[QUOTE=mlees]
I have a question.
Some folks have said that they felt that “cruel and unusual” is an evolving concept, and I think it is on a practical level. After all, the death penalty as applied in the early days (death by hanging, death by firing squad) might be viewed today as cruel, as the convict may feel an unacceptable level of pain, or suffer through a lingering death in a botched attempt.
However, to rule that a particular method (say, death by firing squad) is unconstitutional in effect makes it unavailable forever. Who’s to say that in the future, the citizenry no longer feels that death by firing squad to be cruel and unusual?
With the inherent subjectivity of the phraseology, shouldn’t the various jurisdictions be allowed to decide for themselves what is cruel, and whether or not to ban certain forms of the death penalty?
For example, right now there is debate whether death by lethal injection is cruel. Some folks have floated the idea that, even though the convict is paralyzed and unable to communicate his/her distress, he/she still suffers. Reasonable people can disagree on whether the convict suffers, or suffers too much, just like reasonable people can disagree about the effectiveness or validity of the death penalty itself. Once some judge rules that lethal injection to be cruel and unusual, that method is gone forever, effectively binding future generations to the feelings of society that made that decision.
Seems like the pendulum can evolve in only one direction, here.
[/QUOTE]
What you said is very much what was said in the dissent written by Justice Alito. He said that prior court decisions had never said that the eighth amendment should be a “one-way ratchet” preventing new punishments.
This ruling outlawing child rape is self-affirming. Should a state 100 years from now try to legalize the DP for child rape, the Court could say “Only one state has legalized the DP for child rape, so 49 states think it is wrong” and strike down the law.
It is pretty much what happened here. An honest view of history would show that the DP was historically widely applied for rape. In 1972, SCOTUS nixed ALL DP statutes leaving the states to start over. In Coker, in 1977, they ruled that the DP for the rape of an adult woman was unconstitutional.
So, here are the states left in confusion as to what is allowed. They have a large disincentive to pass a DP law for child rapists because they know that they will have to spend big bucks defending it in court. (Read Alito’s dissent)
Then the majority in this case uses the fact that few states have DP laws for child rapists as grounds to say that there is a trend away from it. Well, no joke, there is a trend away from it because the Court has skewed it that way!