I never said the bet din can perform a get without a husband’s consent.
I offered an opinion (one that’s echoed by many rabbis througout the centuries) that the conduct we discussed of a man not willing to give his wife a get could be seen as a man who did not enter the original marriage contract in good faith.
If you’d like to put words in people’s mouths so that you can round and round for pages on end, I suggest you bait one of the “Jews are a race” folk or some such, since they seem to have an appetite for it.
Asking me to cite based on something I actually said is perfectly reasonable.
I’m happy to oblige later today. I have to get my son off to Jewish Day School (but not before I eat an amazing non kosher breakfast burrito) and then attend to the day’s events. Catch you this evening, nu?
Thanks. I looked for this thread earlier and couldn’t find it.
I personally feel that a man who does not grant a get is invalidating the original marriage contract. If a ketubah can acknowledge the possibility of divorce (and the ‘freeing’ of a woman after she is ‘acquired’ by a man), then refusing to give a* get * could suggest a man never intended to uphold the ketubah in the first place. Keeping a woman in a marriage is not following the contract. It’s slavery. Help me out, Counselor. Does tricking someone into a contract invalidate the contract in Jewish law? (Or maybe “void” is a better word?)
It makes sense that extra rules were placed upon men who wanted to divorce their wives. Beggar women and children were in no one’s best interest. Changes have also been made to address men who are mentally ill. Since it was easier to ‘persuade’ a man to grant his wife a divorce 2,000 years ago through coercion, additional protections for women would not have been necessary. It’s also reasonable to assume that rabbis in the early Diaspora years would have had a hard time fathoming a woman who was fully capable of supporting herself.
Is there such thing as a contract that is forever binding? If so, then how is it a contract? Jews have a “covenant” with God that they constantly break.
I have to pick up my son. Do you want me to formulate an opinion based on Jewish law or do you want me to cite more authoritative figures who have done so? I don’t write responsa on a regular basis, but I do roll on Shabbos. Be back in a few hours.
When a man taketh a wife, and marrieth her, then it cometh to pass, if she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some unseemly thing in her, that he writeth her a bill of divorcement, and giveth it in her hand, and sendeth her out of his house…
Since a few hours have passed, I thought I’d bump this again.
I understand that you personally feel that refusing to grant a get invalidates the original marriage contract, but I cannot find any rabbinical court or authority that has agreed with you on this point. The case law in the Talmud Bavli, Yèrushalmi, Ge’onim, Rishonim, and Aharonim is unanimous. Indeed, Rashba (Ketubot 3a), specifically says that the Rabbis never dissolved a kiddushin retroactively without a get.
Moreover, the laws pertaining to gittin are very precise - the get must say, for example, at muteret l’chol adam. This has a rather unfortunate English translation, but the meaning is: you are free to remarry. A document without that precise phrase is ineffective. The get must be exactly twelve lines long, and the letter lamed must appear in every line – lucky thing if Levi is divorcing Leah, I suppose, but it must be tougher if it’s Saul dumping Sarah.
I mention all this to also point out that gittin law forbids a pre-filled-out get. A valid get is only one written by the sofer at the time of the divorce, period. This suggests that the idea that the ketubah, or another document, could serve as some kind of get-substitute by agreeing in advance that if the marriage ends, the husband must grant a get, and his failure simply voids the original contract is not going to fly.
A woman may refuse to accept the get, but the man has a legal option: heter meah rabbanim. No such option exists for the woman.
At least one Orthodox commentator has suggested that the Orthodox community adopt something similar to what you suggest: hafka’at kiddushin, the dissolution of a once-valid marriage. The problem with this proposal is that the Talmud examples to not track well with our situation: in the Talmud’s example, the husband commissioned a valid get, but the get was rendered invalid by a later event, and the rabbis then granted hafka’at kiddushin. But this doesn’t involve voiding the ketubah ab initio, and the resolution depended on the existence of a valid get, even if it later became invalid. Without that key element present, the appearance is of eshet ish yotse’a be-lo get, which is precisely why Rashba says there must be a get.
So – whatcha got? Your opinion based on Jewish law rather necessarily must draw on “more authoritative figures,” must it not?
You’re describing kiddushei ta’ut, a marriage voided because it was entered into under false pretenses of some kind.
Yes, this applies if the facts are as you say: that from the beginning, the man intended to divorce but not provide his wife a get. But that’s not the case in the vast majority of cases: they involve an ordinary marriage with ordinary intentions that later goes south. In those cases, there were no false pretenses, but simply changing circumstances. And therefore the remedy of kiddushei ta’ut is unavailable.
But how does one know the mind of a man getting married? You cannot. You must take him at his word, and only judge his mind if he appears to have misled you. So it is best to assume that a men who does not grant his wife a get was intending to enslave his wife, because:
There is no hope for a woman who is abandoned by her husband and he refused a get.
There is no hope for a woman who is abused by husband and cannot receive a get.
There is no hope for a woman who is just treated terribly and suffers emotionally and cannot receive a* get*.
There is no hope for a woman who just tires of him.
While a rabbinical court may rule a woman is allowed a divorce and try to persuade a man, they cannot force a man. Since civil law will take precedent here (a group of Jewish thugs can’t threaten to kill a guy or extort him for not divorcing his wife), it is only proper to review the laws of agunah.
Technically, a man cannot be forced into granting a get. But not too long ago, you could force a man by coercion and the get would still be valid.
Since the Jewish community has a hard time doing that, it’s best to assume that a man who does not grant his wife a get even when deemed appropriate will thus be considered one who never intended to enforce the marriage contract in the first place.
imho, since the wife entered into the contract of her own free will, she should not be punished (as in, her children should not be bastards) when a court (hypothetically in the future) grants a woman a get, because doing so would necessarily punish those who did not commit the crime.
Any man who does not grant his wife a get and is shunned by the Orthodox is a heretic anyway, since he doesn’t subscribe to the law. Do you trust that a heretic would not enslave a woman?
eta: in kiddushei ta’ut, what happens to the woman’s children? say she procreated with a man who turned out to have mental illness? also, kiddushei ta’ut doesn’t allow for trickery, does it? just misunderstanding? abuse?
Hmm. If a* get* does not void a marriage contract, doesn’t it still* override *the marriage contract? For example, if I am born Yaakovah Phillips and change my name to Yaakovah Simon upon marriage, my birth isn’t invalidated so much as I just have a new name (and identity cards).
A kiddushei t ut invalidates a ketubah, no?
The idea that Oral law has now become so equated with Written Law that it cannot be changed is paradoxical in Orthodox circles.
Sure, a woman can go bet din shopping, but what flies in LA doesn’t fly in Brooklyn.
These statements are an example of confusion of the inverse. Because the assumptions allow us to reach a desirable result (or four desirable results!) we should accept the assumption. But whether a woman has tired of her husband is of no relevance in determining if he married her with the hidden plan to refuse to grant a get. None of these reasons go to determining the truth of the supposition.
Except for the inconvenient fact that Dina d’malchuta dina has been the law since at least the third century. There’s nothing new here that the commentators did not know. And the Orthodox rabbinic community has rejected the solution you offer, just as the responsa have rejected it. Consider the Teshuvot Noda B’Yehuda (2:E.H:50) case of the kohain who married a woman he thought was a widow, but then discovered she was a divorcee. Noda B’Yehuda ruled that a get was required, even though it was obvious that the kohain would not have proceeded with the marriage knowing the truth. This is a much more solid conclusion than the inferences you urge on us now, and STILL the responsa mandates a get.
I get it. In your opinion, this should be a way out.
But the Orthodox rabbinate does not agree. I’m clear about your opinion-- but your opinion doesn’t carry that much weight in the Orthodox community. (I’m assuming this, anyway, because it sure seems to me that if it did, you’d have offered up some citations to Mishnah or Gemarah by now instead of restating your opinion).
The Mishnah (Ketubot 72b) describes a case where a man marries an ailoneet (a woman who lacks female organs – think of an AIS female) is entitled to kiddushei ta’ut. That could be trickery or honest ignorance. Mental illness? No.
Her children are not mamzierim if kiddushei ta’ut is granted.
To refresh your recollection, you said:
I asked you for a cite. Your opinion is obvious; where are the “many rabbis through the centuries” that have agreed?
I suppose it overrides the marriage contract, in the sense that it terminates it.
For example, if the ketubah specifies a payment to be made in case the marriage ends, the get is evidence that the payment must be made, but if kiddushei ta’ut, no payment need be made. Of course in that case the burden of proof is a bit different, since hamotzi mei’chaveiro alav ha’raayah - the one who claims money owed has the burden to prove it.
Nonsense. I can name plenty of changes to the Oral Law over the centuries. It can happen. But it doesn’t happen unless there is compelling reason, and a broad base of support.
Sure. Or a woman can decide to follow the Conservative tradition and no one will bat an eye at her lack of a get.
Calm down. I was offering a logical conclusion to set up the conversation. If a bet din’s ruling cannot be enforced because of civil law, then that issue needs to be addressed. Since more than half of Jewry resides outside the state of Israel and the world (as in science, economic advancement, politics, et cetera) has changed quite a bit in the last hundred years, it may be even more worthy to re-address that issue.
Jewish law is pretty reflective of basic societal need and the needs of Jews over time. I’m not saying that Jewish law has to be molded into some strictly humanistic viewpoint. I’m just stating the obvious.
The idea that a married woman is better off being married than single was true in most cases a hundred years ago, or even fifty years ago. But not now. Do the Orthodox really find it so scary that women can be financially independent? You say that changes in Oral law only happen with a compelling reason. You don’t see a compelling reason and your arguments are based on…Oral law. OK.
I don’t think the Orthodox need to change for me. If the Orthodox want be exclusive, that’s their prerogative. You seem to think that moving from Orthodox to Conservative is* so* easy. The Conservative movement may not be as tight cheeked about it, but you’re still expected to obtain a get. You appear to be of the opinion that what is not Orthodox is not valid…?
I solidified my argument with some reasoning, but since I live in a world where chicken isn’t pareve, I’m happy to expand.
Sorry, I’ve had like a week and a half to forget this thread.
I await your expansion, but again I direct your attention to “…one that’s echoed by many rabbis througout the centuries…” Your reasoning is welcome, but let’s not forget to cite this claim.
1: This thread began with the case of a woman in the Orthodox community whose problems arose specifically from the Orthodox insistance on adherence to a strict version of halahkic practice. It’s not that I judge the Conservative or Reform or Reconstructionist communities less valid, but simply that we were discussing the Orthodox.
2: Actually, I kinda do have that opinion. But my reasons for this are not entirely rational and certainly not germane to the discussion. And for me, it’s all theory anyway; I’m a good Catholic boy. I just studied Talmud extensively, and Hebrew slightly less so, for reasons again that aren’t germane.
I’m not trying to backpeddle, but I may have phrased that a bit off. If I said, “Rabbis have been arguing this specific thing for centuries”, well, then Jewish law would have been changed by now and that’d be an easy 1 second Google.
I think I had a misplaced modifier. What I mean to say is that commentary on related issues made by Rabbis over the centuries could be applied to the cases we have today that would warrant a revisit of law. What would a Talmudic rabbi say about xyz situation?
Finally, Talmud is not an end all be all.
That’s basically what responsa does today. (: Rabbis never discussed “late term abortions”, but rabbis today can reasonably conclude what the law may say to this situation.
Kind of like…precedent.
so yes, i’ll parse that out, but that’s going to be me pulling out some texts and since you let this thread lapse, it’s fair to give me a few!
Why is chicken meat? Because it could’ve been confused for meat 1700 years ago. For reasons not explained, chicken has been meat. Even though Torah law says it isn’t.
Do you see rabbis changing this law? No. Why? It’s tradition.
Why should rabbis update laws of aginuah? You can’t argue ‘it’s tradition’. It hurts the Jewish community.
I don’t care what the Orthodox think of my practice. I don’t care who wants to wave a bloody chicken around on YK. But this is one of those ‘relevant to all Jews’ things. And if Orthodox women are suffering, (and often, their children) then f yeah I’ll get judgy.
That’s a safer claim. There are several modern writers who have made this same case to solve the problem of agunah. I accept the truth of this new claim.
Of course. I’m not sure when the unborn child was likened to a rodef, but I’m sure it was sometime after Moses came down from Sinai.
Take your time. I’ll bump this thread in a couple of days.
I mean, it kind of is. You could make a totally supportable argument for it being pareve, just like you could make a totally supportable argument for it being kosher to handle money on Shabbat. It depends on how many fences you want to build.
Oh, I’m absolutely with you. I had a friend who was, in his own way, very observant, but he ended up leaving yeshiva (to his parents’ great dismay) because he wouldn’t accept these kinds of distinctions. He was perfectly happy to eat a chicken filet and cheese sandwich, reasoning that he’d stop the practice when chickens started giving milk.
But not to sound Clintonesque when I say: it depends on what the meaning of pareve is. There’s nothing objectively “neutral” about pareve fish as opposed to fleishik beef. So the word refers to the classification in kashrut practice. To be pedantically precise, the classification of chicken as pareve is not a mitzvah d’oraita but a mitzvah d’rabbanan.
Catch you this evening, nu?
I don’t write responsa on a regular basis, but I do roll on Shabbos. Be back in a few hours.
