Should we have nuked the Russians?

Great Debates
21

In addition to the moral questions (I’m putting that lightly) for the United States to wage a war of aggression using nuclear arms, I think the OP also significantly overestimating the influence of the Soviet Union on Communist governments during the Cold War.

For example, the Chinese Communist Party was successful in deposing the Nationalists not because of Russian support, but because peasants hated the grossly unfair political and economic system that existed prior to 1949. (Not to say that things got better after that, of course.) Further, once Stalin died in 1953, the two countries barely had anything in common, to say nothing of the fiction that China was a satellite of the USSR. Killing Stalin and millions of Russian civilians through a campaign of nuclear warfare wouldn’t have saved a single Chinese life in the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution.

I’m willing to concede that there is a chance that the Korean War wouldn’t have happened if Stalin had been otherwise occupied on his western flank… but then again, maybe the war would have started in 1945 instead of 1950.

I very much doubt that an attack on the Soviets would have prevented the Vietnam War, because it was that was essentially a war of independence, from which Ho and Giap drew greatly from Chinese ideology and advice in its earliest stages (and Russian arms, too – but since when did lack of good arms prevent a war from occuring?). And I am at a loss as to what the Khmer Rouge had to do with supporting a Soviet agenda.

Similar arguments can be made for the communism that sprung up in various African countries during their struggles for decolonization – it was not the Soviets that started those conflicts, but they sure as hell capitalized on the wars, as did the United States. To state but one example, the US probably has as much blood on its hands with respect to Angola as does the USSR.

I think the OP makes the same mistake that many right-wingers made during the Cold War, namely seeing Communism as a monolithic strategy directed from inside the Kremlin. Although I do not wish to underplay the influence of the Soviets, with the benefit of hindsight, it is not at all difficult to see that the Communist ‘bloc’ was a great deal more fractured than estimated by its contemporaries.

Lastly, if one is only concerned about body counts, we could have saved more lives during by acting in accordance with a truly selfless, humanitarian foreign policy for the last 60 years-- such as by intervening in the Rwandan genocide, to state but one example – than by warmongering in the aftermath of WW2.

All this being the case, I can’t see how the United States could possibly see an advantage to starting World War III.

22

First of all, I agree with the logic presented by the no nukes side in this thread, which is that if we had killed a million we might have prevented the rise of regimes that eventually killed ten of millions, but then again we might have enabled the rise of even more brutal regimes, and we also would have turned worldwide opinion against America permanently. You never know.

But there’s another consideration. After the war, much of the Eastern European population still lived in rural areas without electricity, telephones, running water, or much communication with the outside world. And in the cities, power plants, train stations, and other infrastructure had been all but wiped out by the war. So these countries were not ready to transition immediately to modern industrial states. If another tremendous war had promptly swept the region, there’s no telling what might have happened, but it probably wouldn’t have been anything good.

23

A country plunged in civil war as a result of your actions won’t be a secure logistic point and staging area.

Both the french and italian communist parties got around 30% of the votes in the elections following the war. In France, the government included communist ministers. So, first, you would have had to disband the government.
There was real concerns following the war that they could try to seize power, possibly by force, and “sleeping cells” have been organized to counter a possible communist insurgency. More generally, the “national union” government, and De Gaulle who was leading it was very concerned about the political stability of the country, and his main concern was to keep it united at all costs. Should I mention, by the way, that De Gaulle would have been utterly opposed to such an attack and was hugely popular on the other side of the political spectrum? I can’t think of a party which would have supported such a policy (except probably amongst the former suporters of Vichy) . It would have been to be forcefully imposed.

Communists were extremely popular for the part they had taken in the resistance. They were stalinists and totally faithful to Moscow. They were extremely well organized, armed and their networks had just spend the last four years fighting the germans. They would have been ready overnight to attack your “secure logistic points”. As soon as Stalin would have said “attack” they would have done so.

You’re demonizing the Soviet Union, but you seem to forget that it wasn’t perceived this way at all at this time. The russians had heroically fought the germans under Stalin’s leadership, and few people would know/pay attention to the worst about stalinism. They were allies. Even non-communists, for the most part, would probably have been outraged by an attack against a staunch and courageous ally.

I’m not sure how the way it would have happened would have made a difference, especially since you’re advocating the use of nuclear weapons, which probably wouldn’t have been perceived very kindly.

In 1945, the french army fielded 15 regular land divisions and included a total of 700 000 men, many being in training/organization, amongst them around 200 000 from the former resistance organizations, mainly the FFI and the communist FTP. I wouldn’t know how they were split, but assumiong 50/50, you get at least 100 000 armed and organized people who are going to ask “how high?” when Stalin will say “jump!”. I’m pretty certain than using France for logistic purposes, the US/UK would have had to commit troops to garrison it.
It seems to me quite obvious that the cold war wasn’t exactly the same situation than the nuking of people who were allied the day before. Besides, the situation was obviously much more volatile right at the the end of the war than some years later, when normal life would have resumed.

Germany also I envision more as a logistic and staging area, not a main combatant.

Thanks for the link…I didn’t know that. Who knows where I half remembered that from…post war bomb production wasn’t exactly my specialty. :slight_smile: Probably saw some fragement on the History Channel and just mis-remembered it. Ok, so we’d have the bombs. I’m still unsure why we would need to use them in a war against Russia. Again, if we were committed to war in Russia with the goal of driving them out of Eastern Europe (from your OP) then we could have accomplished that conventionally IMO…we didn’t NEED to use the bomb. We could even strike into Russia strategically/tactically using only conventional means, as we had air craft with sufficient range to bomb them wherever they were (unlike the Germans with no 4 engine heavy bombers). I don’t see how Russia could possibly have held on to Eastern Europe if we wanted to drive them out…and all that without using a nuke.

Invasion though…thats another kettle of fish. And again, I don’t see how nukes would necessarily help, unless you are willing to basically throw the major cities of Russia (and all their civilian populations) into the fire to achieve ‘victory’. If your intention was to defeat the Russians and basically lay waste to Russia pretty much for a long time, sure. But if it was to defeat russia and actually have something afterwards, then nukes wouldn’t be a good way to go. You would probably end up destroying most of Russia’s major cities before they even considered surrender.

-XT
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24

All good points, and I could be falling prey to the seductive concept of a “domino theory”. But was that theory entirely without merit? If no communist Russia, would there have been a communist China? If no, would there have been a communist Vietnam? And so on. That was my basic logic, and I’m sorry I didn’t make that clear. You point out that China broke away from the Soviets post Stalin. But how instrumental was the USSR in the foundation of Red China? I know from considerable study that the Viet Kong depended greatly on the Chinese, which was a terrible irony. I was taught Ho, who FDR utilized to rid Indochina of the Japanese, actually approached the Americans and asked for help with the problem of French Imperialism. Naturally, he was spurned, and the rest is history, as they say. This fits with your following statement…

I have no dispute with these sentiments except warmongering vis-a-vis the communist threat. Again, with the benefit of hindsight, would we have been warmongers if we had not waited until Pearl Harbor to enter the European theater in WWII? Would it not have been the right thing to do in light of the Holocaust? And was not Stalin’s regime one long Holocaust for many who fell within the Soviet empire?

Just a thought, not something I have an answer to myself.

25

Loopydude, yeah, that would have made us total heros, bringing democracy to Russia.

:rolleyes:

You ARE aware that communism came to power because people thought they’d overthrow the bloody tsarist regime and get some freedom! (Of course, the communists weren’t the ones who did it, but that’s a different story). WWI devastated the Russian economy. What would a nuclear attack have done? Besides render a great deal of Eastern Europe unlivable?

How do you KNOW you wouldn’t get something ten times worse? During WWI, the ultimate enemy were the nasty Huns and the German Kaiser. Of course, the Kaiser was a freaking joke compared to Hitler.
Look, I hate what communism did to Eastern Europe as much as anyone. But your plan doesn’t sound like a better alternative.

Good point, Ravenman. In fact, I’d say that made it even harder to defeat communism-overestimating the enemy is just as dangerous as underestimating him.

26

So you don’t see any difference between defending one’s own country against an intransigent invader, and launching a pre-emptive strike under the guise of saving the Russians from themselves? I don’t find the logic similar at all.

Hmmm…I wasn’t aware that I was excessively repeating myself. You’ve admonished me several times, though. Sorry if I bored you. :frowning:

I think others have explained it better than I can, and I don’t want to just repeat what they said, but I guess the main points would be:

  1. We couldn’t have known for a fact that we would have been successful.

  2. We couldn’t have known for a fact that whatever government eventually replaced the existing one, wouldn’t have been just as tyrannical, or more so.

  3. There is a general principle at work here, that committing atrocities in the name of a supposedly greater good is NEVER acceptable. When you think about it, it’s the exact mistake that Stalin made. Countries trying to extend their influence throughout the world through military might almost never results in a better way of life.

  4. We already set a very, very dangerous precedent by being the first and only country to use an atomic bomb. Using more atomic bombs would certainly have only made matters worse.

27

Please re-read my previous posts for comprehension…I’m one of the one’s NOT advocating the use of nuclear weapons.

Please try and follow along. I’m not talking about some kind of unilateral and unprovoked attack against the Soviets the second the Germans surrendered. The Soviets in the following years provided plenty of provocation as they tightened their grip on Eastern Europe. I’m theorizing that IF the other Allies had of taken a more agressive stance then there COULD have been a general war. I’m not saying this is a good or a bad thing…I’m saying it is a ‘what if’ thing. Get it? You seem to be trying your best to paint me into some kind of anti-Soviet warmonger here…I’m just playing the what if game.

Who’s demonizing the Soviets? I’m simply saying that when they started making their move in Eastern Europe people started to get a bit worried. Sure they were looked up to initially…but they pretty much destroyed a lot of that good will with their subsequent actions. Or maybe I’m wrong…maybe the people of Europe loved the Soviets and really just wanted the US to get the hell out all through the 50’s and 60’s. Is that correct?

Maybe you are right. Maybe simply using France as a logistics and staging group would have thrown the nation completely into revolt to toss out the hated Americans/British. You are saying that, reguardless of the provocation by the Soviets or the circumstances of a war that the French would have gone into revolt against the US/UK even though they were the ones that pretty much liberated France and they ALSO were held in generally high reguard? I don’t see it that way, but I’ll conceed I could very well be wrong.
Again, just to be clear here, I’m not saying I think the US/UK SHOULD have attacked the Soviets in the late 40’s early 50’s (either conventionally OR with nukes). I was simply saying that, IMO, the use of nuclear weapons against the Soviets wasn’t the only option, nor was it the best option. I seriously have doubts as to the effectiveness of their use from either a tactical or strategic perspective. They were good for simply killing a lot of civilians (at the time…and still are IMO)…something I doubt would have effected the Soviets ‘resolve’ very much with Stalin in charge.

I think that if it had of come to the fight, the US/UK COULD have pushed the Soviets out of Eastern Europe eventually (contrary to Dissonance fine link) because with hindsight we know those areas were ripe for revolt anyway (As happened in Poland, Hungary, etc)…the Soviets wouldn’t have just been fighting the allies, but the peoples of those regions as well. The allies would have had a much simpler logistics problem than the Soviets (barring your French general revolt of course), could have projected air superority at least locally over Eastern Europe, and could have (eventually) destroyed much of the Soviet Army on the group (in Eastern Europe anyway) the same way they did the Germans…through the use of tactical air strikes, destroying resupply columns, etc. The Soviets were very vulnerable to this because their army was at the end of a very long and slender logistics thread…one that was ripe for attacking if you could gain air superiority, which the Germans couldn’t do…but which the US/UK COULD have done, especially locally.

It would have been bloody, it would have been costly, and I doubt that either the US or the UK had the resolve to do it…but it WAS possible.

-XT

28

I overlooked that; yes, the dead are quite the same, is the survivors that don´t fare the same, a phosphor bomb doesn´t cause mutations and birth defects on the following generations, leuchemia, and all the other radiation related health problems that keep killing people for years after the original ka-boom.
Now returning to the OP, the preposition is failed, you assume that the lives lost on a third WW would had been less than the lives lost under the Soviet regime between 1945 and 1989. I don´t remember very well now, but I think the Russians lost 20.000.000 lives on WW2, and Germany didn´t have nukes, strategic bombing and or as much oomph! as the USA could have put in action in Operation Barbarossa II. How long could have taken to “pacify” the Russians?, how many lives would have been lost in that war? Thinking that Stalin and the Russians would have droped their guns after a nuclear attack is IMO naive in extreme, they would have fought, for years. The death toll at the end could have been, most probably, much greater.

29

Well, it would seem there is near-unanimous disagreement with any and all portions of my basic thesis (which, I must add in my defense, I support more for dialectical purposes than because I believe strongly one way or the other). There have been some interesting points made, and a kind of consensus formed in the opposition that I find curious, and would like to explore.

To best do so, I will try to synthesize my points and the opposing points as best I can, so I can later point out what I find interesting and worthy of further debate. If you all care to continue, feel free correct me if I’ve misrepresented you; but please forgive me if my broad summary contradicts some specific points raised by individuals above. I’m trying to sort out a general consensus.

To sum up so far, with some refinement given important points made during the discussion, my position has been this: In hindsight, ceding of all of Eastern Europe to Soviet influence after the end of WWII may have been a dire historical blunder, which was anticipated by some important figures at the time, most notably Winston Churchill. While turning on our erstwhile ally against the Axis powers would have seemed treacherous, and led to great loss of life on both sides, the nature of the conflict made collaboration with a butcher like Stalin rational only because Hitler was more boldly aggressive. Once Nazi Germany was defeated, we should not have felt obliged to leave the decimated nations of Eastern Europe to Soviet annexation. Stalinist Russia had already proven itself to be a regime of brutal repression, and had already brought about massive loss of innocent life within its borders (e.g. the Purges); this slaughter would continue apace after the war. Leaving all of Eastern Europe to Soviet puppetry almost immediately elevated Russia to the status of a superpower, diametrically opposed to the West. The Soviets could then project their power effectively to both directly and indirectly help foster the creation of a number of similarly repressive communist totalitarian states that, collectively, may well have perpetrated the loss of more innocent human life in half a century than all other previous conflicts combined.

At the end of WWII, the USA and England had the military might necessary to, at the least, drive the Soviets back out of Eastern Europe, thus robbing the Soviets of superpower influence. It may have even been possible to defeat the Soviets on their own soil and depose Stalin, though that should not have been the primary goal. Eventual Soviet capitulation and Allied victory would have been assured, because we possessed, for a brief time in history, a clear and overwhelming advantage: sole possession of nuclear weapons. The mere threat of such doomsday weapons may have been sufficient to achieve victory, and that of course would be preferable; but, in light of what proved to be the monstrous depredations of communist totalitarianism, limited use of such weapons would have been justified if it could have prevented the spread of Stalinism and Maoism. An expanded Marshall plan could have hence led to the establishment pro-Western democracies in Eastern Europe, increasing American security, as well as bringing just government and relative freedom to the region. Furthermore, a reduced Soviet Empire may have limited their influence in other regions, and helped avert, for example, some of the Cold War tragedies of East and Southeast Asia.

The rebuttal? Utter nonsense, all of it. Firstly, to suppose that viable and friendly democracies could have been established in the power vacuum left in Eastern Europe following Nazi occupation is hopelessly naive. While Western Europe had striven (with varying degrees of success) towards democracy for two centuries, and was largely modernized, Eastern Europe was relatively autocratic and underdeveloped. Rule in many parts of the region was no less tyrannous than what the Soviets had to offer; and Slavic fealty in much of Eastern Europe lends little credibility to the assumption that the inhabitants of the region would have welcomed Allied occupation over Soviet occupation, post the Nazi conquest. One might just as easily assume widespread resistance, both from local and Soviet forces, to Allied assault, and the region might have been plunged into massive conflict on the scale of WWII. The resulting loss of civilian life would negate any potential benefit that could be realized by reducing Soviet power.

Furthermore, the suggestion that this aggression against the Soviets be facilitated by the threat or use of our brief nuclear hegemony, beyond being patently immoral, is fundamentally flawed for two reasons: The loss of civilian life, both immediate, and from fallout, would again negate the original aim of the conflict; and it may still not have served as either an effective deterrent threat, nor a tool for certain victory, in practice. To suppose the use of nuclear weapons would have triggered rapid surrender and thus limited casualties is absurd: It might have further inflamed enemy hatred and rather escalated the conflict.

Finally, the supposed cause-and-effect relationship between the rise of Soviet power, and the subsequent rise of other oppressive communist dictatorships is fallacy. It is simply myth that a monolithic communist bloc orchestrated from Moscow ever existed. Each sovereign country where communism arose was different, with national interests sufficiently distinct that to presume all acted as Soviet puppets, and thus could have been neutralized somehow by limiting Soviet power, is ridiculous. These nations may have opted for some version of communist totalitarianism in the complete absence of Russia, for all we can know, or worse systems of government may have arisen instead.

Ultimately, using hindsight of the Cold War to justify a position of aggression against the Soviets in post-war Europe, especially if such aggression involved the use of nuclear weapons, would be fatuous and criminal. The Cold War may seem tame compared to what might have been left in the wake of Churchill’s proposed World War III, and the Bomb would make this doubly true. For all its problems, the Cold War was the better alternative. Better still would have been a true American policy of goodwill and selfless defense of human rights, versus our self-serving anti-communist imperialism in opposition to our Cold War rivals: Conflicts like Vietnam and Angola, where our culpability for the death of innocents equals or exceeds that of the communists, might have been averted in such a political climate; and hence a far better alternative to a nuclear war in the ‘40s was available to us all along.

Is this a fair summary, up to this point?

30

I think your summary is pretty accurate.

I should be clearer - there’s the issue of Stalinization of Eastern Europe, and then the “domino theory” of spreading communism in the Third World. The idea that the Soviets started trouble in the Thiird World should be dismissed. The Soviets helped along potential allies, but communism was attractive to many poor countries because it was a break with the colonial structure that made those countries poor. I’m being very general here, but I suggest that a domino theory should be closer associated with the Third World trying to break out of subservience to world powers (mostly Western ones) than it should with a Kremlin plot.

I meant “warmongering” to apply to the idea of starting an unprovoked war with the Soviets after WW2, not to the Cold War policy of containment that the US actually applied.

31

OK, I have a question now.

To begin, let’s review history: According to all testimonials of the decisionmakers of the day, the first atomic bombs were developed to use on the Germans, but VE day had come and gone before we ever got the chance. However, we were still fighting the Japanese. One could reasonably conclude that victory, with or without the Bomb was assured, but only after a protracted air and land assault of the Japanese homeland that might have claimed millions of lives. Hence, the decision was made to use the bombs to bring about a swift end to the conflict. After the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Emperor, Hirohito, addressed the entire Japanese people himself (an unheard of event in Japanese history), and announced Japan’s unconditional surrender. With that, the war was over.

Considering Japanese resolve, even in the face of likely defeat, Hirohito’s capitulation amply demonstrated the power of the Bomb to influence policy. We can debate the Japanese position in the absence of a nuclear attack (some argue the Russian threat motivated them, though Stalin declared war on Japan only after Hiroshima had been bombed, at which time the Japanese had not yet ceased hostilities), but the fact remains the Japanese had never lost a war against a foreign power on Japanese soil, so their sudden, swift surrender was without precedent.

Now say the allies had turned on Russia after the defeat of Germany and Japan: It has been argued above that the Soviets would not have been sufficiently deterred by the threat or use of nuclear weapons, despite the fact they would likely lose even a purely conventional war against the Allies given enough time; yet Japan, under those very conditions, surrendered after only two bombs. What makes the two so different? Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, from a military standpoint, relatively unimportant targets; the Japanese were not so much crippled militarily as fearful of complete destruction. So the Russians wouldn’t have been just as awestruck? They would rather have been hardened and inflamed, and hence the war would be escalated? How is this position justified?

32

The Japanese were surrounded and their supply lines almost completely cut, they couldn´t win, they knew it and when the bombs fell they saw that they could not even trench and hope to kill as many invation troops as possible and as fast as possible before they´d starve and run out of fuel and ammo under the siege.
On the other hand the Russians had a vast territory, and all the natural resources they could ever need for a prolonged war. Russia could not be put under siege as Japan was.

33

Ok. I misunderstood. I assumed you refered to an attack right at the end of the war. Of course, 10 years later, the situation would have been entirely different. Beside, I mixed up your post with the posts advocating the use of nuclear weapons. I apologize.

By the way, I wasn’t exactly refering to a general revolt in France, but to a high risk that several countries, including france (I expanded about this country for obvious reasons), would have fallen into civil wars led by the local communist parties had the allies attacked the USSR in 1945, like Greece historically did (plus, the soviet probably would have received a significant support in the countries they were occupying in central/eastern europe. It’s not like everybody wanted them out in 1945).

34

I think the strength of the Soviet position conventionally is being seriously underestimated. As Ale said the USSR was entirely self sufficient, and the useful targets for strategic bombing were located out of the range of bombers – most Soviet industry had been evacuated east of the Urals during the war. It was also an economic powerhouse in terms of military production; it had out-produced the US during the war in a number of categories, notably tanks and artillery. The Western Allies would be outnumbered on the order of 2-1 in land forces, and face a smaller inferiority in numbers of aircraft. The Soviet logistical situation was quite strong, they had become very efficient at repairing and replacing damaged and destroyed rail lines during their advances against the Germans, and had taken delivery of 435,000 2 ½ ton trucks through lend-lease during the war to bolster their indigenous production. Soviet forces regularly consumed prodigious amounts of artillery shells during the advance through Eastern Europe and Germany. The ability of the Western Allies to interdict Soviet supplies would be many times less than what they were able to accomplish against Germany. By the time of the advance through Western Europe, the Western Allies had achieved air supremacy – the Luftwaffe had been effectively destroyed through attrition of planes and pilots after 4 years of fighting off strategic bombing and lack of fuel, both for flight operations and training new pilots. Despite having a numerical inferiority, the air forces of the West would likely be able to attain a degree of air superiority, but it would be an uphill battle, and the Red Air Force would be able to attack western supplies lines as well. Russia wouldn’t be facing a fuel shortage for its pilots, unlike Germany did.

Even delivering an atomic bomb would be a bit problematic, as the US could not fly unescorted single B-29s to Soviet targets without having to worry about being shot down on the way as was done against Japan.

35

It might not have been different, but we can’t be sure. And the allies couldn’t have been, either. Perhaps Stalin, facing the threat of nuclear bombs falling on russian cities, would have surrendered. Or someone would have ousted him.

But actually I doubt it. It’s quite clear that Stalin was ruthless, and never appeared to be extremely worried about the loss of human lives. And apart out of concern for his own people, I can’t see why he would have accepted to surrender, since he had, personnaly, everything to loose. Since i’m quite skepikal with the “concern for his own people” part, I doubt he wouldn’t have chosen to fight to the bitter end.

I can’t see him being ousted, for instance in a coup, as a likely outcome, either, given how he had entrenched his power.

Besides, hat’s assuming he would have actually lost the war, or thought he would lose it, which wasn’t a given. It could have won, it could have ended in a stalemate, the allies government could have been replaced by other less warmongering during the next election and settled for peace, etc…
Now, I can see several differences between the situation concerning Japan and the Soviet Union :
-First, Stalin wasn’t the emperor Showa. I already covered this point.
-Second, japan was on the verge of defeat anyway, and was already seeking for peace terms, but just not ready to accept a surrender without conditions or the occupation of Japanese mainland. So, a couple bombs have been decisive. But the Soviet Union wasn’t in a similar situation by any stretch of the imagination. It was perfectly able to go on fighting for a long time, and had huge military ressources.
-Third and perhaps more importantly, the US/ UK were already at war with Japan. Nuking it couldn’t have made things worse for them. At worst, this intimidation would have failed, the war would have went on, and Japan would have to be conquered. It could only (from the allies point of view) have a positive outcome : Japan surrendering without the heavy death toll an actual invasion would have caused. It’s a bet which could only result in “win” or “no loss”. While in the USSR case, if the bet failed (the soviet don’t surrender at once), the allies would have been plunged in a bloody war in eastern europe, without certainty to win (read the cite from the UK general staff posted in the thread), and in any case with likely an enormous death tol for the allies (not even taking into account the russians).
-Finally, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, as you (I believe) stated, rather “minor” targets. I can’t see, once again, Stalin surrendering following the destruction of, say, Dnipropetrovs’k and Kazan. So, what next? You nuked two minor cities and, surprise, Stalin doesn’t surrender. Are you going to nuke right and left, until eventually, the soviet regime collapse? Are you going to destroy Minsk, Kiev, Leningrad, Moscow and wipe out their population to achieve your noble goal of liberating the russians (I mean the ones who happened to live in the countryside, since the others are now dead) from tyranny?

36

Ah, but after the defeat of Germany, we had some other things the Russians didn’t: Wernher von Braun, the V2 Rocket as well as jet engine technology. The first nukes were massively heavy, but our ability to refine plutonium (greatly reducing critical mass and increasing expolsive power per kilogram) shrunk them down rapidly. We also had some pretty advanced (for their day) bombers, that could perhaps have carried a big rocket closer to its destination, cruise-missile-style. The Germans were already getting pretty good at launching rockets from German soil and hitting targets in London and other parts of the UK. It’s reasonable to think by '46 or '47 we could have fitted these rockets with nuclear payloads, and perhaps increased their range (the V2 could travel about 230 miles) and versatility, if we focused hard on it. The rate of progress of the German missile and jet fighter program, even during the duress of WWII, was more than impressive, and one wonders what these engineers could have accomplished unburdened from Hitler’s mismanagement (I believe Hitler jailed, and wanted to execute, von Braun at one point because von Braun kept trying to work on space travel, and Hitler had to be strongly persuaded to keep him alive). I’m not sure important Russian targets were totally safe from bombardment while we were the sole possessers of the Bomb. Plus, with nukes, targeting doesn’t need to be all that accurate.

But I agree, the sheer size of the territory, and the ability to widely distribute important targets, are indeed a daunting issues, practical delivery methods (missiles, jet bombers?) or no. It is conceivable, I suppose, that we lacked the capability to damage enough of the Soviet infrastructure to subdue them at that time, with the number of bombs in our posession, assuming a reasonalbe success rate of targeting.

37

Dude, the Russians got their hands on those German toys too. Granted they weren´t quite as advanced techologically than the USA/UK, but I´d like to remind you about the Sputnik; the Russians made progress in [Dr. Evil quote]Rocket Science[/Dr. Evil quote] at least as fast as the USA. Ditto for jet propulsion (with a little help from the UK, truth be told)
In any case I doubt the WWIII arms race would had been too different from the Cold War one.

38

I don’t think Stalin would have surrendered…we’d have had to kill him to get rid of him.

Probably the best way to do that would be to obliterate Moscow, in a nuclear strike. However, as I remember, a B-29 would have to take off from Poland in order to reach Moscow with a nuclear payload. (To say nothing of providing escort fighters.)

And, of course, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Stalin would know that that’s what we’d have planned for him, if the rest of the allies suddenly declared war on him. I doubt he’d stay in Moscow.

Fighting our way into Russia would probably be gruesome, too. Though using chemical or biological weapons against Russian troops might help “even the odds” a bit. I don’t know if Russia would have been able to provide proper protection to all of them.

And you’d have to make one hell of a “hearts and minds” campaign to make the Russian people see the allies as anything other than just yet another conquering army from the west.

So, in the end, maybe you’d just have to weigh the number of people who suffered and died under the influence of Stalin and Soviet Communism, vs. the number of people who’d suffer and die during WW 2.5.

And you just know, given our luck, that even if we did invade Russia, kill Stalin, and overthrow communism in place of a proper democracy, we’d probably just end up with a 1st World, modern Russia today…which is antagonistic towards the west, because they’re bitter about us interfearing with their internal affairs, despite their actually being better off for it! :smack:

So we’d basically have another France, only covering 1/6th of the world’s surface, and with an industrial capacity rivaling the United States.

Hmmm…maybe we were better off leaving Russia to wither away. We didn’t really suffer for it, and now Russia doesn’t even pose much of a threat anymore.