This is, perhaps, your funniest observation in this whole thread. If you think that Alito’s opinion is simply the result of dispassionate, objective analysis, I have a large swamp in Florida that you might be interested in for your next condo development. He dislikes the VRA as much as Kagan likes it, and this is clear from the contortions he goes through in order to effectively eviscerate it.
Because, like Shelby County before, this case is probably more important for its future consequences than it is for the particular issue being decided in the case. While I think that the lawyers challenging the Arizona law, as well as Kagan’s dissent, make some strong points about the disparate impact of the Arizona law on particular racial and ethnic groups within the state of Arizona, the consequences of this ruling will be far more consequential in other cases that come before the courts.
When the Supreme Court killed the preclearance rule in Shelby County, they and their supporters basically said to the critics, “What are you complaining about? You’ve still got Section 2 of the VRA to protect you against discrimination.” But now the court has dramatically limited Section 2, gutting the key protections of the VRA and likely helping to preserve all sorts of discriminatory voting laws that have been passed, and will be passed, in other states. Arizona is just the start.
Your whole discussion also seems to rest on this rather thin “analysis.”
But that’s not exactly the issue that the VRA addresses, or the way that it reads. And this is where your incredibly dull and simplistic dismissal of Kagan really exposes your own prejudices on the matter. I find her reading of the statute itself far more compelling than Alito’s, and I thought you might actually be interested in such things, given that you have defended textualism on this board in the past.
Alito says, near the beginning of his opinion, that the place to start is the text, but he then spends 37 pages basically ignoring the text of the statute that he’s supposed to be ruling on. He says that the court is declining to “announce a test to govern all VRA §2 claims involving rules” for voting, but then proceeds to lay out a series of five criteria for evaluating such claims, which he must know that lower courts will effectively use as a test in future voting rights cases. These rules are disconnected from the text of the statute, and are clearly outcome-oriented and purposivist. He spends a lot of time on legislative intent, the work of committees, alternative text proposed for the revision of Section 2, and a whole bunch of other stuff conservatives often whine about when liberal justices do it. He also, for some reason, seems to believe that any voting restrictions that existed in 1982, when Congress amended Section 2, should generally be presumed valid, as if Section 2 wasn’t amended precisely to reduce discrimination and restrictions.
Now, I’m not necessarily accusing Alito of hypocrisy here. He has never claimed to be a textualist, and what he has always been–perhaps never more so than over the past couple of years–is a hidebound ideologue. But make no mistake, this decision is basically what conservatives are always claiming to hate: legislating from the bench.
What’s even more puzzling is why someone like Gorsuch signed on to an opinion that is so completely unmoored from the text. For Gorsuch, text is supposed to be the first and last point of analysis. Legislative intent, legislative history, implicit purposes, and practical considerations are, in his strict textualism, essentially irrelevant and are supposed to yield before a close reading of the statute (or the constitution, depending on the case). How he signed onto this opinion is completely beyond me, and I’m also surprised that Amy Coney Barrett attached her brand of textualism’s approval to Alito’s opinion.
Maybe, but it’s no better to completely ignore the issue of disparate impact, which Alito basically does, and also to make the test for discriminatory intent or purpose so rigid that it can basically never be met.
Under Alito and the majority’s understanding of discriminatory intent, you might be able to establish racially discriminatory intent in a voting restriction if the legislature actually passed this bill while wearing bedsheets and white hoods, but even then Alito would probably give the members of the legislature a chance to explain that all their clothes were in the laundry that day, so they had nothing else to wear.
Alito scolds the dissent for not considering the “totality of the circumstances,” but he just chooses a different totality when he chooses to ignore the clearly differential impact of this law on particular groups in the state of Arizona.
For people who care about the spirit of the Voting Rights Act and the reality of democracy, this was a pretty terrible decision. One possible bright spot is that it was a statutory analysis case which, unlike a Constitutional interpretation case, is not a place where the Supreme Court necessarily has the last word. If Congress can get its act together while the Dems control the House and the Senate, they could, if they wanted, pass a new Voting Rights Act that effectively says, “Despite the rantings of Sam Alito, we are actually serious about preventing discrimination.”
Harvard law professor and voting rights expert Nick Stephanopoulos, in an interview yesterday with constitutional scholar Leah Littman of the Strict Scrutiny podcast, actually offered a short and punchy sentence that could effectively erase the opinion in this case:
Littman suggested that a bit more detail might be necessary in order to establish clear standards, and we could talk about possible additions, but the fact is that Congress and the President can effectively nullify this ruling if they can get together on a bill.