Here is von Mises’ straw construction for the “collectivist” view of society (his interpretation).
This is rather misrepresentative of actual collectivist philosophy, but is offered as part of the foundation of von Mises’ rejection of society as “an urge ingrained in man’s essential nature” or anything beyond conscious individual decisions. Rather, he tells us authoritatively that society is “joint action and cooperation in which each participant sees the other partner’s success as a means for the attainment of his own.”
So von Mises’ extensive discussion of human society is effectively a redefinition which excludes any recognition of social forces which derive from unconscious, unselfish or biologically inherent impulses. Anything outside his narrow definition of society as a manifestation of the sum of individual self interests is to be discarded and derided. While this is not a rejection of “society” per se, von Mises has effectively “boxed in” society (to use erislover’s term) into only the parts he likes.
I don’t want to broaden the thread into areas the OP did not intend, so if you’d like to continue down this road, I’ll beg Gad’s pardon first.
Yes. Arbitration and enforcement of the law (noncoercion) are what you pay for and agree to when you consent to be governed. Private arbitration is an option when both parties consent freely, but government arbitration is available to every citizen.
Yes, UCs are endemic to an economy of any sort. But when an economy is centralized, there is no freedom to opt out of what has been planned.
Some UCs can be positive (as in Adam Smith’s invisible hand, or F. A. Hayeks spontaneous order) when their application is local and there is freedom to select options. (One assumes that the best options will make themselves apparent over time.)
But when their application is central, then their effects are coercive and ubiquitous. See, for example, the rates of murder in U.S. history during prohibition and the War on Drugs as opposed to other times. The intention was to reduce crime but the consequence was to create new crime.
Another example is imposing quotas on steel imports, where the intention is to protect companies and steel-workers from competitive pricing. But the consequence is not seen until automobile manufacturers raise the prices for their cars.
Your first question seems to have been reversed in your parenthetical clause, and is followed by an “if so, then…”. So let me just say this: to govern means to secure rights, specifically, the rights of those who have given consent to be governeed. Therefore, if you coerce a Dystopian, then the entity protecting their rights is not Libertaria but Dystopia. But in coercing, you must realize that you waive your own rights, and Libertaria will not protect you when you meet defense or retaliation. So, carry the yesses and noes around as appropriate.
Location isn’t relevant. In fact, Libertaria has no borders. Go somewhere and coerce, you fend for yourself.
Lib, click on the “www” link at the bottom of my last post. This will take you to a thread in which you and I had an intriguing discussion regarding society, the social contract, and morality. No single post contains my definiton of society, but beginning about halfway down the page, we really get into it.
Success! As they say, “If you can’t dazzle them with brilliance, then just confuse the hell out of them.”
So, using cowgirl’s example, would a Libertarian therefore waive his/her rights if he/she bought Product X from Dystopia, if Product X were being manufactured by a mean old corporation (or whatever) that was polluting without the consent of the citizens of Dystopia (or, specifically, without the consent of the people who had to use the polluted water)? (Carrying the yesses and noes around would lead me to this conclusion, but I wanta double-check since IIRC you hadn’t previously stated anything to this effect.)
In the same vein, would the Libertarian citizens waive their rights if 50% of the Dystopians affected by the water pollution consented to the pollution? Or 90%? (I.e., for a piece of property (like a river) that is pretty much communal by necessity, how is “consent” determined WRT use of the property?)
Go ahead, xeno. I’m jetlagged, I’ve got a twenty-five page paper due Monday, a large bluebooking assignment due Saturday, lines to learn, a girl to woo, erl and I have intractable differences of opinion re: informational concerns and the market, and I’m tired, for the moment, of responding to Lib’s blindered bushwah.
It would be coercion by proxy, as given in the example, since the manufacturers of Product X are engaging in coercive behavior in the making of Product X, so the purchasing of Product X would therefore enable the manufacturers to further their coercive practices.
By “you would have to demonstrate” do you mean “you as a citizen of Libertaria would have to demonstrate”, i.e. that purchasers of Product X would be justified in their actions until a private citizen brought arbitration against them? This strikes me as being a problematic setup, since the Libertarian arbiters would stand to gain nothing by the elimination of Product X from the market (all things being equal), while the Dystopians wouldn’t be able to bring arbitration against the Libertarians since they lack the political means of doing so (and besides, their first beef is going to be with the guy directly engaging in coercive practices, not with the guys engaging in coercion by proxy).
The problem would be similar with remote coercion – the ones who are capable of bringing arbitration against the offender(s) are not going to benefit from doing so, and the ones who would benefit from arbitration lack the political means to do so.
The problem being that it is unfeasible (and likely impossible) for a single private citizen or even a single consortium of citizens to purchase, say, the Mississippi River, or (more problematic) the Mississippi Basin Water Table, or (still more problematic) the Atmosphere.
Perhaps this wouldn’t be an issue in Libertaria, since anybody who uses the Atmosphere would be able to bring arbitration against the polluter. It becomes an issue, though, when the pollution is taking place in Dystopia, where only 10%/50%/90% of the citizens have given consent to the pollution, while the remaining 90%/50%/10% are being coerced. At what point is Libertaria engaging in coercion by proxy by purchasing Product X from Dystopia?
That’s not what I would consider to be coercion by proxy. Coercion by proxy is hiring a hitman to assault someone, or hiring a conman to defraud someone — hiring proxies for the purpose of doing your deeds, rather than doing them yourself.
It doesn’t make sense to say that purchasing Product X enables coercers. What enables coercers is unethical government.
Whoever is being coerced ought to bring action. You’ll have to forgive me for not knowing whatever complexities there might be in your head about your hypothetical.
The only way they can lack the political means is if their government is unethical, i.e., not libertarian. You will have to call upon someone else — Chumpsky perhaps — to entertain hypotheticals with respect to authoritarian political contexts.
Funny, in my ten years or so of libertarian apologetics, I’ve entertained very many of the man-who-owns-everything scenarios. I’ve even heard about the man who owns all the water on earth.
Nevertheless, I still don’t understand what you’re asking here. I already did not see the relevance of percentages, and now I do not see the relevance of being unable to own the atmosphere. You’ll have to presume that I do not know your underlying assumptions, how you derived your hypothetical, or what your point is unless you state it.
At no point that I can see. It doesn’t even make sense to me. Libertaria doesn’t purchase anything. Libertaria isn’t even a rights-bearing entity.
Do you consider “funding unethical government” to be equivalent to “enabling coercers”? If so, then why don’t you consider “purchasing Product X from (an unethical government)/(a business that is unethically aided by an unethical government)” to be equivalent to “enabling coercers”? My assumption here is that whoever is selling Product X is doing so at a profit, and that these funds are then used to further their coercion, and/or the profitability of their coercive enterprise supplies them with an economic justification for said enterprise. I.e., the purchase of Product X provides the coercers with an economic means for coercion and/or an economic justification for coercion.
If you do not consider “funding unethical government” to be equivalent to “enabling coercers,” then what is the difference between “coercion by proxy” and “giving money to people who engage in coercion”?
There’s no question that Dystopia’s government is being unethical, that’s pretty much a given in the hypothetical. The question is whether a Libertarian would waive his rights as a citizen of Libertaria by “enabling” coercion by the Dystopian government or its agents (by directly or indirectly funding their coercive enterprise), or whether all bets are off regarding the effects of a Libertarian’s actions outside of Libertaria (i.e. “if another Libertarian doesn’t initiate arbitration against the Libertarian in question, then it’s all kosher”).
Would a citizen of Dystopia be able to bring arbitration against a citizen of Libertaria, if the Dystopian were still in Dystopia and the Libertarian were still in Libertaria when the alleged coercion occurred? My underlying question was whether this was feasible/possible, hence my specification that it was Dystopians who were being coerced.
Would the Dystopian be able to use Libertarian arbiters, or would he have to hire his own arbiter? (My assumption is that a Libertarian citizen would have access to arbitration by the government of Libertaria, i.e. that he would not necessarily have to fund his own arbitration. If this is not the case, then ignore this question.)
The question is, “Does the government of Libertaria only protect the rights of Libertarians, or does it also protect the rights of Dystopians (or whoever) from being violated by Libertarians?” I don’t care about the specifics of Dystopia’s political system.
Well, yes, I do. But you did not give the scenario of people paying the government of Dystopia to coerce on their behalf. You gave the scenario of people purchasing a product from a citizen of Dystopia, whom you say is coercive. I told you that if coercion exists in Dystopia, it is the fault of the Dystopian government.
At what point is there a reductio ad absurdum? You buy cookies from a girl scout, knowing that she will turn around and spend her dollar on a Nestle’s Crunch bar. Have you enslaved Africans?
Coercion is the initiation of force or fraud, and is never kosher. But it is unreasonable to expect the government of Libertaria to govern Dystopians, which is what it would be doing if it secured their rights for them. Once more, to govern means to secure rights. And only those who have freely and volitionally given their consent may ethically be governed.
Please try to understand the above before proceeding further if your inquiries are sincere. Libertarian government is not the authoritative nanny style of permission dispensation and problem solving that you’re used to. It is protection of property on behalf of those who have given consent to be protected. That is its only role. It doesn’t conduct diplomacy, trade, or world politics.
It might behoove you to re-read prior responses, as we are edging toward repetition. As I explained before, Libertaria is not a nation-state with borders. It does not claim any property as its own (it is not a rights-bearing entity — rights = property). Therefore, there is no such thing as being in Libertaria, per se. If you are on the property of a Libertarian, then you are in Libertaria; otherwise, you are not.
As to what a Dystopian can do, again, I have no idea. I’m not an apologist for dystopianism. If you are, for some reason, asking whether Libertaria will arbitrate on behalf of Dystopians, the answer is no.
Why would Dystopians have access to Libertarian arbiters? If they had paid for Libertarian government, they would be Libertarians.
Gosh. I wish I would have waited until I got to this.
Libertaria protects the rights of Libertarians. Dystopia does whatever it does — tyranny, protection, whatever — for Dystopians. But again, in case you’ve forgotten, if it is determined (by Libertaria) that a Libertarian has coerced a Dystopian, then Libertaria will not defend the Libertarian when the Dystopian or his government uses force to defend or retaliate. Libertaria suppresses coercion only, and coercion is initial, not responsive, force.
Fair enough, and I’m sorry if I came off as being repetitive. My question (couched in regards to pollution) basically amounted to “How does Libertaria handle international relations?” And the answer (correct me if I’m wrong) is, “It doesn’t.” (My confusion mostly stemmed from the fact that this is different from the response that I’ve received from other libertarians, in which the government of Libertaria would take active measures to prevent coercion performed by or against the citizens of Libertaria, e.g. with a police force of some kind that acted without necessarily having received a complaint or a request for arbitration on a matter.)
There he goes again.
Lib said (and has said several times): “I’ve even heard about the man who owns all the water on earth.”
I pointed out in another thread that this statement, and a lot of others like it that Lib has come up with is a strawman. Lib, as I expected, ignored what I posted.
So now, Lib, I am asking specifically: put up or shut up. Either direct us to the thread where anyone who disagrees with you said anything like your quote, or explain why you feel that Libertarianism has to be defended with what is, in essence, a lie.
Thank you for your attention.
While I’m sure it will be an interesting read, Mapache, I don’t quite follow how you suppose that what Lib mentions is the basis of his argument, or defense of Libertarianism.
eris:now you’re doing it too. I didn’t say that “The man who owns all the water in the world” was the basis of his argument. I said, and elaborated on what I said in the other thread (“Libertaria, a case study” started by you on 05-28-02) that Lib habitually uses strawman arguments, and I gave one example here and more in the other threads. My point is that if your case is a reasonable one, you shouldn’t have to use sophoistry to defend it.
As you say, I don’t use water monopolies or even Giant Squids to defend libertarianism, but that was one of the very first questions I ever encountered back in the early 90s. Only a small percentage of my time writing apologia for libertarianism has been on this board. Apparently, Mapache assumed otherwise.
But even here, going back as far as the search will allow, the same sort of discussions have taken place. For example, Sake Samurai had written in May, 2000:
And there was Single Dad’s hypothetical around the same time:
And there’ve been several others.
There was also a promise made by Mapache back in May, 2002:
