Thank ye muchly, good sir, for the links! I’ll look into them as soon as I get a chance, and if I find anything interesting to report I’ll get back to you.
However, I do want to make a couple of quick observations regarding the rest of your post; nothing systematic, just a few random reflections.
From your first link, you quote the following:
This might be a nickpick, but for the record, it is exactly this sort of reasoning that Popper attempted to “rule out” with his falsification criteria. I’ll just quote him directly:
This is the Lord thy God, Sir Karl himself speaking. Only note that rather than dissin’ evolution, he’s dissin’ Freud.
Regarding your division of science into General Concepts, Specific Models, and Observations: yeah, I think as well that the real problem for falsification per se arises with the falsification of General Concepts, and with the links between GCs and SMs.
Finally, just so we’re all absolutely clear about this: I’m not discussing the scientific status of evolution here. For the purposes of this debate, I take the scientific status of evolution for granted. I question the efficacy of the falsification criteria as means of distinguishing between science and non-science. Evolution was just an example. I have absolutely no truck with Scientific Creationists and other such piffle: I don’t waste my time with them. But there are deeper issues to ponder here, for those who are so inclined.
I notice that both you and blowero tend to reflect on these questions in rather black-and-white, either-or terms. Thus, just to take one example, you express this choice as if it were one between science, on the one hand, and psychosis (or politics, which is maybe even worse), on the other. I suspect that this is something of a false dilemma, derived from the fact that you spend too much time arguing against creationist airheads.
I have not framed my responses in this manner. To be honest, I think to start with that the question itself is probably too broad and too unspecific. Thus it risks provoking a stereotype, generalized response that doesn’t really imply anything of substance. For me, a more interesting question might read something like: what is the nature of the interface between religious insight on the one hand, and scientific knowledge, on the other? (Incidentally, by religious insight I do not refer to creation bullshit.) Or, perhaps, what can science learn from the religious worldview, and vice versa? In other words, I’m not convinced that there necessarily must exist an adversarial relationship between science and religion.
Regarding dogma vs. science: I still think we are talking at cross purposes. I might have to explicate my arguments more clearly so that we can figure out where the difference lies. For example, I experience the following statement:
as dogmatic. I think that the social sciences in general, and psychology in particular, have lost their way, so speak, in adopting the model of the natural sciences (especially physics) as means of exploring their field of study. Other perspectives, many with a great deal of value – even validity – have been categorically dismissed simply on the basis that their observations, or interpretations, cannot be scientifically confirmed.
For lots of specific reasons, but to succinctly summarize: because my work lacks all the formal characteristics of scientific methodology. It does not constitute experimentation, the observations made are hopelessly subjective (and are encouraged to be so), they are not “repeatable” in any meaningful sense and so on.
Concerning the philosophical nature of my replies, and my reliance on authority: well, I can’t see how we can discuss the relationship between religion and science without a little philosophizin’. If you chose to reduce the discussion in such a manner that only practical issues can be discussed, you win by default: but that’s only because you stack the deck to start with. Anyway, its an admirable strategy: they’re only philosophers, after all, so what can they possibly know about science? Shame that your argument doesn’t deal with the real issues at hand.
You’ll note that while I’ve referred often to Popper, whom I find to be a fascinating thinker, I’ve nevertheless been rather critical of him. I do admit that I have respect for certain authorities, such as various scholars of scientific history and such, but I try to apply my limited critical facilities as best I can.
A couple of posts back, in my very long * magnum opium * (or whatever they call it), I explicated a couple of arguments against the falsifiability of evolutionary theory. I’ll be looking at your links, of course, but if you should have the time or inclination, I’d be interested to hear you rebuttal to those arguments.
To clear up any confusion, I am no objection to evolution. My “How could a hundred million go wrong?” was folling around and bringing attention to rjun’s statement about offending the sensibilities of people who don’t know the difference between fact and fiction. A shitload of people have religious faith of some sort, and that gives it more credibility to me. However that has nothing to do with evolution, which I agree with completely.
Boy, are there lots of interesting threads all mixed up in this one discussion. And poor me, trying to quickly participate betwixt other events in life! I apologize if I missed a few of the finer points made by others in my attempt to read quickly …
**The nature of science is to strive for falsifiability and for objectivity, but occassionally neither is achievable. **Some truths are not falsifiable within any particular epistemology(insert Goedelkeit here). And no experiment is or can be entirely objective. Like all perception, context matters. We interpret results in the context of our current sets of hypotheses, we set up the experiment with these in mind. We require less solid results for a finding consistent with our understanding than for findings that conflict with our current worldview. Always. The failure of some scientists to recognize that they are biased in their interpretations, or to realize when they hold onto a worldview as dogma rather than a falsifiable approxiamation of the truth, is regretable, but not an indictment of the process, just the individuals. Religion strives for neither falsifiabilty or objectivity. It is an attempt to provide understanding with certainty.
Evolution is definitely falsifiable. Predictions can be made and data inconsistent with those predictions could be found. Only data consistent with the theory have been found.
Psychologic theories are falsifiable. Providing an evidenciary basis for counselling is difficult, not impossible. Much is inherent in interpretation. To use Mr. S’s ADHD example: A set of characteristics exists that travels together with a strong genetic link; medication is very effective in allowing individuals with these symptoms function etterin society as it exists today; counselling has not been shown to be as effective. Is it a disorder or a variant? Should medication be used … always … occassionally … never? Where is the cutoff between disorder and normal? Those are value judgements and biased by your current worldview.
All perception of how the world works is a metaphor of reality, not reality itself. Science, at its best, is cognizant that there may be a better metaphor around the corner and is always looking for it. Religion is never looking for a better metaphor. It accepts its postulate with certainty, certainty that science can never have. To agree with blowero, religious faith is not only independent of evidence, but resistent to it. We believe because we need the certainty. Science may often have little doubt about its conclusions, but some doubt always exists. (Please note, I say this as a theist. I believe that “Good” and “Evil” exist outside of any individual’s perception of it, I believe this despite some good evidence that such is perhaps not the case. Yet my belief is unshakable.)
Anyway, as my old drill sergeant used to put it: “They ain’t nuthin’ worse than an educated foo’, Svinlesha.” Being face-first in the dirt doing push-ups, I felt I was in no position to argue with him. But, as you go on to point out yourself:
Basically, you’re making a subjective judgement call. This doesn’t mean that you have to dismiss the idea of a “vast conspiracy of scientists;” it just means that you have decided, on the basis of your own experiences in life, that the worldview they have constructed over the last century or two is correct. They’re method of explaining events in the world is the one that “makes sense” to you.
In other words, it is an unavoidable fact that all knowledge, even “objective” knowledge, is mediated by the “subjectivity” of the self.
As for whether such a judgement require MORE or LESS faith, well, I’m not sure how one measures the quantity of faith. Perhaps you have access to some scientific studies or so forth that back up you assertion? Oh, but wait…one might have to have a certain amount of faith to believe in them…
Regarding narrative structure:
Yeah, pretty much. I submit that this fact has certain consequences, however. I think in implies that different narrative structures cannot be objectively compared, because in all probability they are incommmensurable. On the other hand, I don’t know if that would be a point worth debating.
Again, this strange insistence that empiricism and spirituality are somehow mutually exclusive realms of discourse. Perhaps you know something I don’t…?
If we focus on the meditation techniques of Theravada Buddhism, which I am prepared to argue is that form of monastic practice closest to the Buddha’s original doctrine, then we note immediately that it encourages critical thought and explicitly discourages taking the word of the Buddha on faith alone. In fact, many of the Sutras themselves are little more than critical question-and-answer sessions with the big B, in which he tries to rationally articulate his insights.
In practice we begin with a long period of “concentration meditation,” which is designed to hone the mind’s ability to focus its concentration to the utmost. This eventually will lead us the to the 4th, or highest, Jhanna, which is also known as Samadhi, or “union with the Godhead.”
It is at this point that Buddhism makes a right turn and leaves other traditional forms of Hindu mysticism behind. Having achieved a state of complete concentration, the practitioner is directed to begin Vipassana (insight) meditation. This act involves the meticulous inspection of every single thought and sensation that passes through one’s consciousness, with the intent of understanding its true nature. In particular, one focuses on the relationship that arises between consciousness itself and the objects of consciousness – thoughts, feelings and sensations. In this process, one eventually discovers the Law of Dependent Causation, which is the basic law governing the relationship between consciousness, on one hand, and the world of illusion “arising” within consciousness, on the other.
I submit that such a process of introspection is one of the most highly developed empirical/phenomenological methodologies extant in the ancient world. It is empirical in the classical sense of the word: it involves an in-depth inspection of Nature itself, as opposed to the Cartesian reliance upon man’s fundamental “rationality.” Given that they didn’t have electron microscopes in India 2500 years ago, this was the next best thing.
Naturally, an empirical method such as Vipassana is not the same as the modern scientific method, so of course the world picture painted by this brush is somewhat different from the one painted by science. However, what is perhaps more interesting is the fact that ancient Buddhist mystics and modern physicists have come to a number of surprisingly similar conclusions regarding the fundamental structure of Nature. See the thread, The Universe is Just One of Those Things That Happens From Time to Time for an example. (I’m referring to the question of “something coming out of nothing,” which is such a problem from a rational, modern perspective. Buddhists can’t explain this kind of “arising” either, but can accept it with a shrug of the shoulders, and have been doing so since before the time of Christ.)
Regarding falsifiability, again:
I don’t understand your argument, and as I wrote earlier, I think we are debating at cross-purposes. To begin with, you state:
I understand this to be your critique of religious insight. Such insights “revel” in the non-falsifiability of God, as opposed to the sensible, rational knowledge produced by scientists, the hallmark of which is its falsifiability. But then you go on to write:
Am I missing something, or is it not the case that your own argument against religious insight/knowledge is predicated on precisely the standard you are now claiming to be irrelevant?
Finally, with regard to this:
That’s one distinct possibility among very, very many. The real problem, IMHO, is the lack of experimental controls in such studies.
** Markus **:
No comment.
** DSeid **:
I emphatically agree with your point about the “metaphorical nature” of our world picture, and emphatically disagree with the argument that, “Psychologic theories are falsifiable.”
Abe:
I read the linked material with great interest. Thanks again.
Science as a religion!!!heck why not. People have created all sort of religions to believe in for many purposes such as controling others and so on. Religion based on science…I can see it now…THE GOD OF TEST TUBES HAS SPOKEN TO ME AND SAID THAT YOU SHOULD GIVE ME YOUR MONEY AND KILL THOSE WHO DONT THINK AS YOU DO.
A Harris poll shows that 35% of the American populace believes in astrology. With current census numbers, that works out to over 100 million people who believe. Surely you’re not going to argue that this gives astrology more credibiliy, are you?
Point well taken. Maybe I give a large portion of the American populace too much credit. That feels odd to say however, because I also feel like I am a normal average person in the American populace.
Here is a question that is kind of going off topic, how is astrology any different then religion?
I am back with a little more time to post. First of all, thanks to everyone who contributed to this lively debate.
markusgonewry and Svinlesha, evolution theory has crept into this discussion for a particular reason: it is considered by many (incorrectly) to be one of the weakest outputs of science. I therefore used the “weakest output of science”, which has been falsely accused of being a cult and therefore (in theory) as close to religion as you can get, to discuss the applicability of the term “religion” (and its attendant dogma) to science. If the point that such terms are wholly inapplicable can be made successfully–which I think it was–using supposedly the weakest output of science, I am satisfied that the major issues are addressed.
I don’t think I suggested either of you were supporters of creationist drivel, however if you put forward creationist arguments you will hear vigorous rebuttals, not aimed at you but at the material you are espousing for the sake of the discussion.
Markus, the notion that 100 million people are necessarily correct compared to one person may be an intuitive conclusion in this day of over-hyped democracy, but it’s actually a fallacy: the bandwagon fallacy to be precise. That’s why science, which proceeds by reasoning, has little time for idiocies like astrology or creationism, or even most religious dogma (although in the case of the latter scientists normally go out of their way to be respectful of other people’s beliefs). That a lot of people believe in God, or in creation, or in alien landings, etc, has absolutely no impact on or relevance to the truth (whatever that may be). The overwhelming majority of human beings lack the education and intelligence to make informed decisions on many topics, and almost all persons alive today lack what I would term the most basic and required scientific or even simply critical skills (in short, people are unable to distinguish between truth and falsehood in situations where they ought to be able to, such as the astrology or creationist silliness).
Svinlesha, I’m glad you enjoyed the links, is there anything that they and the prose in this thread left aside or that you would like me or others near my position to address? On the nature of science you have accused me of exalting the scientific method to levels of pristine knowledge, but I think the many words I have written on this thread show that I am actually saying that science is by far the best method we have at our disposal and one that has served us well beyond complaint, a certain few belly-aching philosophers of science be damned. Yes, the method works and therefore it’s good (philosophers of science seem to think that pragmatism is a dirty word, but I’ve discussed that already as well).
The distinctions made in the James Randi article were ones I had made earlier (the self-correcting nature of science) although I made them in greater detail, probably unnecessarily.
Science is an analytical method for explaining physical phenomena. It is the best such method ever developed.
Religion is a spiritual belief system. A part of it may offer to explain physical phenonmena, but it is usually much more than that, it is about spiritual meaning.
Only pathetic simpletons would believe that science is a religion and vice versa.
“Based on my own experiences in life” is an extremely vague way of putting it. I would say based on the soundness of the methods on which their conclusions are based. You are unfairly trying to characterize my view as being completely arbitrary, when it is in fact not so. I agree that science is susceptible to human failings, but it is still the best method we have of obtaining objective knowledge.
So there are no degrees of faith? You are either 100% certain of everything, or you know nothing at all? You are sounding more and more like a solipsist. Perhaps we should just believe any damn fool thing we feel like, since you apparently feel that we can’t truly know ANYTHING? Say hi to Santa Claus for me.
Perhaps I do. I’m sorry if you object to my request that you back up your vague assertions with some actual content.
I’m sorry, but what you have done here is simply to redefine “empirical” to suit your own purpose. Buddhism sounds really fascinating to me - in fact, I have thought about giving it a try myself. BUT, I’m still going to use a feeler gauge to gap my spark plugs rather than meditating on the distance to the electrode until I receive enlightenment.
You’re comparing a relatively new theory that attempts to provide a mechanism to explain the behavior of the universe at it’s inception, to some monks sitting on top of a mountain and saying “gosh, I don’t know how the universe got here, and I don’t care”? Never mind that it’s only a theory, and will most certainly get dumped if they aren’t able to substantiate it. Are you honestly saying you don’t see a difference? Did Buddhists know anything about quantum mechanics since before the time of Christ?
Yes, you most certainly did miss something. I do not claim this standard to be irrelevant - I say it is irrelevant TO RELIGION (but not to science). And I’m not really “critiquing” religious insight, I’m simply describing it. Aside from you and perhaps a number of fundamentalists, I don’t imagine most religious people would take exception to my characterization of religious beliefs. In fact, I would be willing to wager that the majority of those who believe in God consider faith in the absence of objective evidence to be a virtue. I’m sure I could dredge up a dozen Bible quotations saying just that, but surely you will concede the point that pure faith is considered a virtue by most Christians?
Nice to have you back. I was beginning to to fear that you were gone for good.
Actually, if I remember correctly, evolution theory crept into this discussion because I happened to mention, basically as an aside, that one of the many critiques against falsfication was the fact that, strictly speaking, evolution is not “falsifiable.” This fact was acknowledged, perhaps incorrectly, by Popper himself, as you can read in the link you yourself have provided.
I’ve never accused evolution theory of “being one of the weakest outputs of science,” nor even considered it to be so. (For a seriously weak output of science, check out “behaviorism” sometime.) I’ve never considered it to be a cult. I don’t know where you are getting all of this from, but like I said before, I suspect you are reading more into my posts than is intended.
For what its worth, you linked a page above with info regarding the relationship between falsification on the one hand and evolutionary theory on the other. To summarize, I think the author of that page makes a few short cuts in his presentation. Perhaps that’s necessary, given the complexity of the issue on one hand and constraints of a webpage discussion on the other. Having said that, I am of the impression that he and I have approximately the same understanding of the question. He might lean a bit more towards the positivist idiom than I do, but its really a matter of nuance.
Thus far, in this thread, no one has directly addressed the critique I presented regarding the falsifiability of evolutionary theory. NO ONE. I’ve expressed it as clearly as I could on the last page, and have repeatedly requested everyone here, including your good self, to help me figure out where I’ve gone wrong in my reasoning. (The most interesting rebuttal I’ve yet found was on the page prior to the one you linked, entitled “Is evolution a tautology?” There is some merit to the argument presented there, and I would love to discuss it with someone. In fact, I even have some questions about it, since I’m not 100% sure I understand the reasoning.)
?
What creationist arguments have I put forward? I’ve put forward Karl Popper’s own critique of falsification, and that’s all, as far as I can tell. That creationists attempt to exploit such an argument for their own ends is neither here nor there, and totally irrelevant to both me and my argument.
Anyway, the falsifiability, or non-falsifiability, of evolutionary theory is but one of a number of important critical objections the general idea of using falsifiability as the criterion of scientific statements.
I say again, I think science is good at what it does. But is not the end all and be all, which I wish to argue is part of the problem. To state it clearly: Positivism gives no space whatsoever to other fields of knowledge, or other methods of producing knowledge. That is the problem in a nutshell, and the reason why science is often perceived, not only by creationist quacks but even by a large number of very well-educated historians, sociologists, and philosophers, as dogmatic. Can you not see that in dismissing all other methodologies, and all other forms of knowledge, science (and scientists) act dogmatically? You yourself are dismissing my arguments on the basis that they are merely the “belly-aching” of a bunch of philosophers of science.
By the way, regarding “pragmatism,” I agree that there has been something of an over-reaction from “literati.” I am no po-mo flake, ready to drop all science into a vat of discursive relativity and claim “There is no knowledge. There is only discourse, the subject, and power,” or something along those lines. I do not think pragmatism is a dirty word. I just think that, mayhap, Horatio, there be more to heaven and earth than there is in your philosophy (to misquote the Bard).
blowero:
I can’t help but notice an element of hostility in your last response, and so if I’ve done something to provoke you, I apologize.
Your post deserves a longer response, but I am under constraints at the moment since I’m posting from work. I just want to respond to this:
I don’t object to your request at all. In fact, I welcome it. And I fully expect a well-thought out and rational reply to my posts, since I am in fact shamelessly using your brain to help me come to a deeper understanding of these issues. That’s why I written several paragraphs on meditation, with the hope that you would be willing to discuss their potential relevance with me. But if you think I’m advocating meditation as means of repairing your car, then you’re missing my point.
For the record, I have not redefined “empiricism,” or at least I don’t think I have. I place in opposition to Descartes “rationalism,” the philosophy that it actually is a reaction against. Descartes thought that one could come to a full understanding of the universe through the use of reasoned logic alone. That’s why he secluded himself when writing his “Meditations,” which subsequently took the learned world by storm. The pragmatic English “empricists” objected to his approach, and argued that true knowledge could only be derived by an indepth inspection of the natural world. I’m an empiricist myself.
What you do point out, that I think is relevant, is that my position borders on solipism. In addition, there is the very distinct problem of sorting out the shit from the shinola, or as you write,
I think this is one of the major challenges of a “non-scientific” methodology – I mean, let’s give the devil his due, science is very good at excluding other forms of knowledge, and many of them (such as creationism) should be excluded.
Nah, no hostility intended. The tone of your posts got a little more aggressive, and I responded in kind. That’s just my style of writing, I guess. Hope I didn’t offend you. My friends tell me I can be a tad sarcastic at times:D
Well, I don’t think I missed your point - I just disagree with it. I think there is a very real line to be drawn between things outside of one’s own mind that are observed, and thoughts themselves. Obviously there is some gray area such as hallucinations or false memories, where a person may believe that s/he has observed an actual event when in fact s/he did not, which is why we tend to put more stock in events that are observed by more than one person. Now, if you want to be a solipsist, and argue that EVERYTHING is pure thought, be my guest. Just don’t expect me to follow you down that path, because I don’t see how that kind of reasoning can ever get us anywhere.
Now correct me if I’m wrong, but meditation does not involve the observation of any external (outside of one’s own mind) events, save perhaps the burning wick of a candle. In fact, from what I know of meditation practices, there is a deliberate effort to screen out external events. And this seems to be a very effective means of “quieting” the mind, to the point that it could not be ignored by the West, and is becoming a part of mainstream psychotherapeutic practice, correct?
BUT, a person can not derive ANY empirical information about the world by meditating. One may gain insight; one may figure things out; but one cannot observe anything other than their own thoughts.
Yes, but that doesn’t mean that everything that is NOT “rationalism” is empiricism by default. Meditiation is not empiricism EITHER.
I think a good question here would be: What would be your method of sorting out the wheat from the chaff, as it were, if not the scientific method? You seem to embrace Buddhism, for example, yet you denounce creationism. Your claim seems to be that science is not the only valid method for determining the validity of a given proposition; but if it is not the only method, then what else is? What were your criteria for deciding that Buddhism was more valid than creationism?
First a brief correction. I wrote above that no one had addressed my argument regarding falsification vis-a-vis evolution, but it occurred to me afterwards that you did. My bad.
You write:
To my knowledge there are two major kinds of meditative practices. As you point out, “concentration meditation” involves reducing the amount of external distractions to a minimum in the process of learning to focus one’s consciousness.
Vipassana, however, involves using one’s focused attention to inspect the sense data that flash, as it were, across one’s consciousness. The status of this data is rather difficult to ascertain, IMO, because it might originate from internal sources, such as a pain in the right knee, or from external sources, such as the sound of raindrops impacting on the roof. I don’t think Buddhists make a particularly big deal about the distinction between these phenomenon, since regardless of their origin they are still experienced by consciousness as external objects.
Okay, here’s where we disagree, and I suspect it has something to do with our different understandings of the term “empiricism;” but I also suspect that we’ve gone about as far as we can in this discussion. From here on out, it’s really a matter of opinion, I think. (You’re welcome to try to convince me otherwise.)
This is a good point. I guess I was simply trying to argue that Buddhism is empirical because it dismisses the idea that one can come to insight, or understand the fundamental nature of the universe, through reason alone. My sense is that most schools of Buddhism are fairly “anti-intellectual,” and some (such as Zen) are radically so. On the other hand, Buddhism invites critical discourse and rational analysis, and is based (as far as I understand it) upon a meticulously “empirical” study of the relationship between consciousness, on the one hand, and everything else (internal or external) on the other. It is therefore, I argue, a “religion” that meets many of the commonly accepted requirements of a “science.”
Naturally, as pointed out earlier, Buddhism is asking different questions, and using a different method, than the natural sciences, and thus it produces different answers. Part of the problem here, arguably, is that Buddhist methods transcend and/or ignore the division we tend to make between inner and outer; and from that perspective, it might not be completely correct to refer to it as a form of empiricism.
To me, this is really the most important question. Unfortunately (you may be glad to learn), I don’t have a very good answer for it, and certainly not when it comes to finding any sort of logically valid criteria for differentiating between Buddhism and creationism. This is, admittedly, a serious weakness in my argument, but, as Reagan once said, “We’re working on that one, dear.”
If I reflect on my own field of work, however, I have a few ideas. Some of this might come off as sounding rather overly technical, so I apologize in advance. Anyway, here goes:[ul]
[li]Empiricism: clearly, any knowledge about the human psyche needs to be grounded in some sort of systematic observation. However, the criteria for this kind of psychoanalytic research, IMO, should not be the same as that for other sorts of empirical work, especially since the methods of psychoanalysis rely heavily on the analyst’s own subjective reactions to the events experienced in the analytic session.[/li]
[li]Intersubjective sense certainty: which I also think of as “triangulation.” Borrowed, admittedly, from positivism, but modified for the psychoanalytic encounter. This has two elements. First off, the focus of " sense certainty" is shifted somewhat: we investigate reports that are derived, as it were, from the center of our own subjectivity. To guarantee them, we need many such reports. Secondly, we make sense of analytic encounters in light of reports from other analytic encounters. The validity of such reports, therefore, should be directly proportional to their usefulness. (This ought to imply that nonsensical reports tend to disappear from the literature, because they fail to provide generalizable narratives. How true this is in practice is a matter for debate).[/li]
[li]An alternative role for theory: Psychoanalytic theory does not play the same role as theory does in the natural sciences, although the difference is one of emphasis than kind. Theory in psychoanalysis can never achieve the level of certainty one finds in most of the natural sciences, and therefore it functions less as a “model” for the phenomena it refers to, and more as a structure to aid the researcher in reflecting over his/her own experiences.[/li][/ul]Those are some of the ideas I’m mulling over at the moment, anyway.
What’s nice about science is that it provides us with a ready-made tool for separating the wheat from the chaff; but the risk is that it sometimes creates the illusion that is has done so, by virtue of its restrictive epistemological commitments. Let’s face it, science is great at measuring things, and sticking them into a lab to dissect them, experiment on them and such. But how can it address phenomena that are unquantifiable, unmeasurable, and indeterministic? Because there are certainly a lot of such phenomena out there. Do we merely dismiss them because we can’t approach them scientifically? Banish them, as it were, from existence?
OK, Svinlesha, I am back again for a little while. In addition to the many good points made by the others, I am going to address a couple of complaints and objections in your last post to me.
You are correct in saying that you brought up the topic, but I think I deserve the credit for beating it to death. I ought to have said “the reason I focused on evolution…”
But I’m not sure now if I made my point, as I note that you still seem to express doubts on the falsification of evolution. This is it, I am going to put to rest any such notions!
I didn’t say you said these things, I said that evolution “is considered by many (incorrectly) to be one of the weakest outputs of science”. I then explained that this view of evolution, being what many consider science at its least scientific, was the focus of my defence of science. After all, it would be useless to defend the theory of gravitation and then have someone bring up evolution theory after pages and pages have been written about gravitation (to which only a few crack heads object with claims such as “the Earth is expanding so rapidly that we experience an acceleration of 9.8 m/s squared that we have mistakenly called gravitation”). I figured evolution was a great focus for this debate because it’s a scientific theory that has many very loud critics. Best to get all the work done in one go, as it were.
Behaviourism is an interesting area (particularly some of its successors, like B.F. Skinner) but not comparable to evolution. I agree many components and theories of behaviourism are highly unscientific, but at this point you may as well delve farther back in time and bring up phlogiston or the ether or similar bunk hypotheses (I say that because the last time behaviourism was popular was before WWII). In other words, evolution is an accepted theory in science that is considered by many (usually those without much knowledge in science, such as creationists) to be unscientific. Most of classical behaviourism, by contrast, is not accepted and is going the way of phlogiston and ether. Mind you, inquiries in behaviourism made enormous contributions to the fields of psychology theory, psychiatry, neuroscience, etc.; I think it is a good example of error-correction and investigative processes in science.
Well I happen to think that I provided sufficient answers, but let me see if I can find the passage you mention on a second reading; I was under the impression that I had provided more than enough evidence and references to establish that evolution is falsifiable.
OK, I have backtracked a fair length and found the material I think you may be referring to:
OK I’m with you so far, but I stress that, although the process is called “falsification”, it is essentially used to hammer a hypothesis until it holds water (in other words, falsification is necessary to confirm a hypothesis–as far as it is possible to confirm using the scientific method, which requires one to keep one’s mind open to new possibilities as long as they are supported by observation and reasoning).
Yes, these “theories” are not theories at all but poorly supported hypotheses that ought to be called, more correctly, cults (these are similar to religion!). They are not scientific because they are formulated in rather arbitrary terms disguised by pseudo-scientific language (for example, look at the silliness of Freud’s dream interpretation theory). One chief problem is that these “theories” are opinion and not knowledge (I was contrasting the two earlier, there’s material on this in the previous page). Now, the problems with such hypotheses obviously preclude falsification because the terms of the hypotheses are not properly defined. Using incorrect premises (poorly defined terms of the argument) you can use logic to prove anything, and falsification is therefore no longer possible.
Again though, I would not dismiss everything in psychoanalysis as rubbish. The work of Freud may have been largely inaccurate and unfalsifiable, but it contributed many interesting concepts to the field and laid the foundations for later developments in psychology–again an example of the corrective scientific method in action.
Let’s look at this in more detail and I think the difficulties with such general thinking may become more evident. Freudian framework, to which I think you are referring above, postulates personality as consisting of the id, ego, and superego of legendary fame. Right there we already have an assumption (an unknown entity). The conflicts among the three proposed structures of the personality are repressed and lead to anxiety (this is another unknown). The in-DUH-vidual is protected from experiencing so much anxiety by developing defence mechanisms learned from the nearby influences of family and culture (and here is yet another unknown). The defence mechanisms are considered pathological when they inhibit pursuit of the satisfactions of living in a society (what a surprise, another assumption and therefore an unknown). These mechanisms of defence are quantitatively, not qualitatively, different in the psychotic and neurotic states (which is yet one more assumption).
Just in the basic framework itself, we have 5 major unknowns that could no doubt be subdivided into several more. I won’t go deeper into Freudian psychoanalytical framework: I could go on about how Freud assumed that the emotional attachment of a patients to his/her analyst is simply the shifting of the patients’ previous important relationships to the analyst, but I think we have shown that there are more than enough unknowns in this system for it to be considered reliable.
We know that one of the priorities of systems of knowledge is the reduction of unknowns; the multiplication of unknowns simply leads to increasingly inaccurate information/results (rather similar to chaos). Well, with psychoanalytic theory we encounter unknowns at every level of the framework, and to proceed to the successive level it is necessary to multiply chains of unknowns by granting them. That is to say, you have to accept id, ego, and superego before you accept the idea that conflicts of personality structures cause anxiety, which you have to accept before considering defence mechanisms, which you have to accept before diagnosing neurosis/psychosis, and so forth. It’s a chain of reasoning that consists almost entirely of broken links, and that is the problem with it.
Now that takes faith, since there is next to no evidence that supports these hypotheses. And faith is the hallmark of pseudoscience, not science. The reduction of unknown entities is an imperative sometimes called Occam’s Razor, and comes in very useful for shredding away the crap and retaining what we do know. In the words of Newton, “We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.”
This is the simplest way of avoiding Freud’s blunders right from the start: the fewer unknowns you have, the fewer unknowns you can multiply, the fewer unknowns will come back later to bite you in the ass, to put it in the height of scientific terminology.
No, I would say that the trap in question goes rather deeper than saying something like the above, which sounds rather like “evolution is tautological” or “evolution is self-referencing”. Not the case–see the analysis of psychoanalysis above for a true case of tautology or “boot-strapping”. But let’s look at your specific complaints:
This may be a problem with your ex-girlfriend’s information rather than with evolution theory or the scientific method. The creatures you are thinking of are dinoflagellates (literally meaning “whirling whip/tail”), a set that includes Pfiesteria and Pfiesteria-like organisms (some of these cause the disgusting effect known as “red tide”). They are microscopic single-celled organisms that go through several (24 at present count) phases of development; during at least some of these phases they have a tail (a flagellum) that they use to propel themselves through the water. You can find more information about them on this page about Pfiesteria biology
I may not be an expert in marine biology, quite the opposite, but it seems to me, given the information referenced above, that a species of dinoflagellate that never grows a tail is probably not a dinoflagellate. Therefore your ex-girlfriend’s assertion that not having tails is an evolutionary advantage for dinoflagellates seems unreasonable, unless you or her or anyone else can define the discussion by establishing that dinoflagellates exist that never grow a tail through any of their development phases (we can then explore the matter).
Slightly beside the point, I am wondering how a lack of a tail is an evolutionary advantage for such a microorganism. Comparatively little energy is wasted growing a tail, and the advantage conferred by propulsion seems more than enough to make up for that extra day of photosynthesis or feeding (dinoflagellates have characteristics of both plants and animals).
So this case is not at all similar to the objections I discussed above that may be brought to bear against Marxism and psychoanalysis. We are not multiplying unknowns here. Evolution is simply the best theory suggested by the data from most of the other sciences—it is not multiplication of unknowns. Especially because when something is not known it is clearly labeled as unknown.
Well, we have seen that the explanations may not be so reasonable after all, and they also happen to be very simplistic. Diametrically opposed accurate observations cannot be explained on the basis of the same theory and the same prevailing conditions, except by chance (and that happens rarely and seems to last only a short time). Also keep in mind that mutation is random, but survival is not. If organism X undergoes a mutation, its survival will depend on its ability to adapt to the environment; it does not necessarily mean that previous “versions” of the organism must vanish.
Opposable thumbs are a development of most primates, and are particularly advanced in humans. The evolutionary advantage conferred by an opposable thumb is primarily the ability to grip with precision, allowing the gripper to manipulate just about anything. Both baboons and humans have hands that are built for extremely fine and precise manipulation. I think we can agree that this is an evolutionary advantage.
BUT, when we look at apes in general, we see a rather different story. Apes are far less manually dexterous than humans or even baboons, because their thumbs are shorter (having a lower angle of rotation/opposition) and their fingers are longer (being able to power-grip better). I hope I don’t drive you completely nuts when I say that the reason for the hand architecture of apes is also the reason for the superficially opposite observation in baboons and humans: evolutionary adaptation. Apes are far more suited to tree-climbing and branch-swinging (brachiation) than fine-handed humans and baboons, and we observe that they tend to lead rather more arboreal lives than us precision-handed folk. We and baboons on the other hand spend only a little time in trees and have made use of the fine-handed adaptation to survive. So here we have diametrically opposed observation (fine- vs. coarse-handedness in primates) that is explained very sensibly on the basis of evolutionary adaptation.
To make things more interesting, there are at least two species of primates I know of that have lost or significantly reduced the thumb: the spider monkeys of South America and the colobus monkeys of Africa. If a thumb is an evolutionary advantage, can no thumb also be an evolutionary advantage? That depends on the organism and the environment of the organism. However, in the case of the above two thumb-less monkeys, researchers make the tentative hypothesis that the loss of the thumb may be an evolutionary adaptation for locomotion in the specific case of spider and colobus monkeys. However, the scientists concerned stress that the rationale is not understood at present. The scientific method has no problem admitting the unknown–in fact, the scientific method relies on admitting the unknown and attempting to find reliable data for it.
I will address one more point that I complained of in the past, because this irritated me a bit:
Come on Svinlesha, we’re having a good discussion here without employing the despicable tactics used by some faith-based persons who can’t handle the accuracy and record of science. The above, and the following, are feeble complaints, not arguments.
The interpretative monopoly of the scientific community?? You make it sound like an Illuminati conspiracy! Yes, science does have quality control, as I have explained in four or five lengthy posts on the subject (if you disagree, explain your reasoning). Let me put it this way: do you know of any other method that even comes close to the scientific method in terms of producing reliable and accurate information? Are you aware of another system that tirelessly seeks to falsify and cross-check and predict in order to provide the best possible model of XYZ? And, finally, what other system is there that teaches you that nothing is certain or impossible according to the system, only likely or unlikely? The scientific method is the most efficient, open-minded yet critical system of thinking available to us. There is very little doubt that data obtained using the scientific method is likely to be more accurate than data obtained by other means, such as doctrine/dogma. That is why the scientific method enjoys (or ought to enjoy) epistemological priority over the rest of the unfiltered noise. As an example, if a geologist tells me that the Great Himalayan Range was raised by global plate-tectonic forces that produced tremendous upheavals in the Earth’s crust, and then he shows me evidence and reasoning for it, I will be fairly happy that such a claim has been extensively checked for quality. But am I really going to trust a claim that the mighty Range was created by God to teach humility to little humans, or some such faith-based assertion?
To conclude, I once more make the claim (adequately supported by this mammoth post I hope) that the scientific method draws conclusions on a subject of objective inquiry as suggested by the body of evidence; it is therefore not at all a belief like religion, which essentially amounts to doctrinal dogma. And evolution is falsifiable, damnit! I hope we’ve established that.
I discussed something vaguely related to this topic in this discussion: Best way to fight creationist pseudoscience?
I mention this because the clash between belief/faith and knowledge is discussed there, and the fundamental difference between the scientific method and the rest of the chaff are also highlighted. My first post, where I begin to address some of these issues, is on the top of the second page.
That’s it for now, I hope that takes care of the objections that you felt no one had addressed. I’ll be back for another installment of “developing carpal tunnel syndrome” later on as needed and as permitted by work. Hope the above makes sense.
Returning to the gist of the OP I would like to pose that , originaly, religion served the same function as science today; explain the world around us.
Religions tried to give answers as to why it rains, why does the sun come up etc. As nobody realy knew the answers it was allright to make things up. That’s basically why there are so many religions and where belief/faith creeps in.
As there was no way to check if there was indeed a rain-god, you just believed it or you didn’t.
Nowaday’s we know why it rains, through sience. Religion has become an outdated means to explain the world around us.
If you feel you still want to believe in a rain-god, you are ofcourse perfectly free to do so, if that makes you happy.
First, thanks again for the response. I doubt my posts are worth the trouble you’re expending on them….
I assumed since your previous post was directed towards me and (the aptly-named) Markusgoneawry, that you meant he and/or I were of the opinion that evolution was some kind of cult, or something, hence my response.
I disagree quite strongly with you regarding the “usefulness” of behaviorism, but since that is something of a hijack, I won’t go into it at length here. I’m confused concerning your statement that you agree with me that* ”many components and theories of behaviourism are highly unscientific,” *because I am of the opinion that they are quite the opposite: that is to say, that they are ”highly scientific”. In addition, they are generally unsatisfactory. I’ve not gone back into pre-war history to find this stuff, by the way, since I began my college career studying psychology, and the department was heavily behaviorist. (I’m not that old. This was in the early 80s. Admittedly, the head of the department was something of a fossil himself….) At any rate, it was to a great extent my unsavory and pointless experiences in ratlab, combined with a realization of the uselessness of statistical analysis in the study of individual human behavior, which led me to abandon the field in favor of anthropology. Behaviorism is still very popular, combined with various sorts of cognitive therapies, because (IMHO) it mimics the scientific approach; and, again IMHO, it is this field above all others that scientific methods have proven themselves to be an insufficient tool in the pursuit of knowledge. But I suspect this is a topic for a different thread.
Now, then, on to falsification:
I know you’re going to hate me for this, and I apologize in advance for being so pedantic. You have located the passage to which I was referring, and you write:
I suspect that this is the reason why we have arrived at this impasse. And I submit that either you have formulated yourself incorrectly here, or that we have different understandings of the term “falsification.” This is my understanding: Strictly speaking, falsification can never be used to confirm a theory. In fact, Popper formulated the falsification criteria precisely because of the fact that scientific theories can never be confirmed. This problem is, as you are no doubt aware, articulated by Hume in his critique of inductive reasoning. Hume claims that we cannot ever make logically valid inductive generalizations, and this leads inexorably to the conclusion that, as Bertrand Russell expresses it, “…every attempt to arrive at general scientific laws from particular observations is fallacious, and Hume’s skepticism is inescapable for an empiricist.” Popper buys into Hume’s argument as well, stating categorically that following Hume, any claim to objective knowledge “…is unmasked as being not only of the nature of belief, but of rationally indefensible belief – of an irrational faith;” falsification is his “solution” to this dilemma. (By the way, Hume’s argument also put the nail in the coffin of Aristotle’s old demarcation between epistemé [knowledge] and doxa [opinion], which I note that you often refer to.) Accepting that we can never approach truth “positively,” Popper argues our only avenue to truth (or objective knowledge) is through figuring out what she ain’t. It’s kind of a via negativa to truth, if you know what I mean. To summarize, Popper argues that if a scientific theory has been “robustly” tested through attempts at falsifying its observation statements, and has survived, it falls into the “cannon” of scientific knowledge, as it were – although technically, if one accepts Popper’s analysis, scientists never really “know” (or “confirm”) anything, ever.
I agree, at least for the most part, with the analysis you present after the quote above. However, the fact that psychoanalysis is based on speculation after speculation is only tangentially related to its “unfalsifiability.” Again, at the risk of sounding overly pedantic, even a simple, straightforward theory can be essentially unfalsifiable. Freud’s dream theory is an example, really: all dreams are the expression of repressed drives. While such a formulation does provide an interesting explanation for a number of the characteristics of dream imagery, its fundamental flexibility makes its totally resistant to falsification. In other words, any dream report can be interpreted in such a way that it relates back to an “assumed” repressed drive.
Conversely, the “simplicity” of a theory, or lack of “ass-biting unknowns,” does not guarantee that it is thereby falsifiable. So if you’re attempting to argue that evolutionary theory is falsifiable simply on the basis that it is not based on an extensive use of “unknown factors,” I unfortunately must disagree with you.
Regarding dinoflagellates:
Please take my explanation of this at a grain of salt. It was just an example, and probably a bad one; I’m a layman and have no idea how accurate my reconstruction of dinoflagellate morphology might be.
Instead, let’s look at your example of opposable digits in primates. You are well-versed in this, I take it, so you should be able to wipe the mat with me.
Of course, the parameters here are different. Baboons and apes occupy different ecological niches. It would be more difficult to explain this structural divergence if they occupied the same ecological niche: if apes were ground-dwelling in the same sense that baboons are. Anyway, the problem is this: the sensibility of the explanation is not in question. In fact, there could quite a few other sensible explanations for such things, and I wouldn’t be surprised if there were. The question is, can we derive a falsifiable observation from evolutionary theory? This question is a shitload more complicated than it might appear at first glance.
Perhaps we could begin with more global considerations. Evolutionary theory would predict, for example, that no “poorly-adapted” species exist, or, at the very least, survive long. But then we’re stuck trying to operationalize the concept of adaptation, or find a way of measuring poorly vs. well adapted characteristics. But perhaps that would be the way to go. One could claim that there are no polar bears native to Papua New Guinea, and no crocodiles in the Antarctic; but this is only with the proviso that should we discover a species of crocodile that thrives in cold weather (or any other falsifing observation), we would be willing to abandon evolutionary theory. It is my general sense that this is not done; that when confronted with strange or inexplicable adaptations, scientists nevertheless try to stuff them into the conceptual box of evolution. Such a strategy has the flavor of an ad hoc solution.
But should evolutionary theory predict more specific morphologies? Well, to the extent that we use the theory to explain these morphologies, I’d have to answer yes. Shame you had to make the conversation “more interesting,” Abe:
This is where the falsification dilemma raises its very ugly head. Again, speaking purely as a layman, it appears to me that any morphological observation can be explained by evolutionary theory, and that this is a good example of the problem.
I apologize yet again for being so pedantic; I’m honestly not trying to be argumentative, I’m trying to come to a deeper understanding of these questions. But the fact remains: all possible observations can be explained in terms of natural selection. There is no way that, given extensive data regarding a specific bio-system, an evolutionary biologist could predict the morphology of the animals living within the system to such an extent that should the predictions turn out wrong, evolutionary theory would be falsified. NOTE: **THIS IS NOT AN ARGUMENT AGAINST EVOLUTION. IT IS AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE FALSIFICATION CRITERIA. **
Uh-huh. Right. “Tentative” hypothesis? I disagree. Although the specific mechanisms may not be well understood, no one is prepared to give up evolutionary theory on the basis of such a weak anomaly. And to be taken seriously by the scientific community, any explanation of “thumb-less-ness” in monkeys will at the very least have to be couched in the terms of evolutionary theory. From your own link:
Alas, I fear I am that pedant.
I really need to respond to your last point as well. Sorry to irritate you, but I must point out that you framed the situation in such a way as to suggest that we must either trust scientists, on the one hand, or raving lunatics and creationists, on the other. I would hope that there exists a certain gradation between these two poles. I agree that science is a truly impressive structure of knowledge, and in fact I stand in awe of it almost every day. But I am not as optimistic as you are regarding its critical flexibility. Some paradigms are incommensurable. I work in such a field; one in which the blessings of science are certainly a mixed bag. Many of the observations and theories that inform psychotherapeutic work are difficult, perhaps impossible, to address scientifically; and there exists a strong movement, fueled to a great extent by the scientific community, to eradicate such “non-scientific” trash. I think this would be a mistake.
By the way, psychoanalysis is also self-corrective, includes a large body of professionals working with theory, peer-reviewed journals ( the best known being the International Journal of Psychoanalysis), and so forth. But I still don’t think psychoanalysis cuts the mustard as a science.
But let me answer your questions:
*No.
*Yes. Psychoanalysis.
Yes, again. In this case, psychoanalytic theory is probably superior to scientific methodologies.
Welcome, Latro!
In fact you are absolutely right on this: compared to the prevailing psychological theory of the time, which relied on subjective introspection and rather arbitrary pattern-matching, classical behaviourist theory, relying as it did on independent observers observing the same object, was both more useful and more scientific. All due to the objectivist position of the father of the field, Watson.
To tell you the truth I don’t remember exactly what I was thinking on the topic, but I do draw distinctions between behaviourism, neobehaviourism, and later offshoots. I do know that in spite of its revolutionary approach classical behaviourism had certain problems. One very valid criticism (and this is very interesting when considering the evolution of sciences) is that classical behaviourism provided no framework for a theory beyond the stimulus-response principle. In addition to that, behaviourism specifically excluded “fuzzy” items like emotions, ideas, and inner mental activity in general, which we now know to be extremely important.
This condition improved sometimes in the 1930s to 1940s with the emergence of neobehaviourism, in which psychologists worked on a detailed experimental theory of adaptive behaviour based on Watson’s significant but rather “unmeshed” contributions. From then it’s been generally uphill. So, it’s interesting to see that behaviourism emerged first as an improvement over the pseudoscientific old school of psychology (interestingly enough, Watson accused psychology at the time of being dominated by “religious philosophy”, which ties in well with this discussion and with my point on the difference between science and pseudoscience/religion). Then classical behaviourism, vast improvement as it was, was quickly replaced by neobehaviourism, and a few of its leading exponents eventually encouraged the development of neuroscience (which I would say is today’s “hard” science of choice when it comes to behaviour and the functions of the nervous system). It’s quite a wonderful process of refining and refining in order to obtain better and better data and models. Fascinating.
This is funny because I had a similar experience, although I loved the ratlabs. In fact, I became so attached to a particularly large and good-natured rat that I named it Attila the HUN-gry (his accomplishments included ascertaining that aspartame causes no significant adverse effects—I’m still not sure about that!). My negative experiences with statistics were probably due to my mathematical ineptitude rather than anything else, and although I studied anthropology on the side for a while, after a couple of years I found myself craving more of the hard science and abandoning the relativistic approach to everything. Damnit, the Yanomano are a bunch of filthy, rotten, thieving, cheating, lying, murdering, drugged-out, raping, body-snatching, violent, dishonourable scum, and they can put cultural relativism in their pipes and smoke it as far as I am concerned!
It probably is a topic for another discussion, because I do not think the scientific method has ever been proved an inefficient tool in the pursuit of knowledge of the physical world (including concepts romantically perceived as more metaphysical, such as the mind). Actually, I think that when you say behaviourism you refer to the original field and all its later developments, whereas I was thinking specifically of classical behaviourism (1920s) as a response to old psychology theory (in other words an improvement, but nothing that would necessarily be applicable today since it was quite an unexplored and incomplete field before the advent of neobehaviourism).
Yes, but I gave that caveat in my statement (I said, “as far as it is possible to confirm using the scientific method”), meaning that we are talking about degrees of probability as opposed to certitude. Whichever way you look at it, falsification is the theory-wringer. If a hypothesis or theory makes it through the falsification wringer, the process of confirmation (with my caveat in mind) may proceed and a hypothesis may be accepted or rejected. Of course, nothing is ever certain in science, only highly probable. But falsification is absolutely necessary to provide confirmation for a theory by establishing that it is possible to provide evidence for or against—in fact it is usually the first step to take when a new hypothesis is presented (a key component of critical thinking).
I reject the notion that the demarcation between knowledge and opinion is in any way compromised. In spite of the head-scratchings and equivocations of dozens of philosophers, there is a clear contrast with scientific knowledge, which is verifiable and based on as objective a set of observations as possible (even if potentially fallible), and opinion, which is arbitrarily subjective and not provable (and which may be true but need not be) (and as you noticed I am very fond of the distinction, although I rarely use the original Greek terms for fear of having my intentions misinterpreted as Aristotelian). Now, of course I realize that the concept of perfect information, or absolute knowledge, is something that currently escapes science and may for a very long time, or ever. But I see no problems in using particular observations to arrive at general laws because the scientific method involves the use of, in addition to all the goodies we have discussed so far, imagination and statistical analysis. It’s a marriage between observable data and the superb pattern-forming ability of humans (how come that happens? What reason could it be the data looks like this? Then you test the possible reason strenuously using statistical methods that ensure the data you collect is a fair sample of the phenomenon you are observing, and accept or reject hypotheses for it based on the process we know and love). This is the only reliable way you build models of nature as far as I know.
Keep in mind that Hume and most of the other trouble-makers are speaking in absolute terms in your references above, but science readily admits that even the most fundamentally accepted and verified general theories derived from specific observations may be inaccurate, and therefore I do not see such criticisms as harsh (science is not absolute knowledge, but it is the best and least fallible system of knowledge available to us). You’ve quoted the philosophers’ nay-sayings, but I don’t think their arguments apply to the ultra-cautious concept of modern science, which goes out of its way to avoid these absolutist difficulties.
I have a problem here. If anyone feels that we can never approach truth by true “confirmation”, only rejection, he/she had better provide damn good support for such an extraordinary assertion. That statement, in fact, may be an unrestricted negative, which is something that will always remain conjecture since it is not possible to demonstrate. It’s more accurate to say that we approach truth simultaneously positively and negatively in the entire process (evidence is positive, falsification is the possibility of accepting negatives).
Exactly, which is why all scientific knowledge must remain open to challenge, and is. This is not a problem though, because neither scientists nor I talk in absolute terms on such subjects (if they/I do, well it’s not supposed to happen). I still do not see how this attacks the knowledge/opinion demarcation in any way. The whole foundation of modern science is the recognition that anything is possible, and scientific agreement to well-established theories is provisional unless there is reliable material against such theories. Does that impact on the difference between knowledge and opinion? Probably, if you really want to split hairs; but in practical terms it does not, because (as pragmatists are fond of saying, again in highly scientific terms) philosophers can complain until the cows come home, have a shower, smoke a joint, and knit a sweater, but that doesn’t change the fact that the system works extremely well in all applications so far.
In other words, establishing knowledge is a work in progress and we currently use the via negativa to counter-balance the via positiva often provided by evidence and observation, but that in no way impairs the knowledge itself or the system of refining knowledge. An opinion is born of a rather different process and point of view. Let’s not confuse scientific knowledge and layman opinion; sure, scientific knowledge is subject to change and not immutable, I am not disputing that, but it’s a body of knowledge that for the most part has a great likelihood of being correct, or if not correct then in need of a little tweaking. That is rather distinct from opinion.
Of course, but my argument is that the multiplication of unknowns (which is a characteristic not of the scientific method but of pseudoscience and religion, to link back to the original argument) leads to unfalsifiable hypotheses, such as the case of psychoanalysis (which is a general concept), where unknown entities in the form of false assumptions render the entire general concept (not just specific models) unviable. Now, in a specific model, like Freud’s dream interpretation, the false assumptions are what definitely wreck the specific model itself. Dream theory is rife with false assumptions; for example, assuming that dreams reflect waking experience, are mirrors of the subconscious, are always interpretable and meaningful, and have curative potential, to mention just a few. The fundamental flexibility of dream theory is due to the lack of controls for these unknowns; as I said earlier, when you build an argument on false premises it is logically possible to prove anything, which is in other words what you say of dream theory’s unfalsifiability (it is so “flexible” because the unknown entities provide little or no parameters and anything becomes possible). I may be wrong, but if so I cannot think off-hand of any hypothesis that does not assume unknowns and that is unfalsifiable.
Do you still feel that way after I clarified my comments on the above? (It’s more than “simply on the basis”!) All unknown entities in a model must be admitted, controlled, regulated, and/or investigated according to the scientific method precisely to avoid such garbled unfalsifiable hypotheses as dream theory. Is it possible to have an unfalsifiable hypothesis that is not based on unknowns? As I said above, I can’t think of any.
I must now break because my message is too long to be posted in one piece.
If you chose to reduce the discussion in such a manner that only practical issues can be discussed, you win by default: but that’s only because you stack the deck to start with. Anyway, its an admirable strategy: they’re only philosophers, after all, so what can they possibly know about science? Shame that your argument doesn’t deal with the real issues at hand. 