I do want to add, though, that I also think this cuts both ways.
Certainly it can go both ways. I am by no means advocating legislative solutions as utopian. What legislative bodies can do, however, is change the rules when a necessity to do so is perceived.
BTW, it is a bit of a tangent, but I have found myself musing about the nature of elected arbitrators in Libertaria. I find the idea troubling for many of the same reasons that I dislike elected judges in general, but I think the potential for abuse is even greater in Libertaria given the lack of a system (however imperfect it may be) for proviing checks and balances to the decisions of government arbitrators.
One consistent result of modern election tracking is that money wins elections. While I have never seen a detailed statistical analysis, there appears to be a strong correlation between money spent on a campaign and success in a campaign. Certainly, the behavior of those raising money for political campaigns indicates that they feel the correlation is strong. So, it seems quite likely that many campaigns for arbitrator will be won by individuals with either great individual monetary resources or by individuals who can convince such folks to contribute large sums to the campaign. There’s nothing revolutionary about that, of course, it is pretty much what we see in our own elections.
Now, without pretending that all folks so elected will be crooks and sadists, it seems likely that (again, as in our own system) some of the arbitrators will not be perfectly honest in the discharge of their duties, and that in particular they will favor the concerns of the wealthy (again, as in our own system). But–in Libertaria a government arbitrator is (if I understand correctly) the only recourse a poor man if he feels he has been coerced.
Basically, it seems that Libertarian arbitrators would be particularly vulnerable to the type of manipulation of the mechanics of the system that we see ample evidence of in other forms of elected office, both because the individual arbitrators are not bound by precedent and because the only system Libertaria provides to check the power of an arbitrator is through election.
I’m not at all married to the idea of popularly elected arbiters. In fact, I’m intrigued by the notion of a libertarian monarchy with arbiters appointed by the king, who functions as chief enforcer. I’d be interested in hearing of any structural formulations of government that might best execute the supression of coercion.
As I’ve said before, however, there is a check on the power of an arbiter no matter how he comes to exist. If you perceive that he has arbitrated unfairly, then you may charge him with coercion. But if he has arbitrated fairly, then justice has been served.
With respect to legislation and changing rules, it should be noted that they can be changed for any arbitrary motivation, and not just for a perceived need for change. And I think it’s fair to say that, in practice, they are changed most often for the purpose of political expedience.
Further, the more rules there are, the more unintended consequences there can arise. If we were to legislate nose blowing, for example, we would affect not only nose blowers but lots of other people as well.
Tissue manufacturers and places where nose blowers are employed would have to establish internal bureaucracies to ensure conformity with government specifications. Establishments that are patronized by nose blowers would be exposed to new liability issues if their patrons failed to blow their noses legally. Government itself would have to bureaucratize the implementation of nose blowing statutes. Parents and guardians would have to teach their children the nose blowing laws. Schools and other institutions would have to adjust policies to accomodate them. Police would have to enforce them. Courts would have to deal with unlawful nose blowers.
New crime would be created out of whole cloth.
And that’s not even the worst of it. The worst of it is when they start tweaking the legislation to provide exceptions for specific cases, accomodations of special interests, and random subjective perceptions of necessity. A man might rightly come to fear blowing his nose altogether.
Unfairly? I guess I’m confused, here. By what definition does preferring one claimant over another constiturte coersion?
I think one of the reasons I find the “single law” tenet for human society to be untenable is that so often I see proponents of that idea acting as if determining initial force in a conflict were an almost trivial exercise. Maybe I am misunderstanding something when you say that an arbitration can be challenged if it is “coersive”? Under what circumstances might an arbitrator be viewed to have coerced a claimant?
As for how arbitrators are chosen, I’m not sure the Libertarian monarchy does anything except concentrate the risk of corruption into a single source (much like historical monarchies.) Now, instead of being able to secure their position through accumulation or appeasement of wealth, arbitrators must appease a single man. So long as that man is honest and competent, it seems a good system. The first corrupt monarch, though, finds himself with pretty much arbitrary authority over those too poor to secure their rights through private arbitrators or mercenaries.
You are undoubtedly correct that the majority of legislative initiatives serve to advance political interests rather than to correct “flaws” within the system. But that is a different issue. I am simply noting that a legislative structure has the capacity to adapt in the face of poor judgments where your Libertarian system of arbitration does not. I see this as a weaknes sof Libertaria, when compared to a modern democracy/republic. You, of course, see the often intrusive nature of legislation as a weakness of modern republic when compared with Libertaria.
When it comes down to it, I think any proposed model for human co-existence which pretends that it will always present an ideal solution is too absurd to be believed. Libertaria, Cummuniville, Socialopolis, Atlantis, America: they all have warts.
I couldn’t agree with you more. Since you’ve lurked often in my threads, you’ve seen me say many times (including in this thread) that libertarianism makes no pretense of providing solutions — ideal or not — to people’s problems. All it does is attempt to provide a context of peace (no initial force) and honesty (no initial fraud) so that people may work to solve their own problems in whatever way they believe is most effective.
I disagree with your assertion that a democratic republic is adaptable while a libertarian monarchy is not — for two reasons.
One, the same potential for adaptability inherent in legislative modification is equally inherent in interpretive modification. But beyond that, a libertarian government that is not making its people happy faces the withdrawal of their consent, which is the very basis of its legitimacy. There is no law restricting people, once their contractual obligation has ended, from forming whatever government they believe is most likely to effect their safety and happiness. A greater potential for adaptation can hardly be imagined.
You ask under what circumstance an arbiter may be viewed to have coerced a citizen, and the answer is the same as I gave before. The arbiter has sworn an oath (contracted) to apply the Noncoercion Principle to his cases. If it can be shown that he applied some other consideration, then he stands in breach. And breach is a coercion because the person who stands in breach has fraudulently misrepresented the intentions he expressed when he contracted. If you have paid a man to do X but he does Y instead, disregarding his obligation, then you have been coerced.
In anticipation of a possible objection to breach of arbitration, you may say that an arbiter who is corrupt might potentially face another arbiter who is corrupt when his charge of coercion is heard, and that the latter arbiter might rule merely as a favor that the former arbiter did not coerce. Setting aside that both arbiters may then be charged with coercion, keep in mind that there really is no substantive difference in the way arbiters in Libertaria and judges in Democrataria fundamentally work — both apply their own interpretations to the law. The substantive difference is that one of them deals with one law, while the other deals with millions.