Er, it doesn’t. That’s what the “choice” in pro-choice means.
Mr. Moto,
Pro-choicers may make personal judgements about aborting for certain reasons. I wouldn’t (or so I believe) abort a single twin. Or based on gender. (I did go through the fertility drug thing and signed the paper that I’d “selectively reduce” multiples in excess of three - and I think I would have) However, I have learned that the reasons I find acceptable aren’t for other people (I have no problem with aborting for birth defects, or because a pregnancy would cause economic hardship) therefore I don’t feel I am the person to draw the line for another woman.
I don’t think anyone is the right person to draw the line for another woman. That’s the choice part of choice.
A lot of countries have abortion laws that are supposed to control motivation - you can abort for birth defects or health of the mother, but not for gender, for example. It is often believed that these restrictions are pretty generally ignored (South Korea for example, has these restrictions, and somehow ends up with many more boys being born every year than girls!) I don’t think anything is gained in legislating these restrictions. But then, there is a little Libertarian in my Liberal.
Dangerosa sayeth:
Ah, so you meant that the act of making a choice was just as bad, as in just as difficult? Sorry, my misunderstanding. I’ll work on my reading comprehension skills. 
Jeff
According to robertluigi:
First: I don’t think this thread is the place for a straight-up “When’s a fetus a person?” discussion. A little too hi-jacky for my tastes. I’ve been walking a fine line as it is.
Second: I never claimed that everything is black and white, but I refuse to believe that nothing is, either. In the particular realm of abortion, I believe that the situation is black and white, subject to some clarification. If the thing in the woman’s belly is a human, it is wrong to kill it, in the same way that it is wrong to kill a newborn infant, and with all the caveats that implies. If it is not a human, then there can be no more moral harm in killing it than in killing, as I said before, any other being of comparable cognizance (I used the example of a prawn). Now, this doesn’t say anything about either whether or not a fetus is a human, or whether or if so at what point it becomes a human, or anything else. If it is human, it carries the same moral weight as a human. If it is not human, it does not. That is my argument.
Third: For the record, I’m not a rabid pro-life zealot, or anything. I’m what I would describe as squeamishly pro-choice. I don’t like abortion, I think that in many, if not most, cases it’s irresponsible, and it’s something I would never choose for my own child. Nevertheless, for my own reasons, I would prefer that first-trimester abortions remain legal.
Fourth: I highly doubt there would be - ahem - “stompage”. Thanks for the invitation, though. 
Jeff
I maintain that if, for whatever reason, it is decided that the fetus is a human, then it carries the same moral weight as any other human. Killing it for no reason than convenience would be bad, for example. If, for some reason, the fetus was stalking you and trying to kill you, killing it would be an acceptable for of self-defense. And so on.
Well, my previous example was that it perhaps resembled a prawn in terms of cognitive ability. That’s the only reason I mentioned a prawn. And if you read my reply to robertluigi, you’ll notice that I’m not speaking in absolutes here. I’m not saying “a fetus is human”. I’m saying “IF a fetus is human, THEN it implies blah blah blah.” What I’m trying to get across is the notion that “If OBJECT A is a member of CLASS B, then OBJECT A acquires all attributes inherent in objects in CLASS B.”
Yes, some people have problems killing prawns. So what? Again, you’re missing my point. IF a fetus is comparable to a prawn (and I’m not saying it is), THEN people who don’t have problems killing prawns shouldn’t have problems killing fetuses.
But in this case, I think you’re making the situation more complicated than it needs to be. I’m simply trying to assert the following statement: “All things that can be classified as human possess whatever basic moral worth that is inherent in all humans.” Note that I said “basic” moral worth. This moral worth is subject to situational modifiers. The human is trying to kill you? That changes its moral worth. Preserving the life of the human jeopardizes the lives of others? That changes its moral worth. The human sodomizes five year olds? That changes its moral worth.
If we could simply decide that all humans were created equal, so to speak, I think that would simplify things. Instead of having to argue nebulous concepts of moral worth, it’s simply necessary to argue when something is or is not human. That rock over there? Not human. Feel free to kick it. That tree? Not human. Bob Barker? Human. A fetus? And there you have your debate, but at least it’s a debate with more manageable parameters.
Well, sorry, you’re not going to get your argument. Debating whether or not a 9 week old fetus has more moral worth than a pig is beyond the scope of this thread, and completely misses the point I’m trying to make, anyway.
And I don’t think the classification of “human” is an empty categorization, anyway. Once you ascribe the classification of “human” to something, it instantly tells you a lot about it - including things involving moral worth. If I told you that I went and killed a human today, would that provoke some reaction in you? At least a desire to get more information, so you could decide whether I was a murderer or not? Would you have the same reaction if I said I killed a tulip? If the answer to that second question is “no”, then you ascribe moral relevance to the classification of human, whether you want to admit it or not.
Note that I said “…to a person who is pro-life.”
Maybe, maybe not. It depends on whether a fetus is human or not. I notice that you’re using the empty classification “human” when discussing moral worth. This is really a meaningless term, and I wish that you would use something with more weight to it. 
It has great relevance. The OP asks whether or not aborting one half of twins is morally different than other abortions. I’m stating that unless you have some greater knowledge about the child you’re aborting - say, the child will grow up to kill millions of people - then I don’t think you can say that aborting any one fetus is morally different from aborting any other.
Jeff
El Jeffe,
No problem, I probably wasn’t clear.
—I maintain that if, for whatever reason, it is decided that the fetus is a human, then it carries the same moral weight as any other human.—
Good for you. But you haven’t explained why this is, and what is so particular special about the species category “human.”
In other words, you are bypassing any debate over what we are actually talking about, and simply wish to either dump any given being into category A “of full moral consequence” or category B “of no moral consequence.”
—And if you read my reply to robertluigi, you’ll notice that I’m not speaking in absolutes here. I’m not saying “a fetus is human”. I’m saying “IF a fetus is human, THEN it implies blah blah blah.” What I’m trying to get across is the notion that “If OBJECT A is a member of CLASS B, then OBJECT A acquires all attributes inherent in objects in CLASS B.”—
I think you know what you’re doing. You are avoiding moral arguement about beings in favor of a game of creative categorization. But the categorization is at best a shorthand for an actual discussion of moral capacity of actual beings. And I’m calling you on that shorthand.
—Yes, some people have problems killing prawns. So what? Again, you’re missing my point. IF a fetus is comparable to a prawn (and I’m not saying it is), THEN people who don’t have problems killing prawns shouldn’t have problems killing fetuses.—
I’m not missing your point: that’s MY point. My point is: in what way, relevant to morality, is a fetus different than a prawn? You answer seems to be “well, because if it’s human, it is.” And my response is “how is that, by itself, a morally relevant difference? What has species to do with something’s actual moral capacities?”
—Well, sorry, you’re not going to get your argument. Debating whether or not a 9 week old fetus has more moral worth than a pig is beyond the scope of this thread, and completely misses the point I’m trying to make, anyway.—
I think it completely skewers the point you are trying to make, because it exposes what you are up to: replacing any sort of actual moral arguement with a tipsy essentialist categorization. Simply put, we cannot put fetuses in the category “human” and then pretend that the category contains the same class of beings it did when we used it to describe non-fetus/embryo/zygote humans (just as we cannot put corpses in the same category and pretend that this means corpses have moral rights). We can call fetuses human, or we can admit that merely being human is not BY ITSELF a moral capacity, and examine what actual characteristics are important.
—Maybe, maybe not. It depends on whether a fetus is human or not. I notice that you’re using the empty classification “human” when discussing moral worth. This is really a meaningless term, and I wish that you would use something with more weight to it.—
Hello? That was certianly despertate. I am not using it as a classification of moral worth: I am noting that humans of a certain stage of development (late stage to past birth) have distinctly different capacities than those of other stages (fetuses). It’s not that “human” cannot be useful for distinguishing in shorthand, but rather that it can’t substitute for actually getting down to the brass tacks of moral interests of particular sorts of beings.
I don’t think there is any question that fetuses are human in at least a genetic sense: but so what? We can juggle around all different definitions of “human” till the cows come home. But the fact is, we don’t think “humans” have moral worth simply because they are “humans”: we think it because most of the things we’re used to calling humans have particular sorts of capacities and interests that killing violates. If we met an intelligent alien species that had those same capacities, we wouldn’t go around killing them indescriminately just because they “aren’t human.”
And the question is: do fetuses have those same interests and capacities that make us grant the same sort of moral worth to what we used to mean when we talked about “humans” in the sense of the people we walk around and interact with day to day? I think, certainly at nine weeks, that they pretty clearly do not, whether or not they fit into some definition of human.
Hence, aborting one fetus or the other is equally wrong, but certainly nowhere near as wrong as killing a nine month old fetus, or a baby. And if you are comfortable with killing animals of equal or greater capacity for the convience of the taste, then I find it hard to see it as anything other than gross moral inconsistency that one would complain about killing a nine-week old fetus.
Apos -
I think we’re at an impasse here. To me, the classification of “human” carries with it certain traits - such as having two legs, a brain, body hair, and an intrinsic moral worth. It’s part of the definition of “human” - the humanity, so to speak. To you, something classified as “human” carries zero moral worth - that worth is something added later. Any given “human’s” moral worth can range from zero to A Whole Lot, and take any value in between. I guess to me, the moral worth of a person is (base value + modifier), and to you it’s just (modifier). We’re really just arguing semantics at this point, though. I’m saying, “Using my definition of human, we can reduce the argument at hand to a simpler case”, you’re saying “Using my definition we can’t”, and we’re both right, I think.
Since you seem determined to get me to comment on the relative moral worth of a fetus and a cow, I’ll throw you a bone. The difference, I think, boils down to potential. A fetus, if left alone to do its thing, will become a baby, and later an adult. It has the potential for humanity. A cow doesn’t. Nor does a prawn, a dog, or a shoe. However, I don’t think that you can really settle this argument by talking in terms of “capacity”, anyway. By “capacity” I assume you mean something to the effect of consciousness, cognitive ability, or something to that effect. That opens up a lot of loopholes, though. A dog has more capacity, then, than a sleeping person. Does that mean the sleeping person has less moral worth? How about a retarded person? Does a retarded person have less moral worth than an adult? Does a baby have less moral worth than an adult? I don’t think so. I submit as evidence the fact that people are likely to be just as, if not more, angered by the murdering of an infant than the murdering of a Mensa member. Potential is part of it, but not the whole story. There’s something that I can’t put into words, but we can call it “humanity”, for the sake of discussion. All people have it, and it doesn’t really matter whether they’re young or old, stupid or smart. And that’s why I prefer to ascribe a basic moral worth to anything that falls into the category of “human”. It’s not required by rules of logic, or anything, it just makes sense to me. Kinda like you don’t need to ascribe the quality of “round” to things classified as “orange”, but it kinda makes sense to do so.
Anyway, I’ve now typed this in three times and had IE die on me, so I’m going to quit while I’m ahead. Goody, haven’t had a Windows reinstall in a good month.
Jeff
Or not. If a mother removes the fetus and lets it do its thing, then it dies. Plus, just because something may become human doesn’t make it so. By your logic, a sperm cell swimming towards an egg cell in the fallopian tubes is human, because “left alone”, it too will become human.
I would say that “removing the fetus” doesn’t constitute leaving it alone to do its thing. And a sperm cell swimming down a fallopian tube isn’t the same, because the sperm cell, by itself, in any environment, doesn’t do anything. It’s a separate entity. That, and the fact that a single sperm swimming down a fallopian tube is statistically unlikely to lead to much of anything, whereas a fetus is almost certain to become a baby.
Jeff
Every time she looks at her one surviving child, wouldn’t she wonder what the other one would have been like? What would have happened if her surviving child had been the one aborted? The surviving one would have to live under its twin’s shadow for the rest of its life. And “not too much work?” This woman doesn’t seem cut out to be a mother.