The reason for that, to the extent true, is the same as in general, to bring attention to what the ‘renewed superpower’ Russia is doing wrt everything, since it’s once again a superpower don’t you know, for domestic Russian consumption.
Putin is rational and laser focused on Job 1 of dying in his own bed not a prison cell or up against a wall. Getting involved in NK would advance that goal how? It wouldn’t, so it’s not going to happen.
In terms of military history though, Russia launched an invasion of (Japanese occupied) northern Korea from its own territory in August 1945, along with the invasion of Japanese occupied Manchuria. But although both places were attacked and occupied with days, the Soviets found enough room for the Korea invasion to be launched initially from Soviet territory, mainly by sea in short range amphibious operations down the northern Korean coast.
This was a pretty good article. On NPR this morning, I heard an interview with Democratic Sen. Jeff Merkley of Oregon. Unfortunately there’s no transcript up, but you can listen to it here. Maybe I’m just paranoid and succumbing to despair, but it sounded to me like the tone of it was, “we’re about to start shooting.” The interviewer, Steve Inskeep, didn’t seem to press Merkley much on whether war with NK was a good idea or even necessary. Inskeep started the interview with (paraphrased), “NK has been a problem for a long time. What’s changed?” The answer was (again paraphrased) “We have a new president”. Then Inskeep quickly went on to ask questions about things like China’s view of any military action and the threat to Seoul, but it didn’t strike me as a very tough interview. It was almost like Inskeep and Merkley both seemed resigned to a coming conflict. Again, maybe I’m misreading it. At the end, Inskeep did ask Mekley if he trusted Trump to make the call on whether to attack. Merkely hemmed and hawed and said he trusted Trump’s advisors, especially Mattis.
There was another point in the interview where Inskeep asked something like, “The US could destroy NK entirely. Is the NK regime rational?” This disturbed me for a couple reasons. One, the question seems to buy into the narrative that the NK regime is nuts and we have to do something, even if it means they force our hand into blasting them. And, two, it assumes *our *leaders are rational. Trump certainly is not. I hope Mattis can be a moderating influence, and Mattis is by all accounts an excellent military leader. But, when the only tool you have is a hammer…
Bolding mine. I know it was a passing remark but your estimate is off by 3 orders of magnitude. The closest NK artillery batteries can reach Seoul (a city of 24 million) in 45 seconds. Most estimates are a million killed, and that’s only if the conflict remains conventional.
Anyone checked in with South Koreans to see if they think anything is going to happen? Or if it’s only people far away who think so? Though, admittedly in the case of the US, our government could take action that made something happen.
That sounds surprisingly accommodating. Half meant for us, half for NK, I imagine. They’re not going to stop us, so NK needs to stop playing around. We don’t need to put boots on the ground to mess up their world.
I am very curious if Russia and China are discussing anything though. I can’t imagine that interference would be well received at all. Yet another reason why people get a little worried about this whole thing. So many ways to get FUBAR.
I agree the estimates seem low. Especially if you factor the non-conventional, which is what I think most people are factoring in now. For whatever reason, and it could just be our regime change here, there is a lot of focus in NK on nukes right now. Did anyone see any of the films from the “celebrations” last week? There were images featuring ICBMs reaching San Fran.
It is in China’s interest for the US to get embrioled into a conflict with North Korea. It’ll create unrest, potentiallly alienating our crucial ally in the region if we push too hard, and if we’re steaming large elements of the Seventh Fleet into the region it gives their own naval ambitions the affirmation of necessary defensive posturing. They can publically decry North Korea while still providing enough support to keep the regime ensconced. The fledgling Chinese Navy can test itself against the US Navy and Japanse Maritime Self-Defense Force, probing for technological and tactical weaknesses and challenge it, and it also has the advantage of stretching the Seventh Fleet out north so that it has more freedom to operate in the disputed areas in the South China Sea.
The US getting into a conflict directly with North Korea is a losing game for us, and plays right into the hands of the PRC. It is a stupid, costly, and strategically ill-conceived adventure that will not achieve the ostensible goal of terminating North Korea’s nuclear program or forestalling their development of ballistic missile delivery systems. And if the Trump administration wants to start throwing around threats of strategic bombing or unilateral use of nuclear weapons, the US ends up looking like the aggressor, which will not endear us to everybody else in that part of the world.
I don’t think China is ready for the disruption of the maritime trade routes a war would inevitably bring. In ten years when their One Belt One Roadinitiative is up and running and they have built infrastructure and economic links in ostensible US Alliesfrom one end of Eurasia to the other, then yes.
They don’t want a war; they do want political conflict and a reason to legitimize their naval buildup and facilitate their expansive territorial claims. China aims to be the dominant power in Asia by damaging strategic alliances, and the hot point of North Korea serves as a touchstone to advance their agenda, e.g. “Look at the shit the Americans are stirring up halfway around the world.”
From an extremely vulgar, pragmatic US-centric view of things, I believe there is a valid argument to go to war. I don’t know if ‘valid’ is the best choice of words, but consider the following and suggest a better alternative. Of course it relies on a few assumptions/premises, but I think they’re pretty sound.
[ul]
[li]At this time, North Korea cannot reach the US mainland with a nuclear weapon. [/li][li]At this time, North Korea’s ability to strike the US mainland with conventional weapons is limited. [/li][li]At this time, North Korea’s ability to inflict substantial casualties is limited to neighboring countries and US military installations[/li][li]In any confrontation, North Korea will only be able to respond militarily for a short period of time. [/li][li]The devastating economic consequences of an open conflict with North Korea will be global [/li][li]It is likely that North Korea will eventually develop ICBMs that can reliably hit a US city (if they haven’t already)[/li][li]It is likely that North Korea will eventually develop the ability to reach the US mainland with a nuclear weapon[/li][/ul]
If the above are arguably correct, then going to war now likely means tremendous: (US military casualties) + (extreme civilian casualties in other countries) + (global economic costs) + (the horrors of war)
If the above are true (especially the last two), it means going to war later means tremendous: (US military casualties) + (extreme civilian casualties in the US) + (extreme civilian casualties in other countries) + (global economic costs) + (the horrors of war)
It is therefore rational to choose the former; it lets our allies take the brunt of the physical/civilian damage. It doesn’t even require putting allies in scare quotes — a hot war now or later will not increase or decrease the harm to them (assuming North Korea will continue manufacturing nuclear weapons and the amount he would use today on them remains constant).
This assumes, of course, that war is inevitable – that diplomatic options will contain North Korea for a while but it will likely either end in war anyway (or North Korea will export its nuclear knowledge/material to someone who will use it on the US).
It also assumes that once North Korea develops the ability to reach the US with nuclear weapons, it will immediately use that ability to affect negotiations.
I don’t think it’s far-fetched that this is a basic calculus in military minds (I won’t venture a guess as to what’s in Trumps).
For strategy, all they have to do is let Donald play the belligerent fool but avoid a first strike. One tantrum too many and North Korea is likely to attack first, giving political cover for posterity.
One thing about NK and nukes, we really have no reason to be afraid of them.
Even if they do manage to get the capability of getting a nuke or two over here, so what? It’s not optimal, but it’s not like a nuke or two will make our country collapse or end our way of life or anything. If they are targeted well enough to actually hit major population centers, it may be tragic, but it is in no way going to end us as a nation.
With russia, or even china, it’s a bit different, as they have an arsenal quite capable of causing pretty widespread damage, but north korea will just sign its death warrant by launching nukes at us, no matter how well they work or are targeted.
“Mr. President, I’m not saying we wouldn’t get our hair mussed. But I do say no more than ten to twenty million killed, tops. Uh, depending on the breaks.”
18 to 36 months is the consensus timeline for a NK ICBM capable of reaching western CONUS. NK has recently made leaps and bounds in modern composite manufacturing (i.e. carbon fiber) and may soon be able to produce lightweight, solid fueled, road-mobile TOPOL knockoffs capable of hitting Denver.
AIUI that is a highly exaggerated death toll. We’d be looking at, perhaps at most, half a million dead from a North Korean nuke, which even right now is still only at the Nagasaki-size stage. Not 10-20 million.
I do think that China publicly conceding that they will not interfere if we decide to destroy NK’s nuclear facilities is significant. When is the last time they have ever entertained any possibility of significant military action in their sphere of influence without significant posturing or outright “no entry” signs? The Korean War. Possibly the Vietnam War, depending on how you count sphere of influence.
The message may be an attempt to get Kim to start paying attention to how deep in the shit he is. Maybe their actual reaction would be different if a MOAB suddenly appeared (or smart bombs, or whatever), but the message itself is significant I think.
ETA: to be clear, I’d like China to solve this. I think they should solve this. I think if we were smart about it, we could ease that along. Will that happen? I am not holding my breath.
He was quoting an actor in Dr Strangelove, or how I learned to love the bomb. In that scene, the probablility of the death toll is probably lighter that what it would actually be.
That is part of the normal flght demonstration (Follow On Test & Evaluation or FTO&E) test program that launches 3-5 missiles a year to assess the operational reliability of the 40-something year old LGM-30G ‘Minuteman III’ fleet. This is not any kind of response to North Korea, nor is it a demonstration of new capability. The argument of hypocrisy that the US engages in routine missile tests while North Korea performing at test is considered provocative may have some merit, but the fact that the US has this capability has been a part of the status quo for decades, is subject to international inspections per treaty obligations, and (up until now, at least) has not threatened to unilaterally unleash it should be taken into account, while nobody has any real idea what Kim Jong-un would do with practical nuclear capability or how it is secured against accidential or malicious use.
With few exceptions, the Senators who left the secret briefing on NK said it was unhelpful, provided no new information, failed to clarify the administration’s policy, and failed to explain why NK is suddenly a crisis. Some Senators questioned why the meeting was held. Others said it was not clear that the discussion was even classified. Also, apparently Trump only showed up briefly and made an ass of himself.
To back this up, in a previous life I worked for a company that gathered radar data on these launches, and evaluated them as a ‘disinterested third party’ between the Air Force and the missile builders. Very routine.