# Sept. 11th 4th plane **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [December 10, 2004, 12:23am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039 "2004-12-10T00:23:09Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 4
**Author:** ![Kel\_Varnsen\_Latex\_Division](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/k/aeb1de/32.png) [@Kel\_Varnsen\_Latex\_Division](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Kel_Varnsen_Latex_Division)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 5:16am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/61 "2004-12-14T05:16:19Z")
> [@CynicalGabe](#): > > But truth is always preferable to myth. Are you suggesting it was shot down? ---
**Author:** ![blowero](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/41988e/32.png) [@blowero](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/blowero)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 8:33am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/62 "2004-12-14T08:33:09Z")
> [@Kel Varnsen - Latex Division](#): > > It was possible and it did happen. It just didn’t happen fast enough. I agree. ---
**Author:** ![Broomstick](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/broomstick/32/246_2.png) [@Broomstick](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Broomstick)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 11:03am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/63 "2004-12-14T11:03:16Z")
> [@blowero](#): > > Well, with “traditional” hijackings, didn’t the hijackers generally end up talking to some kind of negotiator? If appropriate - if the guy just said “fly me to Cuba and no one gets hurt” they probably would have just let the plane fly to Cuba. Prior to 9/11, the goal was to get everyone back on the ground alive. The military _might_ be called out, but it was an option, not something mandatory (as best I understand - I am not a controller myself, nor do I have detailed knowledge of their procedures.) > [@](#): > > Yes, I would assume that whoever is monitoring the radio communications and radar tracking would have some sort of contact list in case the proper authorities needed to be called in. Are you saying they have _no_ way to contact the FBI, CIA or U.S. military, and when hijackings occur, they just sit in their glass booth and hope that nothing bad happens? Well, I sure _hope_ you’re wrong. Sure, they CAN call in the big law enforcement/military guns _if they need to_ - determining whether or not they need to do so isn’t always an instaneous decision. I will reiterate something I have brought up numerous times on threads since 9/11. It was NOT obvious that the planes had been hijacked _at first_. No one came on the radio and said “This is a hijacking” in plain terms. The loss of transponder signal and subsequent course deviation seen by individual controllers in separate sectors _could_ have been an airplane in distress. In fact, when an airplane of any size loses a transponder signal, radio communications fail, or it deviates radically from course the _most likely_ explanation is an airplane in distress. So some time was “lost” while the controller tried to figure out what the hell was going on. I’m willing to bet that if you went back to records of the actual communications on that day that the FIRST mention of “hijacking” was in a sentence very like “Flight XXX _ **may** _ have been hijacked” In other words, the person relaying that information wasn’t 100% certain what was going on, just had a strong suspicion. At that point, a controller supervisor would be called in, because the controller can’t just stand up, run down the hall, and engage in a phone conversation with NATO - he (or she) still has to conduct traffic control duties. Aside from trying to restablish communication with the possible hijack, he also has a bunch of other airplanes to direct through his assigned area and, once the signal is lost, he has to talk to all those other planes and tell the pilots to watch out for an airplane he can’t see on his secondary radar anymore. The _supervisor_ contacts “appropriate authorities”, _not_ the controller. Then the information has to be passed up some sort of chain of command, and someone has to decide whether to send an intercept or a hostage negotiator or both. (All that assuming we’re talking about something like a TRACON, which is where the weird stuff was first noticed on 9/11 - an airport tower is a somewhat different sort of operation.) None of this will happen instantly. And do keep in mind that prior to 9/11 hijackers weren’t suicidal - they wanted to go somewhere, or they wanted to get something, but killing people and knocking down buildings weren’t a goal. So while it was an emergency, it wasn’t the _same_ sort of emergency and the assumption was that you had a good chance of getting everyone on the ground alive if you didn’t spook the Bad Guys. On 9/11, the system could only work with the information it had, and that information was incomplete and based on some assumptions that had worked well before but were not suitable to that particular day. ---
**Author:** ![Broomstick](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/broomstick/32/246_2.png) [@Broomstick](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Broomstick)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 11:57am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/64 "2004-12-14T11:57:13Z")
> [@blowero](#): > > You guys are all missing the mark here. I’m not saying the _controllers_ were supposed to single-handedly shoot down the plane. But are you saying that an ATC who _discovered_ that a plane had been hijacked would do nothing about it other than to continue staring at the screen and listening to the radio? Of course not - but as I said, there were alterative explanations for what they were seeing at first that had to be eliminated before calling for a military intercept. > [@](#): > > They don’t have any kind of supervisor that they would tell? And the supervisor doesn’t have _any_ way of contacting NORAD, OR NEADS, or whoever would be the appropriate agency? I find that really, really hard to believe. There is actually a written series of procedures controllers are to follow in the event of any emergency, including hijackings. SOP would be to inform a supervisor, who would then most likely handle subsequent phone traffic with other agencies, then go back to controlling air traffic. Because all the other traffic doesn’t suddenly disappear – there are still lots of airplanes that need guidance and direction. That work can’t stop merely because _one_ plane in the area is hijacked. Unless there is someone available to step in, that controller has to stay at his post regardless of what else is going on provided he himself is not in imminent danger. Meanwhile, the supervisor is following yet another set of procedures. This may involve contacting a military authority directly, but launching an intercept requires _that_ person to contact _other_ people, who may or may not be instantly availble. 30 second and one minute delays in communication add up. Remember that, at first, it was not known that there were multiple hijackings - you had four separate people dealing with what they all thought were individual hijackings, with no knowledge of the others. When the true situation started to sink in people changed their responses - up to the unprecedented “everybody out of the water” order to ground EVERY airplane. It just didn’t happen quite fast enough. _We_ have the luxury of hindsight, three years of reflection and investigation, and much more complete information than _anyone_ had that morning. It’s easy for us to say “oh, they should have done XXX”. Not so apparent to those who were there at that time. > [@](#): > > I’m kind of perplexed by the way some of you are viewing this. Anyone in the whole country who had a t.v. or a radio on knew what was going on that day. Yet you’re saying that the ATCs didn’t know because they were isolated in their towers, and supposedly nobody saw fit to apprise them of the situation. First of all, while I have been in airport towers where the controllers were listening to music or the radio, they were in very not-busy locations. Where controllers are busy, they do not want such distractions. Second, the controllers in question were not in airport towers, they were in TRACONS, which are busy pretty much all the time. They would _not_ have a radio or TV in the room where controllers are working - there’s _already_ enough noise and distraction from all the other controllers talking to their assigned airplanes. Third - if a plane crashes in New York city why would you tell a controller in Elgin, Illinois? He’s not concerned with what’s going on in New York city, he’s concerned with what’s happening over the Midwest and what’s going on in his assigned airspace. I mean, sure, he’d make sympathetic noises over the news if someone mentioned it, but it’s not _relavant_ to what he’s doing on the job, except to the extent it might affect his traffic flow. _No one_ is going to run through the room like Paul Revere on a horse bellowing “Airplane crash in NYC! Airplane crash in NYC!” There’s no reason to - the controllers in Elgin can’t help anyone in NYC, and it might distract them from what their doing. Distracted controllers are not a good thing - it could potentially endanger others. _Relevant_ information is relayed to controllers, of course, but not stuff that has no connection to the job at hand. Now, when the order came to land everyone - THAT’s a different story, THAT affected everybody. But then the controllers became so busy they didn’t have time to ask what the hell was going on - safety takes precedence over all in that job. It was more important that they help get everyone on the ground safe and sound than they know every detail of what’s going on. AFTER everyone is landed, THEN they can find out the details. It’s a matter of priorities. Keep in mind that when they said “land now” they meant LAND NOW - not “go on to your destination and land” but “land at the very closest airport that can accomodate your airplane”. So you had pilots being told to land at airports they’d never been to and that they had no information on. You had passenger airplanes landing at airports without any passenger facilities, even without air traffic control towers, and a whole lot more traffic landing everywhere than anyone had ever seen before. All of a sudden a whole lot of information had to be relayed to pilots in the air, either by airport personnel or by controllers or by airline dispatchers. You had folks standing behind the people manning the radios flipping through books trying to determine if airport Y had a runway long enough to handle jet W. And - perhaps this is not well known - there WERE successful intercepts of a number of airplanes after the four crashes. It’s just that none of those airplanes happened to be hijacked. But there were airplanes intercepted and escorted down to runways. Did that prevent any takeovers? I have no idea - and neither does anyone else. > [@](#): > > They should have been the _first_ to know, not the _last_. Why? How would knowing there’s a hijacking or crash in New York help a controller in California do his job better? Until it was apparent that it was _multiple_ hijackings and a coordinated attack no, there was no reason to relay the events in New York to on-duty controllers across the country. When it became apparent that this wasn’t an isolated incident, yeah, information was relayed. > [@](#): > > Not only that, but you seem to think that that’s perfectly acceptable, and represents a smoothly-running organization. Oh, I’ve never claimed the FAA or the air traffic control system is perfect! > [@](#): > > I understand that it’s not their _job_, but I find it incomprehensible that nobody would have ever worked out a contingency plan for what to do if a plane were hijacked, other than stand around with their thumbs up their butts. Of course they had plans - it’s just that the plans were drawn up to deal with a completely different sort of hijacking than what we had 9/11. Prior to that, it was a safe assumption that the hijackers wanted to survive the experience. And those procedures worked very well for that sort of hijacking. As people have pointed out, the rules had changed but nobody on our side knew that. > [@](#): > > The ATCs would be the first to discover such things; you’re honestly telling me that nodoby thought of that before? These weren’t the first hijackings in the history of the world. The ATC covering the sector with the hijacked airplane would be the first to know - most of the rest would find out on the evening news just like you or me. No, they weren’t the first hijackings in the history of the world - they _were_ the first to use airplanes as weapons. That’s a huge difference. And while a few, very few people had suggested the possibility it wasn’t something 99% of the folks in aviation had ever considered before. > [@](#): > > Hmmm…if it were me, I would put a higher priority on informing air traffic controllers than on informing farmers. They _do_ have phones in the towers, don’t they? Yes, they do have phones in their facilities - but those phone are only for information relevant to their jobs. I know from experience that if you do call air traffic on the phone they put less priority on answering the phone than the radio - so let it ring quite a long time. As I said - how does knowing something bad is going on in New York help a controller in, say Nevada do his job better? If it’s not going to help him do a better job don’t bother him with it, it’s just a distraction. When it became apparent that this wasn’t an isolated case controllers WERE alerted to look out for other hijackings… but this didn’t happen instantly. ATC is a _huge_ system, with everything from huge TRACON operations to one-man airport towers. There are several ways to disseminate information and all were used, but let’s get real - if a controller at Dinky Nowhere airport has an airplane on final approach with low fuel or something else “interesting” going on he’s going to let the damn phone ring because taking care of the airplanes in his territory is the first priority. Frankly, as a user of the system, I’m somewhat amazed at _how quickly_ they got the information out to everyone. I mean, this is the system that wants 30 days notice before you change the lightbulb on a tower and _still_ has trouble informing everyone concerned that the lights will be out from 3:05 to 3:10 pm April 9th. I think everyone reacted as fast as they could on that day. I also think that if the same thing happened again information would flow faster. Not only are the communications (supposedly) streamlined, but you won’t have to deal with the disbelief factor - the “Huh? FOUR hijackings? You’re kidding, right? No, really - you expect me to believe that?” sort of thing that did occur and did slow down communications. > [@](#): > > Well that’s kind of a tangent. But I would think that all that money we spend on having the strongest military in the world would go for _something_. The FAA and its ATC system are not military - they are _civilian_ organizations. Certainly, they work with the military where appropriate, but they are two entirely different parts of government. > [@](#): > > There were _plenty_ of warnings from our intelligence services that an attack on the U.S. was in the works. Absolutely none of which were relayed to ATC. > [@](#): > > But they _didn’t_ do everything right. It supposedly took over 1/2 hour from the time that someone knew about the hijacking to the time that the people responsible for doing something about it found out. Because protocols at the time didn’t demand anything faster, because they had been written for an entirely different _sort_ of hijacker, one that wanted to survive the experience, and thus would be unlikely to _immediately_ endager the entire aircraft. In prior hijackings there was not a need to scramble jets instantly, there was _time_ to methodically plan and act. Not so 9/11 - but again, no one told our side the rules had changed. ---
**Author:** ![Broomstick](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/broomstick/32/246_2.png) [@Broomstick](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Broomstick)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 12:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/65 "2004-12-14T12:03:53Z")
> [@Kel Varnsen - Latex Division](#): > > The problem isn’t so much this situation. The problem was the system was so inflexible that it could not be adapted to things that had not bee anticipated. I disagree - I think the system IS flexible enough to handle unanticipated situations. Both controllers and pilots have enormous lattitude in dealing with true emergencies. But the people invovled have to 1) identify the problem and 2) come up with a course of action. For anticpated emergencies there are written protocols and drills, but for new situations you have to improvise on the fly, and that’s just not as efficient or fast. So… first you had a situation that could have either been a plane in distress, OR a hijacking. OK, you’ve figured out it’s a hijacking – so you go to the hijack-handling procedures THEN - oops! - this _isn’t_ like previous hijackings. NOW what do we do? I know - GROUND EVERYBODY, and sort it out later! Like I said, I’m sort of surprised this only took a half an hour. Of course, that doesn’t mean we can’t make the system _better_. ---
**Author:** ![Steve\_MB](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/steve_mb/32/5339_2.png) [@Steve\_MB](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Steve_MB)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 5:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/66 "2004-12-14T17:50:24Z")
> [@GorillaMan](#): > > what’s cellphone coverage like in rural Pennsylvania? Not good, in my experience. ---
**Author:** ![Steve\_MB](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/steve_mb/32/5339_2.png) [@Steve\_MB](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Steve_MB)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 5:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/67 "2004-12-14T17:52:23Z")
> [@RickJay](#): > > Not to point out the obvious here, but it’s hard to miss fighter planes if they happen to go right over you. A fighter plane could shoot down a jet airliner from 30 miles away. Even if the fighters were in the air with such orders at the time (they weren’t), it’s unlikely that they’d shoot from maximum range unless they simply had no more time to get closer and make sure they had the right target. ---
**Author:** ![blowero](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/41988e/32.png) [@blowero](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/blowero)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 5:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/68 "2004-12-14T17:55:51Z")
> [@Broomstick](#): > > If appropriate - if the guy just said “fly me to Cuba and no one gets hurt” they probably would have just let the plane fly to Cuba. Prior to 9/11, the goal was to get everyone back on the ground alive. The military _might_ be called out, but it was an option, not something mandatory (as best I understand - I am not a controller myself, nor do I have detailed knowledge of their procedures.) Whether they did so _all the time_ is irrelevant. We are discussing whether there were _any_ kind of measures in place to allow them to get in touch with the authorities. I think we’ve established that there were. > [@](#): > > Sure, they CAN call in the big law enforcement/military guns _if they need to_ - determining whether or not they need to do so isn’t always an instaneous decision. I can scarcely think of a more urgent situation than what they had on their hands on 9/11. “Do we need to contact the authorities?”, really shouldn’t have been at issue at that time. > [@](#): > > I will reiterate something I have brought up numerous times on threads since 9/11. It was NOT obvious that the planes had been hijacked _at first_. Don’t know what you mean by “at first”. What we’re discussing is the time period between 9:30 and 10:07. By 9:35, it was EXTREMELY obvious that 93 had been hijacked. Here are some of the crucial parts of the timeline: > **[Center for Cooperative Research](https://formspal.com/cooperativeresearch/)** > > Center for Cooperative Research Introduction Objectives Application History of this project What people are saying Introduction The Center for Cooperative Research seeks to encourage grassroots participation and collaboration in the documentation of... > [@](#): > > (9:29 a.m.) > Shortly after hearing strange noises from the cockpit of Flight 93, Cleveland flight controllers notice the plane has descended about 700 feet. They try to contact the plane several times, but get no answer. At 9:30, a controller asks other nearby flights on his frequency if they’ve heard screaming; several say that they have. [Independent Commission Report 6/17/04] > > (9:32 a.m.) > A hijacker says over the radio to Flight 93’s passengers: “Ladies and gentlemen, here it’s the captain, please sit down. Keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb aboard.” Apparently Cleveland flight controllers can understand about a minute of screams, then a voice again says something about a “bomb on board.” A hijacker says in broken English that they are returning to the airport. [9:32, MSNBC, 9/3/02, 9:34, , 9:35, Newsweek, 9/22/01] According to the 9/11 Commission’s account, the hijacker’s voice says, “Keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board.” The controller understands, but chooses to respond, “Calling Cleveland center, you’re unreadable. Say again, slowly.” Apparently there’s no answer. The controller notifies his supervisor, who passes the notice up the chain of command (see 9:34 a.m.). [9/11 Commission Report 6/17/04] > > (9:34 a.m. ) > According to the 9/11 Commission, word of Flight 93’s hijacking reaches FAA’s Washington headquarters. By this time, the headquarters has established an open line of communication with the FAA Command Center at Herndon, Virginia. It had instructed the center to poll all flight control centers about suspect aircraft. So, at this time, the Command Center passes on Cleveland’s message: “United 93 may have a bomb on board.” The Command Center continually updates FAA headquarters on Flight 93 until it crashes. [9/11 Commission Report 6/17/04] > > (9:35 a.m.) > When Flight 93 is over Youngstown, Ohio, Stacey Taylor and other Cleveland flight controllers see it rapidly climb up 6,000 feet above its assigned altitude at 35,000 feet and then descend rapidly. The plane drops so quickly towards Cleveland that the flight controllers worry that they might be the target. Other accounts have the climb occur around 9:35. Controllers continue to try to contact the plane but still get no response. [Guardian 10/17/01; USA Today 8/13/02; Independent Commission Report 6/17/04] > > (9:35 a.m. ) > The San Francisco United Airlines maintenance center receives a call from an unnamed flight attendant on Flight 93 saying that the flight has been hijacked. The information is quickly passed on. [Independent Commission, 1/27/04] Within ten minutes, “everyone” in the United Airlines crisis center “now [knows] that a flight attendant on board had called the mechanics desk to report that one hijacker had a bomb strapped on and another was holding a knife on the crew.” [Wall Street Journal 10/15/01] > > (9:36 a.m.) > According to the 9/11 Commission, at about this time Cleveland flight control asks the FAA Command Center specifically whether someone has requested the military to launch fighters toward Flight 93. Cleveland offers to contact a nearby military base. The Command Center replies that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command have to make that decision and are working on the issue. [Independent Commission Report 6/17/04] > > (9:36 a.m.) > Flight 93 files a new flight plan with a final destination of Washington, reverses course and heads toward Washington. [9:35, “turned around near Cleveland,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/01, “turns off course,”9:36:01, Guardian, 10/17/01, 9:36, MSNBC, 9/3/02, 9:36, “made an ominous turn,” Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 219] Radar shows the plane turning 180 degrees. [CNN, 9/13/01 (B)] The new flight plan schedules the plane to arrive in Washington at 10:28. > [@](#): > > No one came on the radio and said “This is a hijacking” in plain terms. Question: How much more plain than “We have a bomb on board”, would you have liked for it to get? Were they waiting for the hijackers to radio in their names and social security numbers? > [@](#): > > The loss of transponder signal and subsequent course deviation seen by individual controllers in separate sectors _could_ have been an airplane in distress. In fact, when an airplane of any size loses a transponder signal, radio communications fail, or it deviates radically from course the _most likely_ explanation is an airplane in distress. So some time was “lost” while the controller tried to figure out what the hell was going on. I’m only referrring to the time from when the FAA _knew_ Flight 93 was hijacked to the time when the military was aware of it, not any prior time when they didn’t know yet. > [@](#): > > I’m willing to bet that if you went back to records of the actual communications on that day that the FIRST mention of “hijacking” was in a sentence very like “Flight XXX _ **may** _ have been hijacked” In other words, the person relaying that information wasn’t 100% certain what was going on, just had a strong suspicion. Read the timeline. The controllers practically _begged_ them to do something. > [@](#): > > At that point, a controller supervisor would be called in, because the controller can’t just stand up, run down the hall, and engage in a phone conversation with NATO - he (or she) still has to conduct traffic control duties. Actually, that was all done fairly quickly. The failure did not occur at that level. The problem was the FAA sitting on the information. > [@](#): > > Aside from trying to restablish communication with the possible hijack, he also has a bunch of other airplanes to direct through his assigned area and, once the signal is lost, he has to talk to all those other planes and tell the pilots to watch out for an airplane he can’t see on his secondary radar anymore. The _supervisor_ contacts “appropriate authorities”, _not_ the controller. Then the information has to be passed up some sort of chain of command, and someone has to decide whether to send an intercept or a hostage negotiator or both. That’s irrelevant to the situation, though. The controllers _did_ contact their supervisor, and that part went relatively smoothly. > [@](#): > > And do keep in mind that prior to 9/11 hijackers weren’t suicidal - they wanted to go somewhere, or they wanted to get something, but killing people and knocking down buildings weren’t a goal. Yes, but by 9:30 AM on 9/11, everyone already knew what was going on. I understand your point that the ATCs weren’t watching TV, but the people higher up in the FAA that they passed the info on to (and that DID occur), DID know that we were facing a situation with multiple hijackings for the purpose of crashing the planes. > [@](#): > > So while it was an emergency, it wasn’t the _same_ sort of emergency and the assumption was that you had a good chance of getting everyone on the ground alive if you didn’t spook the Bad Guys. Yes, but my point was only that lines of communication _did_ exist. I only brought it up because you seemed reluctant to even acknowledge that the FAA had any way at all to contact authorities. Of course they did. > [@](#): > > On 9/11, the system could only work with the information it had, and that information was incomplete and based on some assumptions that had worked well before but were not suitable to that particular day. And that constitutes a failure in planning. ---
**Author:** ![Steve\_MB](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/steve_mb/32/5339_2.png) [@Steve\_MB](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Steve_MB)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 5:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/69 "2004-12-14T17:57:11Z")
> [@rfgdxm](#): > > Isn’t it widely believed that some passengers found out about the WTC crashes, and took over flight 93 and crashed it themselves to prevent the terrorists from crashing it into some large, occupied building? Or is it perhaps these passengers were hoping to take control of the plane themselves, and land it safely?] The most likely scenario is that the plane crashed with nobody really in control (i.e. the melee between the passengers and the terrorists had reached the cockpit). Presumably, if the passengers had taken control, they would have tried to land. Of course, they might not have succeeded (especially if the plane was already off the straight and level as a result of the aforementioned melee). ---
**Author:** ![GorillaMan](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/50afbb/32.png) [@GorillaMan](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/GorillaMan)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 7:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/70 "2004-12-14T19:21:23Z")
> [@blowero](#): > > And that constitutes a failure in planning. No, it was perfect planning, that did not plan for suicide hijacks. Until that day, 100% of hijacks had involved hijackers who wanted to survive. Never had a hijack initiated the use of a plane as a weapon. Everything in the planning and procedures was set up to deal with the situation that historically was inevitable, and not for the situation that had never happened before. And you’re still looking back with very poor memory - well _after_ flight 93 crashed, there was still all sorts of speculation about other planes that were possibly hijacked and so on. At 9.35, everyone knew it was serious, but nobody could say “this, this and this plane are now flying bombs, and all the others are ok”. They will have been trying to account for every piece of information being fed to them - which will have been a _lot_ of information, and not just one message about flight 93. ---
**Author:** ![blowero](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/41988e/32.png) [@blowero](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/blowero)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 7:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/71 "2004-12-14T19:31:40Z")
> [@Broomstick](#): > > Of course not - but as I said, there were alterative explanations for what they were seeing at first that had to be eliminated before calling for a military intercept. We’re discussing the time period after 93 was known to be hijacked. Look at my timeline excerpts in my previous post. > [@](#): > > There is actually a written series of procedures controllers are to follow in the event of any emergency, including hijackings. Right. Exactly my point. So people need to stop saying it’s not the FAA’s job, or that they wouldn’t have had any idea what to do. That’s just not true. > [@](#): > > SOP would be to inform a supervisor, who would then most likely handle subsequent phone traffic with other agencies, then go back to controlling air traffic. Because all the other traffic doesn’t suddenly disappear – there are still lots of airplanes that need guidance and direction. That work can’t stop merely because _one_ plane in the area is hijacked. Unless there is someone available to step in, that controller has to stay at his post regardless of what else is going on provided he himself is not in imminent danger. Irrelevant. The information _was_ passed on; the controllers’ other duties did not prevent it. > [@](#): > > Meanwhile, the supervisor is following yet another set of procedures. This may involve contacting a military authority directly, but launching an intercept requires _that_ person to contact _other_ people, who may or may not be instantly availble. 30 second and one minute delays in communication add up. One minute seems reasonable. A half hour does not. > [@](#): > > Remember that, at first, it was not known that there were multiple hijackings - you had four separate people dealing with what they all thought were individual hijackings, with no knowledge of the others. When the true situation started to sink in people changed their responses - up to the unprecedented “everybody out of the water” order to ground EVERY airplane. It just didn’t happen quite fast enough. That’s not what we’re discussing. I have said absolute nothing about the decision to ground planes. > [@](#): > > _We_ have the luxury of hindsight, three years of reflection and investigation, and much more complete information than _anyone_ had that morning. It’s easy for us to say “oh, they should have done XXX”. Not so apparent to those who were there at that time. Well you can’t learn from your mistakes if you refuse to admit that any mistakes were made. > [@](#): > > First of all, while I have been in airport towers where the controllers were listening to music or the radio, they were in very not-busy locations. Where controllers are busy, they do not want such distractions. Actually, that’s neither here nor there, because when I look at the timeline, it’s obvious that the controllers _did_ apprise their supervisors of the situation very quickly. So _that_ part of the system _did_ work. > [@](#): > > Third - if a plane crashes in New York city why would you tell a controller in Elgin, Illinois? He’s not concerned with what’s going on in New York city, he’s concerned with what’s happening over the Midwest and what’s going on in his assigned airspace. I mean, sure, he’d make sympathetic noises over the news if someone mentioned it, but it’s not _relavant_ to what he’s doing on the job, except to the extent it might affect his traffic flow. _No one_ is going to run through the room like Paul Revere on a horse bellowing “Airplane crash in NYC! Airplane crash in NYC!” There’s no reason to - the controllers in Elgin can’t help anyone in NYC, and it might distract them from what their doing. Distracted controllers are not a good thing - it could potentially endanger others. _Relevant_ information is relayed to controllers, of course, but not stuff that has no connection to the job at hand. Apparently the FAA _did_ think it was relevant (from the timeline): > [@](#): > > According to the 9/11 Commission, word of Flight 93’s hijacking reaches FAA’s Washington headquarters. By this time, the headquarters has established an open line of communication with the FAA Command Center at Herndon, Virginia. It had instructed the center to poll all flight control centers about suspect aircraft. Whether the supervisors told the individual ATCs, I don’t know, but as I said, that’s not the issue, because the breakdown didn’t occur at that level. I don’t really see the relevance of your next few paragraphs. > [@](#): > > How would knowing there’s a hijacking or crash in New York help a controller in California do his job better? The controllers were the first to know when anything suspicious happened that day, so it would be especially important for them to immediately report anything that didn’t look right. > [@](#): > > Until it was apparent that it was _multiple_ hijackings and a coordinated attack no, there was no reason to relay the events in New York to on-duty controllers across the country. When it became apparent that this wasn’t an isolated incident, yeah, information was relayed. Did anyone say they should have done it _before_ they knew about any hijackings? That doesn’t even make sense. > [@](#): > > Of course they had plans - it’s just that the plans were drawn up to deal with a completely different sort of hijacking than what we had 9/11. Prior to that, it was a safe assumption that the hijackers wanted to survive the experience. And those procedures worked very well for that sort of hijacking. As people have pointed out, the rules had changed but nobody on our side knew that. 1. We’ve had multiple threads about this in the past, but it’s well known that there _was_ intelligence available to suggest that this precise thing might be tried. 2. I think it’s a valid excuse for the FIRST plane crash, but by the time Flight 93 crashed, everyone was well aware of what was occuring. It wouldn’t make sense for anyone, by that time of the day, to still be thinking “Gee, I bet the hijackers just want to survive.” > [@](#): > > Yes, they do have phones in their facilities - but those phone are only for information relevant to their jobs. I know from experience that if you do call air traffic on the phone they put less priority on answering the phone than the radio - so let it ring quite a long time. Well that’s just not true. The timeline _says_ that the FAA contacted “all flight control centers.” I assume they used a phone, not smoke signals. > [@](#): > > By this time, the headquarters has established an open line of communication with the FAA Command Center at Herndon, Virginia. It had instructed the center to poll all flight control centers about suspect aircraft. > [@](#): > > As I said - how does knowing something bad is going on in New York help a controller in, say Nevada do his job better? If it’s not going to help him do a better job don’t bother him with it, it’s just a distraction. No, it’s not a “distraction” to tell them to be especially vigilant in reporting suspicious occurrences. > [@](#): > > When it became apparent that this wasn’t an isolated case controllers WERE alerted to look out for other hijackings… Well, what the hell? You go on and on about how it would be such a horrible distraction for them, THEN you admit that they did it. Again, who ever suggested they should have taken action _before_ they knew that planes were being hijacked? Nobody’s asking for a time machine. > [@](#): > > Frankly, as a user of the system, I’m somewhat amazed at _how quickly_ they got the information out to everyone. I mean, this is the system that wants 30 days notice before you change the lightbulb on a tower and _still_ has trouble informing everyone concerned that the lights will be out from 3:05 to 3:10 pm April 9th. I don’t follow you. First you say that there would be NO REASON to disseminate the information, because it would interfere with the ATC’s duties, then you laud the FAA them for doing so. Your arguments contradict each other. > [@](#): > > I think everyone reacted as fast as they could on that day. I disagree. > [@](#): > > The FAA and its ATC system are not military - they are _civilian_ organizations. Certainly, they work with the military where appropriate, but they are two entirely different parts of government. So what? > [@](#): > > Absolutely none of which were relayed to ATC. Did you read the part where I said I wasn’t blaming the ATCs? And did you read the part where Kel Varnsen and I both agreed that it was a defect in the _system_ that was in place, and not the individual ATCs themselves? I thought that was pretty clear. > [@](#): > > Because protocols at the time didn’t demand anything faster, because they had been written for an entirely different _sort_ of hijacker, one that wanted to survive the experience, and thus would be unlikely to _immediately_ endager the entire aircraft. And those protocols should have been changed. > [@](#): > > In prior hijackings there was not a need to scramble jets instantly, there was _time_ to methodically plan and act. Not so 9/11 - but again, no one told our side the rules had changed. Like I said, there _was_ intelligence to suggest that such a thing might happen. It was unfortunately ignored. Part of national defense it to plan for what _might_ happen, not just continually close the barn door after the horse gets out. ---
**Author:** ![blowero](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/41988e/32.png) [@blowero](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/blowero)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 7:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/72 "2004-12-14T19:38:47Z")
> [@GorillaMan](#): > > No, it was perfect planning, that did not plan for suicide hijacks. Until that day, 100% of hijacks had involved hijackers who wanted to survive. If your plan for national defense only covers scenarios that are exactly the same as those that have occured in the past, then it’s a pretty piss-poor plan, isn’t it? > [@](#): > > And you’re still looking back with very poor memory - well _after_ flight 93 crashed, there was still all sorts of speculation about other planes that were possibly hijacked and so on. At 9.35, everyone knew it was serious, but nobody could say "this, this and this plane are now flying bombs, Yes, they could say that about Flight 93 at that time. Read the timeline, please. > [@](#): > > and all the others are ok". I don’t understand this. You’re saying they had to _rule out_ all other hijackings before taking action on Flight 93? > [@](#): > > They will have been trying to account for every piece of information being fed to them - which will have been a _lot_ of information, and not just one message about flight 93. Other information doesn’t _negate_ the clear evidence they had about Flight 93. ---
**Author:** ![GorillaMan](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/50afbb/32.png) [@GorillaMan](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/GorillaMan)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 8:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/73 "2004-12-14T20:03:59Z")
> [@blowero](#): > > If your plan for national defense only covers scenarios that are exactly the same as those that have occured in the past, then it’s a pretty piss-poor plan, isn’t it? Trying to have plans and strategies in place for every situation that has never ever happened would be idiotic. You seem to be castigating them for not having a plan for the _one particular unanticipated scenario_ which unfolded that morning. > [@](#): > > I don’t understand this. You’re saying they had to _rule out_ all other hijackings before taking action on Flight 93? No - but they could not devote all their attention to it, either. There were thousands of planes in the air, any of which could have been another hijacking unfolding. ---
**Author:** ![blowero](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/41988e/32.png) [@blowero](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/blowero)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 8:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/74 "2004-12-14T20:38:06Z")
> [@GorillaMan](#): > > Trying to have plans and strategies in place for every situation that has never ever happened would be idiotic. Contingency planning is hardly idiotic. > [@](#): > > You seem to be castigating them for not having a plan for the _one particular unanticipated scenario_ which unfolded that morning. No, you’re _defending_ a plan that only envisioned _one particular scenario_ that happened in the past. I hardly think it’s unreasonable for whatever plan they have in place to include notifying _someone_ in the executive branch of the U.S. Government when terrorists have hijacked a plane, (especially when it’s _known_ that 3 other planes have already been hijacked by terrorists), and not waiting 1/2 hour to do so. That could cover _any number_ of scenarios. You don’t seem to understand that I’m not suggesting that the plane necessarily should have been shot down - only that the FAA, which is responsible for regulating air traffic, should have immediately notified the division of the government which is responsible for national defense. They could have decided what to do, but they can’t do _anything_ if they don’t find out until it’s already over. > [@](#): > > No - but they could not devote all their attention to it, either. There were thousands of planes in the air, any of which could have been another hijacking unfolding. But all those other thousands of planes didn’t transmit messages like “We have a bomb on board”, or suddenly make very strange up and down climbing maneauvers, or reverse course inexplicably, or have the passengers calling on their cell phones to say that they were hijacked. And most certainly not _all of those things happening to the same plane_. So what’s your point? Why should that have _stopped_ them from notifying NORAD or NEADS or whoever they were supposed to notify? ---
**Author:** ![Broomstick](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/broomstick/32/246_2.png) [@Broomstick](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Broomstick)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 10:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/75 "2004-12-14T22:38:02Z")
> [@](#): > > > [@](#): > > > > Sure, they CAN call in the big law enforcement/military guns if they need to - determining whether or not they need to do so isn’t always an instaneous decision > > I can scarcely think of a more urgent situation than what they had on their hands on 9/11. “Do we need to contact the authorities?”, really shouldn’t have been at issue at that time. You’re still looking backwards. As more than one person has pointed out, it was not obvious at first that we had _multiple_ hijackings and needed the “big guns” as it were to deal with the problem. A statement such as “the FAA knew that Flight 93 was hijacked at 9:35” is misleading - the FAA is not one person, it is a collective group of _thousands_ of people. Since it is not a hive mind of some sort, information know to one of that group isn’t immediately know to all. The issue is not “when did the first person at the FAA know a certain plane was hijacked?” it’s “When did the first person at the FAA know _multiple_ airplanes were hijacked?” Then you have to ask who that person was, and what authority did they have. There is no question the top guy (actually, if I recall correctly it was actually a “top gal”) has the authority - nay, _duty_ - to call some pretty powerful military types during a national emergency. Someone four rungs down the hierarchy may not. Who knew what when, and what action did they take? Your timeline information is very non-specific about that. > [@](#): > > Don’t know what you mean by “at first”. What we’re discussing is the time period between 9:30 and 10:07. By 9:35, it was EXTREMELY obvious that 93 had been hijacked. Here are some of the crucial parts of the timeline: > > > [@](#): > > > > (9:29 a.m.) Shortly after hearing strange noises from the cockpit of Flight 93, Cleveland flight controllers notice the plane has descended about 700 feet. They try to contact the plane several times, but get no answer. At 9:30, a controller asks other nearby flights on his frequency if they’ve heard screaming; several say that they have. [Independent Commission Report 6/17/04] (9:32 a.m.) A hijacker says over the radio to Flight 93’s passengers: “Ladies and gentlemen, here it’s the captain, please sit down. Keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb aboard.” Apparently Cleveland flight controllers can understand about a minute of screams, then a voice again says something about a “bomb on board.” A hijacker says in broken English that they are returning to the airport. Your timeline is using hindsight as well. That last sentence “A hijacker says…” _On that day at that time there was no way for the controller to know for certain that was a hijacker._ There ARE foreign airline captains - I hear foreign accents over the aviation radio every time I fly. Under stress his English may well deteriorate. If the controller had been speaking to the real captain and now this is a different voice - well, OK, maybe it’s the first officer. YES, it is _obvious_ something is _very wrong_ here, but are there hijackers aboard? Did someone call the flight crew with a bomb threat? Did one of the cabin crew _find_ a bomb or bomb-like object in the lav? Or is that voice a hijacker? Did a bomb _go off_, but not cause enough damage to down the airplane, which would more than account for the screams and course deviations? NOW we know - at that moment in time it was _impossible_ to know, for sure, if you weren’t on that airplane. > [@](#): > > [9:32, MSNBC, 9/3/02, 9:34, , 9:35, Newsweek, 9/22/01] According to the 9/11 Commission’s account, the hijacker’s voice says, “Keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board.” The controller understands, but chooses to respond, “Calling Cleveland center, you’re unreadable. Say again, slowly.” This is called “gathering information”. Why would the controller “waste” valuable time doing this? Because he doesn’t know for sure what’s going on. > [@](#): > > Apparently there’s no answer. The controller notifies his supervisor, who passes the notice up the chain of command (see 9:34 a.m.). Nicely non-specific - what did the controller actually say? “Supes, something strange is going on here, but I’m not sure what”? “Supes, we may have a hijacking?” “Supes, maybe this is an airplane in distress, maybe it’s an airplane with a bomb on board, maybe it’s a hijacking - I’m not sure but we should be prepared for anything”? What did the controller _actually_ say? Surely the supervisor took a look at the situation, too - what did he/she think? > [@](#): > > [9/11 Commission Report 6/17/04] (9:34 a.m. ) According to the 9/11 Commission, word of Flight 93’s hijacking reaches FAA’s Washington headquarters. By this time, the headquarters has established an open line of communication with the FAA Command Center at Herndon, Virginia. It had instructed the center to poll all flight control centers about suspect aircraft. What, exactly, do they mean by a “flight control center”? There is the command center at Herndon… OK… but otherwise, do they mean the _regional_ centers? The TRACONs? Every tower and FBO in the country? If they called the regional centers then those centers have to disseminate the information to the other facilities lower in the hierarchy and, guess what, that’s going to take at least a few minutes. In addition to the regional and TRACON facilities there are the Flight Service Centers and over five thousand airports in the United States. What about the privately owned dispatch centers? The FBO’s? The corporate owned facilities? All spaced out over thousands of miles and how many time zones? It’s 5 am in California and the middle of the night in Hawaii - will there even be someone at work to answer the phone in every possible location? Saying “the contacted flight control centers” isn’t enough information. > [@](#): > > So, at this time, the Command Center passes on Cleveland’s message: “United 93 may have a bomb on board.” Oh, wait - I thought you said they were saying there was a “hijacking”. Now, it’s _ **may** _ have a bomb on board. Not “may have been hijacked”. Gosh, sounds like maybe they aren’t absolutely sure what’s going on, doesn’t it? > [@](#): > > When Flight 93 is over Youngstown, Ohio, Stacey Taylor and other Cleveland flight controllers see it rapidly climb up 6,000 feet above its assigned altitude at 35,000 feet and then descend rapidly. The plane drops so quickly towards Cleveland that the flight controllers worry that they might be the target. Other accounts have the climb occur around 9:35. Controllers continue to try to contact the plane but still get no response. OK, again - we know something is wrong - but _what?_ Is this plane damaged from a bomb, and not fully controllable? Is there a struggle going on? Whose flying the plane? Gosh, maybe they’re trying to contact someone on board to get more information, huh? > [@](#): > > [Guardian 10/17/01; USA Today 8/13/02; Independent Commission Report 6/17/04] (9:35 a.m. ) The San Francisco United Airlines maintenance center receives a call from an unnamed flight attendant on Flight 93 saying that the flight has been hijacked. The information is quickly passed on. [Independent Commission, 1/27/04] Within ten minutes, “everyone” in the United Airlines crisis center “now [knows] that a flight attendant on board had called the mechanics desk to report that one hijacker had a bomb strapped on and another was holding a knife on the crew.” [Wall Street Journal 10/15/01] (9:36 a.m.) Um… are you aware that the “San Francisco United Airlines maintenance center” is NOT an FAA facility? It is part of a _privately owned business_ called “United Airlines”. It is not a room full of controllers, nor would it have radar screens depicting current flight information anywhere in its facilities. It probably would have FAA inspectors on premesis part of the time, but those would be _maintenance_ inspectors who have nothing to do with ATC. I mean, bully for that flight attendant, she got through to SOMEONE and that’s exactly what she needed to do. She did not, however, contact the FAA directly. She contacted her employer. Yes, the information is passed on - the poor mope answering the phone probably called his supervisor, or had to find a phone book. Then someone had to call the FAA, ask for the appropriate person to report a hijacking to, and report the flight number. This, in turn, had to be relayed to whoever in the FAA hierarchy would need to hear it in order to connect this phone call to San Francisco with events happening over Cleveland. Just how fast do you expect that to happen? The FAA was NOT notified of a phone call confirming a hijacking at 9:35 am - _United Airlines_ had that information and needed to relay it to the FAA. > [@](#): > > According to the 9/11 Commission, at about this time Cleveland flight control asks the FAA Command Center specifically whether someone has requested the military to launch fighters toward Flight 93. Cleveland offers to contact a nearby military base. The Command Center replies that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command have to make that decision and are working on the issue. [Independent Commission Report 6/17/04] Huh - sounds like the higher ups still aren’t sure exactly what’s going on, but the folks in Cleveland are doing everything they can to help. > [@](#): > > (9:36 a.m.) Flight 93 files a new flight plan with a final destination of Washington, reverses course and heads toward Washington. [9:35, “turned around near Cleveland,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/01, “turns off course,”9:36:01, Guardian, 10/17/01, 9:36, MSNBC, 9/3/02, 9:36, “made an ominous turn,” Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 219] Radar shows the plane turning 180 degrees. [CNN, 9/13/01 (B)] The new flight plan schedules the plane to arrive in Washington at 10:28. “Files a flight plan”. How very interesting. In what sense? “I am Abdul, we are going to Washington, get everyone else out of our way”? Or did they file a flight plane like a pilot would? - given that at least some of them _were_ licensed pilots this is not beyond the realm of possibility. Did Cleveland know these guys weren’t the real pilots? Suspect they weren’t? Not sure? Does anyone have _transcripts_ of these conversations? Everything that goes out through ATC is recorded - there should be a record. > [@](#): > > > [@](#): > > > > No one came on the radio and said “This is a hijacking” in plain terms. > > Question: How much more plain than “We have a bomb on board”, would you have liked for it to get? Ask the folks in Lockerbie, Scotland - you don’t need a hijack to have a bomb on board an airplane. I have no doubt they _strongly suspected_ a hijacking. _Especially_ the folks higher up who were making the decisions on what to do were thinking that by this time, but you still don’t shoot down a civilian airliner unless you are CERTAIN that is the only viable alternative you have left. Because if you do that everyone on board _will die_ and maybe, just maybe, there was some hope these folks would survive. In retrospect, maybe that wasn’t rational or logical but then people aren’t Star Trek Vulcans - they _do_ have emotions, irrational hopes, and so forth. A contingency plan that doesn’t take that into account is far weaker than one that does. > [@](#): > > Read the timeline. The controllers practically begged them to do something. I didn’t see any begging going on - I see them offering to make some phone calls. Somehow you’re equating “should we/can we call this air force base” with desparation. > [@](#): > > Actually, that was all done fairly quickly. The failure did not occur at that level. The problem was the FAA sitting on the information. WHO at the FAA? At what level? On what do you base that? Or were there high level people discussing whether this situation justified shooting down Flight 93? Or do you prefer a world where the government has no qualms about firing upon civilians? Do you _honestly_ want the first response of the FAA or military to a hijacking to be “shoot them down!”? For that matter, based upon what you have given us, it could have been the _Air Force_ “sitting on the information” and refusing to launch. For all you know the FAA folks were down on their knees _begging_ for a military intercept. Or maybe not. You’ve provided no proof of your assertion that anyone was “sitting on the information” > [@](#): > > And do keep in mind that prior to 9/11 hijackers weren’t suicidal - they wanted to go somewhere, or they wanted to get something, but killing people and knocking down buildings weren’t a goal. > Yes, but by 9:30 AM on 9/11, everyone already knew what was going on. I understand your point that the ATCs weren’t watching TV, but the people higher up in the FAA that they passed the info on to (and that DID occur), DID know that we were facing a situation with multiple hijackings for the purpose of crashing the planes. Again, I don’t see the proof. That timeline seems to indicate that, until 9:35 when the flight attendant called San Francisco no one on the ground knew _for sure_ this was a hijacked airplane, and at the point the information _confirming_ the hijack was yet to be in the hands of the FAA. I’m sure United didn’t dawdle in relaying it, but I’m expecting it took at least a few minutes to hand it over. > [@](#): > > > [@](#): > > > > So while it was an emergency, it wasn’t the same sort of emergency and the assumption was that you had a good chance of getting everyone on the ground alive if you didn’t spook the Bad Guys. > > Yes, but my point was only that lines of communication did exist. I only brought it up because you seemed reluctant to even acknowledge that the FAA had any way at all to contact authorities. Of course they did. At no point did I say the FAA had no means to contact the authorities. Perhaps I have a more realistic idea of the speed at which this works given that I’ve been dealing with the FAA and ATC at least occassionally over the past 10 years. There is NOT a Big Red Telephone in every control tower to link directly to the NORAD command and the White House. > [@](#): > > > [@](#): > > > > On 9/11, the system could only work with the information it had, and that information was incomplete and based on some assumptions that had worked well before but were not suitable to that particular day. > > And that constitutes a failure in planning. No, it consitutes a lack of a crystal ball. ---
**Author:** ![Broomstick](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/broomstick/32/246_2.png) [@Broomstick](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Broomstick)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 10:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/76 "2004-12-14T22:52:16Z")
> [@](#): > > > [@](#): > > > > The FAA and its ATC system are not military - they are civilian organizations. Certainly, they work with the military where appropriate, but they are two entirely different parts of government. > > So what? It will slow down the transfer of information between them, that’s what. > [@](#): > > Did you read the part where I said I wasn’t blaming the ATCs? And did you read the part where Kel Varnsen and I both agreed that it was a defect in the system that was in place, and not the individual ATCs themselves? I thought that was pretty clear. I think it’s pretty clear you expect contingency planners to see the future with 100% accuracy. The system in place that day wasn’t perfect. Guess what - no matter what we do, no matter how much money and effort we spend, it will NEVER be perfect. The best we can do is learn from the past and go forward, making as many improvements as we can. > [@](#): > > > [@](#): > > > > Because protocols at the time didn’t demand anything faster, because they had been written for an entirely different sort of hijacker, one that wanted to survive the experience, and thus would be unlikely to immediately endager the entire aircraft. > > And those protocols should have been changed. When? Between 8 am and 9 am on September 11, 2001? > [@](#): > > > [@](#): > > > > In prior hijackings there was not a need to scramble jets instantly, there was time to methodically plan and act. Not so 9/11 - but again, no one told our side the rules had changed. > > Like I said, there was intelligence to suggest that such a thing might happen. It was unfortunately ignored. Part of national defense it to plan for what might happen, not just continually close the barn door after the horse gets out. The FAA was NOT part of the “national defense” system - even today that is still not its prime mission. That’s why we have the TSA - the Transportation Security Administration which is NOT part of the FAA, nor is the FAA part of it (although obviously the two do work together on aviation security). You know, we COULD be invaded by extra-terrestrials. Yes, we _really could_ because we haven’t ruled out the possibility of life elsewhere in the universe. But does it _make sense_ to put in place a vast infrastructure to defend against something so _unlikely_ as alien invasion? Planning for suicidal hijackers to use airliners as a poor man’s cruise missle was, on September 10, 2001 along the same lines as discussing the possibility of using lasers to blind airplane pilots on final approach (indeed, there is a thread on just that here in Great Debates). The laser thing is poo-poo’ed by a bunch of folks, and probably always will be - unless someone causes a crash by doing just that. And just what should be done about that, anyway? Ban the sale and possession of all lasers? But they’re so _useful_ - sort of like knives and boxcutters are handy tools, their peaceful purposes far outnumbering their evil uses. Set up a 20 miles “no man’s land” perimeter around every airport in the world? Um… not practical for a lot of reasons. Also, it still wouldn’t prevent someone from targeting an airplane in flight. How much money are you willing to spend to chase the goal of absolute foresight and safety? What are you willing to give up for security? ---
**Author:** ![GorillaMan](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/50afbb/32.png) [@GorillaMan](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/GorillaMan)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 10:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/77 "2004-12-14T22:56:25Z")
> [@blowero](#): > > Contingency planning is hardly idiotic. Contingency planning is anticipating likely events. On experience prior to 9/11, the likely course of a hijacking would involved slowly and calmly talking the hijackers into a safe landing. Contingency planning does _not_ involved tackling every scenario that could possibly exist, even the ones that stretch credibility and even imagination (which the idea of 4 suicide hijacks would have done for the average ATC manager prior to that day). Why can’t you accept that Al Qaeda found a vulnerability, exploiting the precedent set by countless previous unrelated hijacks - a vulnerability which could only be exploited purely by their willingness to do something which had never been done before (a co-ordinated suicide attack on US soil)? ---
**Author:** ![Broomstick](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/broomstick/32/246_2.png) [@Broomstick](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Broomstick)\ **Post date:** [December 14, 2004, 11:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/78 "2004-12-14T23:21:29Z")
> [@](#): > > > [@](#): > > > > No, it was perfect planning, that did not plan for suicide hijacks. Until that day, 100% of hijacks had involved hijackers who wanted to survive. > > If your plan for national defense only covers scenarios that are exactly the same as those that have occured in the past, then it’s a pretty piss-poor plan, isn’t it? Until we invent a forward-traveling time machine, though, it’s generally our best option. Yes, our national defense is based heavily on the past. Why? Because we can’t see the future! There’s another branch of planning that deals with future _possibilities_ and tries to assign a likelihood to each one - but it’s far from an exact science. Here’s an analogy - through the study of the past and extensive research, automobiles are MUCH safer to ride in than in, say, 1950. But they aren’t _perfectly_ safe, and never will be. All we can do is make them safER. Likewise, national defense and contingency planning is based heavily on experience, as well as some research and extrapolation. But you will NEVER be able to foresee all possible occurances or combination of events. We can _improve_ our planning, but it will _never_ be perfect. > [@](#): > > > [@](#): > > > > And you’re still looking back with very poor memory - well after flight 93 crashed, there was still all sorts of speculation about other planes that were possibly hijacked and so on. At 9.35, everyone knew it was serious, but nobody could say "this, this and this plane are now flying bombs > > Yes, they could say that about Flight 93 at that time. Read the timeline, please. [Princess Bride]“I don’t think that word means what you think it does.”[/Princess Bride] Go back and re-read it yourself. At 9:35 some person at _United Airlines_ in San Francisco was the only person on the ground who KNEW, FOR SURE Flight 93 was hijacked. The FAA did not - yet. > [@](#): > > I don’t understand this. You’re saying they had to rule out all other hijackings before taking action on Flight 93? No - they had to rule out _other possibilities_ for what was happening with Flight 93, such as accident, bomb-discovered-on-board (as opposed to bomb-carrying-terrorists-on-board), and so forth. > [@](#): > > > [@](#): > > > > They will have been trying to account for every piece of information being fed to them - which will have been a lot of information, and not just one message about flight 93. > > Other information doesn’t negate the clear evidence they had about Flight 93. After reading your timeline, it seems to be that the “clear evidence” didn’t show up at the FAA until _after_ 9:35 am - _after_ it was relayed from United Airlines. > [@](#): > > > [@](#): > > > > Trying to have plans and strategies in place for every situation that has never ever happened would be idiotic. > > Contingency planning is hardly idiotic. [Princess Bride]“I don’t think that word means what you think it does.”[/Princess Bride] > [@](#): > > No, you’re defending a plan that only envisioned one particular scenario that happened in the past. I hardly think it’s unreasonable for whatever plan they have in place to include notifying someone in the executive branch of the U.S. Government when terrorists have hijacked a plane, (especially when it’s known that 3 other planes have already been hijacked by terrorists), and not waiting 1/2 hour to do so. That could cover any number of scenarios. Um… why would they notify the executive branch? Shouldn’t they be notifying the _military?_ The military would need authorization from very high to fire upon a civilian airliner, so yeah, at that point the _military_ might notify the executive branch, but that’s up to the military, not the FAA. I mean, geez, you call the cops you don’t micromanage how they do their job, right? You call the military in to deal with a hijacking you let them do the job, you don’t meddle with them while they’re doing it. And, perhaps you should go back over that timeline and reconsider who knew what and when. > [@](#): > > You don’t seem to understand that I’m not suggesting that the plane necessarily should have been shot down - only that the FAA, which is responsible for regulating air traffic, should have immediately notified the division of the government which is responsible for national defense. Uh, yeah - the military, not the executive. And, for all you know, the appropirate person(s) at the FAA _did_ notify the proper military authorities in a timely manner - but then someone _still_ has to decide the proper course of action, then put it into effect. It does take some time to scramble jets and crews, it does take time to make an intercept. > [@](#): > > But all those other thousands of planes didn’t transmit messages like “We have a bomb on board”, or suddenly make very strange up and down climbing maneauvers, or reverse course inexplicably, or have the passengers calling on their cell phones to say that they were hijacked. And most certainly not all of those things happening to the same plane. So what’s your point? Why should that have stopped them from notifying NORAD or NEADS or whoever they were supposed to notify? You know, if the flight attendant had called the Cleveland controllers watching Flight 93 on their radar screens that argument might work - but she didn’t. She called someone in San Francisco. Fine, you have a phone call in San Francisco reporting a hijack. Which of the 10,000 or so airplanes above the US is _that particular_ airplane? Even if she said “we’re over Ohio” that is still multiple airspace sectors - someone has to connect the dots here. Is there a wonky acting airplane over Ohio? Yes? OK - is this person calling from that airplane or is there yet _another_ hijacking going on? I have no doubt it was that sort of questioning - how many hijacked airplanes? Which ones are hijacked? - that lead to the FAA ordering _everyone_ to land. Those that didn’t cooperate - well, they’re probably hijacked and now MUCH more visible because there isn’t all that other traffic for them to get lost in. Remember that tracking these airplanes was not easy - once the transponders were off the secondary radar - which is what controllers usually use - didn’t pick up those airplanes any more. That means switching to primary radar - which gives you FAR more “hits”, but much less information about each hit. It will also pick up flocks of birds and false echoes and a bunch of other crap you have to sort out. Once you get the _rest_ of the air traffic on the ground, THEN you can track these guys on primary radar, but not until. Unless the military has something or guys trained to sort that sort mess out - but those military trained and equipped guys are NOT in a civilian air traffic control facility! ---
**Author:** ![blowero](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/41988e/32.png) [@blowero](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/blowero)\ **Post date:** [December 15, 2004, 8:16am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/79 "2004-12-15T08:16:45Z")
> [@Broomstick](#): > > You’re still looking backwards. Don’t know what you mean by that. > [@](#): > > As more than one person has pointed out, it was not obvious at first that we had _multiple_ hijackings and needed the “big guns” as it were to deal with the problem. I don’t know why you keep bringing up this irrelevancy. IF we were discussing what happened earlier in the morning on 9/11, it would be relevant. But we’re not. At least _I’m_ not. > [@](#): > > A statement such as “the FAA knew that Flight 93 was hijacked at 9:35” is misleading - the FAA is not one person, it is a collective group of _thousands_ of people. Since it is not a hive mind of some sort, information know to one of that group isn’t immediately know to all. The issue is not “when did the first person at the FAA know a certain plane was hijacked?” it’s “When did the first person at the FAA know _multiple_ airplanes were hijacked?” It’s funny that you say _I’m_ backwards, while you keep bringing up events from _earlier_ in the day than what we’re discussing. I know you’re aware of this already, but Flight 93 was the LAST plane to crash, not the first. The FAA was MOST CERTAINLY aware that multiple hijacking occurred. I mean, my God, are you serious? You’re actually contending that they didn’t know by 9:30? I’m sorry, but that’s just plain incorrect. I suspect that you misconstrued what the timeline excerpts said, or you wouldn’t have said what you did. I’ll repost the pertinent entry: > [@](#): > > (9:34 a.m. ) > According to the 9/11 Commission, word of Flight 93’s hijacking reaches FAA’s Washington headquarters. By this time, the headquarters has established an open line of communication with the FAA Command Center at Herndon, Virginia. It had instructed the center to poll all flight control centers about suspect aircraft. So, at this time, the Command Center passes on Cleveland’s message: “United 93 may have a bomb on board.” The Command Center continually updates FAA headquarters on Flight 93 until it crashes. [9/11 Commission Report 6/17/04] No, they didn’t have a “hive mind”, as you so sarcastically quip. They had a Command Center, and the people at the Command Center were aware of the status of Flight 93. And again, they ALREADY knew that multiple planes had been hijacked. The whole country knew by that time, for crying out loud. > [@](#): > > Your timeline is using hindsight as well. That last sentence “A hijacker says…” _On that day at that time there was no way for the controller to know for certain that was a hijacker._ > There ARE foreign airline captains - I hear foreign accents over the aviation radio every time I fly. Under stress his English may well deteriorate. If the controller had been speaking to the real captain and now this is a different voice - well, OK, maybe it’s the first officer. YES, it is _obvious_ something is _very wrong_ here, but are there hijackers aboard? Did someone call the flight crew with a bomb threat? Did one of the cabin crew _find_ a bomb or bomb-like object in the lav? Or is that voice a hijacker? Did a bomb _go off_, but not cause enough damage to down the airplane, which would more than account for the screams and course deviations? NOW we know - at that moment in time it was _impossible_ to know, for sure, if you weren’t on that airplane. So what? It was obvious that something was seriously wrong about that flight. > [@](#): > > This is called “gathering information”. Why would the controller “waste” valuable time doing this? Because he doesn’t know for sure what’s going on. > > Nicely non-specific - what did the controller actually say? “Supes, something strange is going on here, but I’m not sure what”? “Supes, we may have a hijacking?” “Supes, maybe this is an airplane in distress, maybe it’s an airplane with a bomb on board, maybe it’s a hijacking - I’m not sure but we should be prepared for anything”? What did the controller _actually_ say? Surely the supervisor took a look at the situation, too - what did he/she think? What’s your point? > [@](#): > > Oh, wait - I thought you said they were saying there was a “hijacking”. Did I say that? > [@](#): > > Now, it’s _ **may** _ have a bomb on board. Not “may have been hijacked”. Gosh, sounds like maybe they aren’t absolutely sure what’s going on, doesn’t it? Yeah, maybe it was the _good_ kind of bomb. :rolleyes: > [@](#): > > OK, again - we know something is wrong - but _what?_ Is this plane damaged from a bomb, and not fully controllable? Is there a struggle going on? Whose flying the plane? Gosh, maybe they’re trying to contact someone on board to get more information, huh? But while they were doing all that soul-searching, they meanwhile could have at least contacted the military and apprised them of the situation. The military could even have sent fighters on their way to intercept. See, fighter planes have radios in them, so you aren’t necessarily committed to shooting anyone down just because you sent them out. > [@](#): > > Um… are you aware that the “San Francisco United Airlines maintenance center” is NOT an FAA facility? It is part of a _privately owned business_ called “United Airlines”. It is not a room full of controllers, nor would it have radar screens depicting current flight information anywhere in its facilities. It probably would have FAA inspectors on premesis part of the time, but those would be _maintenance_ inspectors who have nothing to do with ATC. What’s your point? > [@](#): > > The FAA was NOT notified of a phone call confirming a hijacking at 9:35 am - _United Airlines_ had that information and needed to relay it to the FAA. I don’t see where you’re going with this. How does this disprove: “[9/11 Commission Report 6/17/04] (9:34 a.m. ) According to the 9/11 Commission, word of Flight 93’s hijacking reaches FAA’s Washington headquarters.” > [@](#): > > [snip] > Does anyone have _transcripts_ of these conversations? Everything that goes out through ATC is recorded - there should be a record. Do you think you’re disproving that the FAA knew about the Flight 93 hijacking by 9:35? Because I really don’t think you’ve done so. You’ve just nitpicked a bunch of irrelevant stuff. It’s very clear - from the 9/11 Commission report itself: > [@](#): > > [9/11 Commission Report 6/17/04] (9:34 a.m. ) According to the 9/11 Commission, word of Flight 93’s hijacking reaches FAA’s Washington headquarters. Now, if you’re contending that the FAA is such a disjointed organization that “reaching Washington headquarters” doesn’t mean anything, then I submit that that is yet another FAILURE OF THE SYSTEM. > [@](#): > > Ask the folks in Lockerbie, Scotland - you don’t need a hijack to have a bomb on board an airplane. I have no doubt they _strongly suspected_ a hijacking. _Especially_ the folks higher up who were making the decisions on what to do were thinking that by this time, but you still don’t shoot down a civilian airliner unless you are CERTAIN that is the only viable alternative you have left. They didn’t HAVE to shoot it down. I’m just saying they should have _told_ someone who is responsible for national defense. How many times do I have to say that? It wasn’t the FAAs call to make, so they shouldn’t have sat on the information. You seem to think that if the FAA even _told_ anyone about the suspected hijacking, that would be tantamount to shooting down the plane. That’s utter nonsense. ---
**Author:** ![blowero](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/41988e/32.png) [@blowero](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/blowero)\ **Post date:** [December 15, 2004, 8:52am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039/80 "2004-12-15T08:52:29Z")
> [@Broomstick](#): > > Um… are you aware that the “San Francisco United Airlines maintenance center” is NOT an FAA facility? It is part of a _privately owned business_ called “United Airlines”. It is not a room full of controllers, nor would it have radar screens depicting current flight information anywhere in its facilities. It probably would have FAA inspectors on premesis part of the time, but those would be _maintenance_ inspectors who have nothing to do with ATC. Um… are you aware that you’re really annoying? I had a feeling that you would nitpick every irrelevant detail of the timeline that you could, and act as though that means something. > [@](#): > > I mean, bully for that flight attendant, she got through to SOMEONE and that’s exactly what she needed to do. She did not, however, contact the FAA directly. She contacted her employer. Yes, the information is passed on - the poor mope answering the phone probably called his supervisor, or had to find a phone book. Then someone had to call the FAA, ask for the appropriate person to report a hijacking to, and report the flight number. This, in turn, had to be relayed to whoever in the FAA hierarchy would need to hear it in order to connect this phone call to San Francisco with events happening over Cleveland. Just how fast do you expect that to happen? There are _other_ entries in the timeline that SPECIFICALLY say that the FAA HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON was aware of the hijacking. But I’m sure it’s much more fun for you to poke at irrelevancies. :rolleyes: > [@](#): > > Quote: > According to the 9/11 Commission, at about this time Cleveland flight control asks the FAA Command Center specifically whether someone has requested the military to launch fighters toward Flight 93. Cleveland offers to contact a nearby military base. The Command Center replies that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command have to make that decision and are working on the issue. [Independent Commission Report 6/17/04] > > Huh - sounds like the higher ups still aren’t sure exactly what’s going on, but the folks in Cleveland are doing everything they can to help. Huh - I have no idea how you can read it that way. It _sounds_ like the ATCs _knew_ what should have been done, and it got lost in the upper levels of beauracracy. Sounds like another failure of the system. > [@](#): > > “Files a flight plan”. How very interesting. In what sense? “I am Abdul, we are going to Washington, get everyone else out of our way”? Or did they file a flight plane like a pilot would? - given that at least some of them _were_ licensed pilots this is not beyond the realm of possibility. Did Cleveland know these guys weren’t the real pilots? Suspect they weren’t? Not sure? You DO understand that I’ve given you a plethora of evidence that was available to the ATCs at the time, and was passed on to their supervisors? Yet you choose to nitpick _each individual_ piece of evidence as though it stood on it’s own. How disingenuous of you. A changed flight plan might not mean a lot. But taken together with sudden extreme maneuvers, a bomb threat, screaming passengers, etc., it does mean something. Besides which, the 9/11 Commission Report _says_ the FAA was aware of the hijacking. You’re gonna tell them what they were or weren’t aware of? > [@](#): > > Ask the folks in Lockerbie, Scotland - you don’t need a hijack to have a bomb on board an airplane. I have no doubt they _strongly suspected_ a hijacking. _Especially_ the folks higher up who were making the decisions on what to do were thinking that by this time, but you still don’t shoot down a civilian airliner unless you are CERTAIN that is the only viable alternative you have left. Because if you do that everyone on board _will die_ and maybe, just maybe, there was some hope these folks would survive. In retrospect, maybe that wasn’t rational or logical but then people aren’t Star Trek Vulcans - they _do_ have emotions, irrational hopes, and so forth. Wow, great Strawman. So now the simple act of _telling_ the military about the hijacking, so they can at least _prepare_ to intercept it, is tantamount to mass murder. Geez, did you even buy that one when you were _writing_ it? The FAA wasn’t _charged_ with making the decision to shoot down a plane. Why do you keep insisting that the decision was theirs? > [@](#): > > A contingency plan that doesn’t take that into account is far weaker than one that does. I’m sorry, did I suggest that the plan should include mass murder? I don’t think so. > [@](#): > > I didn’t see any begging going on - You do know what the word “practically” means, right? It means “almost”, but still NOT. > [@](#): > > I see them offering to make some phone calls. Somehow you’re equating “should we/can we call this air force base” with desparation. I’m equating it with a strong desire for that to occur. Or maybe you think they asked about it even though they didn’t care? > [@](#): > > WHO at the FAA? At what level? Washington. > [@](#): > > On what do you base that? On the timeline I posted. > [@](#): > > Or were there high level people discussing whether this situation justified shooting down Flight 93? The people who _should_ have been discussing it COULDN’T have been, because they weren’t even informed of the hijacking until 10:07. Please try to keep up. > [@](#): > > Or do you prefer a world where the government has no qualms about firing upon civilians? That’s about the lamest strawman ever. > [@](#): > > Do you _honestly_ want the first response of the FAA or military to a hijacking to be “shoot them down!”? The strawman that’s so lame, you posted it twice. > [@](#): > > For that matter, based upon what you have given us, it could have been the _Air Force_ “sitting on the information” and refusing to launch. Nope. You aren’t following the thread. > [@](#): > > For all you know the FAA folks were down on their knees _begging_ for a military intercept. Or maybe not. You’ve provided no proof of your assertion that anyone was “sitting on the information” wrong. > [@](#): > > Again, I don’t see the proof. What? Proof that the nation knew about multiple hijackings by 9:30 AM? It was on every news network in the country. > [@](#): > > That timeline seems to indicate that, until 9:35 when the flight attendant called San Francisco no one on the ground knew _for sure_ this was a hijacked airplane, and at the point the information _confirming_ the hijack was yet to be in the hands of the FAA. I’m sure United didn’t dawdle in relaying it, but I’m expecting it took at least a few minutes to hand it over. Again, you’ve selected the wrong part of the timeline. That call doesn’t prove the point on its own. There is other evidence, which you seem to be ignoring. > [@](#): > > At no point did I say the FAA had no means to contact the authorities. Perhaps I have a more realistic idea of the speed at which this works given that I’ve been dealing with the FAA and ATC at least occassionally over the past 10 years. Maybe you are incapable of taking a step back and seeing the big picture, then. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039.md?page=3) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/sept-11th-4th-plane/279039.md?page=5)