@](#): > > \*\* > That’s silly. Having no failure be possible is the ideal of every strategy. It isn’t often realized, of course, but that’s always the target. \*\* When no failure is possible because the enemy WANTS you to succeed, that is hardly an ideal strategy. Do you seriously want to say that having to fight close to the cities, with more cover for the Iraqis and a higher chance for civilian deaths is more advantageous for the US than if they had face Iraqi troops in the open desert? ---
**Author:** ![Spiritus\_Mundi](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/c68b51/32.png) [@Spiritus\_Mundi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Spiritus_Mundi)\ **Post date:** [April 7, 2003, 2:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/30 "2003-04-07T14:38:36Z")
> [@](#): > > If you’d familiarize yourself with the British concerns, you’d know what specific points they addressed. Well, one might imagine that that is why I asked you to list them, but then you appear more intent upon having a fight than discussing an issue. Now that you have listed the specific concerns, they are quite clearly tactical in nature. I will happily admint that the US chaeckpoints may not be constructed in the ideal manner. Let’s hope that they get better so that deaths all around are minimized. > [@](#): > > Third, the British are ordering Union Jacks in numbers the manufacturers have trouble keeping up with to drape their tanks and other vehicles in them for even the most paranoid US soldier to realize he’s looking at allies. You really must explain to me how you imagine that this bit of data realtes to British concerns about US interactions with Iraqi civilians. > [@](#): > > And that justifies riddling the PASSENGER ROOM with bullets, let alone the vehicles BEHIND a car that fails to stop? 1. Yes, passengers in the car represent a threat, too. 2. Have you any support for the contention that cars behind the first vehicle were intentionally targetted? 3. Exactly what conclusions do you draw from these incidents concerning the strategic goals of this conflict? > [@](#): > > I wasn’t talking about trade. I was very literal in my speaking of hearts and minds stopping to work. Yes, and I was very literal in saying that it is not possible to prosecute a war without disrupting trade in a country being invaded. > [@](#): > > And as for so-called unavoidable consequences of war, I’d like to remind you that it was not the Iraqis who chose for this war to happen now and in this fashion. No shit? Wow. Why, that makes absolutely no difference to anything that I have posted in this thread. Thanks for the reminder. > [@](#): > > You listed broad slogans, not specific goals. Changing the ruling structure is not a goal, it is blind actionism, until you have a clear perspective as to WHAT you are changing it. You are simply wrong, here. It may not be a wise goal, but it is a goal. Having encountered quite a few folks who argue simply that, “it cannot get worse”, I can also attest that it is a goal which is not without defenders among the American population. > [@](#): > > Having read, and having understood it, are quite different things. The ‘famous quote’ is just about one of the most misinterpreted quotes out there. I, for one, have read him in the original language. Wow, I am utterly crushed by your multilingualism. Oh, wait, I’m not. Care to make an argument, or are you just going to present a reading list and an attitude. > [@](#): > > The problem with your argument is that ‘removing the current regime’ is NOT a political situation. No, that would be an action. The absence of the current regime, however, is a political situation. > [@](#): > > not in power’ is NOT a situation, since it does not describe who, if anyone is running Iraq. You may say this, but it is not true. It is a situation because it places a boundary condition upon the political landscape. “X party is not in power” _is_, in fact, a long-standing and well understood goal of American politics. In the past, of course, “X” had a different substitutive value than “Baath”. > [@](#): > > ‘Your leg is not broken’ is not a description of your health. Of course it is. It is a description that specifies that my leg is not broken. Do you imagine that any political goal provides a complete description of all elements of a political landscape? Of course not. Goals are simplifications of a political scenario in which specific elements are prioritized and given unique consideration. Your insistence that “Y must be included or it is not a goal” is simply an arbitrary construction. > [@](#): > > Sorry, but “it isn’t really a goal unless we include what WE replace him with” is not my argument at all. I was speaking about what replaces him, not necessarily out of action by the US, but equally well out of inaction. Fair enough. Your statement is equally incorrect without the word “we”. > [@](#): > > if you actually read Clausewitz, you would have to recognize that he IS, in fact, arguing in situational goals. I never claimed otherwise. You and I simply differ as to at what point to draw an arbitrary line and say: this is a situation but that is not. > [@](#): > > And no, ‘how we are going to trade with the new regime in future years’ has no connection whatsoever to anything said by you or by me, since it is no part at all of the situation at the day X of declaring ‘objective achieved’. Which is the only thing I am talking about. Yes, but you are insisting that only your own understanding of “objective” and thus “objective achiecved” can be valid. I disagree. > [@](#): > > That doesn’t mean [the Egyptian government] cannot deteriorate even more. Of course not. It means that using it as a support for “destabilized stable governments” is excessivley hypoerbolic, **which is what I said.** Really, are you just so bent on having a fight with someone that you don’t even pay attention to the issues being addressed? > [@](#): > > Sorry, but the separation you are postulating is entirely artificial. Artificial? You mean it is never proper to explore and discuss identifiable elements of a strategic plan separately? That’s a pretty amazing claim that you make. Have you some support for it beyond, “because **OliverH** says so.” > [@](#): > > Whether the Iraqi population believes in the benevolence of US troops translates into the number of bullets the GIs have to dodge. Yep, which is why I spent time discussing teh propoganda campaigns. I also spent time discussing other elements of the conflict, including an evaluation of a targetted bombing campaign. > [@](#): > > What’s equally a reality is that there was nothing unusual, or particularly successful about said advances. So, in the span of three posts they have gone from “illusions” to “totally expected results”. Oh, and “not particularly successful”, too. Right. :rolleyes: > [@](#): > > Anyone with half a brain would have expected them. There is nothing the least remarkable about them. Okay, so can I expect that you will be able to link to a post in which you predicted that coallition forces would have encircled Baghdad by the second week of April while suffering aproximately 100 confirmed deaths. I mean, you have been posting on this topic, and you do have half a brain, right? > [@](#): > > When no failure is possible because the enemy WANTS you to succeed, that is hardly an ideal strategy. Well, if your perfect strategy coincides exactly with the enemy’s perfect strategy, then one of you is a fool. But this is a very different thing than your original claim, which was: **It isn’t a success when no failure was possible.** Again, you seem more interested in expanding your conflict with me than in addressing the actual points that have been raised. I should also note that I can find no reason to take seriously the strategic understandings of a man who presents the current situation in Iraq as exactly what Saddam Hussein wanted to have happen. > [@](#): > > Do you seriously want to say that having to fight close to the cities, with more cover for the Iraqis and a higher chance for civilian deaths is more advantageous for the US than if they had face Iraqi troops in the open desert? Of course not. But even better than that would have been if the Iraqi army all converted to Jaanism and threw down their weapons in a moment of revelatory pacifism. Unfortunately, it is rarely a good idea to build one’s strategy around such fantasies. If the enemy doesn’t want to come out to fight, and if you have nothing to threaten which will force him to come out to fight, then you have to go in after him (or not fight, of course). Surely somewhere in your orignal language reading of Clausewitz you have come across the term, “Schwerpunkt”. Tell me, where exactly in the open expanse of desert do you imagine that we might find the “center of gravity” of the Iraqi regime? ---
**Author:** ![OliverH](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/278dde/32.png) [@OliverH](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/OliverH)\ **Post date:** [April 7, 2003, 3:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/31 "2003-04-07T15:06:44Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Spiritus Mundi \* > \*\* > You really must explain to me how you imagine that this bit of data realtes to British concerns about US interactions with Iraqi civilians. > \*\* The salient quotes have been “Cowboys” and “shoot at anything that moves” > [@](#): > > \*\* > > 1. Yes, passengers in the car represent a threat, too. > \*\* MAY represent a threat. Or may not. But they are irrelevant to the question whether the car is stopped or not. > [@](#): > > \*\* > 2) Have you any support for the contention that cars behind the first vehicle were intentionally targetted? > \*\* Who speaks of intentional targetting? The vehicle in front of them was a TRUCK. In order to do the amount of damage that the cars behind it received, the entire area must have been indescriminately hosed down with bullets galore -which not only suggests headless action, it is highly questionable in terms of the Geneva Convention. > [@](#): > > \*\* > 3) Exactly what conclusions do you draw from these incidents concerning the strategic goals of this conflict? \*\* That the US is unllikely to be particularly welcome in Iraq and that, as such, the risks for the US increase, as does resistance against them. > [@](#): > > \*\* > You are simply wrong, here. It may not be a wise goal, but it is a goal. Having encountered quite a few folks who argue simply that, “it cannot get worse”, I can also attest that it is a goal which is not without defenders among the American population. \*\* Sorry if I am less than impressed by the fact that members of the American population think the situation cannot get worse. > [@](#): > > \*\* > No, that would be an action. The absence of the current regime, however, is a political situation. \*\* Nope. It is a characteristic of several possible situations. It is not ONE situation. > [@](#): > > \*\* > You may say this, but it is not true. It is a situation because it places a boundary condition upon the political landscape. “X party is not in power” _is_, in fact, a long-standing and well understood goal of American politics. In the past, of course, “X” had a different substitutive value than “Baath”. \*\* That is is a long-standing and well understood goal of American politics is of no relevance to whether it is a valid goal in the sense of Clausewitz. It could easily be argued that precisely the fact that the US tends to raise such pseudo-goals is what caused Afghanistan. One could easily argue that it is precisely your argumentation, from the beginning to the end, which gave us the Taliban, by means of declaring ‘Nothing could be worse than Communism’, declaring that communism has to be removed in Afghanistan, without any idea about what comes afterwards, which led to warlords not agreeing on how to separate power, the land descending into civil war etc. etc. > [@](#): > > \*\* > Of course it is. It is a description that specifies that my leg is not broken. \*\* That is not a description of your health. It says precisely NOTHING about your health. You could be totally hale, or you could have both arms and five ribs broken, your lung pierced and slowly filling with blood. In both cases, ‘Your leg is not broken’ is a perfectly accurate description, but it says nothing about the shape you are in. > [@](#): > > \*\* > Of course not. It means that using it as a support for “destabilized stable governments” is excessivley hypoerbolic, which is what I said.\*\* It means no such thing. Unless you contend that civil war from the Atlantic to the Pacific would not be a significant deterioration of the current situation. > [@](#): > > \*\* > Artificial? You mean it is never proper to explore and discuss identifiable elements of a strategic plan separately? That’s a pretty amazing claim that you make. Have you some support for it beyond, “because **OliverH** says so.” > \*\* Why should I offer support for points you simply make up? You must be pretty desperate if you have to invent claims and put them into my words just to have something to refute. The fact that you can dissect away SOME elements of a plan by no means indicate you can isolate every individual element without regard of the other in a meaningful fashion at all times. And I am sure a GI killed by a bullet fired from a civilian exasperated at how the so-called liberators conduct themselves would agree with me. And there’s quite a number Iraqi ex-Pats going back to Iraq to fight the US PRECISELY because they are abhorred by the civilian deaths. > [@](#): > > \*\* > Yep, which is why I spent time discussing teh propoganda campaigns. I also spent time discussing other elements of the conflict, including an evaluation of a targetted bombing campaign. > \*\* Yup. unfortunately that has little impact on whether it makes sense to discuss things seperately or not. > [@](#): > > \*\* > Okay, so can I expect that you will be able to link to a post in which you predicted that coallition forces would have encircled Baghdad by the second week of April while suffering aproximately 100 confirmed deaths. I mean, you have been posting on this topic, and you do have half a brain, right? > \*\* I’d suggest you look at my registration date. And I’d suggest you read my posts a bit more thoroughly. It helps not having to make things up. > [@](#): > > \*\* > I should also note that I can find no reason to take seriously the strategic understandings of a man who presents the current situation in Iraq as exactly what Saddam Hussein wanted to have happen. \*\* Except for the fact I said no such thing. Seriously, I’d recommend being a bit more thorough in your analysis of what is being said and what is NOT being said. It will help you not having to deal with the antagonism you complain about. People react much more friendly when you don’t routinely make up things just to have something to refute. ---
**Author:** ![Spiritus\_Mundi](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/c68b51/32.png) [@Spiritus\_Mundi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Spiritus_Mundi)\ **Post date:** [April 7, 2003, 4:30pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/32 "2003-04-07T16:30:42Z")
I sometimes enjoy exchanging posts with folks who want to fight just because they want to fight, but not right now and not in this thread. ---
**Author:** ![OliverH](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/278dde/32.png) [@OliverH](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/OliverH)\ **Post date:** [April 9, 2003, 7:16am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/33 "2003-04-09T07:16:26Z")
It is very rare that I enjoy discussing with someone who doesn’t care what is being said and simply makes up statements in order to have something to retort. Maybe that’s because it isn’t really a discussion at all when it’s pretty much irrelevant what you’re saying. ---
**Author:** ![CyberPundit](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/76d3ee/32.png) [@CyberPundit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/CyberPundit)\ **Post date:** [April 9, 2003, 7:35am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/34 "2003-04-09T07:35:46Z")
As a follow-up to the Slate piece I linked here is a very interesting article in the NYT about the broad strategy that is being actually followed in the current attack on Baghdad. (free registration required): > **[A NATION AT WAR: STRATEGY; Push to Finish the Job (Published 2003)](https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/09/world/a-nation-at-war-strategy-push-to-finish-the-job.html)** > > News analysis reports that US commanders, finding Iraqi forces reeling from almost three weeks of air and land attacks, are mounting three-pronged Army assault on Baghdad to try to force quick end to war; photo; commanders alter plan for more... ---
**Author:** ![Measure\_for\_Measure](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/measure_for_measure/32/557_2.png) [@Measure\_for\_Measure](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Measure_for_Measure)\ **Post date:** [April 9, 2003, 8:10am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/35 "2003-04-09T08:10:12Z")
Great links, Cyberpundit. It’s still not clear to me how this plays out though. I suppose the options are 1. Saddam surrenders and sues for peace (unlikely) 2. Saddam is captured/killed, and 3. Saddam escapes. Under the 2nd two options, I suppose I can imagine a senior official surrendering. But I can also imagine an extended urban guerilla war carried out by the Special Republican Guard, other loyalists and perhaps the odd Arab volunteer. Perhaps the quality of the Rumsfeld plan is related to what sort of force (marine/army (large or small)/special ops or whatever) is best matched for urban fighting in Baghdad. I can’t say that I know the answer to that question. ---
**Author:** ![IzzyR](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/2acd7d/32.png) [@IzzyR](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/IzzyR)\ **Post date:** [April 9, 2003, 1:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/36 "2003-04-09T13:58:46Z")
The amazing thing is how quickly you can go from being a genius to a moron and then back to a genius again. [Feints and Jabs Brought Forces to Baghdad](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57248-2003Apr8.html) > [@](#): > > The stunning advance, at a cost of fewer than 10 U.S. combat deaths, would silence complaints by television generals, and even some officers in the field, that the war was being mismanaged. It would also provoke another kind of talk. > > “The U.S. advance on Baghdad is something that military historians and academics will pore over in great detail for many years to come,” British Air Marshal Brian Burridge said Monday. “They will examine the dexterity, the audacity and the sheer brilliance of how the U.S. put their plan into effect.” > > Already, military analysts are comparing the advance to Gen. George S. Patton’s brilliant attack across northern France in the autumn of 1944. Question is about “Rumsfeld’s strategy”. On the one hand, he already disclaimed responsibility, and shouldn’t get credit. OTOH, everyone blamed him anyway, so maybe he should. One positive in any event, is silencing those second guessing TV analysts. (Of course there is a long way to go, in terms of the ultimate political outcome, but it would appear that the military campaign is all over but for the shouting (or sniping). ---
**Author:** ![Sofa\_King](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/58956e/32.png) [@Sofa\_King](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sofa_King)\ **Post date:** [April 9, 2003, 3:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/37 "2003-04-09T15:31:18Z")
I suppose this is as good a place as any to point out that I’m quickly turning out to be quite wrong about the seige of Baghdad. In several other threads, I stated that the battle would inevitably turn out to be a bloodbath of unusually large proportions. It doesn’t look like it’s going that way. I still have questions, like where in the hell are the thousands and thousands of Iraqi troops who were supposed to be fighting it out in Baghdad? I think the possible answer may lie in the aggression of the American advance once it reached the approaches to the city. It almost seems like the Iraqis had their Republican Guard positioned at points outside of the city with the intention of slowly pulling them back into the city itself, but the Americans somehow identified their locations, bypassed them or fixed them in attacks which prevented their withdrawal, and invested the center of the city before the Iraqis could mass there do defend it. Good show, boys and girls. That was a ballsy move where someone like me would have lost the opportunity to undue caution. Hopefully, it will save lives all around and lead to a quicker and more lasting peace. ---
**Author:** ![Fugazi](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/f08c70/32.png) [@Fugazi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Fugazi)\ **Post date:** [April 9, 2003, 3:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/38 "2003-04-09T15:50:28Z")
Don’t feel too bad about your prediction \*\* Sofa King \*\*. While everyone was hoping for the best, I don’t think anyone thought it would go this well. I think the Iraqi troops are “voting with their feet”. While the uprising when we started the war never happened, I think we are now seeing the true feelings of the Iraqi people. ---
**Author:** ![Spiritus\_Mundi](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/c68b51/32.png) [@Spiritus\_Mundi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Spiritus_Mundi)\ **Post date:** [April 9, 2003, 7:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/39 "2003-04-09T19:45:53Z")
Lost track of this thread somehow. Great links **CyberPundit**. **IzzyR** , I think you underestimate the ability of some folks to claim that successes are illusions and that we are doing just what Saddam wants, anyway. **OliverH** > [@](#): > > It is very rare that I enjoy discussing with someone who doesn’t care what is being said and simply makes up statements in order to have something to retort. I will adress this only one time, so you may retort in whatever manner you see fit. What I said was that you seemed determined to fight with someone, and that determination seemed independent of the actual content of our exchange. I will post a couple of representative samples that led me to that conclusion. > [@](#): > > \*\*OliverH: \*\*The US has increased recruiting of militant organisations, destabilized stable governments all across the muslim world, and has turned even pro-war Iraqis against itself. > > \*\*Spiritus Mundi: \*\*Agreed, though the “destabilized stable governments” part suffers from excessive hyperbole. > > \*\*OliverH: \*\*The protests in Egypt were the most severe since the death of Nasser. . . > > \*\*Spiritus Mundi: \*\*I agree, but I would hardly call the current Egyptian government stable. > > \*\*OliverH: \*\*That doesn’t mean it cannot deteriorate even more. > > \*\*Spiritus Mundi: \*\*Of course not. It means that using it as a support for “destabilized stable governments” is excessivley hypoerbolic, which is what I said. > > \*\*OliverH: \*\*It means no such thing. Unless you contend that civil war from the Atlantic to the Pacific would not be a significant deterioration of the current situation. On another topic: > [@](#): > > \*\*OliverH: \*\*The fabled ‘quick advances’ were illusions, based on the fact that the Iraqis avoided facing the US in the open desert, knowing fully well that would be suicidal. > > \*\*Spiritus Mundi: \*\*This makes no sense. The advances are factual. The troops are where they are. Pressure is being aplied to Baghdad. Are you under the impression that a strategy of rapid advancement calls for large amounts of direct contact with enemy forces? It does not. > > \*\*OliverH: \*\*It ain’t a strategy when you’re playing the other guy’s game. > > \*\*Spiritus Mundi: \*\*I disagree, but it’s pretty irrelevant since we are not playing the other guy’s game. > > Of course, I don’t see how even if we were playing the other guy’s game it would support your claim that the rapid advance had been “an illusion”. It happened. We are pressuring Baghdad. That is reality. > > \*\*OliverH: \*\*What’s equally a reality is that there was nothing unusual, or particularly successful about said advances. Anyone with half a brain would have expected them. There is nothing the least remarkable about them. > > \*\*Spiritus Mundi: \*\*So, in the span of three posts they have gone from “illusions” to “totally expected results”. Oh, and “not particularly successful”, too. There. You may address the details of these exchanges or not as you see fit. I will not join you in this fight. I post these examples only to indicate to whomever migt care the type of exchanges that I used in drawing my conclusion. \*\*sofa king: \*\*I’m with you. While I was not sure what to expect in Baghdad, it was certainly an uglier set of encounters than we have seen to date. I was amazed that the initial American raids did not provoke a more concerted resistance. Kudos to the men on the ground and the men who made the right calls. ---
**Author:** ![London\_Calling](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/49beb7/32.png) [@London\_Calling](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/London_Calling)\ **Post date:** [April 10, 2003, 12:17am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041/40 "2003-04-10T00:17:49Z")
That quote that **Izzy** cited (I know it’s not his view) is bizarre; likening this campaign to Patton’s is …… plain stupid. Fwiw, as best I can tell, the most common miscalculation was about the Republican Guard. These guys were no more than para-military policemen – the enforcers of Saddam’s regime and as such were an inward looking outfit. Ultimately, as with all non-ideologue, power (only) motivated dictators, once the power begins to crumble away, so does the military – no political ideology to keep them in situ. It seems to me, the military planners got it just about right. Not necessarily in the right order (they assumed the people would rise earlier, miscalculating the effect of Bush 41 last time) but, generally and on what we know, they judged it well, IMHO. Having said that, I’d be interested in knowing the levels of remaining ordinance, the condition of the troops at the front and the weariness of the flyers. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/rumsfelds-strategy/166041.md?page=1)