A slight majority of Americans think apple should help unlock the phone.
That poll is a little old. As people have learned more, they have increasingly sided with Apple. Not that it matters. On complicated issues like this polling is pretty much meaningless. But it is surprising that “terrorism is scary” has become much less effective than ten years ago.
It’s function of getting past the initial sound bite. Congress did the same thing.
I still have a gut feeling this was viewed as low hanging legal fruit and when the apple didn’t fall they had to walk it back.
I see three possible options, in descending order of likelihood:
(1) The FBI saw its legal case going worse than expected and abandoned ship;
(2) The FBI is so incompetent that it wasn’t aware of the alternative methods until this weekend;
(3) The FBI knew of the alternative methods but for some reason doubted them until something changed their mind this weekend.
Imagine being Judge Pym’s law clerk and clicking send on your scathing bench memo only to find the FBI has decided to cancel the hearing. It’d be enough to drive you to use PGP email, I tell ya!
It’s a reported bug in iMessage security:
As noted, it’s not something that would actually help unlock the “at rest” data on an iPhone, which strengthens the suspicion that the FBI is looking for a face-saving excuse to bail after realizing that they picked the wrong fight. (Also as noted, it shows that the Feds’ yammering about “going dark” is about as worthy of serious consideration as a brat’s complaints about “going hungry” when he doesn’t get dessert until he finishes his vegetables.)
No, it’s not the iMessage exploit. Matthew Green (the guy behind that work at JHU) has said it is most likely one of the hardware hacks everyone has known about for months. Plus, the FBI’s filing made clear that this method would unlock the phone.
Sounds like the FBI is hoping for the whole mess to go away before their quest for a favorable precedent ends up creating an unfavorable one. The iMessage exploit serves as a useful smokescreen (the Teeming Millions will just remember “somebody found a bug in the iPhone and then the FBI said they don’t need Apple to open the phone any more”), and after a decent interval they can announce (whether or not they actually have a way to get in) that there was no relevant data on the phone (because, duh, Farouk used the now-destroyed personal phone for that stuff).
The FBI say they have successfully broken into the phone using the ‘third party’ assistance mentioned above.
Are they telling the truth? Or, is it just a nice job of closing the PR loop? Doubt we’ll ever know.
It’s a nice job of closing the PR loop and taking a last cheap shot at Apple. The fact pattern of the case (this was a government-issued work phone; the shooters destroyed their personal phones but didn’t bother to destroy this one) clearly indicates that there is no relevant information to be had from it, which makes actually breaking into it (as opposed to setting a precedent, as they had hoped to do before things went pear-shaped for them) superfluous.
That was a fast billion billion years.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank my debating opponents and tell them:
Neener neener neener.

Wait, you think these events support your position in this thread Scylla? I don’t think I could come up with a more perfect evisceration of your position than for the FBI to give up after the briefing and then crack the phone itself. That’s the complete opposite of a psy-ops campaign to convince terrorists that they can’t do it.
The whole “it’s a ruse and they are already in the phone” is, as you say, eviscerated.
This was founded on two basic principles:
- The FBI is and was being clever (also eviscerated.)
- Breaking into this phone isn’t the big old billion billion year problem everybody seemed to think it was.
So, I was partially correct.
In the grand tradition of the SDMB, being partially correct means I get to make great big sweeping claims of total victory.
What about this don’t you get?
I’m with you there, but I also think you’re straw-manning #2 by conflating the difficulty in mathematically cracking the encryption with the difficulty in black bagging a single phone. AFAIK, the technological consensus remains unchanged: it would be nigh-impossible to crack the encryption, but not-so-difficult to hack the delete-after-10-attempts hardware mechanism.
Your main claim was that the FBI has secretly broken the AES256 encryption algorithm, probably by comparing one plaintext encryption to another plaintext encryption.
You’re not even close.
You need to read more carefully.
I was asked how I proposed the FBI got into the phone, and that was one possibility among several that I gave.
Those I believe are your first two posts in the thread that generally lay out your thesis. There’s a lot more back and forth on how you think AES 256 is like a complex substitution cypher (I’m being simplistic here). But your main points were:
- FBI has been in the phone for a long time
- They did it by comparing some known phrase like “Heil Hitler” in the memory of the phone.
- FBI intended to lie to say they weren’t in the phone so as not to alert terrorists.
The problems are: there’s no evidence that the FBI has been in the phone for more than a few days; that’s not how AES works; and the FBI has now alerted the terrorists that they can hack iPhones. I’m just not seeing where you were right on anything, with the caveat that nobody can prove claim #1 conclusive true or false at this point.
Which post of yours, precisely, are you saying I didn’t read carefully enough?
Whatever, dude.
It will be interesting to see if Congress lets this go.
The fact that the current Congress would be hard pressed to reach a consensus on which pizza toppings to order works in the nation’s favor in this case.
Another interesting question is how this affects future court cases, given that the FBI’s rationale “we need to make them help us; there’s no other way” is now gutshot. They may have to rely on one-off hacks in the future (which would be a good thing, as it would require a significant investment of resources for each case, ruling out bulk surveillance and forcing a pick-and-choose triage of actual criminal cases (e.g. “no, we’re not spending ten grand to open some pot grower’s phone”). Even the inefficiency would be beneficial in and of itself – as Bruce Schneier points out here, overly efficient law enforcement suppresses social progress:
[QUOTE=Bruce Schneier, “Data and Goliath”]
Across the US, states are on the verge of reversing decades-old laws about homosexual relationships and marijuana use. If the old laws could have been perfectly enforced through surveillance, society would never have reached the point where the majority of citizens thought those things were okay. There has to be a period where they are still illegal yet increasingly tolerated, so that people can look around and say, “You know, that wasn’t so bad.” Yes, the process takes decades, but it’s a process that can’t happen without lawbreaking…
[/QUOTE]