# Should Electronic Voting Machines be Required to Produce a Printed Ballot Receipt? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [February 10, 2005, 3:02pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/should-electronic-voting-machines-be-required-to-produce-a-printed-ballot-receipt/289398 "2005-02-10T15:02:28Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 11\ **Page:** 2
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 9:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/should-electronic-voting-machines-be-required-to-produce-a-printed-ballot-receipt/289398/21 "2005-02-12T21:19:32Z")
> [@Brutus](#): > > Still, I don’t see any particular problem with the theory of producing paper backups of electronic votes, if the authenticity of the paper backups can somehow be verified. Granted, that is a big ‘if’, seeing as how even a major media outlet was conned by some simple forged documents. See post #14. The technology, already invented, produces a printed ballot right after the voter presses the final button on the touchscreen; it is visible, under glass, to the voter; then it is deposited in a sealed box, to be opened if anyone demands a recount. It seems to me a difficult system to rig. > [@Brutus](#): > > Unfortunately, the measure doesn’t seem to address the problem of people voting twice, or voting when not technically eligible to do so . . . No, because those are entirely **different** problems, if problems they be\*, and would require fundamentally different solutions. Say, a national ID card which, for U.S. citizens holding it, would constitute an automatic voting registration, updated whenever the voter changes address. If you’re a resident alien you would get a card stating you’re not a citizen. \*Do you have any cite for any study showing that voting fraud of the kind you describe here has materially affected the outcome of any recent election? > [@Brutus](#): > > After all, reputable sources have yet to show that there is a significant problem with the existing electronic system. Reputable computer scientists have demonstrated that it is at least **possible** to hack or rig the electronic voting machines and leave no trail. From [http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040816&c=8&s=dugger:](http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040816&c=8&s=dugger:) > [@](#): > > **The Kids Prick Open a Scandal** > > Some kids who are “really interested in computers” were playing around last year, spidering through the links on various websites, when they discovered that Diebold had an unsecured FTP site (the same one Behler had used). One of the boys noted the fact on his website. Some other material on that site–not the stuff about Diebold–attracted a lot of hits, and that automatically led Google, the cyberspace search engine, to position it among the early-listed sites for many searches. One day Bev Harris, a literary publicist in Washington who was doing research for a book on vote-counting in computers, fed Google the right search words and the FTP site itself popped up. Knowing little about computers, she turned to David Allen, who was publishing her book, and he recognized the openly posted source codes and much other data concerning Diebold voting machines. > > A small group of activists in Georgia worked with Harris. One of them, Roxanne Jekot, who runs a software consulting firm, analyzed “almost every line” of the Diebold source code and found many ways to change vote totals there and also in the Microsoft operating code. “The software is totally junk,” she says. “They sold vaporware.” Determined to get peer review of what she was finding, Jekot approached David Dill, the Stanford computer science professor. > > “Both Roxanne and Bev were very courageous and determined to lift the veil of secrecy on the code,” Dill says. “I think most academics would be much more cautious, especially about publishing the fact that they looked at the code. I certainly was, and I wasn’t about to get other people in trouble by asking them to help me. A number of us would be inclined to talk to lawyers before doing anything too bold. So it made a huge difference that Bev posted the code in New Zealand for everyone to download. That reduced but didn’t eliminate the legal risks of the Johns Hopkins/Rice University people looking at the code. If Bev and whoever else was involved in releasing this code had not been so brave, people [with strong professional reputations] might not have been able to speak out so freely.” > > After some agreements on a division of roles, Avi Rubin of Johns Hopkins and three other scientists produced a devastating twenty-three-page exposure of the Diebold software. That was followed by two more damaging technical studies in Ohio. Then a “Red Team” exercise to break the Diebold code was staged at RABA Technologies’ headquarters in Maryland. Four of the eight computer scientists on the team had worked at the National Security Agency, and the team director had been the senior technical director for the NSA. The team concluded, “A voter can be deceived into thinking he is voting for one candidate when, in fact, the software is recording the vote for another candidate.” A security vulnerability “allows a remote attacker to get complete control of the machine.” And one can “automatically upload malicious software” that will “modify or delete elections.” Some kids sniffing around in cyberspace had led, step by step, to the dawning national realization that computerized vote-counting puts democracy in grave danger. Whether such rigging has actually taken place in any election is still an open question, but there have been plenty of suspicious circumstances – e.g., Georgia in 2002. From [http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040816&c=7&s=dugger:](http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040816&c=7&s=dugger:) > [@](#): > > **Voting Machines Stolen in Georgia** > > In 2000 five out of six Georgians cast a paper ballot that could be recounted on ES&S systems. In January 2001, in a speech to the Democratic-controlled legislature, Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox, a Democrat who is expected to run for governor in 2006, declared that considering all the recent problems down in Florida, Georgia should adopt one “uniform electronic voting system by November 2004.” Upon Cox’s fervent recommendation of the just-born Diebold Election Systems, in May 2002 Georgia agreed to pay Diebold $54 million for 19,000 DRE voting systems. The counties and cities of Georgia had chosen their own voting machines for the last time, and, less obviously, Georgians had lost their ability to recount their votes in contested elections. > > At once Diebold set to manufacturing 282 of its AccuVote TS voting systems a day. Some of the earliest ones arriving in Georgia, sent out for use in the training of election workers, were left in a hotel conference room overnight, stolen and never recovered. Late that June the secret vote-counting codes inside nine to fourteen more of the Diebold machines were stolen. Diebold made an uncounted number of apparently illegal changes in the election-conducting code between June and November. The memory cards on which the votes on each of the computers were recorded on election day all over Georgia had no encryption. According to Rob Behler, who served as Diebold’s production deployment manager in Georgia during the first half of that summer, those cards could be used to change the results manually, precinct by precinct. > > Incumbent US Senator Max Cleland and incumbent Governor Roy Barnes, both Democrats, were odds-on favorites to win re-election. A week before the voting an Atlanta Journal-Constitution poll showed Cleland ahead by five points, 49-44, but on election day he lost to his Republican opponent, Saxby Chambliss, by seven points, 53-46, a twelve-point swing. The loss of Governor Barnes to Sonny Perdue was even more remarkable: a one-week switch of fourteen percentage points. These were suspicious anomalies, and subsequently in a Peach State Poll one in eight Georgia voters were “not very confident” or “not at all confident” that the DREs had produced accurate results; another 32 percent were only “somewhat confident.” > > In his front parlor at home in Georgia, Rob Behler told me that just before or just as he took over the Atlanta warehouse for Diebold, some of the voting machines had been sent out to “do demos,” and in one southern county “somebody broke in and stole…[nine or] fourteen of the machines and, I think, one of the servers.” He says the vote-counting programs in the stolen computers could have been completely reconstructed by reverse engineering and employed to jimmy the election. > > “Quality-checking” the AccuVote machines as they arrived from Diebold at a warehouse in Atlanta, Behler and his crew found problems, he says, with “every single one” of them and about a fifth of them were shoved aside as unusable. When Diebold’s programmers wanted “patches,” that is, changes, inserted into the voting-system software, Behler says, they sent them to him via the company’s open, insecure File Transfer Protocol (FTP) site in cyberspace. On his own unsecured laptop (resting on his desk as he spoke), Behler made twenty-two or twenty-three of the cards that were used to change the programs in the machines. > > The night of the November 2002 election, sixty-seven of the memory cards used in Fulton County (Atlanta) disappeared. Running his laptop with a dual battery, Behler says, in six or seven hours he could have changed the totals on those sixty-seven cards. “There’s no technical problem. There was absolutely zero protection on the card itself. You throw the card in, you just drill down into its files.” > > Brit Williams, a computer consultant at Kennesaw State University who runs Georgia’s testing of voting systems, confirmed to me that the memory cards were not encrypted and all had the same password (1111), but each one, he contended, was “unique to its machine.” He snapped, “We had 22,000 voting stations. How would you like to be in charge of 22,000 passwords?” Williams said the sixty-seven missing memory cards in Atlanta had been left in the machines by forgetful workers and were recovered. > > The Georgia election of 2002 illustrates how serious risks of technical malfunctions and malicious tampering can occur without anyone outside the voting business finding out about them. No doubt in part because of the hasty start-up, Diebold’s “security,” though approved by the independent testing authorities and the state, was in fact farcical. Both of the losing Democrats had backed installation of the DRE systems statewide, so they could hardly call for recounts that their own state party had made literally impossible. ---
**Author:** ![SteveG1](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/bb73d2/32.png) [@SteveG1](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SteveG1)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 9:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/should-electronic-voting-machines-be-required-to-produce-a-printed-ballot-receipt/289398/22 "2005-02-12T21:21:04Z")
> [@Brutus](#): > > Unfortunately, the measure doesn’t seem to address the problem of people voting twice, or voting when not technically eligible to do so, so I don’t see much to be gained from this measure. After all, reputable sources have yet to show that there is a significant problem with the existing electronic system. There’s always been issues of “game playing” no matter what system was used. People voting twice, dead people voting, dogs and cats voting, people being blocked from voting etc. Did they affect the outcome? Sometimes they did. In a huge landslide, it’s harder to affect the outcome. In close votes like we have been seeing, it’s a bit more invisible and more “doable”. Did it happen in this election? Who knows. If it did, did it change the results? Who knows. Brutus, you (and I) have seen plenty of politicians and “commoners” screaming about rigging. Wouldn’t it be cool (blue sky thinking) if there were some way to get rid of all the recounts and accusations, to either say it did or didn’t happen, and put it all to rest? To be able to say The Election Tallies Are Accurate And Verifiable? All it may take is a tweaking of some lines of computer code. ---
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 9:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/should-electronic-voting-machines-be-required-to-produce-a-printed-ballot-receipt/289398/23 "2005-02-12T21:40:50Z")
> [@SteveG1](#): > > Wouldn’t it be cool (blue sky thinking) if there were some way to get rid of all the recounts and accusations, to either say it did or didn’t happen, and put it all to rest? To be able to say The Election Tallies Are Accurate And Verifiable? All it may take is a tweaking of some lines of computer code. It would take a lot more than that, **Steve.** Any line of computer code can be altered by a sufficiently talented hacker (see above). Altering marks on paper, and leaving no trace of the alteration, is much more difficult. ---
**Author:** ![Steve\_MB](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/steve_mb/32/5339_2.png) [@Steve\_MB](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Steve_MB)\ **Post date:** [February 13, 2005, 4:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/should-electronic-voting-machines-be-required-to-produce-a-printed-ballot-receipt/289398/24 "2005-02-13T16:44:07Z")
> [@lee](#): > > I’d like to see each vote produce two documents. Both should have > > non-ambiguous human readable listings of what vote was cast. They should both be visible to the voter after the vote for inspection, but the one copy never leaves the control of the voting machine. So the voter could glance at them see if they match and then **take one with** Do you propose to print the header “This Certificate Good For One Payoff And/Or One Intact Kneecap?” You might as well; that’s what it would amount to. ---
**Author:** ![Steve\_MB](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/steve_mb/32/5339_2.png) [@Steve\_MB](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Steve_MB)\ **Post date:** [February 13, 2005, 4:48pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/should-electronic-voting-machines-be-required-to-produce-a-printed-ballot-receipt/289398/25 "2005-02-13T16:48:02Z")
> [@1010011010](#): > > I’d like to be able to vote online from any computer… securely and anonymously and only once per poll event. That would make it more convenient to participate. If I still have to put on clothes and go to a designated place to use dedicated hardware… I really couldn’t care less about the format of the ballot. Whether it’s a touch screen or a #2 pencil and little black ovals or putting an X next to a candidate’s name is a minor concern in the scheme of dragging my ass to a polling location. That raises the question of whether we really want to encourage people who don’t care enough to go to the trouble of “dragging their ass to a polling location” (and, presumably, also didn’t care enough to do any homework on the issues) to vote. Nothing personal, but I for one don’t. (Assisting people who have legitimate problems getting to the polls is a separate issue, that can be resolved via absentee ballots.) ---
**Author:** ![SteveG1](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/bb73d2/32.png) [@SteveG1](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SteveG1)\ **Post date:** [February 13, 2005, 5:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/should-electronic-voting-machines-be-required-to-produce-a-printed-ballot-receipt/289398/26 "2005-02-13T17:16:26Z")
> [@Steve MB](#): > > That raises the question of whether we really want to encourage people who don’t care enough to go to the trouble of “dragging their ass to a polling location” (and, presumably, also didn’t care enough to do any homework on the issues) to vote. Nothing personal, but I for one don’t. That (not doing the homework) will always happen, no matter what. So will all the other charming little things we all know and love. We have the straight ticket voters, who will vote their party even it is run on the “who will be eaten first” platform. We have the ones who voted based on physical appearance (Kennedy vs. Nixon comes to mind. Kennedy just looked “nicer”). We have the ones who vote only one issue (Joe is pro-gun. I don’t care about the rest). We have the ones who vote based on one minute soundbites. We have the ones who vote religion (Kennedy vs. Nixon again - Kennedy will take his orders from the Pope). We have the fearmonger vote (Johnson vs. Goldwater, complete with nukes blowing up little girls in the “commercial”). (Bush and Cheney -vote for us or we will all die). We have the Swiftboat vote, based on believing outright lies (also called the anti-McCain vote, also based on lies). Finally, there will always be crooks who try to rig the game (Tammany Hall / Boss Tweed is the classic example). ---
**Author:** ![DeepMauve](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/a9adbd/32.png) [@DeepMauve](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DeepMauve)\ **Post date:** [February 13, 2005, 5:59pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/should-electronic-voting-machines-be-required-to-produce-a-printed-ballot-receipt/289398/27 "2005-02-13T17:59:27Z")
> [@Steve MB](#): > > That raises the question of whether we really want to encourage people who don’t care enough to go to the trouble of “dragging their ass to a polling location” (and, presumably, also didn’t care enough to do any homework on the issues) to vote. Nothing personal, but I for one don’t. > > (Assisting people who have legitimate problems getting to the polls is a separate issue, that can be resolved via absentee ballots.) Ok, I’d like to make a few points on this subject. 1. a paper trail is a MUST of any voting system, otherwise you leave it open to manipulation and fraud. This is an obvious point. 2. you can’t allow a voter to leave with any proof of their vote or else they may be open to intimidation tactics. Before I go on, answer this question? Altering which of the first two points allows for greater (and easier) election manipulation? Would it be to electronically change the votes vehind the scenes without ever beign able to validate it afterwards due to a lack of paper trail? OR, would it be to strong arm and intimidate enough voters in the conventional fashion so as to alter garner enough votes to actually change the election? If you chose the former, you may want to think that a paper trail, while flawed, offers a MUCH more secure system in which your vote can truly count. Allow me to go on. 1. Judge people by their actions. ANY person, group, or political party that attempts to circumvent a paper trail in voting should be instantly put under suspicion and questioned without hesitation, regardless of any idle arguments they may put out as their defense. The end result is the same, no paper trail can not be seen as a boon for a free election. 2. The voter MUST be able to see the paper print-out for there to be any faith or trust in the system. We will NEVER be able to prove that an electronic vote is the same as what the voter entered. It is the nature of electronics. There is no signature and a complete ease of manipulation. It is this ease of manipulation that would make most people uneasy about the system. But, with the paper ballots, there can be a recount to verify the results of the electronic system. (A quick system off the top of my head would be to have the printout appear in a transparent, plexi-glass case on the side of the machine. The voter can see the results, press a confirmation button on the screen and then move on into the final storage place. If you have a better solution, please include it in this thread!!) What’s the point you ask? Why bother with this fancy electronic who-dah if that’s the case? A good question my friend. One reason that quickly comes to mind. Instant results on election night are good for the system. Meanwhile, the paper recount can be done, quietly over the weeks to validate the results. Which brigns me to my next point… 3. A paper count is necessary to keep the electronic system honest. With this system in place, no political party would risk the tampering with the system knowing full well that a mandatory paper recount would reveal their misdeeds. Without this hand-recount of paper ballots, a political party could manipulate the results in any way or fashion without any fear of being uncovered. Think people would catch on to the fraud themselves without the paper ballots? Consider this scenario. Pick a deadlocked state. Switch the vote by a marginal amount to win the state. Would anyone question a 51% Dem, 49% Rep. result versus a 49% Dem., 51% Rep. result? Good luck polling the population to prove it. 4. My last point (and the reason I quoted the above message)… getting people to physically go out to the polls is a fundamental part of the system that I think should be kept. Making a system ‘too’ easy to use could be the difference of having 10% of uniformed voters vs. 30% of uninformed voters. I mean, why go stand in line for 3 hours to cast one joke/casual ballot when you could be out playing football/shopping at the mall with your friends? On the other hand, make it a couple of mouse clicks and you’ll see a larger skew in the results, which is fine for the Britney Spears polls on MTV’s website, but not for a persidential election. Thanks for reading through this, I’d love to hear any feedback. ---
**Author:** ![Ignatz](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/3be4f8/32.png) [@Ignatz](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ignatz)\ **Post date:** [February 13, 2005, 6:54pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/should-electronic-voting-machines-be-required-to-produce-a-printed-ballot-receipt/289398/28 "2005-02-13T18:54:52Z")
> [@Fear Itself](#): > > Next week, [Sen. Hillary Clinton will introduce legislation](http://www.friendsofhillary.com/home.php) to require electronic voting machines to produce an auditable paper receipt for use in recounts. This legislation has been introduced before, and it was blocked by Republicans. > > Why is this a partisan issue? Is it so hard to understand that guaranteeing free and honest elections is good for both parties? Can the Republicans not imagine a time in the future when they feel they are the victims of election fraud, and desire a meaningful recount? Why does this break down along party lines, unless one party enjoys a benefit by maintaining the _status quo_? Or is it just the ‘We Hate Hillary’ knee-jerk that causes conservatives to oppose anything she introduces? The state of NC just got a commissioner of agriculture (yes, they still elect them) after one of the contenders conceded. The paperless electronic machines in one county (Carteret) “lost” over 4,000 votes due to a memory overload. That was enough to decide the outcome so there was an immpasse. ---
**Author:** ![carnivorousplant](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/carnivorousplant/32/3563_2.png) [@carnivorousplant](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/carnivorousplant)\ **Post date:** [February 13, 2005, 7:07pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/should-electronic-voting-machines-be-required-to-produce-a-printed-ballot-receipt/289398/29 "2005-02-13T19:07:26Z")
We have a paper ballot marked with thick pens and machine tabulated. Seems a great solution to me. Not letting the lazy and uninformed vote is unfair. Next time it will ne the lazy, the uniformed and those damn Jews. ;j ---
**Author:** ![1010011010](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/1/ea666f/32.png) [@1010011010](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/1010011010)\ **Post date:** [February 13, 2005, 8:02pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/should-electronic-voting-machines-be-required-to-produce-a-printed-ballot-receipt/289398/30 "2005-02-13T20:02:37Z")
> [@Fear Itself](#): > > To prevent the problems we had in the 2000 election. Does “butterfly ballot” or “hanging chad” ring a bell? Having people put an X in a box next to a name on a piece of paper also prevents those problems. National standardization of ballot designs (and possibly voting equipment) would serve the exact same purpose… whether you chose to go the “electronic voting” path or not. Don’t get me wrong, touch-screen voting/e-ballot is a really good idea. You can do a lot of things with a virtual ballot to eliminate or reduce voter fatigue, top-voting, etc. but if for all it’s bells and whistles the systems is ultimately just a front-end for an interface between the voter and a paper ballot… count the paper ballots as the real votes. The electronic vote is an interim/unofficial result. As for the internet voting idea… There’s more to voting than just the presidential elections, folks. Where are the permanent poll locations are for voting on the mundane everyday stuff that gets put to the people for your jurisdiction? Does your area elect Animal Control Officers? Ever voted for one? What do you suppose the turnout for those is like? The candidate and his friends and family? I’m talking about increasing overall participation in government, not just in a single election every several years. Put it all in a central location and your uninformed voters can take a few minutes to read some linked material, or look up info themselves about the issue (they’re at an internet connected computer anyway, right?), and THEN vote. Also, improved voter turnout for other-than-big-issue questions will tend to encourage more things being put to the public, I’d think. If politicians are going to be slaves to polls and public opinion, we might as well formalize the relationship. ---
**Author:** ![Snag](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/94ad74/32.png) [@Snag](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Snag)\ **Post date:** [February 13, 2005, 9:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/should-electronic-voting-machines-be-required-to-produce-a-printed-ballot-receipt/289398/31 "2005-02-13T21:19:10Z")
I think a paper trail is useless and offers a false sense of security _unless_ you have automatic recounts and / or large enough statistical samplings made after every vote. That’s because I don’t care if the piece of paper I read matches what’s on the screen. After I press OK and submit my vote, since we’re dealing with software and electrons, what is there to prevent my choices being changed to something else by the time it’s counted by a few people at the end of the night? First of all we don’t have open architecture to verify the programming. We don’t have mil-spec firewalls guarding the machines or their modems. What is to prevent a piece of flash memory being turned on, running a subroutine during the course of an actual election, not a test, and then having that sub-routine vanish forever once the counting process begins? I’ve heard techs raise the possibilities of more subtle cheats beyond my understanding. Unless we verify the accuracy of enough machines to account for the proper outcome (is party A expected to win by 3% or 5 % or 20%?) and you check enough machines to account for expected results, you can’t be certain that the outcome is legitimate. Can anyone explain how to make a sure-fire statistical sampling regardless of the variance in vote totals? Thus, I ask why should we bother with electronic voting in the first place if we need to still count some paper? Without such a count, you can’t be sure of the real outcome. What’s the advantage? I’ve yet to be convinced of one, other than we can see the outcome sooner than counting by hand. Which brings me to another point. In an election if an outcome seems rather certain by the time late voters hit the polls, isn’t this a way to throw an election? Especially for late voters in national elections on the west coast who might not even arrive by the time eastern polls close. If it seems that their candidate is down (especially if an election can be more easily rigged or if projections are off) voters might decide to simply stay at home. Lastly, there were large discrepancies with some electronic scanning machines and exit polls. Exit polls have always been historically reliable, that’s why they are always used as a bellweather of election outcomes. Yet many of the voting results were flipped when optical scanning results where compared to exit the exit polls made at the same location in the last election. If Kerry receieve 55% and Bush 45% from the voters participating in exit polling in that precinct, Bush wound up with 55% and Kerry with 45%. Meanwhile while traditional voting methods remained consistant to thier exit polls. Even if such inconsistancies are sorted out the next day, it will already affect potential voters on election day. Thus, inaccurate polling compounded with possible additional fraud, compounted with ever earlier reported results could greatly influence voter turnout. I’d prefer no results given until all polls have closed. So what if it takes a day or two to tally the results? I’d rather see the system set up to count slowly, with double-checks in place while counting and releasing the results once everybody’s sure they are correct. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/should-electronic-voting-machines-be-required-to-produce-a-printed-ballot-receipt/289398.md?page=1)